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
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a journal for **new ideas** that enlighten the human  
spirit and mind about the conditions of human past,  
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*God is the Light of the heavens and the earth*  
• *Bog je svjetlo nebesa i zemlje* •

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*Illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar* je naučni časopis za afirmaciju novih ideja o vjeri, moralu, umjetnosti, naciji, društvu i državi, uz istodobnu afirmaciju tradicije (*tašdiq*) i inovaciju društvene i državne misli (*tadžīd*). *Illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar* poziva ulemu, učenjake, filozofe i druge autore s područja društvenih i humanističkih nauka da na kritičan način osvijetle i teške izazove suvremenog promišljanja religije, filozofije, etike, povijesti, umjetnosti, državotvornosti, društvenih i humanističkih nauka, a u kontekstu historijskih i suvremenih bosanskih, regionalnih i svjetskih dešavanja. Objavljuju se članci koji su utemeljeni ne samo na izvorima Božanske objave, već i na osobnom razumijevanju i iskustvu o Bogu, čovjeku i svijetu. Časopis je otvoren za objavljivanje prijevoda važnih radova i prikaze knjiga.



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## Uvodnik

### Poštovani čitatelji,

Nismo vas zaboravili. Ovo je peti broj našeg magazina *Illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar*. Kasnimo zbog nekih nepredviđenih tehničkih problema, koje smo, Bogu hvala, otklonili.

Uvjeren sam da vas nećemo razočarati priložima u ovom broju, jer vam nudimo kontinuitet duhovne, moralne i intelektualne misije našeg/vašeg magazina, a to su nove ideje, koje osvjetljavaju spoznaju ljudskoga duha i uma o uvjetima ljudskog života u prošlosti, sadašnjosti i budućnosti.

Akademik Akšamija nastavlja sa svojom originalnom i epohalnom analizom pojmova, sadržaja i oblika „islamske umjetnosti“ kroz inovativnu sintagmu *homo islamicusa*, sintagmu koja je prvi put upotrijebljena i objašnjena u našem magazinu.

U ovom petom nastavku akademik Akšamija analizira i raspravlja o „nekim dijelovima povijesti onog što se deklarira ili titulira kao *'islamska umjetnost'* u kritičnom okviru kako okcidentalno-vesterniziranih tako i nekih muslimānskih teorijskih pogleda“.

Osnovni cilj Akšamijinih komparacija ili sučeljavanja pojmova, sadržaja i oblika „islamske umjetnosti“ sa, uvjetno kazano, „zapadnom“ ili „europskom umjetnosti“ nije u dokazivanju supremacije jedne „umjetnosti“ nad drugom, već je cilj pokazati unikatnost i preciznost (*qadar/ṣinā'at*), „umjetničkog djelovanja“ i djelanja (*ṣinā'at*), koje nije usporedivo sa „zapadnom umjetnosti“ zato što u sebi krije hijeroumjetnički kod, koji zapadni um nije u stanju ni prepoznati ni iščitati.

U tom smislu, akademik Akšamija u ovom broju donosi nam svoje zapažanje o tome da se na Zapadu zanemaruje duh jedinstva i autorefleksivnost islamskih konstanti uz „nametanje umjetne dihotomije sakralnog i profanog, te paradigmatičkih pogleda na vrednovanje estetiziranog postignuća začetnika/dizajnera reprezentacije, odnosno *homo islamicusa*, kao apsolutnog zapadnjačkog vlasništva“.

## Editorial

Dear readers,

We have not forgotten you. This is the fifth issue of our magazine *illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar*. We were delayed due to certain unforeseen technical difficulties, which we have resolved, praise be to God.

It is my conviction that we shall not disappoint you with the articles of this issue as we offer the continuity of the spiritual, moral and intellectual mission of our/your magazine, with nothing less than new ideas which illuminate knowledge of the human spirit and mind about the conditions of human life in the past, present and future

Academician Akšamija continues with his original and epochal analysis of the concepts, content and form of „Islamic art” through the innovative phrase *homo islamicus*, a phrase that was first used and explained in our magazine.

In this fifth issue, academician Akšamija analyses and discusses „some parts of the history of what is declared or titled as „Islamic art” in the critical framework of both Occidental-Westernized and some Muslim theoretical views”.

The main objective of Akšamija’s comparisons or confronting of concepts, content and forms of „Islamic art” with, conditionally speaking, „Western” or „European art” is not to prove the supremacy of one „art” over the another, but the goal is to show uniqueness and precision (*qadar/šinā’at*), of „artistic undertaking”, undertaking (*šinā’at*), which is not comparable to „Western art” because it hides a hiero-artistic code, which the Western mind is neither able to recognize nor read.

In this sense, in this issue, academician Akšamija brings us his observation about the fact that the West neglects the spirit of unity and self-reflexivity of Islamic constants with „the imposition of an artificial dichotomy of the sacred and the profane, and paradigmatic views on the evaluation of the aestheticized achievement of the originator/designer of the representation, i.e. *homo islamicus*, as absolute Western ownership”.



Kao što je slučaj sa svim epohalnim idejama ne samo u „umjetnosti“, ali prije svega u „umjetnosti“, Akšamijine ideje o „islamskoj umjetnosti“, kao *qadar/šīnā'at* (precizno djelanje), te o nositelju i prenositelju te „umjetnosti“ *homo islamicusa*, ne moraju biti shvaćene ovdje i sada, ali će sigurno biti shvaćene jednoga dana na način da se neće promijeniti samo odnos prema „islamskoj umjetnosti“ kao takvoj, već će se promijeniti odnos i prema „umjetnosti“ uopće kako na Zapadu tako i na Istoku.

Naši čitatelji, bili svjesni toga ili ne, imaju privilegiju što im se pruža prilika da svjedoče jednu novu, originalnu i epohalnu viziju „umjetnosti“ kroz analizu svojevrsne „islamske umjetnosti“, koja „osvjetljava spoznaju ljudskog duha i uma“ o stanju ljudskog dodira s onim što je izvan ili iznad čovjekovog osjetilnog iskustva.

Moglo bi se, na neki način, reći da je naredni prilog u našem magazinu o razmatranju odnosa „prirodne vjere“ (*al-īmān*) i „formalne religije“ (*al-dīn*) na liniji odnosa *homo islamicusa* i *homo imanicausa*. U stvari, Akšamijin *homo islamicus* iznosi na vidjelo onu spoznaju ili onu „umjetničku vještinu“ *šīnā'at*, koju *homo imanicausa* ili *homo fidus* ima u sebi kao prirodni ili urođeni potencijal vjere. Taj prirodni ili urođeni potencijal vjere je zajednička rudimentarna vrijednost svakog čovjeka, ali svaki um čovjekov nije u stanju prodrijeti u dubinu svoga duha i duše kako bi iz nje izvukao samu srž prirodne vjere pa mu ostaje da prihvati formalnu religiju, odnosno teologiju, koja nije uvijek u punoj suglasnosti sa prirodnom vjerom, odnosno sa *homo imanicausom*. Zato je Akšamijin *homo islamicus* istodobno i *homo imanicausa* ili *homo fidus* u smislu da iznosi ono što je skriveno u njegovom duhu i duši, kao izraz svoje vjere – povjerenja (*trust*) prema Svevišnjem Bogu s Kojim on, *homo imanicausa*, ima poseban način komunikacije, koji nije formalno utegnut, već spoznajno otvoren prema najvišoj Istini (*al-Ḥaq*), a to je *dhātullah*, Božija bît, onako kako ju čovjek ima i nosi u sebi kao Božansko nadahnuće (*naḥkḥah*) od *qālu balā*, tj. od primordijalnog zavjeta o priznanju Božijeg stvaranja i gospodarenja svijetom i sudbinom čovjeka.

Islam je vjera i praksa ili moral i pravo. Te dvije vrijednosti čine bît i biće vjernika muslimana i zato su te dvije vrijednosti teorijski i praktično neodvojive. Stoga je razumljivo da je nakon razgovora o vjeri, treći prilog u ovom broju posvećen praksi, tj. pravu u islamu (*fiqh*).

Bosanski reisu-l-ulema Husein Kavazović ovdje nam predstavlja pravnu misao u islamu kroz „jednog od najplodonosnijih autora hanefijskog mezheba iz perioda rane osmanlijske vladavine“. Riječ je o Zaynuddīn bin Ibrāhīmu, poznatom kao Ibn Nudžaym (1520–1563), koji je kroz svoja originalna djela, ali i kroz svoje kritične komentare na izvorna pravna (*fikhaska*) djela, unaprijedio islamsku pravnu misao unutar hanefijske škole.

Na vrlo jasan i uvjerljiv način dr. Kavazović objašnjava Ibn Nudžaymovu pravnu metodologiju, koja traži od pravnika (*faqīha*) da, prije svega, razumije pravnu normu kako jezički tako i semantički prije nego se odluči za ovo ili ono pravno i moralno značenje date norme. Od više metoda u izvođenju pravnih (*fikhskih*) normi u islamu, dr. Kavazović je svoj rad posvetio Ibn Nudžaymovom razumijevanju prirodno-pravne ili vrijednosne metode u tumačenju islamskog prava (*fiqha*). Uvjeren sam da će naši čitatelji s radoznalošću i uživanjem čitati ovaj rad, gdje je prikazana raskoš i preciznost u procesu izvođenja pravnih normi u islamu na primjeru jednog od najvećih hanefijskih pravnika (*faqīha*) kao što je Zaynuddīn bin Ibrāhīm – Ibn Nudžaym.

As is the case with all epochal ideas not only in „art”, but above all in „art”, Akšamija’s ideas about „Islamic art”, as *qadar/šīnā’at* (precise forging) and about the bearer and transmitter of that „art”, *homo islamicus*, need not be understood here and now, but it will be understood some day in a manner that will change not only our approach to „Islamic art” as such, but also our relationship towards „art” in general in the West as well as in the East.

Our readers, aware or not, have the privilege to have the opportunity to witness a new, original and epochal vision of „art” through the analysis of a kind of „Islamic art”, which „illuminates the knowledge of the human spirit and mind” about the state of human contact with what is beyond or above human sensory experience.

It could be said, in a way, that the next article in our magazine is about considering the relationship of „natural faith” (*al-īmān*) and „formal religion” (*al-dīn*) in relation to *homo islamicus* and *homo imanicus*. In fact, Akšamija’s *homo islamicus* brings to light that knowledge or that „artistic skill” *šīnā’at*, that the *homo imanicus* or *homo fidus* has within himself as a natural or innate potential of faith. This natural or innate potential of faith is the common rudimentary value of every human being, but not every human mind is capable of penetrating into the depth of man’s spirit and soul in order to extract from him the very core of natural. So, he is left to accept formal religion, i.e. theology, which is not always in full agreement with natural faith, i.e. with the *homo imanicus*. This is why Akšamija’s *homo islamicus* is simultaneously also *homo imanicus* or *homo fidus* in the sense that he expresses what is hidden in his spirit and soul, as an expression of his faith – trust towards the Almighty God with whom he, *homo imanicus*, has a special way of communication, which is not formally weighted, but cognitively open towards the highest Truth (*al-Haq*), i.e., *dhātullah*, God’s being, in the manner man has it and carries it in himself as Divine inspiration (*naḥkhaḥ*) since *qālu balā*, i.e., from the primordial covenant on the recognition of God’s creation and mastery of the world and the destiny of man.

Islam is faith and practice or morality and law. Those two values make up the essence and being of the Muslim faithful, and that is why these two values are theoretically and practically inseparable. Therefore, it is understandable that after the discussion about faith, the third contribution in this issue is dedicated to practice, i.e., to the **law in Islam** (*fiqh*).

The Bosnian Grand Mufti Husein Kavazović here presents us with a **legal thought in Islam** through „one of the most prolific authors of the Hanafi Madhhab (school) from the period of the early Ottoman rule”. It is about Zaynuddīn bin Ibrāhīm, known as Ibn Nujaym (1520–1563), who, through his original works, but also through his critical comments on the referential legal (*fiqh*) works, advanced legal thought in Islam of the Hanafi school.

In a very clear and convincing way dr. Kavazović explains Ibn Nujaym’s legal methodology, which requires from the lawyers (*faqīh*) that, above all, they understand the legal norm both linguistically and semantically before deciding on this or that legal and moral meaning of the given norm. Of the several methods in deriving legal (*fiqh*) norms in Islam, dr. Kavazović dedicated his work to Ibn Nujaym’s understanding of the natural-law or the value method in the interpretation of Islamic law (*fiqh*). I am convinced that our readers will read this work with curiosity and enjoyment, where the luxury and precision in the process of deriving legal norms in Islam is shown on the example of one of the greatest Hanafi jurists (*faqīhs*) such as Zaynuddīn bin Ibrāhīmu – Ibn Nujaym.



Ništa nije slučajno, pa tako ni esej Muhameda Jusića nije slučajno posvećen problemu neznanja ili učmalosti (*al-džāhilijah*) kao glavnom razlogu za čovjekovo udaljavanje od prirodne vjere (*al-īmān*) i dobre prakse (*al-'amal al-ṣālih*) u postmodernim društvima. Svjestan da njegova namjera oko pojma *al-džāhilijah* može biti pogrešno shvaćena, Jusić jasno naglašava da ovdje nije riječ o pred-islamskom zamračenom umu (*džahl*), već da je riječ o postmodernom antiintelektualizmu, koji se ogleda u površnosti u tretiranju suvremenih pitanja, koja se tiču sudbine čovjeka na pojedinačnoj i kolektivnoj razini.

Ne sustežući se od objektivne kritike zapadnog antiintelektualizma, Jusićev fokus je ipak usmjeren uglavnom prema fenomenu antiintelektualizma (*al-džāhilijah*) u muslimanskim društvima. Ovdje je dovoljno izdvojiti sljedeću Jusićevu tvrdnju da naši čitatelji shvate važnost ovoga eseja: „Ta nova *džāhilijah* (kod muslimana) se ogleda u njihovoj hirovitosti, slijepoj *'aṣabiyyah* i isključivosti prema svemu drugačijem, novom i stranom. Ponovo je u dijelovima *ummata* trijumfirao tribalistički duh *džāhilijah* kojeg je islam bio oplemenio“.

Pretpostavljajući da bi se neki naši čitatelji mogli umoriti od prethodnog čitanja, pa im zato nudimo duhovni odmor na „Dobroj vodi“ kod Foče. Baš tako, Ahmet Hadrović nas je za ovaj broj počastio svojim prilogom o vodi i čovjeku kroz priču o „Dobroj vodi“ kod Foče.

Ako znamo da Svevišnji Allah u Časnom Kur'anu kaže: „Mi smo iz vode stvorili sve živo, pa zar oni ne vjeruju“ (*Kur'an*, 21:30), onda nam je jasno zašto je voda uvjet života i zašto postoji „Dobra voda“ kod Foče. O tome nam priča Hadrović na veoma pitak i sugestivan način da shvatimo značaj vode ne samo za svakog *insana*, već i za svekoliki život na planeti Zemlji. Uvjeren sam da ćete nakon čitanja ovog Hadrovićevog članka poželjeti da posjetite „Dobre vode“ kod Foče kako biste razgalili dušu i zasladili grlo.

Nakon domaće teme, Stefan Jakob Wimmer nas uvodi u jedno od najtežih svjetskih pitanja prošlog i sadašnjeg stoljeća, a to je pitanje Palestine. S pouzdanim znanjem i neskrivenim simpatijama prema slobodi i ljudskim pravima Palestinaca, ali i sa razumijevanjem izraelskih zahtjeva za sigurnost, Wimmer nedvosmisleno i hrabro postavlja tezu o tome *da neće biti sigurnosti za Izrael bez slobode za Palestince, ali, isto tako, neće biti ni slobode za Palestince bez sigurnosti za Izrael*.

Wimmer zna da Bosna nije Palestina, ali ne propušta priliku da nam skrene pažnju na to da Sarajevo liči na Jeruzalem, *al-Quds*. Mnogi kažu da je Sarajevo europski Jeruzalem što nas dodatno motivira da pratimo što se događa u i oko *al-Quds*a, posebno u i oko *Masđid al-Aqṣā*, jednom od triju svetih muslimanskih mjesta uz Mekku i Medinu.

U duhu predanog kozmopolite, Wimmer je uvjeren da postoji rješenje za Palestinu i Izrael u duhu principa općeljudskog i moralnog pristupa, a ne po liniji etničke i religijske podjele, koja liči na aparthejd. Ako igdje na svijetu, onda bi ibrahimovske/abrahamovske tradicije trebale pokazati u Jeruzalemu širinu svoga zavjetnog duha, naslijeđenog od Ibrahima, Musaa, Isaa i Muhammeda, a.s. Naravno, to jest moguće pod uvjetom da svi baštinici Ibrahimove/Abrahamove tradicije shvate nužnost suživota i tolerancije, tolerancije koja proizlazi iz uvjerenja da je Bog Svevišnji Stvoritelj nebesa i Zemlje, da je Bog Svevišnji Vlasnik i Vladar svih ljudi, te da je Bog Svevišnji konačni Sudac za ljudske nesporazume. U tom duhu treba čitati Wimmerov esej kao vodič za rješavanje višedecenijskog palestinsko-izraelskog konflikta, koji najviše i najduže opterećuje savjest svekolikog čovječanstva.

As nothing is by chance, so Muhamed Jusić's essay is not by chance dedicated to the problem of **ignorance** or **backwardness** (*al-jāhiliyyah*) as the main reason for man's departure from natural faith (*al-īmān*) and good practice (*al-'amal al-ṣāliḥ*) in postmodern societies. Aware that his intention around the term *al-jāhiliyyah* can be misunderstood, Jusić clearly emphasizes that this term is not about a pre-Islamic darkened mind (*jahl*), but that it is a question of postmodern anti-intellectualism, which is reflected in the superficiality in the treatment of contemporary issues, which concern the fate of man on an individual and collective level.

Not holding back from an objective critique of Western anti-intellectualism, Jusić's focus is nevertheless directed mainly towards the phenomenon of anti-intellectualism (*al-jāhiliyyah*) in Muslim societies. Here, it is enough to single out Jusić's following claim so that our readers understand the importance of this essay: „This new *jāhiliyyah* (in some Muslims) is reflected in their capriciousness, blind *'aṣabiyyah* and exclusivity towards everything different, new and foreign. Once again, the tribalist spirit triumphed in parts of the *ummah* over the *jāhiliyyah* that was cancelled by Islam“.

Assuming that some of our readers might get tired of the previous reading, we therefore offer them a spiritual rest on the „Dobra Voda“ (Good Water) near Foča. Just like that, Ahmet Hadrović honored us in this issue with his contribution.

If we know that Almighty Allah says in the Holy Qur'an: „We created from water all living things, so do they still not believe“ (*Qur'an*, 21:30), then it is clear to us why water is the essence of life and why there is „dobra voda“ (good water) near Foča. Hadrović tells us about this in a very interesting and suggestive way so that we understand the importance of water not only for every *insan* (human being), but also for all life on planet Earth. I am convinced that after reading this article by Hadrović, you will want to visit „Dobra voda“ near Foča to spoil your soul and sweeten your throat.

After this domestic topic, Stefan Jakov Wimmer introduces us to one of the most difficult world issues of the past and current century, which is the **issue of Palestine**. With reliable knowledge and undisguised sympathy for the freedom and human rights of the Palestinians, but also with an understanding of Israel's requirements for security, Wimmer unequivocally and boldly puts forward the thesis that *there will be no security for Israel without freedom for the Palestinians, but, likewise, there will be no freedom either for Palestinians without security for Israel*.

Wimmer knows that Bosnia is not Palestine, but he does not miss the opportunity to draw our attention to the fact that Sarajevo resembles Jerusalem, *al-Quds*. Many say that Sarajevo is the European Jerusalem, which further motivates us to follow what is happening in and around *al-Quds*, especially in and around the *Masjid al-Aqṣā*, one of the three holy Muslim places along with Mecca and Medina.

In the spirit of a devoted cosmopolitan, Wimmer is convinced that there is a solution for Palestine and Israel within the principle of universal, human and moral approaches, and not along the lines of ethnic and religious division, which resembles apartheid. If anywhere in the world, then the Ibrahim/Abrahamic traditions should show in Jerusalem the breadth of their covenant spirit, inherited from Ibrahim, Musa, Isa and Muhammed, s.a. Of course, this is possible on the condition that all the heirs of the Ibrahim/Abrahamic tradition understand the necessity of coexistence and tolerance, a tolerance that stems from the belief that God is the Creator of the Heavens and the Earth, that God is the Owner and Ruler of all people, and that God is the final Judge for human misunderstandings. It is in this spirit that Wimmer's essay should be read as a guide to solving the decades-long Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which burdens the conscience of all humanity the most and for the longest time.



Nakon tužne, ali i obećavajuće Wimmerove priče o Palestini i Izraelu, mladi i perspektivni bosanski politički analitičar Ismet Fatih Čančar otvara nam sive vidike u bosansku (i njenu hercegovačku) stvarnost i perspektivu u kontekstu ili usudu uznemiravajuće ruske invazije na Ukrajinu. Svjestan ratnih i poratnih okolnosti bosanske postdejtonske stvarnosti o etničkoj posesivnosti, koju podjednako protežira srpski Beograd i hrvatski Zagreb, Čančar ne posustaje u artikuliranju nove političke paradigme za Bosnu kao alternativu etno-nacionalnom ekskluzivitetu, kojeg je ustanovio nametnuti Dejtonski sporazum. U zanosu mladalačkog patriotskog bosanskog duha, Čančar razastire kao po bosanskom ćilimu uvjerljive i nepobitne argumente o tome da je bosanska država, sa proširenjem svojih duhovnih, kulturnih, intelektualnih i patriotskih kapaciteta, samoodrživa i sposobna da samostalno ispunjava sve svoje međunarodne obaveze. Čitajući Čančarov rad u našem magazinu, uvjeren sam da će čitatelj naći u sebi oduška u ovom bosanskom sivilu te da će, unatoč svemu, imati razlog za optimizam zato što se u njihovoj blizini rađaju i stasaju bosanski sinovi, poput Ismeta Fatiha Čančara, koji znaju, koji će znati braniti Bosnu svojim perima prije nego svojom krvlju, kao što je bilo dosada.

Na kraju ovoga broja Ahmed Alibašić je uradio prikaz knjige „Kritika čiste vjere“, kao poticaj čitateljima da na jedan nov i inspirativan način preispitaju čistoću svoje vjere u vremenu nečiste ljudske duše.

Sve u svemu, uvjeren sam da će nam naši čitatelji oprostiti kašnjenje jer im u ovom petom broju nudimo bogatu raznovrsnost novih ideja i poticaja za optimizam unatoč crnim oblacima, koji su se nadvili nad nama zbog rata u Europi, zbog ruske invazije na Ukrajinu.

Poštovani čitatelji,  
Naravno, dijelimo zabrinutost s vama, ali i nadu u Božiju milost i silu, koja će spriječiti lude glave da ne posežu za nuklearnim ratom, da se ne igraju sa sudbinom života na zemlji.

Do našeg susreta u šestom broju našeg magazina, ako Bog da, ostajte nam zdravo i raspoloženo.

Dr. Mustafa Cerić, glavni urednik

**illuminatio/svjetionik/almanar**

ČASOPIS O VJERI, MORALU, UMJETNOSTI, NACIJI, DRUŠTVU I DRŽAVI

After Wimmer's sad but also promising story about Palestine and Israel, the young and promising Bosnian political analyst Ismet Fatih Čančar opens grey visions into the Bosnian (and Herzegovinian) **reality and perspective in the context of the disturbing Russian invasion of Ukraine**. Aware of the war and post-war circumstances of Bosnia's post-Dayton reality of ethnic possessiveness, which is equally extended by Belgrade and Zagreb, Čančar does not falter in articulating a new political paradigm for Bosnia as an alternative to the ethno-national exclusivity imposed by the Dayton Agreement. In the ecstasy of the youthful patriotic spirit, Čančar spreads convincing and irrefutable arguments as if on a magic carpet ride that the Bosnian state – with the expansion of its spiritual, cultural, intellectual and patriotic capacities – is self-sustaining and capable of independently fulfilling all its international obligations. Reading Čančar's work in our magazine, I am convinced that the reader will find relief in this Bosnian greyness and that, despite everything, he/she will have reason for optimism because Bosnian sons are born and raised near them, like Ismet Fatih Čančar, who know now and who will know in future how to defend Bosnia with their feathers rather than with their blood, as was the case so far.

At the end of this issue, Ahmed Alibašić made a **review of the book „Critique of Pure Faith”**, by Mustafa Cerić, as an encouragement to readers to reexamine the purity of their faith in a new and inspiring manner in an era of impure human souls.

All in all, I am convinced that our readers will forgive us for the delay because in this fifth issue we offer them a rich variety of new ideas and incentives for optimism despite the dark clouds that have hung over us because of the war in Europe, because of the Russian invasion to Ukraine.

**Dear readers,**

Of course, we share the concern with you, but also the hope in God's grace and power, which will prevent crazy heads from reaching for nuclear war, from playing with the fate of life on Earth.

Until we meet in the sixth issue of our magazine, God willing, stay healthy and cheerful.

Dr. Mustafa Cerić, Editor-in-chief

**illuminatio/svjetionik/almanar**

NEW IDEAS ON FAITH, MORALITY, ART, NATION, SOCIETY AND STATE







ILUSTRACIJA - Uvodni medaljon - Sunašce.  
Nepoznati *homo islamicus*, Herat 1470.

ILLUSTRATION - Introductory medallion - Shams.  
Unknown *homo islamicus*, Herat 1470.





ILUSTRACIJA - Portret homo islamicusa odjevenog po safavidskoj modi skako čita knjigu, prva polovina 17. st.  
ILLUSTRATION - Portrait of a homo islamicus dressed in Safavid fashion reading a book, first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century.

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
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ILUSTRACIJA ~ Dvoje mladih koji nose turbane i odjeću s pojasom, pripisuje se šejku Muhammedu ili Sabzivaru, Perzija oko 1560.-70.  
ILLUSTRATION ~ Two youths wearing turbans and sashed robes, attributable to shaykh Muhammad or Sabzivar, Persia circa 1560-70.



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Mehmed A. AKŠAMIJA

**QADAR/ŞINĀ'AT** – karakterizacija nekih suštinskih okcidentalno-vesterniziranih pogleda na tradicionalni islamski kreativni izraz

**QADAR/ŞINĀ'AT** – characterization of some essential Occidental-westernized views on traditional Islamic creative expression



## Sažetak

Namjera ove analize je nastaviti već započetu raspravu (iz prethodnih brojeva) o nekim dijelovima povijesti onog što se deklarira ili titulira kao „islamska umjetnost“ u kritičnom okviru kako okcidentalno-vesterniziranih tako i nekih muslimānskih teorijskih pogleda. Analizom i postavljanjem granica u skladu s prevladavajućim autoritetima, pridonijet će se vitalnim modalitetima diskursâ *qadar/šīnā'ata*, koji su rezolutno *islāmskī* i u skladu s izvorištem (ar. *al-mardža'* ili *al-mašdar*). Posebno se želi skrenuti pažnja na zalaganje za različitost, upravo zbog okcidentalno-vesterniziranog akademskog nastojanja da se zanemari **duh jedinstva i autorefleksivnost islamskih konstanti** karakterističnih diskursâ *qadar/šīnā'ata* uz nametanje umjetne dihotomije sakralnog i profanog, te paradigmatičkih pogleda na vrednovanje estetiziranog postignuća začetnika/dizajnera reprezentacije, odnosno *homo islamicusa*, kao apsolutnog zapadnjačkog vlasništva (*western ownership*).

Na koncu mora se primjetiti da okcidentalno-vesterniziran način akademskog razmišljanja u ovoj oblasti, te bilo kojih drugih teorija koje djeluju unutar granica indeksnog poretka i taksonomije, uključujući i koncept današnje globalizacije, također predstavljaju systemske obrasce autoriteta, kontrole i vrednovanja, a time i isključenosti prema drugima.

Međutim, takva forma nametanja linearnog ili cikličkog načina tumačenja, se ipak suočava sa vrlo stvarnim izazovima svojstvenim pisanju globalne „historije umjetnosti“ i potpunim odsustvom razumijevanja drugih i drugačijih formi kreativnog izražavanja.

**Ključne riječi:** *islām, islamska civilizacija, islamska kultura, umjetnost, homo islamicus, qadar/šīnā'at, globalizacija kulture.*

## Abstract

The intention of this analysis is to continue the discussion (from the previous issues) of some parts of the history of what is declared or titled „Islamic art”, within the critical and theoretical framework of both Occidental-Western and (some) Muslim perspectives. The analysis and establishments of limits in line with the prevailing authorities will contribute to the vital modalities of *qadar/šīnāʿat* discourse which are resolutely *Islamic* and in line with their source (ar. *al-marjaʿ* or *al-mašdar*). Particular attention is drawn to advocating differences, due to Occidental-westernized academic efforts to ignore the *spirit of unity and the self-reflective Islamic constants* of *qadar/šīnāʿat* discourses and impose the artificial dichotomy of the sacral and profane, and due to paradigmatic views on the evaluation of the aestheticized achievement of the originator/designer of representation, (i.e. *homo islamicus*) as absolute *western ownership*.

Finally, it should be noted that the Occidental-westernized manner of academic thinking in this area, and of any other theories applied within the borders of index order and taxonomy, including the concept of current globalization, also represent systematic patterns of authority, control and evaluation, and thus exclusion of others.

However, such a form of imposing a linear or cyclic way of interpretation still faces very real challenges typical of writing a global “history of art” and the complete absence of understanding other and different forms of creative expression.

**Key words:** *islām, Islamic civilization, Islamic culture, art, homo islamicus, qadar/šīnāʿat, globalization of culture.*

## QADAR/ŠINĀ'AT – karakterizacija nekih suštinskih okcidentalno-vesterniziranih pogleda na tradicionalni islamski kreativni izraz

Ukoliko se dodatno osvrnemo na okcidentalno-vesternizirana akademska kazivanja i nastojanja, čini se da je u jednom momentu sve činjeno kako bi u potpunosti zaživjela kodifikacija „novog duha“ (njem. *Geist*) i „nova okcidentalna suština islamskog kreativnog izraza“. Nažalost, skoro sve što je činjeno bilo je usredotočeno na zanemarivanje, odnosno nepoštivanje duhovne inicijacije začetnika/dizajnera,<sup>1</sup> to jest na nerespektiranje *qadar/šīnā'ata*<sup>2</sup> kao mogućeg oblika diskursâ djelanja upravo karakterističnog za estetizirano djelanje/*šīnā'at*<sup>3</sup> *homo islamicusa*. \*\*

Suzanne Marchand (rođ. 1961.), američka intelektualka i povjesničarka kulture moderne Evrope jasno je pokazala u svom članku o popularizaciji Oriјenta (u značenju sintetičkog pojma 'istočnog islamskog svijeta') u okviru njemačkih intelektualnih konteksta s kraja 19-og i početka 20-og stoljeća, da je postojala snažna želja za nadziranjem ogromnog broja artefakata prilikom sortiranja i karakterizacije novih arheoloških dragulja koji potječu iz islamskog svijeta. Naime, riječ je o nečemu što akademska zajednica iz čvrsto branjenih okcidentalnih uvjerenja unutar

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<sup>1</sup> Termin *začetnik/dizajner* estetizirane reprezentacije koristimo za one osobe koje se bave kreativnom estetizacijom i ujedno su iskreni sljedbenici islamskog puta, odnosno sljedbenici Kible (ar. *ahl al-qiblah*). To su osobe koje su sposobne kontrolirati vlastitu sudbinu i životnu sredinu kao rezultat korištenja određenih alata na osnovu osobnih spoznaja (ar. *al-ma'rifah*) i uvjerenja (ar. *al-i'tiqād*) na realitetu koherentnog vjerovanja (*cohaerentia religare*), ugrađujući ih u instituciju jedinstvene povijesti (*historiae autonoma*). Narav takvog pregalaštva odgovara biti stvari, tj. svaki *homo islamicus* – *začetnik/dizajner* u svojoj angažiranosti sledi onaj put, što mu ga propisuje njegova bit. U skladu s tim živi i djela u cjelovitoj harmoniji s načinom života, ponašanjem i idealom koji je Poslanik Muhammed (ar. *Muhammad*) stavio pred njega, nastojeći da poštuje i izvršava uputu za vlastiti i društveni život umme (ar. *al-ummāh*).

O definiranju i korištenju termina *homo islamicus* – *islamski čovjek*, odnosno *začetnik/dizajner*, vidjeti Akšamija, A. Mehmed: *Analiza korištenja terminoloških odrednica 'umjetnost islama' i 'islamska umjetnost'*. Časopis *Illuminatio-Svjetionik-Almanar*, svezak 1, №. I, Sarajevo, proljeće 2020., str. 62, fus. 8 i 68, 70, fus. 15, 16, 17 i 18.

<sup>2</sup> Šire obrazloženje i korištenje termina *qadar/šīnā'at*, vidjeti *Ibid.*, str. 38-101.

<sup>3</sup> *Djelanje* – prez. -*ām*, pril. sad. -*ajūci* za razliku od *djelovanja*, odnosno *djelovati*, dakle podrazumijeva određenu čovjekovu spontanu svjesnu angažiranost koja je u potpunosti postala svjesna sebe nasuprot nečega što je činjeno u zbilji zbog potrebe činjenja, odnosno ostvaren određen karakter i učinak predviđene vrste rada. Djelanja (ar. *šīnā'at*) nema bez svijesti o pregalaštvu i *qadara* koje začetnik/dizajner estetizirane reprezentacije smatra i realnim u skladu sa širinom i dubinom svoje pronicljivosti u Suverenost Svevišnjeg.

\*\* **Crvenom bojom** su označeni izrazi, pojmovi i riječi koje predstavljaju transliteraciju arapskih pojmova prema metodologiji IJMES-a u bosanski jezik i dati su u kurzivnoj varijanti korištene tipografije (*italic*).

**Plavom bojom** su označeni izrazi, pojmovi i riječi koje predstavljaju transliterane izraze iz perzijskog, osmansko-turskog i novo-turskog jezika. Pored označenosti bojom svi korišteni izrazi su dati u kurzivnoj varijanti korištene tipografije (*italic*).

Drugim tonalitetom **plave boje** su označene adrese izvora na internetu.

## QADAR/ŠINĀ'AT – characterization of some essential Occidental-westernized views on traditional Islamic creative expression

If we take an additional look at Occidental-westernized academic narratives and endeavors, it seems that at one moment everything was done for the codification of the „new spirit” (Ger. *Geist*) and the „new Occidental essence of Islamic creative expression” to become reality. Unfortunately, almost everything that was done focused on ignoring, or disrespecting, the spiritual initiation of the originator/designer<sup>1</sup>, i.e. disrespecting *qadar/šinā'at*<sup>2</sup> as a possible form of the action discourse characteristic of *homo islamicus*'s aesthetic actions/*šinā'at*<sup>3</sup>. \*\*

Suzanne Marchand (b. 1961), U.S. intellectual and historian of the culture of modern Europe, in her paper on the popularization of the *Orient* (in the meaning of the synthetic concept of the '*Eastern Islamic world*') in German intellectual contexts of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, clearly showed that there was a strong desire for supervising the organization and characterization of the huge number of artifacts when of new archeological artifacts originating from the Islamic world. Indeed, it is something that the academic community of the time could not accept as an expression of *homo islamicus*'s

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<sup>1</sup> The term *originator/designer* of aestheticized representation is here used for persons who are involved in creative aestheticization and are at the same time sincere followers of the Islamic road, i.e. followers of *Qiblah* (Ar. *ahl al-qiblah*). They are persons who are able to control their own destiny and life environment as a result of using certain tools based on their own insights (Ar. *al-ma'rifah*) and beliefs (Ar. *al-i'tiqād*) in the reality of coherent faith (*cohaerentia religare*), fitting them in the institution of a unique history (*historiae autonoma*). The nature of such zeal corresponds to the essence of things, i.e. each *homo islamicus* – *originator/designer*, in his engagement, follows the road prescribed by his essence. In line with this, he lives and works in full harmony with the way of life, behavior and ideal that Prophet Muhammad laid before him, striving to respect and carry out instructions for his own life and the life of his people (Ar. *al-ummāh*).

For the definition and use of the term *homo islamicus*, that is, the *originator/designer* see: Akšamija, A. Mehmed: *An analysis of the use of terminological determinants 'Art of Islam' and 'Islamic Art'*. *Illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar*, Al-Wasatiyya Center for Dialogue, Sarajevo, Spring 2020., Volume 1, No. 1, p. 63, fn. 8 and pp. 69, 71, fns. 15, 16, 17 and 18.

<sup>2</sup> For the reasons and use of the term *qadar/šinā'at*, see *Ibid.*, pp. 39-102.

<sup>3</sup> *Actions*, i.e. *act*, as opposed to *doing*, i.e. *do*, implies man's certain spontaneous conscious engagement that has become fully self-aware as opposed to something which was done in reality due to the need to be active, i.e. it is the achievement of the particular character and effect of an anticipated kind of work. There is no action (Ar. *šinā'at*) without the awareness of zeal and *qadar* that the originator/designer of aestheticized representation also considers real in line with the breadth and depth of his insight into the Sovereignty of the Almighty.

\*\* Expressions are marked in red, concepts and words transliterated from Arabic terms according to IJMES methodology to English; they are written in the *italic* of the used font.

Expressions are marked in blue, concepts and words that are transliterated expressions from Persian, Ottoman-Turkish and New-Turkish. In addition, all the expressions used are written in *italic* of the font used.

A shade of blue signifies web addresses of sources.



dane oblasti, u tom vremenu nije mogla prihvatiti kao izraz svjesnog estetiziranog djelanja/ *šinā'ata homo islamicusa*. Iz tog razloga, dio analiziranog islamskog svijeta je ili populariziran ili shvaćen na, kako to navodi Suzanne, ...'pojednostavljen način' na koji je jedna koherentna vena interpretacije ipak dana cjelini „novog duha“.<sup>4</sup>

Zapravo, potrebno je kazati kako je upotreba njemačke riječi *Geist* prethodno poslužila u evropskim raspravama o očuvanju romantičarskog duha u doba masovne proizvodnje. Visoka evropska kultura nesumnjivo je imala ambiciju ponuditi se kao „paket“ *moralnog uvjerenja*, u čemu je ipak bilo skriveno i *ideološko oruđe*, nasuprot nastojanju da se dokaže suprotno.

U ovoj složenoj matrici, islamski estetizirani izrazi su tako definirani kao „polje“ i dobili svoj *vlastiti okcidentalni Geist*, kako bi se, ipak, bar prividno podržala moguća monolitnost, bez uvažavanja jedinstvene islamske kulturne vrijednosti bazirane na dimenziji *tevhída* (ar. *al-tawhīd*), odnosno autorefleksivnih islamskih konstanti (ar. *al-thawābit al-islāmiyyah*). Ovakav stav i odnos doprinijeli su formuliranju navodnog *obuhvatnog pojma* koji legitimira nazivlje „islamska umjetnost“ – ukorijenjeno u tradicionalne okcidentalno-eurocentrične obrasce mišljenja koji se tiču „drugog“ ali, nažalost i „nas“. Čini se da ova dijalektika iskonstruiranog, ali i neutemeljenog monolitnog kreativnog izraza *homo islamicusa* daje, dakle, jasnu razliku između onoga što okcidentalno-eurocentrična perspektiva naziva *progresivnim* i *racionalno-sekularnim*, te *regresivnim svijetom* koji je još uvijek u mogućim povojima viđenog islamskog estetiziranog djelanja – *šinā'ata*. Bjelodano je da ova teza nastoji brzo i snažno izbaciti esencijalističko nazivlje poput leksema 'islām' iz vlastitog akademskog vokabulara, i kao rezultat toga, neprestano biti u potrazi za 'suptilnijim', ali udaljenijim i ne prihvatljivijim terminološkim diferenciranjem. Pa ipak, kao što primjećuje Shalem prisutna akademska anksioznost doprinijela je do „fraktalizacije jedinstvenog islamskog pōlja“ u svijet potkategorije pōljā.<sup>5</sup>

Naime, izraženi aspekt novije fraktalizacije moguće je bilo uočiti poslije 2000-te godine sa početkom porasta broja publikacija o modernim, suvremenim i tradicionalnim problemima u „islamskoj umjetnosti“, ali sa značajno manjim brojem akademskih povijesnih pozicija koje osiguravaju skromni, moderni nezapadni ali i muslimānski stavovi, pogledi i putevi, nasuprot permanentno aktivnih – okcidentalno-vesterniziranih. Razdvajanje predmodernog od okcidentalno-vesternizirano modernog utemeljeno je na pretpostavci da prijelaz na forme nadahnute zapadnjačkim uzorima signaliziraju šire usvajanje postojećih zapadnih

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<sup>4</sup> Marchand, Suzanne: *Popularizing the Orient in Fin de Siècle Germany*. *Intellectual History Review*, svezak 17, br. 2, Taylor & Francis, Oxford, 2002., str. 175-200.

<sup>5</sup> Vidjeti Shalem, Avinoam: *What do we Mean When We Say 'Islamic Art'? A Plea for a Critical Rewriting of the History of the Arts of Islam*. *Journal of Art Historiography*, Barber Institute of Fine Arts, University of Birmingham, no 6 (6-AS/1), Birmingham, June 2012., str. 13 i fus. 45;

Vidjeti i, Rabbat, Nasser: *What's in a Name*. *Artforum* – International Magazine, Soho Press, New York City, January 2012; Lewis, J. Michael: *Islam by Any Other Name*. *New Criterion* – Literary magazine, Foundation for Cultural Review, New York, decembar 2011; Häntzschel, Jörg: *Nicht jede Glaskaraffe hat religiöse Bedeutung : Umbenannt, umgebaut : Die 'islamische' Kunst im Metropolitan Museum in New York in völlig neuer Präsentation*. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Monday 21 November 2011., str. 12.

conscious aestheticized actions/*ṣinā'at*, due to the strongly advocated Occidental beliefs within the given area. For this reason, part of the analyzed Islamic world is either popularized or understood, according to Suzanne, in ... 'a *simplified way*' in which a coherent vein of interpretation was still given to the entirety of the „new spirit”.<sup>4</sup>

Indeed, it should be noted that the use of the German word *Geist* had previously been useful in European discussions on maintaining the Romanticist spirit at the time of mass production. High European culture doubtlessly had the ambition to offer itself as a „package” of **moral conviction**, which still also concealed the **ideological tool**, despite attempts to prove otherwise.

In this complex matrix, Islamic aestheticized expressions were therefore defined as a „field“ and were assigned *their own Occidental Geist*, to at least seemingly imitate a possible **monolithic character**, without respecting the unique Islamic cultural value based on the dimension of *Tawhid* (Ar. *al-tawḥīd*), i.e. self-reflective Islamic constants (Ar. *al-thawābit al-islāmiyyah*). Such a view and attitude contributed to the formulation of an allegedly *encompassing concept* which legitimizes the term „Islamic art” – rooted in the traditional Occidental-Eurocentric patterns of thought concerning both „the Other” and, unfortunately, „Us” as well. It seems that this dialectic of the constructed, though unfounded monolithic creative expression by *homo islamicus* thus provides a clear distinction between what an Occidental-Eurocentric perspective termed as *progressive* and *rational-secular*, and the *regressive world*, which is still in the possible infancy of the observed Islamic aestheticized actions – *ṣinā'at*. It is evident that this thesis attempts to rapidly and powerfully discard essentialist terms such as the lexeme 'Islam' from its own academic jargon and, as a result, constantly search for a 'more subtle', though more distant and less acceptable terminological difference. Still, as Shalem observes, the present *academic anxiety* contributed to the „fractalizing of the unified Islamic field” into a world of subfields.<sup>5</sup>

Indeed, a prominent aspect of more recent fractalizing could be observed after 2000, with an increasing number of publications on modern, contemporary and traditional issues in „Islamic art”, though with a significantly smaller number of academic historical positions that are ensured by modest modern non-Western as well as Muslim attitudes, views and paths, against the permanently active – the Occidental-westernized ones. The separation of the postmodern from the Occidental-westernized modern is based

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<sup>4</sup> Marchand, Suzanne: *Popularizing the Orient in Fin de Siècle Germany*. *Intellectual History Review*, volume 17, no. 2, Taylor & Francis, Oxford, 2002, pp. 175-200.

<sup>5</sup> See Shalem, Avinoam: *What do we Mean When We Say 'Islamic Art'? A Plea for a Critical Rewriting of the History of the Arts of Islam*. *Journal of Art Historiography*, Barber Institute of Fine Arts, University of Birmingham, no 6 (6-AS/1), Birmingham, June 2012, p. 13 and footnote 45;

See also, Rabbat, Nasser: *What's in a Name*. *Artforum* – International Magazine, Soho Press, New York City, January 2012; Lewis, J. Michael: *Islam by Any Other Name*. *New Criterion* – Literary magazine, Foundation for Cultural Review, New York, December 2011; Häntzschel, Jörg: *Nicht jede Glaskaraffe hat religiöse Bedeutung: Umbenannt, umgebaut : Die 'islamische' Kunst im Metropolitan Museum in New York in völlig neuer Präsentation*. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Monday 21 November 2011, p. 12.



ILUSTRACIJA - Publikacije sa modernim, suvremenim i tradicionalnim problemima u „islamskoj umjetnosti“ – primjeri permanentno aktivnih okcidentalno-vesterniziranih stavova, pogleda i puteva.

kulturnih normi, povezujući stoga ‘umjetnost zapadnog stila’ s trijumfalnom sekularnom modernizacijom. Međutim, kako pojedini autori nastavljaju inicirati diskusiju o višestrukim i često sukobljenim odnosima između one, kako je na Zapadu nazivaju *elitne* i *popularne* kulture, vjerskog i svjetovnog izražavanja i razgraničenja tradicije (ar. *al-sunnah*) i baštine (ar. *al-turāth*), tako postaje sve očiglednije da se unutar kulturne produkcije, uključujući i produkte *qadar/šīnā’ata* rekognitivne<sup>6</sup> i kognitivne<sup>7</sup> unutaranje asimilacije *homo islamicusa*, javlja latentna potreba o promatranjima u terminima interkulturnih pregovora, transponiranja karakterističnog nazivlja, prilagođavanja i moguće reinterpretacije, ali ne samo kao sredstva hegemonijske dominacije. Međutim, dualna suočenost s raširenim generalizacijama o islāmu, koja islām, s jedne strane navodno *ograničava* na porijeklo i pravovjerje, a s druge nastoji izbrisati religijsku esencijalizaciju i ekskluzivizam implicitne riječi ‘*islāmski*’, upravo je doprinosila daljnjem ostvarivanju novih formi kontradiktornih stavova. Ono što na Zapadu predstavlja „islamska historija umjetnosti“ moglo bi biti upotrijebljeno kao razumijevanje za raznoliko viđenje *islāmskih subjektivnosti* izraženih u modernim islāmskim društvima, te da ujedno uključi raspravu o unutarnjim i međusobno referentnim diskursima neraskidivih vjerskih i kulturnih značenja, poštujući i, pak, nezanemarujući ono vjersko (ar. *al-dīni*). Uvjereni smo da porad razdvajanja kulture (ar. *al-thaqāfah*) i neizostavno prisutne tradicije vjerovanja (ar. *al-sunnah*) u razmatranju „islamske umjetnosti“, javna akademska sučeljavanja bi mogla imati potencijal *otvaraju vrata* za razumijevanje islāma. Time bi bile ostvarive suštinske konceptualne podloge kroz koje se može razumjeti višestruka subjektivnost definiranog i funkcionirajućeg muslimānskog svijeta, kako prošlog tako i aktualnog, kao i koncepcije prisutne unutar konzervativnog, tradicionalnog i modernog likovnog izraza.

<sup>6</sup> Inače pod terminom *rekognitivno* podrazumijevamo mentalne procese u funkciji prepoznavanja pojava i formi, a koje su u iskustvenom i reproduktivnom smislu vezane sa produktivno-refleksivnu karakterizaciju asimilacijskog karaktera začetnika/dizajnera reprezentacije; mogu biti jednostavne i složene a uključuju i ilustriranje, argumentiranje, istraživanje i objašnjavanje.

Šire vidjeti Akšamija, A. Mehmed: *Analiza korištenja terminoloških odrednica* ..., str. 62-64.

<sup>7</sup> Pod terminom *kognitivan* podrazumijevamo sve psihičke procese koji se nalaze u osnovi ponašanja *homo islamicusa*, a koji su u vezi sa produktivno-refleksivnom reprezentacijom kolaborativne orijentacije ili dispozicije – vid informativne inicijacije (suradnje) radi postizanja određenog sadržajnog cilja *qadar/šīnā’ata*.

Šire vidjeti *Ibid.*



ILLUSTRATION ~ Publications with modern, contemporary and traditional problems in "Islamic art" - examples of permanently active Occidental-Westernized attitudes, views and ways.

on the assumption that the transition to forms inspired by Western models signalize a broader adoption of the existing Western cultural norms, thus associating 'Western-style art' with the triumphant secular modernization. However, as some authors continue to initiate discussion of the multiple and often conflicting relations between, as called in the West, *elite* and *popular* culture, religious and secular expression and the demarcation of tradition (Ar. *al-sunnah*) and heritage (Ar. *al-turāth*), it becomes increasingly obvious that within cultural production, including products of *homo islamicus*'s *qadar/šīnā'at* recognitive<sup>6</sup> and cognitive<sup>7</sup> inner assimilation, a latent need arises to observe them in terms of intercultural negotiation, translation of characteristic terms, and adjustment and possible reinterpretation, but not only as a means of hegemonic domination. However, the dual encounter with widespread generalizations about Islam which, on the one hand, *limit* Islam to origin and orthodoxy and, on the other, attempt to erase the religious essentialization and exclusivity of the implicit word 'Islamic' contributed to the further creation of new forms of opposing views. What „Islamic history of art” means for the West could be used as an understanding of diverse views on *Islamic subjectivities* expressed in modern Islamic societies, and at the same time it could include a discussion of inner and mutually referent discourse of unbreakable religious and cultural meanings, respecting and not ignoring the **religious** (Ar. *al-dīnī*). We are convinced that, instead of separating culture (Ar. *al-thaqāfah*) and the inevitably present tradition of believing (Ar. *al-sunnah*) when discussing „Islamic art”, public academic encounters could have the potential to *open the door* to understanding Islam. It would create the essential conceptual backgrounds through which one could understand the multiple subjectivity of the defined and functioning Muslim world, both that of the past and of the present, as well as the conceptions existing within conservative, traditional and modern visual expression.

<sup>6</sup> Otherwise, the term *recognitive* refers to mental processes aimed at recognizing phenomena and forms, which in terms of experience and reproduction are related to the productive-reflective characterization of the assimilative character of the originator/designer of representation; they can be simple and complex, and also include illustrating, argumentation, research and explanations.

For more, see Akšamija, A. Mehmed: *An analysis of the use of terminological determinants...*, pp. 63-65.

<sup>7</sup> In this paper, the term *cognitive* refers to all psychic processes which are the basis of *homo islamicus*'s behavior, and which are related to the productive-reflective representation of the collaborative orientation or disposition – a kind of informative association (collaboration) aimed at attaining a particular substantive goal of *qadar/šīnā'at*.

For more, see *Ibid.*



Zbog *mira u kući*, čini se potrebnim pokušati dati odgovor i na potenciranu aktualnu problematiku navodnog *muslimānskog svodenja kulture na religiju*; mada je ona bila prisutna u onim djelatnostima i vremenu kada se takva prisutnost smatrala prirodnim stanjem, što čak ni danas nije moguće isključiti u pojedinim slučajevima. Ne vidimo ništa problematično i da se utvrdi realna složenost *mogućih etničkih i kreativnih doprinosa* kulturama pod bivšim ili sadašnjim islāmskim utjecajem, kao i drugih kultura u odnosu na njihov generalni upliv na islāmsku kulturu i civilizaciju, te i na kreativni doprinos unutar samog *qadar/šīnā' ata*.

Studije Gustavea E. von Grunebauma (um. 1972) o traženju objašnjenja duhovnog razvoja fenomena čovjeka i čovječanstva općenito, dokazuju kako je islāmska povijest bila *ogledalo svijeta*. Prilikom jedne od panel rasprava, koje je von Grunebaum držao na Univerzitetu u Chicagu (1945), govorio je o islāmu koji je uspostavljen kao vjera, kultura i državno uređenje, različitim uglovima dotičaja obilježja muslimānskog srednjovjekovlja, prezentirajući pogled na islāmski koncept i područja koja ga okružuju, njegovo izvorno i preuzeto od drugih, i što je najvažnije, islāmske motivacijske vrijednosti. Na kraju je zaključio da je srednjovjekovno svodenje vjere, kulture i društvenog uređenja vodilo napretku kako islāmskog svijeta, tako i evropske civilizacije:

*'... ne postoji polje ljudskog iskustva u kojem islām nije sudjelovao i s njim obogatio naslijeđe zapadnih tradicija. Uzmimo za primjer hranu, piće, lijekove, oružje, oklope s njihovim natpisima; umijeće proizvodnje, trgovinu i pomorsku plovidbu, umjetnički senzibilitet i tematska usmjerenja, a da ne spominjemo ogroman terminološki rječnik astronomije i matematike. Sve u svemu, popisivanje islāmskih doprinosa u svim tim poljima moglo bi potrajati na mnogo stranica, ali nikako ne bi bilo potpuno.<sup>8</sup> Postojanje islāmskog svijeta samo je po sebi igralo veliku ulogu u preoblikovanju evropske civilizacije i povijesti. Na mnogo načina križarski ratovi su bili najveća i najučinkovitija avantura koju je čovječanstvo napravilo u srednjovjekovnom dobu. Ipak, islāmske pripovijesti, pjesnička mašta, filozofija nevidljivog i odvažna sufijska doktrina ostavile su traga na zapadnim zemljama u srednjovjekovnom periodu. Bez sumnje, najveći evropski srednjovjekovni teolozi i pjesnici duguju islāmu najveće zasluge za nadahnuće i sadržaj'.<sup>9</sup>*

Pitamo se šta bi to moglo biti loše u *homogenizaciji* pojavnih oblika uopće u okviru bilo koje civilizacijske strukture, pa i samog *qadar/šīnā' ata* nasuprot heterogenizacije kulturnih praksi kroz temporalnu dimenziju empirijskih stvari – vrijeme ili *zēmān* (ar. *al-zamān*) i prostor (ar. *al-makān*), ukoliko su korijeni uniformnih karaktera inkorporirani s tradicionalnim poimanjem kreativnosti, na čemu

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<sup>8</sup> Usporedi, 'Isa, Ahmad Muhammad: *Islamic Art Terms : Lexicon, Explained and Illustrated = Muštalahāt al-fann al-Islāmī*. Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, Istanbul, 1994; *Dictionnaire des arts de l'islam* (ur. Roux, Jean-Paul). Réunion des musées nationaux : Fayard, Paris, 2007; Bloom, M. Jonathan i Blair, S. Sheila: *The Grove encyclopedia of Islamic art and architecture*. Oxford University Press, Oxford : New York, 2009.

<sup>9</sup> Grunebaum, Gustave Edmund von: *Medieval Islam : A Study In Cultural Orientation*. University of Chicago Press, 5<sup>th</sup> Impression edition, Chicago, 1962., str. 342. Prvo izdanje navedenog djela objavljeno je 1946. godine.

For the purpose of *peace at home*, it seems necessary to attempt to also provide an answer to the accentuated current issue of the alleged *Muslim reduction of culture to religion*, although it was present in those activities even at the time when such a presence was considered the natural state, which cannot be denied in some cases even today. We do not object to establishing the realistic *complexity of possible ethnic and creative contributions* to cultures under past or present Islamic influence, or of other cultures in relation to their general impact on Islamic culture and civilization, and the creative contribution within the *qadar/šīnāʿat* itself.

Studies by Gustave E. von Grunebaum (d. 1972) on the search for the explanation of the spiritual development of the phenomenon of man and mankind in general prove that Islamic history was a *mirror of the world*. During one of the panel discussions led by von Grunebaum at the University of Chicago (1945), he spoke about Islam as having been established as a **religion, culture and state organization** and about different angles of contact of the features of medieval Islam. He presented his own original view on the Islamic concept and the areas that surround it and views taken from others. Most importantly, he spoke about **Islamic motivational values**. In the end, he concluded that the medieval reduction of religion, culture and social organization led to the progress of both the Islamic world and European civilization:

*'... there is no area of human experience wherein Islam did not participate and thus enrich the heritage of Western traditions. Take for example food, drink, medicines, weapons, armor with their inscriptions; the artistry of manufacturing, trade and navigation, artistic sensitivity and thematic orientations, never mind the huge terminology of astronomy and mathematics. Altogether, the list of Islamic contributions in all these areas could be many pages long, but would never be complete.<sup>8</sup> The very existence of the Muslim world has done much to mold European history and European civilization. The Crusades were, in many ways, the greatest and most consequential adventure on which medieval man embarked. Muslim narrative and poetical imagery, Muslim eschatology and the boldness of Muslim mysticism, all have left their traces on the medieval West. Without doubt, the greatest theologian and greatest poet of the European Middle Ages are deeply indebted to Islam for inspiration as well as material.'<sup>9</sup>*

We wonder what could be bad in the *homogenization* of manifest forms in general within any civilizational structure, even within *qadar/šīnāʿat* itself compared to the heterogenization of cultural practices through the temporal dimension of empirical things – time or *zēmān* (Ar. *al-zamān*) and space (Ar. *al-makān*), if the roots of uniform characters are incorporated with the traditional understanding of creativity, in which

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<sup>8</sup> Cf., 'Isa, Ahmad Muhammad: *Islamic Art Terms: Lexicon, Explained and Illustrated = Mušṭalaḥāt al-fann al-Islāmī*. Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, Istanbul, 1994; *Dictionnaire des arts de l'islam* (ed. Roux, Jean-Paul). Réunion des musées nationaux: Fayard, Paris, 2007; Bloom, M. Jonathan and Blair, S. Sheila: *The Grove Encyclopedia of Islamic art and architecture*. Oxford University Press, Oxford: New York, 2009.

<sup>9</sup> Grunebaum, Gustave Edmund von: *Medieval Islam : A Study In Cultural Orientation*. University of Chicago Press, 5<sup>th</sup> Impression edition, Chicago, 1962, p. 342. The first edition of the work was published in 1946.

homines islamici istrajavaju? Pogrešno je mišljenje da oni zajedno sa ostalim muslimánima nastoje da zaustave vrijeme, već naprotiv, unutar vlastitog opredjeljenja bez prisile i bilo kakvog sugestivnog utjecaja samo pokušavaju da u bilo kom vremenu slave Svevišnjeg; takvo opredjeljenje neopravdava postojanje mogućeg vremenskog anakronizma; suodnos između krutog, odnosno nepromjenljivog i promjenljivog za homo islamicusa bio je i jeste paralelizam između protivrječnog (ar. *al-ta'āruḍ al-lafẓī*) i nespojivog (ar. *ghayr al-mutawāfiq*).<sup>10</sup>

Unatoč navedenom, određene neinventivne okcidentalno-vesternizirane alternative predlažu da se kovanica „islamska umjetnost“ ukloni iz bilo kojeg suvremenog kulturnog konteksta i smjesti u

Islamske motivacijske vrijednosti koje su obogatili naslijeđe zapadnih tradicija.



ILUSTRACIJA - Ibn Sina (Avicenna), *Kanon medicinske znanosti* - Faksimilno izdanje, Biblioteca Universitaria di Bologna, MS 2197. Desno, naslovna stranica *Avicenna Arabum medicorum principis*, Venecija 1608.

ILLUSTRATION - Ibn Sina (Avicenna) Ibn Sina, *The Canon of Medicine - Facsimile Edition*, Biblioteca Universitaria di Bologna, MS 2197. Right, title page of *Avicenna Arabum medicorum principis*, Venice 1608.

<sup>10</sup> Tolerancija *homo islamicusa* i njegov otvoren stav prema mogućoj uvezenoj formi ili izrazu, te njegova sposobnost asimilacije vjerojatno mogu stvoriti pogrešan dojam da mu nedostaje inovativno rješenje. Međutim, potrebno je kazati da se čak može i originalnost estetiziranog djelanja/*šinā'ata* očitovati u njegovoj sposobnosti da se formalno prilagodi takvoj unesenoj formi, kako bi mu ona služila vlastitim potrebama. Ustvari, on ponovno gradi novu estetiziranu pojavnost, odnosno formu kako bi je kvalificirao sa svojim jedinstvenim karakterom u okviru autorefleksivnih islamskih konstanti i, istovremeno, odbacio sve neprilagodljive elemente.

*homines islamici* persist? It is wrong to think that they, together with other Muslims, endeavor to stop time; on the contrary, within their own orientation, without coercion or any suggestive influence, they only attempt to celebrate the Almighty at any given time. Such an attitude does not justify the existence of a possible *temporal anachronism*; for *homo islamicus*, the mutual relationship between the rigid, i.e. invariable, and the variable has been a parallelism between the contradictory (Ar. *al-ta'āruḍ al-lafẓī*) and the incompatible (Ar. *ghayru mutawāfiq*).<sup>10</sup>

Despite the above description, some uninventive Occidental-westernized alternatives propose that the coinage „Islamic art” be removed from any contemporary cultural context and be placed in the historical

Islamic motivational values enriched by the legacy of Western traditions.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Ibn al-Haytham, Abu 'Ali al-Hasan (Alhazen) – *Opticae thesaurus, Kitab tanqih al-manazir li dhawi al-absar wa'l-basair* / *The Book of Correction of Optics for those who have Sight and Mind* (autograph copy, 1309) and *Kitab al-Manazir* (latine).

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Ibn al-Haytham, Abu 'Ali al-Hasan (Alhazen) – sinonim za optiku, *Kitab Tanqih al-Manazir li dhawi al-absar wa'l-basair* / *Knjiga ispravljanja optike za one koji imaju vid i um* (kopija s autogramom, 1309.) i *Kitab al-Manazir* (latinski).

<sup>10</sup> *Homo islamicus's* tolerance and his open attitude toward the possibility of imported form or expression, and his ability to assimilate can probably create the wrong impression that he lacks an innovative solution. However, it should be noted that even the originality of aestheticized actions/*sinā'at* can be manifested in his ability to formally adjust to such imported forms, to use them for his own needs. In fact, he again builds a new aestheticized manifestation, i.e. a form which he qualified with his unique character within self-reflective Islamic constants and, at the same time, rejected all unadjustable elements.



historijski dinastički kontekst; sudar s estetskom romantizacijom političkog prevrata protiv diktatura s dugom poviješću zapadne potpore. Naprimjer, takav stav satkan permanentnim repetiranjem dugogodišnje opozicije između Istoka i Zapada, objašnjava jedan od prisutnih akademskih pogleda na ovakvu situaciju:

‘... da bi se shvatila islamska estetika, zapadnjaci moraju podržati svoj osjećaj ukrašavanja kao manje umjetnosti... Određeni ambijentalni užici stapaju se sa svetošću u muslimānskīm stilovima’ (akcentirao aut.), čime se autoritativnim samopotvrđivanjem bitna udaljenost čini još izražajnijom između Istoka i Zapada. Stoga, taj isti autoritet iznosi mišljenje kako „islamska umjetnost“ nudi ‘*aventure u različitosti*’ što dovodi do osviještenja ‘*potonjih potomka renesansnog vjenčanja grčke i rimske s judeokršćanskim tradicijama*’.<sup>11</sup>

Pomenuta *akademska anksioznost* izrodila je i druge izraze kao što je *islamicate*,<sup>12</sup> te doprinijela da eurocentrični historičari umjetnosti i nadalje, posredstvom „nove“ metode, utječu na „razbijanje“ jedinstvenog polja ‘*islāma*’ u moguća podpolja. Obrazloženje za ovakvu formu ‘*doprinosa*’ je navodno satkano posredstvom *originalnog termina* kojim treba opisivati kulturne manifestacije proizašle iz arapske i perzijske pismene tradicije. U nastojanju da se pronađe moguće opravdanje za takvo postupanje, naglašeno je da se korištenje ovog izraza ne odnosi direktno na *islāmsku religiju*, već na *socijalni i kulturni kompleks koji je u povijesti povezan s islāmom i muslimānima, kako među samim muslimānima, tako i čak i kada se nađeno pojavi među nemuslimānima*,<sup>13</sup> ali se, u svakom slučaju vjerska komponenta isključuje. Unatoč povećanoj pažnji prema takozvanim regionalnim oblicima i praksama

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<sup>11</sup> Vidjeti Schjeldahl, Peter: *Old and New : the Reopening of the Islamic wing at the Met*. Sedmični časopis *The New Yorker*, New York, US, 7.11.2011., str. 88-89.

<sup>12</sup> Postoje tvrdnje kako izvjesni Marshall Hodgson polaže pravo na plasiranje ovog pojma u uvodu svoje povijesti, *The Venture of Islam*. Volume 1: *The Classical Age of Islam*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, str. 59.

Na primjer, Hodgson je tvrdio da postoje razni *umjetnički, arhitektonski i književni stilovi* indikativni za navodnu kulturu *islamicate*. Iznio je i tvrdnju da bez obzira gdje se ovi *estetski stilovi* nalaze, posredstvom ovog izraza bi bila moguća *očigledna njihova identifikacija*, t.j. da potječu, ne od *islāmskih već islāmiziranih kulturnih kompleksa*, pa i onda kada ih je moguće identificirati među muslimānima ili nemuslimānima.

Potrebno je upozoriti da *stil* (lat. *stilus* od gr. *stylos* — držak, pisaljka) je način izražavanja u značenju individualnosti koja se očituje u rukopisu i djelima neke osobe, „umjetničke škole“, pravca ili „umjetničkog smjera“ (za koji je i sinonim), kao i „umjetničkog razdoblja“ u smislu njihove diferencijacije u sadržajnim i povijesnim uvjetima. Takav slučaj je bio sa renesansom, romanikom, gotikom, barokom, rokokom, neoklasicizmom, kubizmom, fovizmom, ekspresionizmom, orfizmom ili suprematizmom, a unutar „islamske umjetnosti“ takav vid označavanja nije uopće poznat niti primjenljiv. Tako, govoriti o *stilu* u bilo kom značenju unutar modaliteta diskurs *qadar/šīnā’ata* nije opravdano, ali je apsurdno.

Također, atributi poput *klasične, srednjovjekovne, suvremene ... ‘umjetnosti’* su po komparativnom mišljenju, vodećeg marokanskog historičara i stručnjaka za političku teoriju Abdullaha al-Urvija (Laroui) besmisleni i nepotrebni. Ne postoji razlika između „klasične islamske umjetnosti“ i „srednjovjekovne islamske umjetnosti“ i samog *islāma*, kao i ‘*umjetnosti*’ bez ikakvih atributa s vremenskim značenjem.

Laroui, Abdullah: *Pour une méthodologie des études islamiques : l’Islam au miroir de Gustave von Grunebaum*; u: *Diogène*, br. XXXVIII, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1973., str. 30-41.



dynastic context; a collision with the aesthetic romanticization of political upheaval against dictatorship with a long history of Western support. One such view permanently repeats the opposition between the East and the West and explains one of the existent academic views of such a situation:

'... to grasp Islamic aesthetics, Westerners must upend their sense of ornamentation as a *minor art*... Certain ambient pleasures merge with sanctity in **Muslim styles**' (emphases by the author), and thus, by authoritative self-confirmation the essential distance between the East and the West seems even more prominent. Therefore, the same authority expresses the opinion that „Islamic art” offers '*adventures in difference*' which leads to the awakening of '*latter-day scion(s) of the Renaissance wedding of Greek and Roman with Judeo-Christian traditions!*'<sup>11</sup>

The described *academic anxiety* has also given birth to other terms such as **islamicate**,<sup>12</sup> and has pressed Eurocentric art historians to 'break' the single field of '*Islam*' into possible subfields, by means of a „new” method. Rationale for such a form of '*contribution*' has allegedly been woven by means of an *original term* that should describe cultural manifestations resulting from the Arabic and Persian written tradition. In the efforts to find a possible justification of such a procedure, it was pointed out that the use of this term does not pertain directly to the *Islamic religion* but rather to the *social and cultural complex which was historically associated with Islam and Muslims, even when what was found appeared among non-Muslims*,<sup>13</sup> though, in any case, the religious component is excluded. Despite the increased attention to the so-called regional forms and practices in studying „Islamic art”, a general consensus seems to have

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<sup>11</sup> See Schjeldahl, Peter: *Old and New: The reopening of the Islamic wing at the Met*. Weekly The New Yorker, New York, US, 7.11.2011, pp. 88-89.

<sup>12</sup> There are suggestions that Marshall Hodgson lays claim to launching this concept in the introduction to his history, *The Venture of Islam*. Volume 1: *The Classical Age of Islam*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59.

For example, Hodgson claimed that there are different *artistic, architectural and literary styles* indicative of the alleged culture *Islamicate*. He also asserted that regardless of where these *aesthetic styles* are found, this term would allow their obvious identification, i.e. that they originate not from Islamic but rather from **Islamicated** cultural complexes, even when they can be identified among Muslims or non-Muslims.

It should be noted that *style* (Lat. *stilus* from Gr. *stylos* – writing implement) is a way of expression, i.e. individuality, that is manifested in manuscripts and works by a person, „school of art”, trend or „artistic movement” (for which it is a synonym), as well as an „artistic age”, in the sense of their differentiation in terms of content and history. This was the case with Renaissance, Gothic, Baroque, Rococo, Neoclassicism, Cubism, Fauvism, Expressionism, Orphism and Suprematism, while within „Islamic art” such signification is neither generally known nor applicable. Thus, to speak about style, in any meaning, within the modalities of *qadar/šīnā'at* discourse is not justified; it is absurd.

Besides, attributes such as classical, *medieval, contemporary etc. 'art'*, according to the comparative opinion of leading Moroccan historian and expert in political theory Abdullah al-Urvī (Laroui), are meaningless and unnecessary. There is no difference between „classical Islamic art” and „medieval Islamic art” and Islam itself, nor (any difference) between '*art*' with no attributes of temporal meaning.

Laroui, Abdullah: *Pour une méthodologie des études islamiques: l'Islam au miroir de Gustave von Grunebaum*; in: *Diogenes*, no. XXXVIII, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1973, pp. 30-41.

u proučavanju „islamske umjetnosti“, čini se da je uspostavljen opći konsenzus da raznolike vizualne kulture grupirane usvajanjem kulturnih oblika nastalih u muslimānskom svijetu, neovisnih o vjerskim identitetima iako na mnogo načina imaju zajedničku pripadnost. Takva pojavnost je vidljiva posebno unutar okcidentalnog akademizma, koji se bavi mogućom interkulturalnom recepcijom ‘*umjetničkih oblika i praksi*’ što su nastali u muslimānskoj civilizaciji. Izazov je, dakle, objasniti transregionalne i transtemporalne aspekte ‘*umjetničke proizvodnje*’ u muslimānskīm zemljama, istovremeno uzimajući u obzir i naglašavajući povijesne i regionalne razlike. Mišljenja smo da bi eventualni pristup opisivanja kulturnih manifestacija proizašlih iz islāmske tradicije (ar. *al-sunnah*) mogao biti i opravdan, pod uvjetom da se ne ignoriraju ili zaobilaze temelji autorefleksivnih islāmskih konstanti (ar. *al-thawābit al-islāmiyyah*).<sup>14</sup> Nažalost, za mnoge okcidentalno-vesternizirane akademske strukture odgovor na takvo pitanje leži jedino u potrebi priznavanja dijalektike između transregionalnih i regionalnih, kao i dijakronijskih i sinkronijskih ‘*umjetničkih oblika*’ i praksi, te produktivne napetosti koja ne dotiče utemeljenost autorefleksivnih islāmskih konstanti. Baveći se objašnjavanjem geografske i historijske faktografije, osvjetljava se priznavajuća postojanost određenih ‘*umjetničkih formi*’ bez njihovog stvarnog utemeljenja i karakterizacije kulturne prakse kroz vrijeme i prostor. Ustvari, moglo bi se tvrditi da je potreba za arbitražnim procesima između lokalnog i translokalnog, već ranije proživljeno iskustvo i ideal tako strukturirane „novopridošle islamske zajednice“ s pokušajima globalnih dosega, navodno dosljednih karakteristika različitih muslimānskīh kultura. Uvjereni smo ukoliko se unutar ovakvih okcidentalno-vesterniziranih pokušaja ne osmisli uistinu originalna, nadgrađena alternativa koja će uvažiti neophodno potrebnu karakterizaciju i objašnjenja, da će ovakav oblik usvajanja kulturnih oblika nastalih u muslimānskom svijetu, unatoč navodno uspostavljenom općem konsenzusu, ipak, morati biti zanemaren. Zapravo, ustupanje mjesta „islamskoj umjetnosti“ kao okcidentalno-vesterniziranom kulturnom posredniku u međunarodnoj areni, bar za okcidentalno-vesternizirani prostor čini se neminovnim.

Ipak, ostaje otvorena mogućnost da je osporavanje regionalnih oblika i praksi grupiranim usvajanjem kulturnih oblika nastalih u muslimānskom svijetu, ustvari svoje osnovno utemeljenje pronašlo u trojezičnoj monografiji objavljenoj u Istanbulu (na osmansko-turskom, francuskom i njemačkom jeziku) povodom *Svjetske izložbe* u Beču, održane 1873. godine,<sup>15</sup> ili u kratkotrajnom dvojezičnom

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<sup>14</sup> Između ostalih, a po mišljenju Terry Allena, bilo koji svjesni *homo islamicus* unutar modalitetâ diskursâ *qadar/šīnā`ata* poštuje autorefleksivne diskurse unutar tradicionalnog islāmskog poimanja.

Usporedi, Allen, Terry: *Five Essays on Islamic Art*. Solipsist Press, Sebastopol 1988., str. 30.

<sup>15</sup> U Katalogu izložbe u Beču iz 1873. godine vidjeti raspravu, Bozdoğan, Sibel i Necipoğlu, Gülru: *Entangled Discourses : Scrutinizing Orientalist and Nationalist Legacies in the Architectural Historiography of the ‘Lands of Rum’*; u: Bozdoğan, S. i Necipoğlu, G. (ur.): *Historiography and Ideology : Architectural Heritage of the ‘Lands of Rum’*. Muqarnas, An Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World, svezak 24, str. 1–6, Brill, Leiden, 2007. Dostupno na: [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Heghnar\\_Watenpaugh/publication/315622631\\_AN\\_UNEASY\\_HISTORIOGRAPHY\\_THE\\_LEGACY\\_OF\\_OTTOMAN\\_ARCHITECTURE\\_IN\\_THE\\_FORMER\\_ARAB\\_PROVINCES/links/5a3a8cb1a6fdcc3d07afa6a4/](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Heghnar_Watenpaugh/publication/315622631_AN_UNEASY_HISTORIOGRAPHY_THE_LEGACY_OF_OTTOMAN_ARCHITECTURE_IN_THE_FORMER_ARAB_PROVINCES/links/5a3a8cb1a6fdcc3d07afa6a4/)

been achieved that diverse visual cultures grouped by adopting cultural forms created in the Muslim world, independent of religious identities, still have the same affiliation in many ways. Such manifestation is particularly visible within Occidental academism, which deals with the possible inter-cultural reception of 'artistic forms and practices' that appeared in the Muslim civilization. The challenge is, thus, how to explain transregional and transtemporal aspects of 'artistic production' in Muslim countries, taking into account and highlighting the historical and regional differences. We believe that a possible approach to describing cultural manifestations resulting from Islamic tradition (Ar. *al-sunnah*) could even be justified, under the condition of not ignoring or bypassing the foundation of self-reflective Islamic constants (Ar. *al-thawābit al-islāmiyyah*)<sup>14</sup>. Unfortunately, for many Occidental-westernized academic structures the answer to this question lies only in the need for recognizing a dialectic between transregional and regional, as well as between diachronic and synchronic 'artistic forms' and practices, and the productive tension which has nothing to do with the foundation of self-reflective Islamic constants. Dealing with the explanation of geographic and historical factography illuminates the recognized persistence of certain 'artistic forms' without their true foundation and characterization of cultural practice through time and space. Indeed, one could claim that the need for arbitration processes between the local and trans-local is the already lived experience and the ideal of such a structured „newcomer Islamic community” attempting a global reach, with the allegedly consistent characteristics of different Muslim cultures. Unless such Occidental-westernized attempts conceive a truly original, built-on alternative which will take into account the necessary characterization and explanations, we are convinced that such a form of adopting cultural forms created in the Muslim world will still have to be ignored, despite the allegedly established general consensus. But in fact, giving way to „Islamic art” as the Occidental-westernized cultural intermediary in the international arena seems inevitable, at least for the Occidental-westernized space.

Still, there remains an open possibility that challenging regional forms and practices by the grouped adoption of cultural forms created in the Muslim world actually found its basic grounds in the trilingual monograph published in Istanbul (in Ottoman-Turkish, French and German) on the occasion of the *World Exhibition in Vienna* held in 1873<sup>15</sup>, or in the short-lived bilingual journal in French and Ottoman Turkish titled *Le Miroir de l'art Musulman* („The Mirror of Muslim Art”) or, with a somewhat different title in Ottoman-Turkish *Mir'ât-i şanâyī-ī Islāmīye* („The Mirror of Islamic Art”).<sup>16</sup> Indeed, the use of the adjectives '**Islamic**'

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<sup>14</sup> Among others, and according to Terry Allen, any conscious *homo islamicus* within the *qadar/şinā'at* discourse modality respects self-reflexive discourses within the traditional Islamic understanding.

Cf., Allen, Terry: *Five Essays on Islamic Art*. Solipsist Press, Sebastopol 1988., p. 30.

<sup>15</sup> In the exhibition in Vienna of 1873, see the treatise Bozdoğan, Sibel and Necipoğlu, Gülru: *Entangled Discourses: Scrutinizing Orientalist and Nationalist Legacies in the Architectural Historiography of the 'Lands of Rum'*; in: Bozdoğan, S. and Necipoğlu, G. (ed.): *Historiography and Ideology: Architectural Heritage of the 'Lands of Rum'*. *Muqarnas*, An Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World, volume 24, pp. 1–6, Brill, Leiden, 2007. Available at: [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Heghnar\\_Watenpaugh/publication/315622631\\_AN\\_UNEASY\\_HISTORIOGRAPHY\\_THE\\_LEGACY\\_OF\\_OTTOMAN\\_ARCHITECTURE\\_IN\\_THE\\_FORMER\\_ARAB\\_PROVINCES/links/5a3a8cb1a6fdcc3d07afa6a4/AN-UNEASY-HISTORIOGRAPHY-THE-LEGACY-OF-OTTOMAN-ARCHITECTURE-IN-THE-FORMER-ARAB-PROVINCES.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Heghnar_Watenpaugh/publication/315622631_AN_UNEASY_HISTORIOGRAPHY_THE_LEGACY_OF_OTTOMAN_ARCHITECTURE_IN_THE_FORMER_ARAB_PROVINCES/links/5a3a8cb1a6fdcc3d07afa6a4/AN-UNEASY-HISTORIOGRAPHY-THE-LEGACY-OF-OTTOMAN-ARCHITECTURE-IN-THE-FORMER-ARAB-PROVINCES.pdf). Accessed on: 20.2.2016.

<sup>16</sup> Türker, Deniz: *Hakky-Bey and His Journal Le Miroir de l'art musulman, or, Mir'ât-i şanâyī-ī Islāmīye* (1898). *Muqarnas*, An Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World, volume 31, no. 1, Brill, Leiden 2014, pp. 277–306. Available at: <https://archnet.org/>

časopisu na francuskom i osmansko-turskom jeziku pod naslovom *Le Miroir de l'art Musulman* („Ogledalo muslimānske umjetnosti“), ili sa nešto drugačijim naslovom na osmansko-turskom jeziku kao *Mir' āt-i šanāyī 'ī-i Islāmīye* („Ogledalo islamske umjetnosti“).<sup>16</sup> Naime, upotreba pridjevâ 'islāmskī' i 'muslimānskī' u oba primjera predstavljanja ukupnosti estetizacije šarolikih vizualnih kultura sa svojim raznolikim fuzijama transregionalnih i regionalnih elemenata, koje je proizašlo iz polaganja prava osmanskog sultanata na univerzalni hilāfet (ar. *hilāfat*), što u principu dodatno može usložnjavati stanje pretpostavke da je izraz *islamicate* bio samo izum evropskih orijentalista.

Primjer terminološkog definiranja djelanja/šīnā ata homo islamicusa, odnosno „umjetnosti“ u islamskom svijetu / An example of the terminological definition of the actions/šīnā'at of homo islamicus, i.e. "art" in the Islamic world.



ILUSTRACIJA - Dvojezični časopis na francuskom i osmansko-turskom jeziku *Le Miroir de l'art Musulman*/Ogledalo muslimānske umjetnosti ili *Mir' āt-i šanāyī 'ī-i Islāmīye*/Ogledalo islamske umjetnosti.

ILLUSTRATION - Bilingual magazine in French and Ottoman-Turkish *Le Miroir de l'art Musulman*/Mirror of Muslim Art or *Mir'āt-i šanāyī 'ī-i Islāmīye*/Mirror of Islamic Art.

Međutim, svojevremeno vođene rasprave oko novog imena *Galerije islamske umjetnosti*, kao posebnog krila u Metropolitan muzeja u New Yorku – MET, najboljim su svjedokom tome, kao i potpore nekih autora i njihovih (muslimānskīh) pobornika, koji su nesebično prihvatili takav vid substitucije prilikom objašnjavanja islāmskīh fenomena (ar. *al-zawāhir al-islāmīyyah*) iz ove oblasti.<sup>17</sup> Naime, desilo se favoriziranje ljepote nad

AN-UNEASY-HISTORIOGRAPHY-THE-LEGACY-OF-OTTOMAN-ARCHITECTURE-IN-THE-FORMER-ARAB-PROVINCES.pdf. . Pristupljeno 20.2.2016.

<sup>16</sup> Türker, Deniz: *Hakky-Bey and His Journal Le Miroir de l'art musulman, or, Mir' āt-i šanāyī-i Islāmīye (1898.)*. *Muqarnas*, An Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World, svezak 31, br. 1, Brill, Leiden 2014., str. 277–306. Dostupno na: <https://archnet.org/publications/14146>. Pristupljeno 22.2.2016.

<sup>17</sup> Naime, umjesto ranijeg naziva „Galerije islamske umjetnosti – MET“, službeni naziv preuređenog prostora je preimenovan u „Galerija za umjetnost arapskih zemalja, Turske, Irana, Srednje Azije i kasnije Južne Azije“ (*The Galleries for the Art of the Arab Lands, Turkey, Iran, Central Asia, and Later South Asia*). Obrazloženje za takav čin promjene,



and '**Muslim**' in both cases of presenting the entirety of the aestheticization of diverse visual cultures with their varied fusions of transregional and regional elements, which resulted from the Ottoman Sultanate's laying claim to the universal *caliphate* (Ar. *al-khilāfah*), can generally further complicate the state of the assumption that the term *islamicate* was only the invention of European Orientalists.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Part of the interior of the Ottoman pavilion at the World Exhibition in Vienna in 1873.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Dio interijera osmanskog paviljona na Svjetskoj izložbi u Beču 1873. godine.

However, discussions on the new name of the *Gallery of Islamic Art* as a separate wing of the Metropolitan Museum in New York (MET) are the best evidence and support for some authors and their (Muslim) supporters, who selflessly adopted this kind of substitution when explaining Islamic phenomena (Ar. *al-zawāhir al-islāmiyyah*) of this area.<sup>17</sup> Actually, it was favoring **beauty** over **meaning** and blurring

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[publications/14146](#). Accessed on: 22.2.2016.

<sup>17</sup> Actually, instead of the previous name „Gallery of Islamic Art – MET”, the official name of the rearranged area was changed to *The Galleries for the Art of the Arab Lands, Turkey, Iran, Central Asia, and Later South Asia*. According to Nasser Rabbat, “The curators justified such an act of the change saying that it was done to ... convey the variousness of Islamic art and its geographically distinct expressions, as well as to deemphasize the religious identity associated with the old name, since Islamic art, like any other art, has many nonreligious manifestations. He goes on to say that... This rationale seems sound enough and resonates with the prevalent

značenjem i zamagljivanje prisustva procesa vjere i vjerovanja u pokušaju ustoličenja nerazumijevanja islāma kao jedinstvenog okvira, namećući formu vrednovanja posredstvom neutemeljene mogućnosti zajedničke judeokršćansko-grčko-rimske baštine;<sup>18</sup> uvođenje *regionalizma* s uspostavljanjem novog naziva odjela, te koristeći osjećaj ugone kao dio odgovarajuće scene za poticanje *uvjerenja orijentalne fantazije gledatelja*. Između ostalog, ali i radi toga Wendy Shaw, profesorica *Historije umjetnosti islāmskih kultura na Freie Universität* („Slobodni univerzitet“) u Berlinu inzistira na ponavljanju upravo onih tropova koji su uzrokovali eliminiranje izraza ‘islām’ iz naslova galerije, što je navodno nastao pod paravanom ‘*neophodnog poboljšanja značenja*’.<sup>19</sup> Međutim, nama se čini da se sve to desilo više pod paravanom geopolitike i nevidljivog sponzorstva. Sadržaj „islamske umjetnosti“ pod novim nazivom: „Galerija za umjetnost arapskih zemalja, Turske, Irana, Srednje Azije i kasnije Južne Azije“ – (ALTICALSA), nažalost, ne postaje sredstvo za razumijevanje druge kulture. Ovim gestom dešava se potvrđivanje oblika kulturnog narcizma u kojem se kolektivno „ja“, prepuno složene baštine, postavlja protiv pojednostavljene različitosti u kojoj je obećan navodni *osjećaj ugone*; pri čemu nužno nema nikakvog oblika zajedničke islāmske i judeokršćansko-grčko-rimske baštine.

Bez obzira na validnost jedne od prethodno naznačenih motivacija, prelazak na fragmentarnije regionalne taksonomije postavlja pitanja: ... koja je nit, koja prolazi kroz ‘*umjetnost*’ svih ovih regija

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navodni kustosi obrazlažu da je to učinjeno kako bi ... *prenijeli različitost islamske umjetnosti i njene različite geografske sredine porijekla, kao i da bi istakli vjerski identitet povezan sa starim imenom, budući da islamska umjetnost, kao i svaka druga umjetnost, sadrži mnogo nereligijskih manifestacija*. Zatim se dodaje kako im se čini ... *da je ovo obrazloženje dovoljno zvučno i da rezonira s prevladavajućom nelagodnom s pojmom islamska umjetnost, koju mnogi znanstvenici smatraju ograničenom i ograničavajućom* – premda nijedna druga akademska ili kulturna institucija nije poduzela tako hrabar korak da takvo nazivlje u potpunosti izbaci.

Rabbat, Nasser: *The New Islamic Art Galleries at the Metropolitan Museum of Art*. *Artforum International Magazine*, New York, januar 2012., Nstr. 75-78. Dostupno na: <https://www.artforum.com/print/201201/the-new-islamic-art-galleries-at-the-metropolitan-museum-of-art-29813>. Pristupljeno 4.3.2014.

Vidjeti i, Carey, Moya i Graves, S. Margaret: *Introduction: the historiography of Islamic art and architecture*. *Journal of Art Historiography*, Number 6 June 2012., str. 3, gdje je posebno naznačeno da pojam „islamska umjetnost“ definitivno dostiže apoteozu u preimenovanju ...

*Metropolitan Museum to Open Renovated Galleries for the Art of the Arab Lands, Turkey, Iran, Central Asia, and Later South Asia*. Opened: November 1, 2011. Dostupno na: <https://www.metmuseum.org/press/exhibitions/2011/renovated-galleries-for-the-art-of-the-arab-lands-turkey-iran-central-asia-and-later-south-asia>. Pristupljeno 4.3.2014.

<sup>18</sup> Islāmska vizija svijeta i kao duhovnog i kao civilizacijskog izraza, sa svojim skoro petnaest stoljetnim procesima čudesnog preplitanja i prožimanja duhovno-vjerskog i socijalno-političkog naslijeđa, bila je i ostala, kroz cijelu epohu srednjovjekovlja, duhovna vizija. Naravno, po prirodi stvari, niti je bila niti je mogla postojati u primordijalnom, odnosno neopterećenom stanju kao dio istočnog svijeta. Protokom vremena i dodirima sa drugim kulturama, primala je i druge misaone utjecaje. Iako se razvijao i kretao pod pritiskom različitih utjecaja, ovaj nazor na svijet je, onoliko koliko je to moguće, ipak samosvojan, određen svojim sopstvenim prirodno-socijalnim okvirima i konstituiran na originalan način. Istina, nastajale su epohe u kretanju tog nazora kada su neki uvezeni utjecaji (npr. elementi antike ...) uzimali manje ili više maha, ali su se ipak ranije ili kasnije gubili u kontinuitetu izvorne islāmske vizije svijeta, ostavljajući u njoj manji ili veći trag ali nikad radikalno ne ugrožavajući njene bitne odrednice tako da je njena duhovna priroda ipak ostala dominantna. Pri tome treba istaći da su određeni elementi judeokršćansko-grčko-rimske baštine mišljenja ostali ili marginalizirani, na spoljnjem planu, na nivou informacije ili su se, pak, ‘*prosjicali*’ i izgubili u beskrajnoj širini i toku islāmskog mišljenja.

<sup>19</sup> Shaw, M. K. Wendy: *The Islam in Islamic art history*. *Journal of Art Historiography*, Glasgow Iss. 6, (Jun 2012), str. 12.

the presence of **faith** and **believing** in the attempt to inaugurate the non-understanding of Islam as a unitary frame, imposing a form of evaluation by means of the unfounded possibility of a shared Judeo-Christian-Graeco-Roman heritage;<sup>18</sup> the introduction of *regionalism* through establishing a new name for the department, and using **pleasure** as a stage-set for the *viewer's Oriental fantasy*. Among other things, but for this reason as well, Wendy Shaw, a professor of the *History of Art of Islamic Cultures* at *Freie Universität* (The Free University) in Berlin insists on repeating the very tropes that caused the elimination of the term '**Islam**' from the title of the gallery, which was supposedly created under the cover of '*necessary improvement of the meaning*'.<sup>19</sup> However, it seems to us that it was done rather under the cover of geopolitics and invisible sponsorship. The content of the „Islamic art” under the new title: „The Galleries for the Art of the Arab Lands, Turkey, Iran, Central Asia, and Later South Asia” – (ALTICALSA), unfortunately does not become a means for understanding another culture. This gesture reaffirms a form of cultural narcissism in which the collective „self”, replete with a complex heritage, is set against the simplified alterity in which it takes its *pleasure* – and in which the possibility of a shared Judeo-Christian-Graeco-Roman heritage is necessarily nowhere to be found.

Regardless of the validity of the previously described motivations, the shift to a more fragmented regional taxonomy leads to the question: what is the thread that permeates the '*art*' of all these regions, one that could tie or integrate them or, if there is no coexistence between them, no dialogue, system of values, discourse, worldview, why does '*art*' created in all these *diverse regions* have a separate gallery space, and why are all of them, within this and such a space, presented together? Besides respect for the character of a possible answer, we would like to say that such an act could be considered as a return to

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*unease with the term Islamic art, which many scholars find both limited and limiting – although no other academic or cultural institution has taken such a bold step to jettison the phrase entirely.*

Rabbat, Nasser: *The New Islamic Art Galleries at the Metropolitan Museum of Art*. *Artforum International Magazine*, New York, January 2012, pp. 75-78. Available at: <https://www.artforum.com/print/201201/the-new-islamic-art-galleries-at-the-metropolitan-museum-of-art-29813>. Accessed on: 4.3.2014.

See also, Carey, Moya and Graves, S. Margaret: *Introduction: the historiography of Islamic art and architecture*. *Journal of Art Historiography*, Number 6 June 2012, p. 3, where they point out that the concept 'Islamic art' definitely reaches apotheosis in the renaming.

*Metropolitan Museum to Open Renovated Galleries for the Art of the Arab Lands, Turkey, Iran, Central Asia, and Later South Asia*. Opened: November 1, 2011. Available at: <https://www.metmuseum.org/press/exhibitions/2011/renovated-galleries-for-the-art-of-the-arab-lands-turkey-iran-central-asia-and-later-south-asia>. Accessed on: 4.3.2014.

<sup>18</sup> The Islamic vision of the world as both a spiritual and civilizational expression, with its almost fifteen centuries-long processes of wondrous intertwining and permeation of spiritual-religious and socio-political heritage, remained a **spiritual vision** throughout the Middle Ages. Naturally, in the nature of things, it was not and could not exist in the primordial, i.e. unburdened, condition as part of the eastern world. During the passage of time and contact with other cultures it assumes other mental impacts. Although it developed and proceeded under the pressure of different influences, this worldview is, as far as possible, still **distinct**, defined by its own natural-social frameworks and constituted in an original way. Indeed, there have been epochs in the evolution of this worldview when some imported influences (e.g. elements of the Ancient Age) were more or less widespread; however, they still disappeared sooner or later in the continuity of the original Islamic vision of the world, leaving in it a smaller or greater trace but never radically threatening its essential determinants, and therefore its spiritual nature still remained dominant. It should also be noted that some elements of the Judeo-Christian-Graeco-Roman heritage remained either marginalized, external, at the information level, or else were '*sifted*' and disappeared in the endless breadth and flow of Islamic thinking.

<sup>19</sup> Shaw, M. K. Wendy: *The Islam in Islamic art history*. *Journal of Art Historiography*, Glasgow Iss. 6, (Jun 2012), p. 12.



što bi ih mogla povezati ili inegrirati, odnosno ako među njima ne postoji suživot, dijalog, vrijednosni sistem, diskurs, svjetonazor, zašto 'umjetnost' proizvedena u svim tim *raznolikim regijama* ima poseban galerijski prostor, kao i zašto se sve one unutar tog i takvog prostora ipak prezentiraju zajedno? Pored respekta na karakter mogućeg odgovora, želimo kazati da bi se takav čin mogao smatrati vraćanjem na ranija razdoblja u povijesti pōljā kada su pojmovi poput „arapske“ ili „perzijske umjetnosti“ prethodili univerzalnijim kategorijama „muhamedanske“ ili „islamske umjetnosti“. Hoćemo kazati, kako je, ipak, potaknuta povijesna nelagoda s vjerskim implikacijama 'islāma' u „islamskoj umjetnosti“. Čini se da prezentirani islām kroz formu „islamske umjetnosti“ pod prenamijenjenim nazivom galerije, koji za razliku neophodnog gledanja na Istok gleda na Zapad, najbolje bi se mogao shvatiti kao predodređena praznina protiv koje vesternizirani Zapad može potvrditi vlastiti unitarni identitet. Jednostavno kazano, riječ je o rastućem trendu prema tumačenju fenomena predmetnosti u smislu povijesne kontekstualizacije, a ne prvenstveno formalnih svojstava.



ILUSTRACIJA- Metropolitan muzej, *Galerije za umjetnost arapskih zemalja, Turske, Irana, Centralne Azije i Kasnije Južna Azija*.  
1. novembra 2011.

ILLUSTRATION - Metropolitan Museum, *The Galleries for the Art of the Arab Lands, Turkey, Iran, Central Asia, and Later South Asia*.  
November 1, 2011.



past epochs in the history of the field, when terms such as „Arabic” and „Persian art” preceded the more universal categories of „Muhammadan” or „Islamic art”. We believe that it still spurred the historical unease with the religious implications of ‘Islam’ in „Islamic art”. It seems that Islam, presented through the form of „Islamic art” under the changed name of the galleries, which instead of the necessary view towards the East looks to the West, could best be understood as a predetermined void against which the westernized West can reaffirm its own **unitary identity**. In simple terms, it is an increasing trend toward interpreting the phenomenon of materiality in terms of historical contextualization, rather than primarily in terms of formal properties.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Highlights of the collection include: *the Damascus Room* in Metropolitan Museum. Originally constructed in between 1119 and 1707, this is a residential winter reception chamber, typical of the Ottoman Empire.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Posebnosti kolekcije uključuje *sobu u Damasku* u Metropolitan muzeju. Prvobitno izgrađena između 1119. i 1707. godine, ovo je rezidencijalna zimska prijemna soba, tipična za Osmansko carstvo.



ILUSTRACIJA - Na'im al-Din Ahmad: *Šahnama* (*Knjiga o kraljevima*) od Firdawsija (detalj). Safavidski period, 1518, Iran, Širaz.  
Arthur M. Sackler Galerija, acc. br. S1986.58.1.





ILLUSTRATION – Na'im al-Din Ahmad: *Shahnama* (*Book of kings*) by Firdawsi (detail). Safavid period, 1518, Iran, Shiraz. Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, acc. num. S1986.58.1.

U očiglednim estetskim kanoniziranim povezanostima „islamske umjetnosti“, u širokim vremenskim i prostornim lokacijama i područjima isključivo zasnovanim na materijalnosti kulturne razmjene (bez neminovno potrebnih hermeneutičkih ključeva), evidentno je umanjena složenost mreže svih ostalih oblika kulture koje su služile, pripadale, omogućavale ustoličenje i razvoj koncepta klasičnog muslimānskog svijeta, pa samim tim i modalitetâ diskursâ *qadar/šīnā'ata*. Polje „islamske umjetnosti“ je kroz neprihvatljivu epistemološku strukturu, u sklopu evidentno tako povijesno prezentirane vrijednosti islāma izgrađene i definirane po načelima vlastite zapadne historiografije, nemoralno ali i apsurdno prelomilo i sâm islām kroz sekularno očište.

Također i nastojanje da „islamske kulture“, a ne jedinstvena islāmska kultura, postoje u vlastitom vremenu (ili čak po malobrojnim i izvan vremena) jedan je od glavnih faktora koji je motivirao tradicionalnu segregaciju „islamske umjetnosti“ od suvremenih post-srednjovjekovnih razdoblja u istraživanjima *'globalne historije umjetnosti'*. Ovo poricanje istovjetnosti ne samo da je evidentno u istraživanjima „svjetske umjetnosti“ u izostavljanju islāmskih estetiziranih djela nastalih u 18. ili početkom 19. stoljeća, već i u anahronoj medievalizaciji remek-djela iz ranog modernog razdoblja. Stoga se potonja djela često svrstavaju u poglavlja o srednjovjekovlju, umjesto da im se da hronološko pripadanje.<sup>20</sup>

Za razliku od ovakvog diskursa, kasnoantičko i srednjovjekovno razdoblje tradicionalno se u okviru okcidentalno-vesterniziranog promatranja tretira kao *ravnopravno* u obiteljskom odnosu sa zapadnim shvatanjem tradicije (bizantikom, romanikom i gotikom). Čini se da je integriranje ranonovovjekovne „islamske umjetnosti“ u eurocentrične historiografske debele knjižne forme globalne „historije umjetnosti“, ipak predstavljalo određeni problem *iza kulisa*. Interesantno je da je takav problem ugrađen i u sumnjivo stajalište 19. stoljeća, odnosno da je klasična mediteranska „umjetnička baština“, zajednička tzv. ranoj i srednjovjekovnoj „islamskoj umjetnosti“, postala ekskluzivni rezervat Evrope nakon renesanse. Evidentno je da u koriјenu problema *iza zastora*, ipak leži ona tradicionalna konceptualizacija renesansnog humanizma, kao obilježavanje velikog kulturnog prekida između kršćanske Evrope i njenih islāmskih susjeda, jedinstveni fenomen *sui generis* koji je modernost, zanemarujući Istok, usmjerio samo u pravcu Zapada. Ipak, u posljednje vrijeme, zahvaljujući revizionističkim pristupima evropskih znanstvenika koji pokušavaju „preusmjeriti“ renesansu između Istoka i Zapada, prethodno akademsko postupanje ipak je dovedeno u pitanje.<sup>21</sup> Iako se više ne može sumnjati u sudjelovanje islāmskog svijeta

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<sup>20</sup> Različiti kriteriji za sheme periodizacije u okcidentalno-vesterniziranoj historiji umjetnosti, uključujući političke, geografske, kulturne i umjetničke, raspravljaju se u časopisu *Perspective : La revue de l'INHA* iz 2008. godine. Hronologija „islamske umjetnosti“, s njenim problematičnim izostavljanjem modernog razdoblja, predstavljena je u tom dijelu časopisa, vidjeti Volait, Mercedes: *L'art islamique et la problème de périodisation*; u: časopisu *Perspective : La revue*, Institut national d'histoire de l'art (INHA), br. 4, Paris, 2008., str. 783-786. Dostupno na: <https://journals.openedition.org/perspective/2726>. Pristupljeno 20.1.2020.

<sup>21</sup> Alexander Nagel koristi se renesansnom slikom Andree Mantegna, koja prikazuje poštovanje Magova, kako bi pokazao kako je moguće informirati naše znanje o terminima „antika“ i „istok“. Šta je bila antika u razdoblju renesanse i kako se shvaćalo ono istočno? Tvrdi da tragom ova dva pojma možemo ne samo pročitati što bi „renesansa“ mogla značiti, već i



The obvious aesthetic canonized connections of „Islamic art” across broad temporal and spatial locations and regions exclusively based on the materiality of cultural exchange (without the inevitably needed hermeneutical keys) evidently decrease the complexity of the network of all other forms of culture they served and belonged to and allowed the inauguration and development of the concept of a classical Muslim world, and thus the modalities of the *qadar/šīnāʿat* discourse. Through an unacceptable epistemological structure, within the value of Islam evidently historically presented in this way, which was built and defined according to the principles of its own Western historiography, the field of „Islamic art” both immorally and absurdly refracted Islam itself through a **secular point of view**.

Besides, the endeavor to present „Islamic cultures”, rather than a **unitary Islamic culture**, as existing in their own time (or even, according to a few, beyond time as well) is one of the main factors that motivated the traditional segregation of „Islamic art” by contemporary post-medieval epochs in studies of the *‘global history of art’*. This denial of equivalence can clearly be seen in studies of „world art”, in omitting Islamic aestheticized works created in the 18<sup>th</sup> or early 19<sup>th</sup> century, as well as in anachronous medievalization of masterpieces of the early modern period. Therefore, the latter works are often included in chapters on the Middle Ages, instead of being provided with the chronology to which they belong.<sup>20</sup>

Unlike this kind of discourse, the Occidental-westernized view traditionally treats late Antiquity and the Middle Ages as *equal* in the family relationship with the Western understanding of tradition (Byzantium, Romanesque and Gothic). It seems that the integration of the early centuries of „Islamic art” in the Eurocentric historiographic thick-book forms of the global „history of art” was nevertheless a certain problem *behind the scenes*. Interestingly, such a problem is also incorporated in the dubious viewpoint of the 19<sup>th</sup> century that the classical Mediterranean „artistic heritage”, the so-called common to early and medieval „Islamic art” became the exclusive reservation of Europe after the Renaissance. Evidently, the root of the problem *behind the scenes* is the traditional conceptualization of Renaissance humanism as a mark of the great cultural breakup between Christian Europe and its Islamic neighbors, a unique phenomenon *sui generis* which ignored the East to direct modernity only toward the West. Still, recently, due to the revisionist approaches by European scholars who attempt to „redirect” the Renaissance between the East and the West, the former academic procedure was challenged.<sup>21</sup> Although one can no

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<sup>20</sup> Different criteria for the schemes of periodization in Occidental-westernized history of art, including political geographic, cultural and artistic, are discussed in the journal *Perspective: La revue de l'INHA* of 2008. The chronology of „Islamic art”, with its problematic omission of the modern period, is discussed in this part of the journal.

See Volait, Mercedes: *L'art islamique et la problématique de périodisation*; in: the journal *Perspective: La revue de l'Institut national d'histoire de l'art (INHA)*, no. 4, Paris, 2008, pp. 783-786. Available at: <https://journals.openedition.org/perspective/2726>. Accessed on 20.1.2020.

<sup>21</sup> Alexander Nagel uses a Renaissance painting by Andrea Mantegna which depicts the adoration of the Magi to show that it is possible to inform our knowledge of the terms „Antiquity” and the „East”. What was antiquity in this period and how was *eastern* understood? He claims that tracing these two terms not only refines what „Renaissance” might mean but also illuminates how the designation „Europe” came into being, that is, how a geographical destination was transfigured into a cultural identity.

See Nagel, Alexander: *Some Discoveries of 1492 : Eastern Antiquities and Renaissance Europe* (Volume 17 of Gerson Lectures).

u evropskoj „renesansi“, globalne rezonancije „islamske umjetnosti“ izvan njenog odnosa s Evropom prije i poslije 1250. godine trebaju se detaljnije proučiti. Zapravo studije slučaja su u toku i obećavaju da će proširiti svjetske horizonte i izvan njegovog tradicionalnog eurocentričnog fokusa.



ILUSTRACIJA - Andrea Mantegna, *Poklonstvo mudraca*, 1460., Muzej J. Paul Getty, Los Angeles.

Mantegnina slika smještena je u antičko doba. Ipak, ništa prikazano na slici ne može se strogo identificirati kao antičko. Mudraci koji stoje nose turbane poznate po suvremenoj osmanskoj nošnji. Markiz od Mantove Francesco Gonzaga, Mantegnin zaštitnik, posjedovao je takav turban, koji mu je poklonio osmanski sultan Bayezid II. Mnogi su talijanski umjetnici koristili pseudoarapsko pismo u svojim slikama svetih likova, ali ovdje se čini da Mantegna oponaša specifično sirijska pisma usporediva s onima pronađenima u biblijskim rukopisima. Najstariji kralj, u konačnici, nudi porculansku šoljicu koja se proizvodila u Kini u petnaestom stoljeću. Porculan je bio relativno nedavni izum i tek je počeo dospijevati u zapadne zbirke, a ipak je ovdje u rukama biblijskog mudraca. Tako imamo scenu smještenu u antičko doba, ali ispunjenu predmetima iz mnogo kasnijih stoljeća, proizvedenih na mjestima koja se protežu od Kine do Mediterana.

rasvijetliti kako je nastala oznaka „Evropa“, odnosno kako je geografska oznaka preobražena u kulturni identitet. Vidjeti Nagel, Alexander: *Some Discoveries of 1492 : Eastern Antiquities and Renaissance Europe* (Sveska 17 iz Gerson Lectures). The Gerson Lectures Foundation, Groningen, 2013. Dostupno na: <https://books.ugp.rug.nl/index.php/ugp/catalog/view/18/17/82-1>. Pristupljeno 26,12.2018.

Istražujući prema vani potvrdu o tome ko su oni i što ih se definiralo kao „civilizirane“, Evropljani su se susreli s povratnim pogledom onoga što se danas naziva *Istokom*, posebno s pažnjom moćnog Osmanskog Carstva. Forma prijenosnih artefakata pružila je snažne alate za istraživanje kulturnih strujanja koje su proticale između Istoka i Zapada. U konačnici, njihova studija nudi radikalno i široko preispitivanje renesansne umjetnosti.

Vidjeti Jardine, Lisa, i Brotton, Jerry: *Global Interests : Renaissance Art between East and West*. Reaktion Books, London, 2005.

Primjer gdje autori propituju ono što se prečesto može činiti riješenom sigurnošću, poput razlike između Istoka i Zapada, nepromjenjivog sukoba između islama i kršćanstva i „ponovnog rađanja“ evropske civilizacije iz korijena u klasičnoj Grčkoj i carskom Rimu. Vidjeti MacLean, Gerald (ur.): *Re-Orienting the Renaissance : Cultural Exchanges with the East*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, England, 2005.

Povjesničarka Deborah Howard tvrdi da su mnogi Venecijanci stekli uvid u islamsku kulturu osobnim kontaktima sa svojim muslimanskim trgovinskim partnerima. Na temelju opsežnih multidisciplinarnih istraživanja, ona ispituje mehanizme koji su upravljali razmjenom vizualne kulture preko ideoloških granica prije doba tiska.

Vidjeti Howard, Deborah: *Venice and the East : The Impact of the Islamic World on Venetian Architecture 1100-1500*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000.

longer doubt the participation of the Islamic world in the European „Renaissance”, global resonances of „Islamic art” beyond its relationship with Europe before and after 1250 should be studied in more detail. Indeed, case studies are in progress and promise to broaden world horizons even beyond its traditional Eurocentric focus.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Andrea Mantegna, *Adoration of the Magi* (detail), 1460, The J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles.

Mantegna's painting is set in **antiquity**. Yet nothing shown in the painting can be strictly identified as an antiquity. The standing Magi wear turbans familiar from contemporary Ottoman dress. The Marquis of Mantua Francesco Gonzaga, Mantegna's patron, owned such a turban, given to him by the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II. Many Italian artists used pseudo-Arabic script in their paintings of holy figures, but here Mantegna seems to be emulating specifically Syriac scripts comparable to those found in biblical manuscripts. The eldest king, finally, proffers a porcelain cup of a type produced in fifteenth-century China. Porcelain was a relatively recent invention and just beginning to reach western collections, yet here it is in the hands of the biblical Magus. Thus we have a scene set in antiquity but filled with items from much later centuries, produced in locales stretching from China to the Mediterranean.

A similar issue pertained to the theorizing of Islam as a civilization which is „intermediated”, imprisoned in the „Middle Ages” between classical Antiquity and its „re-emergence” thanks to the early definition of modern European humanists. It leaves „Islamic art” (if not Islamic culture in general as well) permanently

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The Gerson Lectures Foundation, Groningen, 2013. Available at: <https://books.ugp.rug.nl/index.php/ugp/catalog/view/18/17/82-1>. Accessed on 26.12.2018.

While searching abroad for confirmation of who *they* are and why they were defined as „civilized”, Europeans came across the rearview of what is nowadays called the *East*, with particular attention to the powerful Ottoman Empire. Portable artefacts provided a form of powerful tools for studying cultural currents between East and West. Ultimately, their study offers a radical and broad rethinking of Renaissance art.

See Jardine, Lisa, and Brotton, Jerry: *Global Interests: Renaissance Art between East and West*. Reaktion Books, London, 2005.

An example where authors discuss what can too often seem as a resolved certainty, such as the difference between East and West, the unchanging conflict between Islam and Christianity and the „rebirth” of European civilization from its roots in ancient Greece and imperial Rome.

See MacLean, Gerald (ed.): *Re-Orienting the Renaissance : Cultural Exchanges with the East*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, England, 2005.

Historian Deborah Howard claims that many Venetians gained an insight into Islamic culture through personal contact with their Muslim trade partners. Based on extensive multidisciplinary studies, she researches the mechanisms that governed the exchange of visual culture through ideological borders before the age of the printing press.

See Howard, Deborah: *Venice and the East : The Impact of the Islamic World on Venetian Architecture 1100-1500*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000.

Srodno pitanje bilo je teoretiziranje islama kao civilizacije koja je „inter posredovana“, zarobljena u „srednjovjekovlju“ između klasične antike i njenog ponovnog „pojavljivanja“ zahvaljujući ranom određenju modernih evropskih humanista. To ostavlja „islamsku umjetnost“ (ako ne i islamsku kulturu općenito) trajno fiksiranom i potpuno nesposobnom da prevaziđe već priznati kreativni zenit u srednjovjekovnom razdoblju. Primjer institucionaliziranja islamskih studija u Njemačkoj predstavljao je jednu od progresivnih formi integracije islama u Evropu, ali samo kao jedino moguće „srednje karike“ globalne povijesti.<sup>22</sup> Ipak, bila je to forma perspektivnog značaja gdje se potvrđivao renesansni humanizam kao trajni kulturni prekid između zapadne Evrope i islamskog svijeta.<sup>23</sup> Ovakva perspektiva i danas je prisutna u prostorima i među zbirkama muzeja *Pergamon* u Berlinu.<sup>24</sup> Takozvano *islamsko krilo* muzeja zauzima fizički posrednički položaj između drevne arheologije i kasne antike do srednjovjekovnih zbirki, koje kulminiraju u modernom razdoblju.<sup>25</sup> Moguće je zaključiti kako ideja takozvanog samoodređenja pōljā pripadnosti „islamske umjetnosti“ kao ‘srednjovjekovne umjetnosti’, konzekventno favorizira formativno porijeklo nad procesima evidentnog historijskog razvoja.



ILUSTRACIJA - Prikaz ptice, crtež Merjeme/Marije i Isaa/Isusa te kineskog mitskog stvorenja Qilina na ukrašenim drvenim pločama sobe u Alepu. Muzej islamske umjetnosti, Berlin (1601.-1603.). Foto: Georg Niedermeiser.

ILLUSTRATION- Depiction of a bird, drawing of Maryam/Maria and Isaa/Jesus and The Chinese mythical creature Qilin on the decorated wooden panels of the Aleppo Room. Museum for Islamic Art, Berlin (1601-1603). Photo: Georg Niedermeiser.

<sup>22</sup> Jedan od vodećih zagovornika te pozicije bio je Carl Heinrich Becker (um. 1933), orijentalista koji je institucionalizirao islamske studije u tadašnjoj Njemačkoj, te osnovao još uvijek utjecajni časopis *Der Islam*. U svom hijerarhijskom poretku civilizacija, Becker je islām smjestio ispod Evrope a iznad Afrike, dodijelivši mu centralno mjesto u njegovom poimanju svjetske povijesti, odnosno islām je dobio funkciju posrednika između Istoka i Zapada.

<sup>23</sup> Detaljnije o Beckerovoj teoriji civilizacija, vidjeti Haridi, Alexander: *Das Paradigma der 'islamischen Zivilisation' – oder die Begründung der deutschen Islamwissenschaft durch Carl Heinrich Becker (1876-1933) : eine wissenschaftsgeschliche Untersuchung*. Ergon, Würzburg, 2005. Dostupno na: <https://search.proquest.com/docview/214034699?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true>. Pristupljeno 23.5.2016.

<sup>24</sup> Naime, premještanjem zbirke muzeja Kaiser Friedrich (danas muzej Bode), osnovanog 1904. godine, u muzej *Pergamon* u Berlinu, svečano otvorenom 1932. godine, novoformirana cjelokupnost srednjovjekovne islamske zbirke utemeljena je takvom pozicijom.

<sup>25</sup> O Beckeru i muzeju *Pergamon*, vidjeti Necipoglu, Gülru: *The Concept of Islamic Art : Inherited Discourses and New Approaches*; u: Benoît Junod, Georges Khalil, Stefan Weber i Gerhard Wolf (ur.): *Islamic Art and the Museum*. Saqi, London, 2012., str. 17-23. Dostupno na: <https://arthistoriography.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/necipogludoc.pdf>. Pristupljeno 10.10.2018.



fixed and completely incapable of overcoming the already recognized creative zenith in the Middle Ages. The example of institutionalizing Islamic studies in Germany was one of the progressive forms of integrating Islam into Europe, though only as a possible „middle link” in the global history.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, it was a form of promising significance where Renaissance humanism was reaffirmed as a permanent cultural breakup between Western Europe and the Islamic world.<sup>23</sup> Such a perspective is still present in the spaces and among the collections of the *Pergamon Museum* in Berlin.<sup>24</sup> The so-called *Islamic wing* of the museum physically occupies an intermediary position between ancient archaeology and the late antique to medieval collections, which reach a climax in the modern age.<sup>25</sup> It can be concluded that the idea of the so-called self-determination of the fields of „Islamic art” affiliation as ‘*medieval art*’ consequently favors formative origin over the processes of evident historical development.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Aleppo Room.  
© Museum of Islamic Art in Berlin –  
Photo: Georg Niedermeiser.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Soba u Alepu.  
© Muzej islamske umjetnosti u Berlinu –  
Foto: Georg Niedermeiser.

<sup>22</sup> One of the leading advocates of this position was Carl Heinrich Becker (d. 1933), an Orientalist who institutionalized Islamic studies in Germany at the time, and founded the still influential journal *Der Islam*. In his hierarchical order of civilizations, Becker positioned Islam below Europe and above Africa, assigning it a central position in his notion of world history; i.e. Islam was assigned a position of intermediary between East and West.

<sup>23</sup> For more details on Becker's theory of civilizations, see Haridi, Alexander: *Das Paradigma der 'islamischen Zivilisation' – oder die Begründung der deutschen Islamwissenschaft durch Carl Heinrich Becker (1876-1933) : eine wissenschaftsgeschliche Untersuchung*. Ergon, Würzburg, 2005. Available at: <https://search.proquest.com/docview/214034699?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true>. Accessed on 23.5.2016.

<sup>24</sup> Actually, by moving the collection of the museum of Kaiser Friedrich (now the Bode Museum), founded in 1904, to the Pergamon Museum in Berlin, opened by a ceremony in 1932, the newly formed entirety of the medieval Islamic collection was founded on such a position.

<sup>25</sup> On Becker and the Pergamon Museum, see: Necipoğlu, Gülru: *The Concept of Islamic Art : Inherited Discourses and New Approaches*; in: Benoît Junod, Georges Khalil, Stefan Weber and Gerhard Wolf (ed.): *Islamic Art and the Museum*. Saqi, London, 2012, pp. 17-23. Available at: <https://arthistoriography.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/necipoglugodoc.pdf>. Accessed on 10.10.2018.

Na način prethodno pomenutih formi pristupa došlo je do odumiranja nesumnjivo utemeljene uzročne matrice djela „islamske umjetnosti“, kako se ne bi realizirala pojava u otkrivanju odgovarajuće izražajnosti intelektualnih sposobnosti iskrenog procesa vjerovanja mnogih, čak i onih anonimno prisutnih začetnika/dizajnera estetizirane reprezentacije, posredstvom prisutnih oblika *qadar/šīnā' ata*. Ovakav način poricanja vjerskog konteksta, moglo bi se tvrditi da proizvodi bitnu deintelektualizaciju povijesne islamske kulture (ar. *al-thaqāfah al-islāmiyyah*). Ovaj model diskursa ne samo da podupire zapadne hegemonističke norme razumijevanja drugih vizualnih kulturnih tradicija kroz denaturirane estetizirane tropove, koji su instalirani nasuprot vjere kao *statičnog carstva* u kojem, navodno, nema *kreativnosti*. Stoga je islām, kako tvrdi i Wendy Shaw, sveden na 'statičnu regresiju' do porijekla,<sup>26</sup> jer se na sve načine umanjuje i kulturna tradicija nastala nakon pokušaja integracije klasične grčke filozofije u islamsku kulturu; zaboravlja se da je islamska civilizacija i kultura nekoliko stoljeća bila najnaprednija svjetska civilizacija, i da je upravo taj pokretački duh pomogao i Zapadu da prevaziđe svoju hiljadugodišnju zaostalost. Muslimáni s ovim učinjenim humanim gestom ne upozoravaju Zapad kako je njihov razvojni fundament boljitka, ipak, uspostavljen zahvaljujući prenesenom i integriranom znanju i umijeću islamske civilizacije i kulture. U skladu s tim, podizanje svijesti *religioznosti* kao informiranja konzumentne pozicije unutar koje se islām bavi vizualnom kulturom, nameće se upućivanjem poziva primordijalnom muslimānskom glasu iz prošlosti: glasu onih koji su u formi narudžbe, izradili ili koristili djela nastala temeljem odgovarajućih modalitetâ diskursâ *qadar/šīnā' ata*, ali čiji je interpretativni svijet postao podzeman kroz prakse zapadne historije 'umjetnosti' i aktualnih shvatanja.

Također i osporavanje odgovarajućeg modaliteta diskursa *qadar/šīnā' ata* atemporalne kategorije (ar. *al-sarmad*), ustvari je čin koji predstavlja suprotstavljanje esencijalizaciji islāma u suštini, prijeteći samoj opoziciji između Istoka i Zapada što se na sve načine pokušava riješiti bez zastoja i sukoba. Umjesto da se bave fundamentalnom složenošću islāma na čemu pak inzistira Wendy Shaw,<sup>27</sup> nove, čak i nezgrapnije 'regionalističke etikete' vraćaju se izvornim geografskim i etničkim terminima. U takvoj situaciji 'umjetnost' muslimānskih zemalja kategorizirana je krajem 19. stoljeća, kada su okcidentalno orijentirani historičari umjetnosti prvi put počeli prikupljati i razmišljati o materijalnoj kulturi Istoka pod rubrikom 'umjetnosti'.<sup>28</sup> Poseban oblik karakterizacije prisutan je tretiranjem islāma kao 'lažne' i 'degenerirane religije', a problematika slikovnog predstavljanja začetnika/dizajnera kakva je evidentno konstruirana u ranoj islamskoj historiografiji, bila je i dalje sporna tačka unutar akademskih shvatanja. Problem, naravno, nije u tome što nije ispravljena ovakva zabluda na samom

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<sup>26</sup> Volait, Mercedes: *L'art islamique et la problème de périodisation...*, str. 783-786.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, str. 13.

<sup>28</sup> Blair, S. Sheila i Bloom, M. Jonathan: *The Mirage of Islamic Art : Reflections on the Study of an Unwieldy Field*. The Art Bulletin, College Art Association, New York, svezak 85, br. 1, mart 2003., str. 153.

The previously described forms of approach led to the withering away of the undoubtedly grounded causal matrix of works of „Islamic art” so as to prevent the discovery of the corresponding expression of intellectual abilities of a sincere process of belief by many, even the anonymously present originators/designers of aestheticized representation through the existent forms of *qadar/šīnāʿat*. This denial of religious contexts can be argued to produce an essential de-intellectualization of historic Islamic culture (Ar. *al-thaqāfah al-islāmiyyah*). Not only does this model of discourse support Western hegemonic norms of understanding other visual cultural traditions through denatured aestheticized tropes that are set in opposition to religion as a *static realm* allegedly absent of *creativity*. As claimed by Wendy Shaw, Islam has thus been reduced to a ‘*static regression*’ to its origins,<sup>26</sup> since all methods are used to downplay the cultural tradition that emerged after attempts to integrate Classical Greek philosophy into Islamic culture; it is forgotten that Islamic civilization and culture was the most progressive world civilization for several centuries, and that it was this very driving spirit that helped the West to overcome its thousand-year long backwardness. With a humane gesture, Muslims do not warn the West that their developmental foundation of prosperity was nonetheless established thanks to the transferred and integrated knowledge and artistry of Islamic civilization and culture. Consequently, raising awareness of *religiosity* as informing the consumer position within which Islam deals with visual culture is imposed by calling up the primordial Muslim voice from the past: the voice of those who may have commissioned, made or used works based on the corresponding modalities of *qadar/šīnāʿat* discourse, but whose interpretative world became underground through practices of western history of ‘*art*’ and current understandings.

Besides, challenging the appropriate modality of *qadar/šīnāʿat* discourse as an atemporal category (Ar. *al-sarmad*) is actually an act which stands against the essentialization of Islam, threatening the very opposition between East and West which underpins so many contemporary stalemates and conflicts. Rather than engaging with the fundamental complexities of Islam, which Wendy Shaw insists on,<sup>27</sup> the new, even more unwieldy ‘*regionalist labels*’ revert to the original geographic and ethnic terms. In such a situation, the ‘*art*’ of Muslim countries was categorized in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, when Occidentally-oriented art historians first began to collect and reflect on the material culture of the East under the rubric of ‘*art*’.<sup>28</sup> A separate form of characterization is present in treating Islam as a ‘*false*’ and ‘*degenerate religion*’, while the issue of the originator/designer’s visual representation as constructed in the early Islamic historiography remains a point of contention within academic conceptions. Of course, the problem is not that such a misconception was not corrected at the very beginning of its active

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<sup>26</sup> Volait, Mercedes: *L’art islamique et la problématique...*, pp. 783-786.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>28</sup> Blair, S. Sheila and Bloom, M. Jonathan: *The Mirage of Islamic Art : Reflections on the Study of an Unwieldy Field*. The Art Bulletin, College Art Association, New York, volume 85, no. 1, March 2003, p. 153.

početku njenog aktivnog označavanja,<sup>29</sup> već to što višegodišnje oživljavanje ovog pitanja odražava trajnu neusklađenost okcidentalno-vesterniziranih pretpostavki o modalitetima diskursâ *qadar/šînâ'ata* i praksama razvijenim u okviru islâmskog svjetonazora.

Da ne bi ostalo otvoreno pitanje šta je uzrokovalo prvi pomak s regionalne na religijsku terminologiju, čija su značenja urodila promjenjivom terminologijom, navest ćemo stav Wendy Shawe, kako pažljivo i odgovorno ispitivanje historiografske faktografije može omogućiti da ponovno procijenimo suvremene pristupe temama islâma unutar historije „islamske umjetnosti“.<sup>30</sup>

Kada je već riječ o tome kako je izvršena kategorizacija termina 'umjetnost', za materijalnu kulturu muslimânskih zemalja, potrebno je napomenuti kako je prvi korišteni termin u upotrebi „muhamedânska umjetnost“<sup>31</sup> bio aktualan već 1910. godine u Evropi. Moguće je pretpostaviti, kako je ustvari on poslužio kao korektiv za uvođenje pojma „islâmska likovna umjetnost“ (osm.-tur. *Sanâyi-i Nefîse-i İslâmi*) što je bio upotrijebljen već 1889. godine, u osnivačkim dokumentima Carskog muzeja Osmanskog Carstva (tur. *Türk ve İslam Eserleri Müzesi*), prije nego što je unutar Evrope bila upotrijebljena oznaka „islamska umjetnost“.<sup>32</sup> Također moguće je bilo se susresti i

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<sup>29</sup> O navedenim zabudama, vidjeti Arnold, Thomas: *Painting in Islam : A Study of the Place of Pictorial Art in Muslim Culture*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1928. (reprint New York : Dover, 1965.); Creswell, Keppel Archibald Cameron: *The Lawfulness of Painting in Early Islam*. *Journal Ars Islamica*, University of Michigan Press, svezak 11/12, 1946., 159-166. Dostupno na: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4515631?seq=1>. Pristupljeno 22.3.2015.

<sup>30</sup> Shaw, M. K. Wendy: *The Islam in Islamic Art History ...*, str. 13.

<sup>31</sup> U Minhenu je 1910. godine održana izložba *Die Meisterwerke Muhammedanischer Kunst* („Majstorska djela muhamedanske umjetnosti“) i odigrala je ključnu ulogu u uvođenju i cementiranju sekularne kategorizacije polja, obima predmeta, regija i interesa koje su na taj način bile označene. Kustosi su promovirali 'umjetničko-nadahnut' stav prema izloženim djelima karakteriziranim posredstvom ograničavajućih tekstualnih informacija kao *umjetnost čaršijskih zanata i dekadentnog ornamentalizma*. Estetizacija predmeta bila je predstavljena kao rijetkost sa dodatno egzotiziranim mjestima porijekla kao tajanstvenim i nepoznatim izvorima predmeta, koji su u muzejskom kontekstu funkcionirali kao 'čista zanatska umjetnost' upripitomljena izvan svog dalekog porijekla. Ne samo da se estetski naglasak izložbe podudara sa tadašnjim suvremenim zanimanjem za „islamsku umjetnost“ kao izvor dizajna, već je poslužio i kao opravdanje za svoju prisutnost u promoviranom zapadnom kontekstu u kojem se 'predmet suočavao sa svojim promatračem kao čisti eksponat'.

Ipak, takav način prezentacije predstavljao je pomak s do tada prisutne kvazi-etnografske na onu koja privlači formalne kvalitete djela. Upravo je takav način izbjegavanja pitanja konteksta i ikonografije omogućio selektivno 'uzdizanje' islâmskih artefakata, da se smjeste uz bok kanonskim djelima okcidentalno-vesterniziranog modernizma na reciprocitetu formalizma.

Usporedi, Troelenberg, Eva-Maria: *Framing the Artwork : Munich 1910 and the Image of Islamic Art*; u: Andrea Lerner i Avinoam Shalem (ur.), *Islamic History and Civilization : After One Hundred Years*, Brill, Leiden : Bosnon, 2010., str. 38;

Vidjeti i, Kröger, Jens: *The 1910 Exhibition 'Meisterwerke Muhammedanischer Kunst' : Its Protagonists and its Consequences for the Display of Islamic Art in Berlin*; u: Andrea Lerner i Avinoam Shalem (ur.), *After One Hundred Years : The 1910 Exhibition 'Meisterwerke muhammedanischer Kunst' Reconsidered*, Leiden : Brill, 2010., str. 67.

<sup>32</sup> Cezar, Mustafa: *Sanatta Batiya Açılıs ve Osman Hamdi*. Erol Kerim Aksoy, zaklada za kulturu, obrazovanje, sport i zdravlje, Istanbul, 1995., str. 548.

Među mnoštvom muzeja koje je razvila vlada kasnog Otomanskog carstva, oni koji su se bavili „islamskom umjetnošću“ odražavali su izgradnju nacionalističkih vizija koje su odgovarale na sporo rasturanje carstva i nagovještale otomansko-turske nacionalističke odgovore na vjersku prošlost. Dok su, s jedne strane, eksponati koji su označeni kao *islâmskî*, a ne kao *otomanski*, religiju preoblikovali u pripadnost carstvu, a ne Arapima, s druge strane, isti izlažu dekontekstualizirane predmete iz svog predanog konteksta i na taj način otvaraju put sekulariziranoj viziji vjerskog identiteta. Ipak, moguće je kazati kako je zbirka „islamske umjetnosti“ u *Carskom muzeju* prva izravno pokazala suvremeni identitet.



signification,<sup>29</sup> but that perennial resuscitation of the issue reflects an ongoing misalignment between Occidental-westernized assumptions about the modalities of *qadar/şināʿat* discourse and practices developed within the Islamic worldview.

Not to leave open the question as to what caused the first shift from **regional** to **religious terminology**, and what meanings this shifting terminology engendered, we will present Wendy Shaw's view on how examining the discipline historiographically can enable us to re-evaluate contemporary approaches to themes of Islam within „Islamic art” history.<sup>30</sup>

When speaking about how categorization of the term 'art' for the material culture of Muslim countries was conducted, it should be noted that the first term used, „**Muhammadan art**”<sup>31</sup> was current in Europe as early as in 1910. It can be assumed that it actually served as a corrective for introducing the term „**Fine Islamic Arts**” (Ott.-Tur. *Sanāyi-i Nefīse-i İslāmi*), which had been employed as early as in 1889 in the founding documents of the *Ottoman Imperial Museum* (Tur. *Türk ve İslam Eserleri Müzesi*), before the label „**Islamic art**” was used in Europe.<sup>32</sup> One could also encounter the frequent use of the term '**Mussulman**' at exhibitions of the modalities of *qadar/şināʿat* discourse in France and Algeria between 1893 and 1907. Instead of the already active „Oriental” or regional terms, it underscored French imperial

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<sup>29</sup> On the described misconceptions, see Arnold, Thomas: *Painting in Islam : A Study of the Place of Pictorial Art in Muslim Culture*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1928. (reprint New York: Dover, 1965); Creswell, Keppel Archibald Cameron: *The Lawfulness of Painting in Early Islam*. *Journal Ars Islamica*, University of Michigan Press, volume 11/12, 1946, pp. 159-166. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4515631?seq=1>. Accessed on 22.3.2015.

<sup>30</sup> Shaw, M. K. Wendy: *The Islam in Islamic Art History ...*, p. 13.

<sup>31</sup> In Munich in 1910, the exhibition *Die Meisterwerke Muhammedanischer Kunst* („Masterpieces of Muhammadan Art”) was held, and it played a crucial role in introducing and cementing the secular categorization of the field, and the scope of objects, regions and interests which this designated. Curators promoted an 'artistic-reverential' attitude towards the exhibited works, which were characterized with limiting textual information as *art of marketplace crafts and decadent ornamentalism*. The aestheticization of the objects was presented as a rarity by further exoticizing their place of origin as mysterious and unknown sources for objects that, in the museum context, functioned as 'pure craft art', tamed from their distant origins. Not only did the aesthetic emphasis of the exhibition coincide with a contemporary interest in „Islamic art” as a source for design, but it also served to justify its presence in a Western context in which the 'object faces its beholder as pure exhibit'.

Still, such a mode of presentation was a shift from the previous quasi-ethnography to one that attracts the formal qualities of a work. It was this way of avoiding issues of context and iconography that allowed the selective 'elevation' of Islamic artefacts, placing them side by side with canonic works of Occidental-westernized modernism on the reciprocity of formalism.

Cf., Troelenberg, Eva-Maria: *Framing the Artwork : Munich 1910 and the Image of Islamic Art*; in: Andrea Lerner and Avinoam Shalem (ed.), *Islamic History and Civilization : After One Hundred Years*, Brill, Leiden: Bosnon, 2010, p. 38;

See also, Kröger, Jens: *The 1910 Exhibition 'Meisterwerke Muhammedanischer Kunst' : Its Protagonists and its Consequences for the Display of Islamic Art in Berlin*; in: Andrea Lerner i Avinoam Shalem (ed.), *After One Hundred Years : The 1910 Exhibition 'Meisterwerke muhammedanischer Kunst' Reconsidered*, Leiden : Brill, 2010, p. 67.

<sup>32</sup> Cezar, Mustafa: *Sanatta Batiya Açilis ve Osman Hamdi*. Erol Kerim Aksoy, endowment for culture, education, sports and health, Istanbul, 1995, p. 548.

Among many museums developed by the government of the late Ottoman Empire, those that were involved with „Islamic art” reflected the construction of nationalistic visions that responded to the slow dispersal of the empire and heralded Turkish nationalistic responses to its religious past. While, on the one hand, exhibits designated as *Islamic* rather than *Ottoman*, transformed religion into belonging to the empire, rather than to Arabs, on the other hand the exhibited, decontextualized objects were shown out of their given context and in this way opened the way to a secularized vision of religious identity. Still, it can be claimed that the collection of „Islamic art” in the *Imperial Museum* was the first to directly show a contemporary identity.

s čestom upotrebom izraza ‘mussulmán’ na prezentacijama modaliteta diskursâ *qadar/şinâ’ata* održanim u Francuskoj i Alžiru između 1893. i 1907. Tu se, umjesto tada već aktivnih „orijentalnih“ ili regionalnih izraza, naglašava francuska imperijalna ambicija da prednjači u razumijevanju islâma i *ispravnog razvoja modernog, civiliziranog i kolonijalnog muslimānskog svijeta*.<sup>33</sup> Međutim, pojava znanstvenog proučavanja takozvane „umjetnosti islamskog svijeta“ datira, kako je već kazano, s kraja 19. stoljeća okupljajući stariju disciplinu „filološkog orijentalizma“ s neofitskom disciplinom „evropske historije umjetnosti“. Jedan od inicijatora bio je i Henri-Michel Lavoix, čuvar kovanica i medalja u Louvru, koji je ipak sugerirao središnju formu kontradikcije između islâma i okcidentalnog shvatanja umjetnosti.<sup>34</sup>



ILUSTRACIJA- U osnivačkim dokumentima *Carskog muzeja Osmanskog Carstva (Türk ve İslam Eserleri Müzesi)* pojam „islamska likovna umjetnost“ (*Sanâyi-i Nefise-i İslâmi*) je bio upotrijebljen već 1889. godine, znači prije nego što je unutar Evrope bila upotrijebljena oznaka/termin „islamska umjetnost“.

ILLUSTRATION ~ In the founding documents of the *Imperial Museum of the Ottoman Empire (Türk ve İslam Eserleri Müzesi)*, the term "Islamic fine art" (*Sanâyi-i Nefise-i İslâmi*) was used as early as 1889, that is, before the label/term "Islamic art".

<sup>33</sup> Stephen Vernoit (ur.): *Discovering Islamic Art : Scholars, Collectors and Collections, 1850-1950*. I.B. Tauris, London, 2000., str. 20.

<sup>34</sup> Lavoix, Henri: *Les arts musulmans : de l'emploi des figure*. *Gazette des Beaux-Arts*, J. Baer, Paris, avgust-novembar 1875., str. 100; Vidjeti i, Lavoix, Henri: *Les arts musulmans : de l'ornementation arabe dans les ouvres des maitres italiens*. *Gazette des Beaux-Arts : la doyenne des revues d'art*, Paris, 1877., str. 15-29. Dostupno na: [https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/gba1877\\_2/0021](https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/gba1877_2/0021). Pristupljeno 19.4.2015.

ambition to lead in the understanding of Islam and the *development of a properly modern, civilized, and colonial Muslim world*.<sup>33</sup> However, the advent of the scientific study of the so-called „art of the Islamic world”, as has already been said, dates to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, bringing together the older discipline „philological Orientalism” with the neophyte discipline of „European art history”. The initiators included Henri-Michel Lavoix, keeper of coins and medals in the Louvre, who still proposed a central form of contradiction between Islam and the Occidental understanding of art.<sup>34</sup>



ILLUSTRATION ~ The catalog *Masterpieces of Muhammadan Art (Die Meisterwerke Muhammedanischer Kunst, Munich 1910)* whose key role was in introducing and cementing the secular categorization of "Islamic art".

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Katalog *Majstorska djela muhamedanske umjetnosti (Die Meisterwerke Muhammedanischer Kunst, Minhen 1910.)* čija je ključna uloga bila u uvođenju i cementiranju sekularne kategorizacije „islamske umjetnosti“.

<sup>33</sup> Stephen Vernoit (ed.): *Discovering Islamic Art : Scholars, Collectors and Collections, 1850-1950*. I.B. Tauris, London, 2000, p. 20.

<sup>34</sup> Lavoix, Henri: *Les arts musulmans : de l'emploi des figure*. *Gazette des Beaux-Arts*, J. Baer, Paris, August-November 1875, p. 100; See also, Lavoix, Henri: *Les arts musulmans : de l'ornementation arabe dans les ouvres des maitres italiens*. *Gazette des Beaux-Arts: la doyenne des revues d'art*, Paris, 1877, pp. 15-29. Available at: [https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/gba1877\\_2/0021](https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/gba1877_2/0021). Accessed on 19.4.2015.





ILUSTRACIJA - Stranica Dastana Amira Hamze - *Hamzanama*. Mughal (detalj), oko 1567-1582.  
National Gallery of Victoria, Melburn, ev. br. AS12-1978.





ILLUSTRATION – A page of the Dastan-i Amir Hamza – *Hamzanama*. Mughal (detail), c. 1567-1582.  
National Gallery of Victoria, Melbourne, acc. num. AS12-1978.

Nažalost, posredstvom novouspostavljene karakterizacije u zapadnoj historiji umjetnosti i tadašnjem širem kršćanskom diskursu, islām i modaliteti diskursâ *qadar/sinā' ata* su postali povijesnom civilizacijskom kategorijom koja se razlikovala od bilo kojeg pristupa moguće interpretacije religije i estetiziranog djelovanja – ‘umjetnosti’. Ustvari, zastupano je mišljenje da zato što islām ne uspijeva vizualizirati teološke predmete poput *božanstva* na način shvaćen kroz kršćanski aspekt (*deus* od lat. riječi *deitas*), zato što se tvrdilo da se islām i u samoj slikovnoj predstavi bilo kojeg karatera *inherentno suprotstavlja*, smatrano je da su postojale potrebne pretpostavke za takozvani „univerzalni islām i njegovu umjetnost“ viđenu kroz očiste tadašnjeg zapadnog mišljenja i razumijevanja. Naime, takozvana *povijesna kritika* više se nije provodila prema nekom pitanju ili samom tekstu, već je odabrana kao princip *genealoškog provođenja teksta*. Na taj način desio se radikalizirani pristup razdvajanja islāma kao principa i kao povijesnog teksta. Islām u svojoj obimnoj sadržajnosti bio je oslobođen historicizma, utoliko što je, po takvom mišljenju, sama povijest jedino nudila *hermeneutičke podloge za religiozno iskustvo* (znanje) kao osjećaj doživljavanja transcendencije. Kanonski su tekstovi izuzeti iz povijesne kritike i izvršena je njihova rekonceptualizacija.<sup>35</sup> U ranom evropskom 20. stoljeću, ovakva situacija imala je dubok utjecaj na ukupnost okcidentalno-vesterniziranih akademskih pogleda na sâm islām; tumačenje osnovnih principa na osnovu rekonceptualiziranih prijevoda Kur’āna. Paradigmatični primjer bio je prvi filološko-akademski prijevod Kur’āna, koje je poduzeo mađarski poznavalac i navodni poštovalac islāma Ignáz Goldziher (um. 1921),<sup>36</sup> ali u skladu s biblijskim naukom tog doba.<sup>37</sup> Islām koji je „otkrio“, po mišljenju američkog historičara kulture i književnosti Sandera L. Gilmana (rođ. 1944), postao je uzor za *novi duh hebrejstva* krajem devetnaestog stoljeća.<sup>38</sup> Međutim, zahvaljujući Goldziherovom pristupu favoriziranja povijesnog i kulturnog nad duhovnim, odnosno perceptivnom analizom Kur’āna došlo je do pojave izražene *doktrine podređivanja* izvornih tekstova unutar prijevoda Kur’āna i tumačenja hadīsa (ar. *al-ḥadīth*). Naravno, nisu ostavljene po strani ni sve ostale sinkretične prakse koje su bile sastavni dio kulturnog obilja muslimānskog svijeta, uključujući sufijske, regionalne i narodne prakse.

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<sup>35</sup> Schulze, Reinhard: *Islamwissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft*; u: Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm i Voigt, Friedemann (ur.: *Religion(en) deuten Interpreting Religion(s) : Transformationen der Religionsforschung*. De Gruyter, Berlin, 2010., str. 96.

<sup>36</sup> Uz Nijemca Theodora Nöldekea i Nizozemca Christiaana Snoucka Hurgronjea, Goldziher se smatra utemeljiteljem *modernih islāmskih studija* u Evropi.

Goldziherova djela su u novije vrijeme dobila obnovljenu pažnju zahvaljujući kritičnim pogledima na Edwarda Saida u njegovoj knjizi *Orijentalizam*. Goldziherovo djelo bilo je iznimka u tome što je cijenio *islāmsku toleranciju prema drugim religijama*, premda je njegova nesklonost bila potkopana posredstvom tumačenja antropomorfizma u mislima Poslanika Muhammeda (ar. *Muḥammad*), kao i onog što Said naziva „previše vanjskom islāmskom teologijom i jurisprudencijom“. Vidjeti Said, Edward: *Orientalism ...*, str. 18 i 209.

<sup>37</sup> McAuliffe, Jane Dammen: *Introduction*; u: McAuliffe, Jane Dammen (ur.): *The Cambridge Companion to the Qur'an (Cambridge Companions to Religion)*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006., str. 9.

<sup>38</sup> Gilman, Sander: *Can the Experience of Diaspora Judaism Serve as a Model for Islam in Today's Multicultural Europe?*; u: Schenker, Hillel i Ziad, Abu Zayyad (ur.): *Islamophobia and anti-Semitism*. Markus Wiener, Princeton : New York, 2006., str. 59-74.



Unfortunately, through the newly established characterization in Western history of art and broader Christian discourse of the time, Islam and the modalities of *qadar/šīnā'at* discourse became a historical civilizational category which differed from any approach of possible interpretation of religion and aestheticized activity – 'art'. In fact, it was proposed that because Islam fails to visualize theological objects such as *deity* in the way understood through the Christian aspect (*deus* from Latin word *deitas*), and because it was claimed that Islam *inherently opposes* the visual representation of any character, it was believed that there were necessary assumptions for so-called „**universal Islam and its art**” – viewed through the lens of Western thinking and understanding of the time. Actually, the so-called *historical criticism* was no longer guided by an issue or a text itself, but was rather chosen as a principle of *genealogical derivation of the text*. This radicalized the separation being drawn between Islam as a **principle** and as a **historical text**. In its extensive contents, Islam was freed from history since, according to such an opinion, history itself only offered *hermeneutical underpinnings for religious experience* (knowledge) as a sense of experiencing transcendence. Canonical texts were thus excused from historical critique and were re-conceptualized.<sup>35</sup> In the early European 20<sup>th</sup> century, such a situation had a profound impact on the totality of Occidental-westernized academic views of Islam itself; the interpretation of basic principles based on re-conceptualized translations of the Qur'an. The paradigmatic example would be the first philological academic translation of the Qur'an, which was undertaken by the Hungarian connoisseur and alleged admirer of Islam, Ignáz Goldziher (d. 1921),<sup>36</sup> though in line with Biblical scholarship of the time.<sup>37</sup> The Islam that he 'discovered' became – in the opinion of American historian of culture and literature Sander L. Gilman (b. 1944) – the model for the *new spirit of Hebraism* of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>38</sup> However, Goldziher's approach, which favored the historical and cultural over the spiritual, or perceptual analyses of the Qur'an, led to the emergence of the prominent *doctrine of subordination* of original texts within translation of the Qur'an and interpretation of *Hadith* (Ar. *al-ḥadīth*). Of course, it did not leave aside all the other syncretic practices that were a constituent part of the cultural plenitude of the Muslim world, including Sufistic, regional and folk practices.

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<sup>35</sup> Schulze, Reinhard: *Islamwissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft*; in: Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm and Voigt, Friedemann (ed.): *Religion(en) deuten Interpreting Religion(s) : Transformationen der Religionsforschung*. De Gruyter, Berlin, 2010, p. 96.

<sup>36</sup> Together with German Theodor Nöldeke and Dutch Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, Goldziher is considered the founder of *modern Islamic studies* in Europe.

Goldziher's works have recently received renewed attention due to the critical views of Edward Said in his book *Orientalism*. Goldziher's work was an exception in that he appreciated the Islamic tolerance towards other religions, although his aversion was undermined by the interpretation of anthropomorphism in the Prophet Muhammed's thinking, as well as of what Said calls „too external Islamic theology and jurisprudence”.

See Said, Edward: *Orientalism* ..., pp. 18 and 209

<sup>37</sup> McAuliffe, Jane Dammen: *Introduction*; in: McAuliffe, Jane Dammen (ed.): *The Cambridge Companion to the Qur'an (Cambridge Companions to Religion)*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 9.

<sup>38</sup> Gilman, Sander: *Can the Experience of Diaspora Judaism Serve as a Model for Islam in Today's Multicultural Europe?*; in: Schenker, Hillel and Ziad, Abu Zayyad (ed.): *Islamophobia and anti-Semitism*. Markus Wiener, Princeton: New York, 2006, pp. 59-74.





ILUSTRACIJA - Neka od Goldziherovih djela koja su u novije vrijeme dobila obnovljenu pažnju.

Prihvatanjem Goldziherovog pristupa favoriziranja povijesnog i kulturnog nad duhovnim došlo je do pojave raznih okcidentalno-vesterniziranih akademskih diskursa i tumačenja islâma. Bila je to forma analogije (*analogia legis*), koja nikad do tada nije postojala s potpunim nedostatkom epistemologijske pozitivne klasifikacije, što ih je eventualno mogla ili pokušala definirati. Popratna pojavnost ovakvih ekscenčnih pristupa i njihova determiniranost u sveukupnoj prisutnosti karakterizacije i klasifikacije kulture islâma, za koju se implicitno ili čak izričito navodilo kako je do toga došlo samo zahvaljujući prisutnoj *degenerizaciji* i napuštanju *vlastitih religijskih ideala*, ustvari je, po njihovom mišljenju time prerasla u *snažnu sekularističku paradigmu*.<sup>39</sup> Nažalost, tu se odigravala cijela tragedija datosti okcidentalno-vesterniziranih institucionaliziranja navodne *'sterilne sekularizirane vjere i njene umjetnosti'* u pred globalnom dobu. Tada su takvim navodnim *'opredjeljenjem'* neosporno i islâm i *qadar/šinhâ'at* obznanjeni unutar okcidentalno-vesterniziranog akademizma kao *kompencijski placebo* bez ikakvih emancipatorskih nakana.

Ukoliko dodatno potražimo obrazloženje na čemu su, pored navedenog, konstruirani i načinjeni takvi ili slični odnosi prema islâmu, doći ćemo do čudesno dojmljivih obrazloženja kako je navodno riječ o *statičnoj religiji* i njenim bitnim načelima koja nisu bila podložna propitivanju i promjenama, odnosno *interpretacijskim varijacijama*,<sup>40</sup> potrebi redefiniranja *'umjetnosti'* kao dijela kulturne produkcije, a ne vjerske prakse; germanskoj sferi potrage za izvornom religijom (*Urreligion*); proučavanju *'mitologije'* odvojeno od racionalizirane znanosti o religiji – shematiziranost kroz epistemološki model koji nudi lingvistika;

<sup>39</sup> Ovakav odnos pretpostavljenih kontradikcija između *'islâma i njegove umjetnosti'* funkcionirao je tokom 19. stoljeća u formi *lažne sekularizirane religije*, koja je ujedno služila i za definiranje njene *'umjetnosti'*. Osnov ovakvog konstrukta vezan je za saznanja kako su prve halife (ar. *al-khilāfah*), Poslanikovi pratioci, uzeli njegov strogi život kao uzor, te da su njihove vrline podsjećale na njegovu skromnost, koju su budući sultáni i emíri, bez obzira na kūr'anska upozorenja koncipirali u čudesan luksuz posuda i vaza od najdragocjenijih metala u svojim palačama. Dodatno se ističe kako su dobročinstvo Abū Baqra i poniznost 'Alíja bili samo dio tradicije bez prisile koja, u kasnijem vremenu nije pronašla sljedbenike. Tako definirana kao oksimoron u odnosu na islâmsku ortodoksiju *'umjetnost'* predstavlja, kako je smatrano *uđenu degeneraciju islâma*, što je bilo, po danom mišljenju moguće karakterizirati kao vid *sekularizma*.

*Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Schulze, Reinhard: *Islamwissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft*; u: Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm i Voigt, Friedemann (ur.): *Religion(en) deuten : Transformationen der Religionsforschung*, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2010., str. 90.



ILLUSTRATION – Some of Goldziher's works that have recently received renewed attention.

Acceptance of Goldziher's approach of favoring the **historical and cultural** over the **spiritual** led to the emergence of various Occidental-westernized academic approaches and interpretations of Islam. It was a form of analogy (*analogia legis*), which had never before existed, with a complete lack of epistemological positive identification which could, or could attempt to, define it. The accompanying manifestation of such excess approaches and their determination in the overall presence of the characterization and classification of the culture of Islam, which was implicitly or even explicitly said to have emerged only due to the existent *degeneration* and abandoning of *own religious ideals*, actually became a *powerful secularistic paradigm*.<sup>39</sup> Unfortunately, this is where a great tragedy of the reality of Occidental-westernized institutionalization of the alleged '*sterile secularized religion and its art*' in the pre-global era occurred. At the time, this alleged '*orientation*' of Occidental-westernized academism doubtlessly made both Islam and *qadar/ṣinā'at* known as a *compensating placebo* without any emancipating intentions.

If we look for an additional rationale of how else those and similar attitudes toward Islam were constructed or made, we will encounter wondrously impressive explanations about how it is allegedly a *static religion* and that its essential principles were not subject to questioning and change, i.e. to *interpretive variance*;<sup>40</sup> about a need to redefine '*art*' as part of cultural production rather than religious practice; about the Germanic sphere of the search for the original religion (*Urreligion*); about the study of '*mythology*' separated from the rationalized science of religion – a schematization through an epistemological model offered by linguistics; about the idealized origin of religion – considering all

<sup>39</sup> In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, such a relationship of the assumed contradictions between „Islam and its art” functioned in the form of *false secularized religion*, which also served to define its '*art*'. The basis of this construct is related to the insight that the first *khalifs* (Ar. *al-khilāfah*), the Prophet's companions, took his austere life as a role model, and that their virtues were reminders of his modesty, which future sultans and emirs, regardless of Qur'anic warnings, conceived in a wondrous luxury of dishes and vases made of the most precious metals in their palaces. It is also pointed out that Abū Baqir's charity and 'Alī's humility were no more than a tradition without potency, which did not find followers in later times. Thus defined as an oxymoron in relation to Islamic orthodoxy, '*art*' comes to represent, as was believed, the *inherent degeneracy of Islam*. According to the given opinion, it could be characterized as a form of secularism.

*Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Schulze, Reinhard: *Islamwissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft*; in: Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm and Voigt, Friedemann (ed.): *Religion(en) deuten : Transformationen der Religionsforschung*, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2010, p. 90.

idealiziranom porijeklu vjere – sva kasnija praksa tretirana je kao odstupanje od izvornog modela; historiziranju proučavanja islāma – distanciranje od proučavanja diskurzivnog značenja u korist proučavanja porijekla; razvijanju nacionalističke jednačine etničke pripadnosti unutar jezičkog rekonceptualiziranja – ideja o „jezičnim plemenima“ postala je metaforom za „kulturalna plemena“; radikalizaciji razdvajanja religije kao principa i kao povijesnog teksta ...

Međutim, da bi se došlo do prethodno navedenih stavova, opravdanost utemeljenja, između ostalog moguće je pronaći u vezanosti određenih pojava u samom islāmu. Naime, postoje tvrdnje kako je iskustvo preporoditeljskog pokreta u islāmu [koji se slobodno nazivaju *vehabizmom* (ar. *al-wahhābiyah*) i *salafizmom* (ar. *al-salafīyah*)] i njihova rekonceptualizacija islāma u potrazi za „istinskim“ islāmom, ustvari, ponajviše doprinijelo prethodno navedenim stavovima. Paralelno s ovom pojavom traženja uporišta za vlastite stavove, tretirani su i aktualni preporoditeljski odgovori protiv moderne zapadnjačke inkluzije (bilo da su je provodile kolonijalne sile ili lokalne, zapadnjački orijentirane muslimānske sekularizirajuće elite), što je često činjeno složenom kombinacijom zapadnjačkih pozitivističkih metodologija i islāmskih interpretativnih okvira. Uglavnom, sve što je činjeno bilo je u funkciji predstavljanja degeneracije tradicionalnog islāma i islāmskog prava šeri'jata (ar. *al-šari'ah*), zamišljeno kao stanje u mirovanju (*statična religija*). Takvo gledište doprinijelo je i ograničenju samog geografskog obuhvata islāmskog svijeta na Arapski poluotok, čiju su dodatnu formu nadgradnje činili Osmanlije, Turci, turkijski narodi, Perzijanci, Afganistanci, jugoistočni Azijati, Indonežani, Malezijci, filipinski i korejanski muslimáni, pa su se u suvremenom svijetu tu pronašli i izdejstvovali svoje mjesto evropski sljedbenici.<sup>41</sup>

Budući da se ideja o jedinstvu 'više' nije mogla uzimati zdravo za gotovo (*praesumo presumo*), odnosno da je stečeno tradicionalno islāmsko znanje (ar. *al-'ilm*) o određenim činjenicama i materijalnim predmetima, drugim spoznajama i prošlim događajima, unutar bilo kojih pokušaja postavljanja kriterija takvog znanja bilo kao *conscientia* ili *scientia* – a u skladu s tom činjenicom ono više nije bilo validno (*commonsensism*, „kritički kognitivizam“) – to je značilo da je čitavo „pòlje“ historije estetiziranog djelanja/*šīnā'ata* bilo u datom momentu dekonstruirano na postmodernistički način; načelno se odnosilo na kritiku apsolutnih islāmskih istina (ar. pl. *al-ḥaqā'iq*), identiteta (ar. *al-huwiyyah*), diskursâ (ar. *al-hiwār*) i glavnih vrednota ustanovljenih neizostavnim slijeđenjem tradicije (ar. *al-taqīd*). Također ovim nastojanjem, odnosno eurocentričnim „umjetničko-historijskim“ pristupom svi oblici kreativnih aktivnosti, pa samim tim i *šīnā'ata* kao djelanja, pozicioniraju se prema *obasjanim središtima* evropske kulturne moći, koja zbog vlastite akademske narcisoidnosti je u mogućnosti dosezanja periferije svojim 'zrakama utjecaja, tumačenja i verifikacije'. U takvoj konstalaciji interesa marginalni status bilo

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<sup>41</sup> Usporedi, Albertini, Tamara: *The Seductiveness of Certainty : The Destruction of Islam's Intellectual Legacy by the Fundamentalists*. Philosophy East and West, svezak I. 53, br. 4, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu : Hawaii, 2003., str. 455-470.



later practices as aberrant from the original model; about historicizing the study of Islam – moving away from the study of discursive meaning in favor of the study of origins; about developing a nationalistic equation of ethnicity within language reconceptualization – the idea of „linguistic tribes” became a metaphor for „cultural tribes”; about the radicalization of the separation of religion as a principle and as a historical text, etc.

However, to reach the above listed views, the rationale for their foundation can, among other things, be found in the relations between some phenomena in Islam itself. Indeed, there are claims that the experience of revivalist movements in Islam [which are loosely referred to as *Wahhabism* (Ar. *al-wahhābiyyah*) and *Salafism* (Ar. *al-salafīyyah*)] and their reconceptualization of Islam in the search for the „true” Islam, were actually what contributed most to these views. In parallel to this phenomenon of seeking a stronghold for their own views, they also considered current revivalist responses against modern Western inclusion (whether it was conducted by colonial powers or local West-oriented Muslims secularizing elites), which was often done by a complex combination of Western positivist methodologies and Islamic interpretive frameworks. All in all, everything that was done represented the degeneration of traditional Islam and Islamic law – *Shari’a* (Ar. *al-sharī’ah*), imagined as fixed (*static religion*). Such a view also contributed to limiting the very geographical scope of the Islamic world to the Arabic peninsula, with the additional form of a superstructure consisting of Ottomans, Turks, Turkish peoples, Persians, Afghans, Southeast Asians, Indonesians, Malaysians, Filipinos and Korean Muslims, and in the contemporary world European adherents also found and secured their place.<sup>41</sup>

Since the idea of **unity** could ‘no longer’ be taken for granted (*praesumo presumo*), the acquired traditional Islamic knowledge (Ar. *al-’ilm*) of certain facts and material objects, other minds and past events, within any attempt to set the criterion for such knowledge either as *conscientia* or *scientia*, was no longer valid in line with this fact (*commonsensism*, „critical cognitivism”). It meant that, at a given moment, the entire „field” of the history of aestheticized actions /*ṣinā’at* was deconstructed in a postmodernist way; generally, it pertained to the critique of absolute Islamic truths (Ar. *al-ḥaqīqah*, pl. *al-ḥaqā’iq*), identity (Ar. *al-huwiyyah*), discourse (Ar. *al-ḥiwārāt*) and main values established by the unavoidable following of the tradition (Ar. *al-taqlīd*). Besides, this endeavor, i.e. the Eurocentric „art-history” approach, positioned all forms of creative activities, and thus *ṣinā’at* as actions as well, according to the *illuminated centers* of European cultural power which, due to their own academic narcissism, could reach the periphery with their ‘*rays of influence, interpretation and verification*’. In such a constellation of interests, the marginal status of any modality of *qadar/ṣinā’at* discourse can look only like an echo of some ‘*artistic creations*’ which are defined in the centers, while within

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<sup>41</sup> Cf., Albertini, Tamara: *The Seductiveness of Certainty : The Destruction of Islam's Intellectual Legacy by the Fundamentalists*. Philosophy East and West, volume I. 53, no. 4, University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, Hawaii, 2003, pp. 455-470.

kojeg modaliteta diskursâ *qadar/šīnā'ata* može izgledati samo kao odjek nekih 'umjetničkih kreacija' koje se definiraju u centrima, dok unutar ovog hibridnog prijenosnika značajna mjesta moći igraju glavnu ulogu u viđenju aktualiziranih kreativnih izraza i opravdanih načina karakterizacije, te svrstavanja u, po njima, definiranim 'izmima', oblicima, etnicitetima, 'stilovima' (ar. *al-uslūb*, mn. *al-asālib*)...<sup>42</sup> Međutim, produkti estetiziranog djelanja, konstruirani u mnogim takozvanim 'rubnim' područjima, iako nisu *obasjani*, ipak otkrivaju činjenicu da je često 'margina' ona koja pokreće i usmjerava vodeću estetsku ulogu. Evidentan slučaj je sa modalitetima diskursâ *qadar/šīnā'ata*, pa u tom slučaju nametanje 'rubne umjetničke produkcije' ili 'rubne posebnosti', odnosno statusa *potčinjenosti* takozvanim centarima, čini da bi ovu paradigmu ne samo trebalo preispitati, već u potpunosti ignorirati.

Mišljenja smo, da nije pretjerano zaključiti kako su različiti nivoi odnosa središta (*viscus*) i periferije (*peripheriae*) zaokupljali mnoge okcidentalne pristupe 'historiji umjetnosti', kao eurocentrične znanstvene discipline veći dio 20. stoljeća. Geografski, nacionalni i svakako religiozni pristupi<sup>43</sup> bili su jedni od osnovnih polazišta, neizbježno u svim pokušajima identificiranja središta i periferije u određenom historijskom razdoblju, a zatim i tumačenja njihovih estetiziranih tekovina, te njihovog međuodnosa. Latentno ili eksplicitno prisutan u mnogim metodološkim usmjerenjima filozofije, 'historije umjetnosti' i kulture, fenomen dimenzija – od Herdera, Hegela, Schnaasea i Tainea na primjer, zatim Riegla, Dvořáka i drugih pripadnika *Bečke škole historije umjetnosti*, do Focillona, Kublera, Pevsnera i Białostockog – tako je bitno određivao tumačenja pojedinih razdoblja kreativnih aktivnosti, korpusa, oblikovnih i 'stilskih' (*stilus*) usmjerenja, ili pak pojedinačnih opusa i spomeničnih vrijednosti.<sup>44</sup>

*Središte (centrum) i periferija* (lat. *periphēria* od st.-gr. περιφέρειν = *periphēreia*) bili su ključni pojmovi kako u tumačenjima modernizma i avangarde, a posebno u pokušajima *tkanja* pripovijesti o kreativnim djelovanjima i djelanjima/*šīnā'ata* kulturnih sredina koje su iz pozicije središta smatrani rubnima, bez obzira na kategorizaciju fenomena (grčki: φαινόμενο = *phainómenon*), a u skladu s time

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<sup>42</sup> Vidi fusnotu 13.

<sup>43</sup> U tom smislu vrijedi spomenuti koncept „geohistorije umjetnosti“ Thomasa DaCoste Kaufmanna objavljenog u u zborniku: *Time and Place. The Geohistory of Art*, (ur. Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann i Elizabeth Pilliod), Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005; Model „horizontalne povijesti umjetnosti“ Piotr Piotrowski je razrađivao u više tekstova, među kojima izdvajamo, Piotrowski, Piotr: *On the Spatial Turn, Or Horizontal Art History. Umění/Art*, br. 5., časopis Ústavu dějin umění Akademie věd České republiky, Prag, 2008., str. 378-383. Kasnije je isti članak objavljen i na poljskom *O horizontalnej historii sztuki. Artium Quaestiones XX*, Instytut Historii Sztuki UAM, Poznań, 2009, 59-73; Zatim isti autor je objavio i postkolonijalnu teoriju u studijima vizualne kulture, Piotrowski, Piotr: *East European Art Peripheries Facing Post-Colonial Theory*; u: *Non-site.org*, br. 12, 2014., str. 62-76,

Dostupno na: <http://nonsite.org/article/east-european-art-peripheries-facing-post-colonial-theory>. Pristupljeno 18. 10. 2019.

<sup>44</sup> Povijesni pregled fenomenologije ideja u filozofiji i okcidentalnoj historiji umjetnosti, odnosno konkretnu svojevrsnu kratku povijest geografije umjetnosti, vidjeti Kaufmann, Dacosta Thomas: *Toward a Geography of Art*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2004., str. 17-104.

this hybrid transmission the significant places of power play the main role in seeing updated creative expressions and justified ways of characterization, and in making classifications according to 'isms', forms, ethnicities, 'styles' (Ar. *al-uslūb*, pl. *al-asālib*)<sup>42</sup> defined by themselves. However, products of aestheticized actions constructed in many so-called 'marginal' areas, though not *illuminated*, still expose the fact that it is often the *margin* that takes the leading aesthetic role. It is evident in the case of the modalities of *qadar/ṣinā'at* discourse, and in this case the imposition of the *peripheral artistic production* or '*peripheral particularity*', i.e. the status of *subordination* to the so-called centers makes it necessary both to challenge this paradigm and completely ignore it.

We believe that it is not too exaggerated to conclude that different levels of the relationship between the **center** (*viscus*) and the **periphery** (*peripheriae*) occupied many Occidental approaches to the '*history of art*' as a Eurocentric academic discipline for the most part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Geographic, national and certainly religious approaches<sup>43</sup> were some of the basic starting points, inevitably, in all attempts to identify the center and the periphery in a given historical period, and then interpretations of their mutual relationship. Latently or explicitly in many methodological orientations of philosophy, '*history of art*' and culture, the **phenomenon of dimensions** – from Herder, Hegel, Schnaase and Taine, for instance, then Riegl, Dvořák and other members of the *Vienna School of Art History*, to Focillon, Kubler, Pevsner and Białostocki – essentially defined the interpretation of individual periods of creative activities, corpuses, orientations of form and 'style' (*stilus*), or individual opuses and monumental values.<sup>44</sup>

**Center** (*centrum*) and **periphery** (Lat. *periphēria* from Old-Gr. περιφέρειν = *periphēreia*) were the key concepts both in interpretations of modernism and the avant-garde and in attempts to *weave* the narration of creative activities and actions/*ṣinā'at* of cultural environments that were considered peripheral to the position of the center, regardless of the categorization of the phenomenon (Gr. φαινόμενο = *phainōmenon*), and accordingly, of inferior value. In this case, in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century the „Western” perspective on 'art historiography' was notably established, which highlights the transnational quality of „Islamic art history”. Of course, it does not bypass the current modernism and historical

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<sup>42</sup> See footnote 13.

<sup>43</sup> In this sense, it is worthwhile to mention the concept „geohistory of art” by Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann, published in the collection of papers: *Time and Place. The Geohistory of Art*, (ed. Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann and Elizabeth Pilliod), Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005; Piotr Piotrowski developed the model of „horizontal history of art” in several papers, including Piotrowski, Piotr: *On the Spatial Turn, Or Horizontal Art History*. *Umění/Art*, no. 5, journal Ústavu dějin umění Akademie věd České republiky, Prague, 2008, pp. 378-383. The same paper was later published in Polish: *O horyzontalnej historii sztuki*. *Artium Quaestiones XX*, Instytut Historii Sztuki UAM, Poznań, 2009, 59-73; This author also published a postcolonial theory in the studies of visual culture: Piotrowski, Piotr: *East European Art Peripheries Facing Post-Colonial Theory*; in: *Non-site.org*, no. 12, 2014, pp. 62-76, Available at: <http://nonsite.org/article/east-european-art-peripheries-facing-post-colonial-theory>. Accessed on 18. 10. 2019.

<sup>44</sup> For the historical overview of the phenomenology of ideas in philosophy and Occidental history of art, i.e. an actual distinctive brief history of the geography of art, see: Kaufmann, Dacosta Thomas: *Toward a Geography of Art*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2004, pp. 17-104.



i vrijednosno inferiornim. U ovom slučaju, sredinom 20. stoljeća dolazi do izražaja uspostavljena „zapadna“ perspektiva ‘umjetničke historiografije’ koja ističe transnacionalnu kvalitetu „islamske historije umjetnosti“, podrazumijeva se ne zaobilazeći aktualni modernizam i povijesnu „zapadnu“ avangardu, ali ih sve zajedno razumijeva na ograničen način, ponajprije afirmirajući koncepte ‘umjetničkog napretka’ i emisije „progresivnih“ tendencija iz središta prema periferiji. Takva perspektiva postaje dominantna uspostavljanjem ‘umjetničkih kanona’ transnacionalne kvalitete, te ima privilegij u vrijednosnom i svemu ostalom. ‘Umjetnost’ zapadnog kulturnog kruga, sa izričitim redefeniranjem fenomena što se naziva „islamska umjetnost“, upravo potiskuje one forme u kojima su lokalne posebnosti kreativne produkcije više dolazile do izražaja. Iako su prvenstveno te „rubne posebnosti“ bile garant navodne transnacionalnosti kao osnovnog obilježja „islamske umjetnosti“, ali i srednjoevropskog i istočnoevropskog modernizma i avangarde, obrada kanoniziranih kreativnih pojava i osobnosti nije ostavljala mnogo mjesta za drukčiju valorizaciju ‘umjetničkih prinosa’ koji su nastajali izvan aktualnih središta.

Jednu od potvrda ovakvog stava moguće je pronaći i u analizi prof. Rudolfa Kleina (rođ. 1930) sa Harvardskog univerziteta, koji iznosi mišljenje o izraženim tenzijama između centra i periferije, odnosno projekcije Zapada na Istok, a poslije i dekonstrukcije tih pojmova:

*... Devetnaesto stoljeće koristilo je istočnjački stil (a ujedno i čitav Orijent) kao ‘tutti frutti’, svojevrsnu mješavinu, spram koje se jasno potvrđuje suverenost okcidentalne umjetnosti (i civilizacije). No u stvarnosti Zapad se pretvorio u ‘tutti frutti’, a periferija je ostala još neko vrijeme kompaktna, kako su to otkrili strukturalisti sredinom 20. stoljeća. Poststrukturalizam dovodi u pitanje valjanost pojma centra i periferije te nastaje opća zbrka koju zovemo globalizacijom kulture<sup>45</sup> (akcentirao aut.).*

Ako se već nastoji umijećem kreativne aktivnosti, odnosno odgovarajućim modalitetima diskursa *qadar/šīnā’ata homo islamicusa* promovirati estetizacija unutar onog što se titulira kao ‘umjetnost’, te na predviđen način označiti zajedničkim „svijetom života“, shvaćeno kao „vladavina izvornih očiglednosti“, a nesumnjivo to nije slučaj, onda skrivena razlika unutar onog dijela ‘umjetnosti’ koju je ona „prevladala“, isijava užasavajućim zračenjem njegovog „ignoriranja, odnosno postojanja“. Iz rakursa ‘onog drugog u umjetnosti’ moglo bi se opisati kao kolektivna posebnost, a *homo islamicus* kao pojedinac koji bi joj eventualno mogao biti zanimljiv u specifičnom odnosu prema univerzalnom, odnosno upotpunjavanju *Geista*.<sup>46</sup> Njegova individualnost (bez duha inicijacije) bi tada mogla biti

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<sup>45</sup> Klein, Rudolf: *Ludwig Försterov Dohány-Tempel u Pešti : Maurska katedrala za ‘Azijate Europe’ = Ludwig Förster’s Dohány Tempel in Pest : Moorish Cathedral for the ‘Asiates Of Europe’*. *Prostor – Znanstveni časopis za arhitekturu i urbanizam / A Scholarly Journal of Architecture and Urban Planning*, 17 [2009], 2 [38], Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Arhitektonski fakultet / University of Zagreb, Faculty of Architecture, Zagreb, 2009., str. 225.

<sup>46</sup> *Geist* na njemačkom jeziku znači „duh, duhovitost, um, oštouman, biti razborit“ ... Pojmom „duh“ u većini jezika označuje se misaoni sadržaj, a sa psihološke strane označuje onaj dio ljudskog života tj. onaj sadržaj koji se nalazi u razumu ili umu kao i promišljanje na razuman način.

Nažalost, podrazumijevajući ono što je u evropskoj tradiciji nazivano *Geistom*, visoka kultura nesumnjivo je imala

„Western” avant-garde but understands all of them in a limited way, primarily affirming the concepts of ‘*artistic progress*’ and emission of „progressive” tendencies from the center to the periphery. Such a perspective – which becomes dominant when establishing ‘*artistic canons*’ of transnational quality – has a privilege in terms of value and everything else. ‘Art’ of the Western cultural circle, as well as the explicit redefinition of the phenomenon which the West calls „Islamic art”, specifically of the forms where local particularities of creative production were more prominent, were designated/defined by inappropriate valorization of emanating values. Although it was these „peripheral singularities” that primarily guaranteed the alleged transnationality as the basic feature of „Islamic art”, as well as of Central-European and Eastern-European modernism and avant-garde, the processing of canonized creative phenomena and identities did not leave much space for a different evaluation of ‘*artistic yields*’ from beyond the **current centers**.

Some evidence of such a view can also be found in the analysis of Prof. Rudolf Klein (b. 1930) from Harvard University, who presents his opinion on the prominent tensions between the center and the periphery, i.e. of the projection of West toward East, and then the deconstruction of these concepts:

*... The 19<sup>th</sup> century used the Oriental style (as well as the entire Orient) as a ‘tutti frutti’; a distinctive concoction against which the sovereignty of Occidental art (and civilization) was clearly confirmed. In reality, however, it was the West that turned into a ‘tutti frutti’ while the periphery remained compact for some time longer, as was discovered by structuralists in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. Poststructuralism challenged the validity of the terms center and periphery, which led to the general confusion that we call the **globalization of culture**.<sup>45</sup> (emphases by the author).*

If the artistry of creative activity, i.e. the suitable modalities of *homo islamicus*’s *qadar/ṣināʿat* discourse, endeavor to promote aestheticization within what is titled ‘art’ and, in an anticipated way, to designate it as a shared „world of life” understood as the „rule of original obviousness”, which is certainly not the case, then the hidden difference within the part of ‘art’ which it has „overcome” *exudes* the horrifying radiation of its „ignoring, or existence”. From the angle of ‘*the other in art*’ it could be described as a collective singularity, and *homo islamicus* as an individual who could possibly be interesting in a particular relationship with the universal, i.e. in supplementing *Geist*.<sup>46</sup> His individuality

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<sup>45</sup> Klein, Rudolf: *Ludwig Försterov Dohány-Tempel u Pešti: Mauriska katedrala za 'Azijate Europe' = Ludwig Förster's Dohány Tempel in Pest: Moorish Cathedral for the 'Asiates Of Europe'*. *Prostor – Znanstveni časopis za arhitekturu i urbanizam / A Scholarly Journal of Architecture and Urban Planning*, 17 [2009], 2 [38], Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Arhitektonski fakultet / University of Zagreb, Faculty of Architecture, Zagreb, 2009, p. 225.

<sup>46</sup> *Geist* means „spirit, wit, mind, shrewd, reasonable” in German. In most languages, „spirit” refers to mental content, while from the psychological aspect it signified the part of human life, i.e. the content that is found in reason or the mind, as well as thinking in a reasonable way.

Unfortunately, implying what was called *Geist* in the European tradition, high culture doubtlessly had the ambition to offer itself as a „package” of moral belief, which certainly concealed an ideological tool, although it assures us that it is free from it.

„medij univerzalnog“, i u hodu bi premostila posebnosti, na kojima inzistira ‘umjetnost’. Dok su za ‘umjetnost’ one identificirane i personalizirane slučajnosti, za modalitete diskursâ *qadar/šīnā’ata* su naprotiv, skoro pa sve anonimne „činjenice života“, garantirano „ne slučajne“ već svjesno opredjeljene na tom putu u *dunjálučkom*<sup>47</sup> prostoru i vremenu.

Poznata je činjenica u ranosrednjovjekovnom razdoblju rijetkog i jedinstvenog izraza namjere *homo islamicusa*, odnosno potvrđivanja autorstva vlastoručnim pisanim prikazom imena na ostvarenjima ornamentalnog i kognitivnog usmjerenja *qadar/šīnā’ata*, kojim se potvrđuje njegov identitet u funkciji autograma. Nažalost, postoje i takve pretpostavke kako je riječ o nesklonosti začetnika/dizajnera estetizirane reprezentacije da potpišu svoja djela, odnosno da su *homines islamici* u „islamskim zemljama“ uglavnom bili *nepismeni radnici*, odsječeni od konteksta intelektualnog okruženja visoke kulture koja ih je obasjavala. Nejasno je kako su takve konstatacije mogle biti uopće zapisane, unatoč prisutnosti potpisa ali i nepotpisanih radova na srednjovjekovnim ostvarenjima (što je, ipak, u skladu s utvrđenim tropom u vezi sa nesklonošću *homo islamicusa* da potpišu svoja djela; uvjerenje i svjedočenje da je sve u našem univezumu stvorio Bog) ili dokazima da su srednjovjekovni keramičari sastavljali stihove koje su upisivali u svoja estetizirana djela.<sup>48</sup>

Primjeri autoriziranih djela /  
Examples of work authorization



ILUSTRACIJA - Kaligraf `Umar Aqta': Dio iz rukopisa Kur'ana, prije 1405.; Illuminator Zain al-'Abidin al-Tabrizi: *Illuminirana prednja stranica rukopisa Mantiq al-Tayr (Jezik ptica)*, oko 1600.; Illuminator Muhammad ibn Aibak ibn 'Abdallah: *Stranica iz rukopisa Kur'ana*, 1307-8.

ILLUSTRATION - Calligrapher by `Umar Aqta': Section from a Qur'an Manuscript, before 1405.; Illuminator by Zain al-'Abidin al-Tabrizi: *Illuminated Frontispiece of a Manuscript of the Mantiq al-Tayr (Language of the Birds)*, ca. 1600.; Illuminator by Muhammad ibn Aibak ibn 'Abdallah: *Folio from a Qur'an Manuscript*, 1307-8. © The Met Fifth Avenue.

ambiciju ponuditi se kao „paket“ moralnog uvjerenja, u čemu je dakako skriveno ideološko oruđe, iako nas uvjerava da je od njega oslobođena.

<sup>47</sup> *Dunjáluk* - ar. *dunyā* (*al-dunyā*, *addunyā*) + osm.-tur. suf. *-lik* - u značenju „ovaj svijet“, „zemaljski svijet“.

<sup>48</sup> Vidjeti Mayer, Leo Ary: *Islamic Architects and Their Works*. Albert Kundig, Geneva, 1956. = *The Art Bulletin*, The Bulletin of the College Art Association, svezak 38, br. 4, CAA, 1956. Dostupno na: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00043079.1956.11408344>. Pristupljeno 30.11.2016.

Na Međunarodnom kongresu orijentalista u Istanbulu 1951. godine Mayer je izvijestio kako identificira stotine pojedinačnih umjetnika i obrtnika, iznoseći na vidjelo imena ranije anonimnih *homo islamicusa*. Vidjeti i, Blair, Sheila S.: *A Brief Biography of Abu Zayd. Muqarnas, an Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World*, svezak 25, br. 1, Brill, 2008., str. 155-176. Dostupno na: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261776583\\_A\\_BRIEF\\_BIOGRAPHY\\_OF\\_ABU\\_ZAYD](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261776583_A_BRIEF_BIOGRAPHY_OF_ABU_ZAYD). Pristupljeno 30.11.2016.



(without the spirit of initiation) could then be a „medium of the universal” and it would bridge the singularities which ‘art’ insists on in the process. While for ‘art’ they are identified and personalized coincidences, for modalities of *qadar/šīnā‘at* discourse, on the other hand, almost all, even the anonymous „facts of life” are certainly „not accidental” but consciously determined on this road in earthly – *dunjālučki*<sup>47</sup> space and time.

In the early Middle Ages, it was a well-known fact that *homo islamicus* had a rare and unique expression of intention, i.e. of confirming his authorship with his personally written name on the creations of ornamental and cognitive *qadar/šīnā‘at* orientation, which confirmed his identity in the form of an autograph. Unfortunately, there are also assumptions about the unwillingness of the originator/designer of aestheticized representation to sign their works, i.e. that *homines islamici* in „Islamic countries” were mostly *illiterate laborers*, cut off from the context of the intellectual environment of high culture that illuminated them. It is unclear how such claims could be recorded at all, despite the presence of signatures, but also of unsigned works on medieval creations (which is nevertheless in line with the established trope related to *homo islamicus*’s unwillingness to sign their works – the conviction and testimony that everything in our universe was created by God) and evidence that medieval tile setters created verses which they inscribed in their aestheticized works.<sup>48</sup>

Examples of work authorization /  
Primeri autoriziranih djela




ILLUSTRATION – Illuminator by Muhammad ibn Taj al-Din Haidar Muzahhib Shirazi, 1562–83.; Painting attributed to Bihzad, ca. 1480.; Calligrapher and painting by Maulana Azhar, ca. 1430.; Painting by Riza-yi 'Abbasi, 1630.; Painting by Shaikh Zada, 1524–25.

ILUSTRACIJA – Iluminator Muhammad ibn Taj al-Din Haidar Muzahhib Shirazi, 1562–83.; Slika koja se pripisuje Bihzadu, ca. 1480.; Kaligraf i iluminator Maulana Azhar, ca. 1430.; Slika Riza-yije 'Abbasija, 1630.; Slika Shaikha Zade, 1524–25. © The Met Fifth Avenue.

<sup>47</sup> *Dunjāluk* – Ar. *al-dunyā* + Ott.-Tur. suf. *-lik* – meaning „this world”, the „earthly world”.

<sup>48</sup> See Mayer, Leo Ary: *Islamic Architects and Their Works*. Albert Kundig, Geneva, 1956. = The Art Bulletin, The Bulletin of the College Art Association, volume 38, no. 4, CAA, 1956. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00043079.1956.11408344>. Accessed on 30.11.2016.

At the International Congress of Orientalists in Istanbul in 1951, Mayer reported that he was identifying hundreds of individual artists and craftsmen, revealing names of previously anonymous *homines islamici*. Also see: Blair, Sheila S.: *A Brief Biography of Abu Zayd. Muqarnas*, an Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World, volume 25, no. 1, Brill, 2008., pp. 155–176. Available at: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261776583\\_A\\_BRIEF\\_BIOGRAPHY\\_OF\\_ABU\\_ZAYD](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261776583_A_BRIEF_BIOGRAPHY_OF_ABU_ZAYD). Accessed on 30.11.2016.

Primjer autorizacije djela, datiranja i posvete /  
Example of work authorisation, dating and dedication



ILUSTRACIJA - Mu'in Musavvir, *Portret homo islamicusa Reze Abbasija*, potpisan i datiran 1673. godine, zbirka Garrett, Sveučilišna knjižnica Princeton, inv.br. 95G.

ILLUSTRATION - Mu'in Musavvir, *Portrait of the homo islamicus Reza Abbasi*, signed and dated 1673 AD, Garrett Collection, Princeton University Library, inv.no. 95G.

Prava bit stvari jest upravo u tome što okcidentalno-vesternizirana sadržajnost 'umjetnosti' koristi posebno i pojedinačno, a diskurs *qadar/šīnā'ata* samo ono posebno (ar. *al-khāṣ*) kao nositelja univerzalnog (ar. *al-kullī*), i tako bi 'umjetnost' svjedočila o zajedničkom duhu ali bez prisustva općeg duha inicijacije *homo islamicusa*. Ako bi se individualnost *homo islamicusa* uzdignula iznimno do njegove evropske bitnosti, što ipak nije opravdano, univerzalnost bi se neminovno oslobodila apstraktnosti, ali i njegove iskrene duhovne potpore (ar. *al-madd al-rūhī*) za svjesno estetizirano *djelanje/šīnā'at* unutar modalitetâ diskursâ *qadar/šīnā'ata*. Čini se nužnim kazati kako neuvažavanje, kojeg se nije lahko osloboditi, unosi pukotinu u moguće univerzalističke „pretenzije“ s jedne strane, te s druge strane totalizaciju univerzalističkih pretenzija. Izgleda da je nužna diferencijacija akademske okcidentalno-vesternizirane sadržajnosti 'umjetnosti', ne radi „pokopa“ sekularnosti, nego radi „činjenične“ ravnopravnosti 'umjetnosti' i modaliteta diskursâ *qadar/šīnā'ata* s obzirom na evidentno stanje *na terenu*. Tek se naime s diferencijom (fr. *différance*), odnosno kroz igru tragova, kao takva ocrta i prisutna disproporcija različitih znakovnih jedinica.

Inscription (confirmation of authorship):

“The likeness of the one who takes refuge in [God’s] mercy and forgiveness, the deceased, the one whose abode is paradise, my master Reza, the ‘Abbasi painter, God’s mercy and forgiveness be upon him. [It] was copied [from an original drawn] in the year 104[?] and was completed on the ffth of the month of Safar of the year 1087, which concluded in success and victory, as a keepsake (?) for insertion in an album, may it be blessed.

Drawn by Mu’in Musavvir, may God forgive his sins.”

Natpis (potvrđivanje autorstva)

„Sličnost onoga koji se utječe [Božijem] milosrđu i oprost, umrli, onaj čije je boravište džennet, moj gospodar Reza, 'Abbasi slikar, Božija milost i oprost neka je na njega. [To] je kopirano [iz originala nacrtanog] 104.[?] godine i dovršeno je petog u mjesecu Safaru 1087. godine, koja je završila uspjehom i pobjedom, kao uspomena (?) za umetanje u album, neka je blagoslovljen.

Nacrtao Mu'in Musavvir, Allah mu oprostio grijehje.”



ILLUSTRATION – Portrait of the *homo islamicus* Reza 'Abbasi by Mu'in Musavvir, Isfahan, Iran, signed and dated 5 Safar Ah 1087/19 April 1676 AD.

© Christie's Images Ltd 2018.

ILUSTRACIJA – Portret *homo islamicusa* Reze 'Abbasija od Mu'ina Musavvira, Isfahan, Iran, potpisan i datiran 5. Safar Ah 1087/19.04.1676.

© Christie's Images Ltd 2018.

The true essence of the issue is that the Occidental-westernized content of 'art' uses the **particular** and the **individual**, while the *qadar/šīnā'at* discourse uses the **particular** (Ar. *al-khāṣ*) only as a carrier of the **universal** (Ar. *al-kullī*), and in this way 'art' would testify to the common spirit, but without the presence of the general spirit of *homo islamicus's* initiation. If *homo islamicus's* individuality were elevated in a particular way to his European essence, which is still not justified, universality would inevitably be freed from his abstraction, as well as from his sincere spiritual support (Ar. *al-madd al-rūḥī*) to conscious aestheticized actions/*šīnā'at* within the modalities of *qadar/šīnā'at* discourse. It seems necessary to note that **disrespect**, which is not easy to get rid of, makes a crack in possible universalist „pretensions“ on the one hand, and the totalization of universalist pretensions on the other. It seems that the **differentiation** of Occidental-westernized academic content of 'art' is necessary, not for the purpose of „burying“ secularity but for the purpose of the „factual“ equality of 'art' and the modalities of *qadar/šīnā'at* discourse, keeping in mind the obvious conditions *in the field*. Indeed, it is only by *différance* (Fr. *différance*), i.e. through a game of traces, that the present disproportion of different sign units is outlined.



Usprkos svemu, ne treba garantirati nikakvu apsolutnu privilegiju kriteriju diferencijacije u 'umjetnosti' nauštrb *vjernosti* uopće. Radi se o drugoj vjernosti, te o prosuđivanju i procjenjivanju između dvije vjernosti. Čini se da bi se 'umjetnost' morala potruditi i biti što je moguće vjernija. Ne zbog brige oko proračunljive tačnosti, nego zato što će se pozvati da slijedi i zakon drugog načina vjernosti određenog estetiziranog izraza, njegovom nalogu, njegovom identitetu, njegovom tekstu, tog drugog događaja utoliko što se već prije desio i što bi se na njega trebalo odgovoriti. Modaliteti diskursâ *qadar/šīnā' ata* su tu i potrebno ih je bilo analizirati, proučiti, istražiti, sagledati, prije nas, ali ne vidimo razloga zašto ne i danas pred i sa „nama“. Antonimija je spremna uvažiti zakon drugoga, ne tako što će mu se pasivno pokoravati nego što će ga supotpisati u svoj njegovoj specifičnoj prouzročivosti, kako bi mogla respektirati autentifikaciju estetiziranog djelanja bilo kog *homo islamicusa*. Nažalost, situacija izgleda posve drugačije. Po svemu sudeći, ne postoji akademsko opredjeljenje da se navodno „nesumjerljivi“ modaliteti diskursâ *qadar/šīnā' ata*, na određen način usuglase sa 'umjetnošću' i eventualno *ovjeri* specifična situacija „zakona drugog“. Zasižno bez toga nemoguće je uspostaviti odnos sa bilo kojim drugim estetiziranim djelovanjem, ili čak djelanjem/*šīnā' ata*om kao takvim. Radi se o napetosti između strategije *qadar/šīnā' ata* *homo islamicusa*, s jedne, i gotovo 'svete vjernosti umjetnikove umjetnosti', s druge strane. Ova napetost je na djelu u većem obimu akademskih anksioznih razmišljanja prilikom prikaza, iščitavanja, tumačenja, sagledavanja iz vana, ona je čak prisutna i kao vokabularna identifikacija. Takva razmišljanja treba pustiti da traju, shvaćajući ih, približavajući im se i eventualno ukazujući im i po potrebi objašnjavajući fundamentalnu problematiku nutarnosti *homo islamicusovog* djelanja/*šīnā' ata*, a ipak pri svemu tome ostavljajući ih nedirnutim u njihovoj anksioznosti. *Homines islamici* preferiraju teozofsku mudrost (mistična ili ezoterična gnoza) koja teži nutarnjoj kontemplativnoj vizualizaciji (ar. *al-mušāhadah*), koja se ne zadobija ni puninom definicija ni izražajnošću silogizama, već snagom istočne svjetlosti (ar. *al-išrāq*) koja se rađa na Istoku duše. Poznata je činjenica da su znanje (*doctrina*), pa čak i apodiktični argumenti utemeljeni na svjedočenju (*martyrium*). Slijed dokazivanja u svim znanostima, kako tvrdi Derrida *pretpostavlja neki sloj vjere*.<sup>49</sup> No, nad tim bezdanim temeljem moćna gradnja je ipak konstruirala uvjete postojane autonomije onoga što se titulira kao 'umjetnost'.

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<sup>49</sup> *Fidélité à plus d'un : Derrida, Celan, Brenner, Cixous, Blanchot*. Érudit Journals, Spirale magazine culturel inc., br. 195, Montréal (Québec), mart-april 2004; Dostupno na: <https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/spirale/2004-n195-spirale1057121/>. Pristupljeno 20.4.2020. = *Vjernost 'više nego jednom' : Zaslužiti nasljeđivanje tamo gdje genealogija manjka* (s francuskoga preveo Ugo Vlasisavljević. *Tvrđa*, časopis za književnost, umjetnost, znanost, Hrvatsko društvo pisaca, Ivanić-Grad 2011., 1/2, str. 11-46. Dostupno na: <https://katalog.kgz.hr/pagesResults/bibliografskiZapis.aspx?&currentPage=1&searchById=30&sort=0&spid0=30&spv0=ljudsko+tijelo++umjetni%C4%8Dke+teme+i+motivi&selectedId=245003966&nbf=1>. Pristupljeno 20.4.2020. Prijevod, autorski rukopis, str. 49.

Nevertheless, one should not guarantee any absolute privilege for the criterion of *différance* in 'art' detrimental to **fidelity** in general. It is another fidelity and evaluation and assessment between two fidelities. It seems that 'art' should try and be as **true** as possible. The reason is not a caring for calculable accuracy, but that it will be called upon to also follow the law of another way of fidelity to a particular aestheticized expression, to its commission, to its identity, its text, to the other event inasmuch as it has already happened and should be responded to. Modalities of *qadar/šīnā'at* discourse are here and they should be analyzed, studied, investigated, perceived, before us, although we cannot see the reason why not also today, in front of and with „us”. Antonymy is willing to accept the law of the other, not by passively yielding to it but by cosigning it in its **distinctive causation**, so as to be able to respect the **authentication of aestheticized actions** of any *homo islamicus*. Unfortunately, things seem to be completely different. By all accounts, there is an academic orientation to align, in some way, the allegedly „incommensurable” modalities of *qadar/šīnā'at* discourse with 'art', and possibly *certify* the distinctive situation of the „law of the other”. It is certainly necessary for establishing a relationship with any other aestheticized activity, or even with actions/*šīnā'at* as such. It is the tension between *homo islamicus's qadar/šīnā'at* strategy on the one hand, and the almost '*sacred fidelity of the artist's art*' on the other. This tension is at work in most academic anxious thoughts when reviewing, perusing, interpreting, viewing from the outside, it is even present as vocabulary identification. Such thinking should be allowed to last, and one should understand it, get closer to it, possibly indicate it and, if needed, explain the fundamental issue of the inside of *homo islamicus's* actions/*šīnā'at*, while still leaving it intact in its anxiety. *Homines islamici* prefer theosophic wisdom (mystic or esoteric gnosis) which strives toward inner contemplative visualization (Ar. *al-moshāhadah*), and which is not achieved by the totality of definitions or expressiveness of syllogisms, but rather by the power of eastern light (Ar. *al-ishrāq*) which is born in the East of the soul. It is a well-known fact that knowledge (*doctrine*) and even apodictic arguments are based on testimony (*martyrium*). The sequence of arguments in all sciences, as Derrida claims, *assumes some layer of faith*.<sup>49</sup> However, over this abysmal foundation, a powerful construction has nonetheless built the conditions for a stable autonomy of what is titled 'art'.

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<sup>49</sup> *Fidélité à plus d'un: Derrida, Celan, Brenner, Cixous, Blanchot*. Érudit Journals, *Spirale* magazine culturel inc., no. 195, Montréal (Québec), March–April 2004; Available at: <https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/spirale/2004-n195-spirale1057121/>. Accessed on 20.4.2020. = *Vjernost 'više nego jednom' : Zaslužiti nasljeđivanje tamo gdje genealogija manjka* (translated from French by Ugo Vlajsavljević). *Tvrđa*, časopis za književnost, umjetnost, znanost, Hrvatsko društvo pisaca, Ivanič-Grad 2011, 1/2, pp. 11-46. Available at: <https://katalog.kgz.hr/pagesResults/bibliografskiZapis.aspx?currentPage=1&searchById=30&sort=0&spid0=30&spv0=ljudsko+tijelo+--+umjetni%C4%8Dk+e+teme+i+motivi&selectedId=245003966&nbf=1>. Accessed on 20.4.2020. Translation in author's manuscript, p. 49.

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
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Mustafa CERİĆ

**O PRIRODNOJ VJERI (AL-ĪMĀN) I FORMALNOJ RELIGIJI (AL-DĪN)**

**ON NATURAL FAITH (AL-ĪMĀN) AND FORMAL RELIGION (AL-DĪN)**



## Sažetak

Ovaj članak je fokusiran na međudjelovanje prirodne vjere (*al-īmān*), formalne ili umjetne religije (*al-dīn*) i umijeća politike (*fann al-siyāsah*) u islamu. Vjera (*trust*) u Boga je iskonska vjera (*al-īmān*) koju dijele svi ljudi svjesni da su Božija stvorenja kojima je Svevišnji Bog udahnuo Svog duha (*al-rūḥ*). To je potencijalna vrijednost vjere. Dakle, vjera u Boga je prirodna materija (*hyle*). Kao takva nema formu/oblik (*al-ṣūrah* ili *al-ṣakl*). Oblik materije vjere postaje religija (*al-dīn*) nakon što je instruktivna teologija oblikuje u dogmu, koja nije nužno u potpunoj saglasnosti s iskonskom materijom (*hyle*) vjere, ali ne može se reći ni da je oblik (*al-ṣūrah* ili *al-ṣakl*) religije (*al-dīn*), kao formalna teologija, potpuno lišen materije ili supstance prirodne vjere (*al-īmān*). Umijeće politike (*fann al-syāsah*), politika koja upotrebljava ili zloupotrebljava prirodno urođenu vjeru (*al-īmān*) i formalnu religiju (*al-dīn*) održava kontinuitet i potiče promjene u povijesti. U ovom procesu kontinuiteta i promjene mnoge su sile u islamskoj povijesti bile u igri i mnoge krize su se zbog toga javljale. Ovaj članak je pokušaj identificiranja ovih “sila”, fokusirajući se na fenomen povijesnih i suvremenih devijacija “ekstremizma” u svijetu islama.

**Ključne riječi:** islam, čista vjera (*al-īmān*), formalna religija (*al-dīn*), diktat vjere, zavjet vjere, talibani, šerijat.

## Abstract

This article is focused on the interplay of natural faith (*al-īmān*), formal or artificial religion (*al-dīn*), and the art of politics (*fannu-l-siyāsah*) in Islam. Trust in God is primordial faith (*al-īmān*), which is shared by all human beings in the conception of their creation by God who breathes His soul (*al-rūḥ*) into each and every human being as a potential trust in Him. Thus, trust in God is the matter (*hyle*) of faith. The faith is not yet the form (*al-ṣūrah* or *al-shakl*). The form of the matter of faith becomes religion (*al-dīn*), after it has been shaped by the art of theologians as an artificial theology, which is not necessarily wholly compatible with the primordial matter (*hyle*) of faith, but it cannot be said that the form (*al-ṣūrah* or *al-shakl*) of religion (*al-dīn*), as formal or artificial theology, is totally void of the matter or substance of the natural faith (*al-īmān*). The art of politics (*fann al-siyāsah*), a politics that uses or abuses naturally born faith (*al-īmān*) and formal religion (*al-dīn*) is to preserve continuity and encourage change in history. In this process of continuity and change, many forces in Islamic history were at play and many crises arose as a result. This article is an attempt to identify these “forces”, focusing on the phenomenon of historical and contemporary deviations of “extremism” in the world of Islam.

**Key words:** Islam, pure faith (*al-īmān*), formal religion (*al-dīn*), dictate of faith, covenant of faith, Taliban, *Sharī'ah*.

## O PRIRODNOJ VJERI (*AL-ĪMĀN*) I FORMALNOJ RELIGIJI (*AL-DĪN*)

### Uvod

**m**oja istinska želja, otkad sam zakoračio u Gazi Husrev-begovu medresu u Sarajevu, zatim kao studenta na Univerzitetu Al-Azhar u Kairu te, naravno, kasnije na postdiplomskom studiju na Čikaškom univerzitetu, bila je da ustanovim da li postoji prirodno urođena vjera koju u biti jednako dijele svi ljudi. Preciznije, htio sam znati razliku između prirodne vjere i formalne ili instruktivne religijske teologije. Ali, prvo, postoji li razlika između tog dvoga? Osjećao sam nekako u dubini moje svijesti da postoje razlike između „prirodne” vjere i „vještačke” religije, jer je primjetno da postoje drastično divergentna i devijantna tumačenja vjere (religije) na temelju kolektivne religijske svijesti i osobnog religijskog iskustva.

Nadalje, osjećao sam da, ako bi svaki čovjek pošao od izvornog osjećaja prirodne vjere, koja je zajednička svim ljudima, čovječanstvu bi bilo lakše prihvatiti činjenicu da su svi ljudi jedno čovječanstvo (One Humanity), jer je Bog jedan te isti Stvoritelj univerza, odnosno multiverza, i unutar njega čovječanstva. Sâma ideja da dijelimo istu bit i istu supstancu vjere u Boga kao urođenu tvar (*hyle*) u našoj duši, približava nas jedne drugima i inspirira nas da jedni s drugima saradujemo. Na kraju krajeva, Svevišnji Bog je svjetlo nebesa i Zemlje. Božije svjetlo dodiruje sve i svakoga na zemlji. Bog je također ljubav. Njegova ljubav dopire do svakog čovjeka bez obzira na to bio on/ona svjestan toga ili ne. Za razliku od životinja i biljaka, ljudi su dodatno opremljeni Božijim svjetlom, a to je svjetlo uma, odnosno to je ljudski razum koji ne može a da se ne uhvati u koštac sa svojom okolinom bez obzira na to da li je to što radi dobro ili loše za čovječanstvo. Naravno, najizazovnije od svega je ljudska misao o Bogu jer je Bog skriven od čovjekovog pogleda, ali čovjek osjeća Božiju prisutnost u svojoj duši kao urođeni osjećaj svoje prirodne vjere u Tvorca nebesa i Zemlje.

## ON NATURAL FAITH (*AL-ĪMĀN*) AND FORMAL RELIGION (*AL-DĪN*)

### Introduction

It has been my deep concern since I had entered into the field of religious studies as a young pupil at the Islamic Madrasa in Sarajevo, then as a student at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, and, of course, later on as a postgraduate student at the University of Chicago to figure out if there is an innate nature of faith that is shared by all humanity. To be precise, I wanted to know the difference between a natural faith and a formal or artificial religious theology. But, first, is there a difference between the two? I felt somehow in my deep consciousness that there was a difference between the two because of the drastically divergent and deviant streams in religious and theological interpretations of faith as a matter of collective background and personal experience.

Furthermore, I felt that if humanity comes to the original terms with a natural faith that is common to all human beings, it would be easier for humanity to accept the fact that we humans are a single humanity because God is the One and the Same Creator of all the universe, nay the multiverse, and within it the whole humanity. The very idea that we share the same core and the same substance of trust in God as an innate item in our soul, moves us closer to each other and inspires us to cooperate with each other for good. After all, God is the light of heavens and earth and His light touches everything and everyone on earth. God is love as well. His love reaches every human being whether he/she is aware of it or not. Unlike the animals and plants, the humans are additionally equipped with God's light in their mind, i.e., in their human reason that cannot but tackle with everything around regardless whether this would be good or bad for humanity. Of course, the most challenging of all is human thought about God as God is hidden from man's sight but man feels God's presence in his soul as an innate sense of his trust in God.



Ako prihvatimo premisu da svi ljudi dijele isti potencijal vjere (*trust*) u Boga, što je prirodna vjera kao takva, onda se postavlja pitanje (*petitio principia*): pretpostavlja li ta premisa istinitost zaključka? Pretpostavlja li se zaključak da su svi ljudi jednaki u svojoj izvornoj ili urođenoj sposobnosti da vjeruju u Boga čak i prije nego što budu izloženi Božanskom pozivu u vjeru? Ustvari, uloga Božanske riječi ili objave je da oblikuje prirodnu materiju (*hyle*)<sup>1</sup> vjere (*al-īmān*) u oblik religije (*al-dīn*), tj. Božanski zakon (*al-šarī'ah*). Ova ideja je eksplicitna u Časnom Kur'ānu u ajetima: 44, 46, 47 i 48, 5. poglavlja *Al-Mā'idah*:

44. *Mi smo objavili Tevrat, u kome je uputstvo i svjetlo. Po njemu su jevrejima sudili vjerovjesnici, koji su bili Allahu poslušni i čestiti ljudi, i učeni, od kojih je traženo da čuvaju Allahovu knjigu, i oni su nad njom bdjeli. Zato se, kada budete sudili, ne bojte ljudi, već se bojte Mene, i ne zamjenjujte riječi Moje za nešto što malo vrijedi! A oni koji ne sude prema onome što je Allah objavio, oni su pravi nevjernici.*

46. *Poslije njih poslali smo Isaa, sina Merjemina, koji je priznao Tevrat prije njega objavljen, a njemu smo dali Indžil, u kome je bilo uputstvo i svjetlo, i da potvrdi Tevrat, prije njega objavljen, u kome je također bilo uputstvo i pouka onima koji su se Allaha bojali,*

47. *i sljedbenicima Indžila smo bili naredili da sude prema onome što je Allah objavio u njemu. Oni koji nisu sudili prema onome što je Allah objavio – pravi su grješnici.*

48. *A tebi objavljujemo Knjigu, samu istinu, da potvrdi knjige prije nje objavljene i da nad njima bdi. I ti im sudi prema onome što Allah objavljuje i ne povodi se za prohtjevima njihovim, i ne odstupaj od Istine koja ti dolazi; svima vama smo zakon i pravac (način života) propisali. A da je Allah htio, On bi vas sljedbenicima jedne vjere učinio, ali, On hoće da vas iskuša u onome što vam propisuje, zato se natječite ko će više dobra učiniti; Allahu ćete se svi vratiti, pa će vas On o onome u čemu ste se razilazili obavijestiti.*

Ovaj eksplicitni kur'anski pluralitet ne samo formalnih religija već i „Božanskih zakona” (*šarī'ah*) i „načina života” (*minhādž*) najuvjerljiviji je dokaz za zajedničku prirodnu vjeru (*al-īmān*) u konkurenciji sa formalnom ili umjetnom religijom (*al-dīn* ili *al-islām*), koja bi mogla postati ekstremna i isključiva ideologija opterećena nerazumnom politikom. Upravo u ovoj tački pronašao sam zanimljivu analizu mog profesora Freda Donnera sa Univerziteta u Čikagu o putu razvoja rane muslimanske zajednice od „vjernika” do „muslimana”. Naime, Donner tvrdi da su Muhammed, a.s., i njegovi sljedbenici sebe u početku doživljavali kao zajednicu vjernika (ar. *al-mu'minūn*), zajednicu kojoj su svi, koji su imali jaku vjeru u Jednog Boga i Sudnji dan, pripadali. Nadalje, Donner tvrdi da korijen islama leži u onome što bismo mogli nazvati „pokretom vjernika”, koji je započeo Muhammed, a.s., kao religijsku reformu. Ovaj pokret naglašava strogi *tawhīd*, monoteizam, i ponašanje po pravdi u skladu s Božijim objavljenim zavjetom/zakonom. Tako je „pokret vjernika” u ranim godinama islama uključivao pravedne kršćane i židove, jer su, poput vjernika Kur'ana, i kršćani i jevreji, bili monoteisti i pristajali su živjeti po pravdi

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<sup>1</sup> Ovdje se aludira na Aristotelovu doktrinu materije (*hulê*) i forme (*eidos* ili *morphê*). Izuzetno utjecajan na razvoj srednjovjekovne filozofije, Aristotelov hilomorfizam je također doživio nešto poput renesanse u savremenoj metafizici.

If we accept the premise that all human beings share the same potential of trust in God, which is a natural faith as such, then begging the question (*petitio principia*) is whether the premise assumes the truth of conclusion. In fact, it does assume the conclusion that all men are equal in their original or innate ability to trust in God even before they are exposed to a divine word. In fact, the role of the divine word or revelation is to shape the natural matter (*hulê*) of faith (*al-îmân*) into the form of religion (*al-dîn*), i.e., the divine law (*al-sharî'ah*).<sup>1</sup> This idea is explicit in the Holy Qur'ân in the verses: 44, 46, 47 and 48 of the 5<sup>th</sup> Chapter *Al-Mâ'idah*:

44. Surely, God revealed the Torah, wherein there is guidance and light. Thereby did Prophets – who had submitted themselves (to God) – judge for the Judaized folk; and so did the scholars and jurists. They judged by the Book of God for they had been entrusted to keep it, and bear witness to it. So (O Jews!) do not fear men but fear Me, and do not barter away My signs for a trivial gain. Those who do not judge by what God has revealed are indeed the unbelievers.

46. And We sent Jesus, the son of Mary, after those Prophets, confirming the truth of whatever there still remained of the Torah. We gave him the Gospel, wherein is guidance and light, and which confirms the truth of whatever there still remained of the Torah, and a guidance and admonition for the God-fearing.

47. Let the followers of the Gospel judge by what Allah has revealed therein, and those who do not judge by what Allah has revealed are the transgressors.

48. Then God revealed the Book to you (O Muhammad!) with Truth, confirming whatever of the Book was revealed before, and protecting and guarding over it. Judge, then, in the affairs of men in accordance with the Law that Allah has revealed, and do not follow their desires in disregard of the Truth which has come to you. For each of you God has appointed a Law and a Way of life. Had Allah so willed, He would surely have made you one single community; instead, (He gave each of you a Law and a Way of life) in order to test you by what He gave you. Vie, then, one with another in good deeds. Unto Allah is the return of all of you. He will then make you understand the truth concerning the matters on which you disagreed.

This explicit Qur'ânic plurality not only of formal religions but also of “divine laws” (*sharî'ah*) and “a way of life” (*minhâj*) is the most convicting proof for a shared natural faith (*al-imân*) in competition with a formal or artificial religion (*al-dîn* or *al-islâm*), which might become an extreme and exclusive ideology influenced by unreasonable politics. On this very point I have found an interesting analysis by my professor Fred Donner from the University of Chicago on the development road of the early Muslim community from “Believers” to “Muslims”. Namely, Donner argues that Muhammad, a.s., and his followers initially saw themselves as a community of Believers (ar. *al-mu'minûn*), a community to which all who had a strong faith in the One God and the Day of Judgment belonged. Furthermore, Donner argues that the root of Islam lies in what we might call the “Movement of Believers,” started by Muhammad, a. s., as a religious reform. This movement emphasizes strict *tawhîd*, monotheism, and righteous conduct in accordance with God's revealed covenant/law. Thus the “movement of believers” in the early years of Islam included righteous

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<sup>1</sup> I am echoing here the Aristotle's doctrine of matter (*hulê*) and form (*eidōs* or *morphê*). Highly influential in the development of Medieval philosophy, Aristotle's hylomorphism has also enjoyed something of a renaissance in contemporary metaphysics.

u skladu sa svojim zavjetima, *Tevratom* i *Indžilom*.<sup>2</sup> Vjerovanje da muslimani čine zasebnu vjersku zajednicu, različitu od kršćana i jevreja, pojavilo se stoljeće kasnije, kada su nasljednici pokreta vjernika odlučili da su pravi vjernici-muslimani samo oni koji drže Kur'an kao konačnu objavu Jednog Boga i Muhammeda kao posljednjeg Božijeg vjerovjesnika. To ih je odvojilo od monoteista koji su se identificirali s Torom ili Jevanđeljem.<sup>3</sup>

Ovdje mi je zagonetka bila intrigantna. Intrigiralo me je zašto i kako se pomak od prirodne vjere ili vjerovanja, koje je zajedničko svim ljudima, mijenja kao takvo da postane toliko neprirodno da više ne liči na sebe? Stvarno, pitanje je kako se ova prirodna vjera pretvara u formalnu ili umjetnu religiju/teologiju sa dijametralno različitim zaključcima ne samo formalno različitih religijskih tradicija nego i sljedbenika iste formalne religije? Zaista, naše bi pitanje trebalo biti kako religija (*al-dīn*) istog Božanskog (prirodnog) korijena postaje isključiva i opasna ideologija u sprezi sa opasnom politikom?



ILUSTRACIJA - Kaligrafsko rješenje zajedničke prirodne vjere, *al-islām*.  
ILLUSTRATION - Calligraphic solution of the common natural religion, *al-islām*.

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<sup>2</sup> Zanimljiv primjer može se primijetiti u mom iskustvu iz 2006. godine na Institutu Madison Lubar na Univerzitetu Wisconsin, gdje sam održao predavanje o Deset zapovijedi kao osnovi za smislen judeo-kršćansko-muslimanski dijalog. Naime, svoje predavanje sam bazirao na testu za slušatelje, čitajući im deset Božanskih citata, tražeći od njih da ocijene koji su od tih citata iz Tore, koji iz Evanđelja, a koji iz Kur'ana. Odgovori su bili različiti. Ali kada sam im rekao da su svih deset citata samo ajeti iz Kur'ana, bili su iznenađeni. Namjera je bila pokazati koliko je slična, ako ne i identična, *tawhīd*, monoteistička, ideja prirodno naslijeđena u sve tri ibrahimovske/abrahamovske tradicije. Vidjeti link dostupan: 26.09.2022.:

[https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&src=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiyqYeOkbL6AhX0\\_7sI-HXSODAcQFnoECBoQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fflubar.wisc.edu%2Farchive%2F2005-06%2F10Commandments.html&usg=AOvVaw0Tx9zZI29AbZSHBzqSjvA](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&src=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiyqYeOkbL6AhX0_7sI-HXSODAcQFnoECBoQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fflubar.wisc.edu%2Farchive%2F2005-06%2F10Commandments.html&usg=AOvVaw0Tx9zZI29AbZSHBzqSjvA)

<sup>3</sup> Vidjeti: Donner, Fred: *From Believers to Muslims : Confessional Self-identity in the Early Islamic Community*, *Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences*, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Journal 50-51, 2002-2003, p. 9-53.

Christians and Jews, because like believers in the Qur'ān, both Christians and Jews were monotheists and agreed to live righteously according to their revealed law, the *Tawrāt* (Tora) and the *Injīl* (Gospels).<sup>2</sup> The belief that Muslims form a separate religious community, different from Christians and Jews, emerged a century later, when the leaders of the belief movement decided that only those who held the Qur'an as the final revelation of the One God and Muhammad, a.s., as the last messenger of God, were legitimate Believers-Muslims. This decisively separated them from the monotheists, who identified themselves with the Torah or the Gospel.<sup>3</sup>

Here I found the puzzle intriguing. I am intrigued to know why and how the shift from a natural faith or belief that is common to all humans is being altered as such to become so unnatural that it sometimes does not resemble to itself anymore? Really, the question is how this natural faith is being transformed into a formal or artificial religion/theology with diametrically different conclusions not only by formal different religious traditions but also by the followers of the same formal religion? Indeed, our question should be as to how the religion (*al-dīn*) of the same divine (natural) root becomes an exclusive dangerous ideology supported by hazardous politics?



ILLUSTRATION ~ *Qur'ān* (Arabic calligraphy) as the final revelation of the One God and Muhammad as the last prophet of God.  
ILUSTRACIJA ~ *Kur'ān* (arapska kaligrafija) kao konačna objava Jednog Boga i Muhammeda kao posljednjeg Božijeg poslanika.

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<sup>2</sup> An interesting example may be noted in my experience (2006) at the Madison Lubar Institute at the University of Wisconsin, where I gave a lecture on the *Ten Commandments as a Basis for Meaningful Judeo-Christian-Muslim Dialogue*. Namely, I based my lecture on a test for listeners by reading them ten sacred quotations, asking them to rate which of these quotations are from the Torah, which are from the Gospels, and which are from the Qur'ān. The answers varied. But when I told them that all ten quotations were verses from the Qur'ān only, they were surprised. The intention was to show how similar, if not identical, is the *tawhīd*, monotheistic idea naturally inherited in all three Ibrahim/Abrahamic traditions.

See link available by 26.09. 2022:

[https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKewiyqYeOkbL6AhX0\\_7sIHXSODAcQFnoECBoQA-Q&url=https%3A%2F%2Fflubar.wisc.edu%2Farchive%2F2005-06%2F10Commandments.html&usg=AOvVaw0Tx9zZl29AbZSHBzquSjvA](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKewiyqYeOkbL6AhX0_7sIHXSODAcQFnoECBoQA-Q&url=https%3A%2F%2Fflubar.wisc.edu%2Farchive%2F2005-06%2F10Commandments.html&usg=AOvVaw0Tx9zZl29AbZSHBzquSjvA)

<sup>3</sup> See: Donner, Fred: *From Believers to Muslims: Confessional Self-identity in the Early Islamic Community*, *Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences*, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Journal 50-51, 2002-2003, p. 9-53.





ILUSTRACIJA - *Veliki Abu Sa'ud podučava zakon* – stranica iz *Divana Mahmuda `Abd-al Baqija* (detalj). Irak, Bagdad, sredina 16. stoljeća.  
Metropolitan muzej, ev. br. 25.83.9.





ILLUSTRATION ~ *The Great Abu Sa'ud Teaching Law* – Folio from a *Divan* of Mahmud 'Abd-al Baqi (detail). Iraq, Baghdad, mid-16<sup>th</sup> century. Metropolitan Museum, acc. num. 25.83.9.

## 1. U potrazi za prirodnom vjerom

Siguran sam da jevreji i hrišćani imaju svoje unutrašnje teološke razlike i ekstremne grupe koje bi trebale biti njihova unutrašnja briga. Rečeno nam je u jednom *hadisu*, koji je prenio Awf bin Malik: „Jevreji su bili podijeljeni u 71 sektu. Jedna od njih je u raju, njih sedamdeset je u paklu. Kršćani su podijeljeni u 72 sekte. Sedamdeset i jedna od njih je u paklu, jedna je u raju. Kunem se Allahom čija svemoć drži Muhammedovu volju, van svake sumnje, moj *ummet*, nacija, bit će podijeljena na 73 sekte. Jedna će biti na nebu, sedamdeset dvije će biti u plamenu. ‘O, Allahov Poslaniče! Ko su ti?’ ‘Ti su *al-džamā’ah* (zajednica koja se drži zajedno).’“<sup>4</sup>

Naravno, neću se zadržavati na jevrejskim i kršćanskim teološkim razlikama i ekstremnim grupama. Ovdje se bavim prirodnom vjerom islama i njegovim formalnim ili vještačkim religiozno/teološkim tumačenjima koja su ponekad neprepoznatljiva po svojoj izvornoj prirodi. Zaista, želim pronaći svoj urođeni osjećaj vjere u Boga kako bih se mogao nositi s formalnom ili umjetnom pripadnosti teologiji, kakva god ona bila. Zato što pripadnost određenoj vjerskoj grupi (*al-džamā’ah*) nije nužno istinska vjera, već može biti varljiva lojalnost lažnim vođama lažne ideologije. Zapravo, želim dokazati sebi, prije nego bilo kome drugom, da je ‘vjera’ urođena vjera u Boga, koja je zajednička cijelom čovječanstvu. Želim da shvatim ideju da je ‘vjera’ samodokazivi entitet kao što je ‘bitak’ (Heideggerov ‘Sein’) „koncept koji je sam po sebi dokaziv“. Parafrazirajući dalje Heideggerov pojam nedefiniranosti ‘bitka’, možemo reći da „kad god se neko odnosi prema entitetima, čak i prema sebi, koristi se ‘vjera’, tj. ‘vjera’ u Boga“; „ovaj izraz se smatra razumljivim ‘bez daljeg *ado*, odlaganja’, baš kao što svi razumiju ‘nebo je plavo’...“<sup>5</sup> Tako, poput pojma biće (*al-wujūd*), i vjera (*al-īmān*) je najviše samodokazivi duhovni entitet, a ipak je i suštinski i konceptualno najskriveniji. Kao što

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<sup>4</sup> Mevlüt Özler dijeli različite narativne verzije 73 sekte ovog hadisa u četiri grupe: 1. Narativi koji deklariraju samo broj sekti na koje će se muslimanska zajednica podijeliti (al-Tirmidhī, Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Mādža, al-Nisābūrī, al-Bayāb, Ibn Hibbān), 2. Narativi koji govore da će samo jedna sekta biti spašena dok će druga biti u paklu (al-Dārimī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal), 3. Narativi koji objašnjavaju tačan identitet spašene sekte (Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Mādža, al-Tirmidhī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, al-Nisābūrī), 4. Narativi u kojima se navodi da će sve sekte biti na nebu osim samo jedne (al-Adžlūnī, al-Suyūṭī, ‘Alī al-Qār’ī, Ibn ‘Arrāq).

Za ove narative vidjeti Özler, Mevlüt: *İslām Düşüncesinde 73 Furka Kavramı* (Istanbul: Nün, 1996), str. 21-28. Drugi istraživač, Ahmet Keleş, procjenjuje narative 73 sekte *haditha* u pet grupa: 1. Narativi u kojima se navodi da će se islamska zajednica podijeliti na različite sekte, 2. Narativi koji određuju identitet sekti koje će ići u raj i pakao, 3. Narativi opisivanja spašene sekte koja će otići u raj, 4. Narativi koji opisuju sekte koje će otići u pakao, 5. Narativi koji sugeriraju da se slijedi zajednica (*al-džamā’ah*).

Za detalje, vidi: Ahmet Keleş, *73 Furka Hadisi Üzerine Bir İnceleme, Marife* 5/3 (2005), str. 25-45. Nijedan od narativa *haditha* o 73 sekte ne spominje se u al-Bukhārīju, Muslimu i al-Nasā’īju. Za više detalja o različitim narativnim verzijama *haditha* o 73 sekte i istraživanje naratora vidjeti Ismā’il b. Muḥammad al-‘Adžlūnī, *Kašf al-khafā’* (Bejrut: Dar ihyā al-turāth al-‘arabī, 1932), str. 149-151; Abdullah Eren, *İftirak Hadislerinin Tahric*, Tahkik ve Yorumu (magistarska teza, Univerzitet Uludağ, 1998); Sayın Dalkıran, *Yetmişüç Furka Hadisi ve Düşündürdükleri*, EKEV Akademi Dergisi 1/1 (1997), str. 97-116.

Vidi: Gömbeyaz, Kadir: *Utjecaj 73 sekte Haditha na klasifikaciju teoloških sekti u islamskoj hereziografskoj književnosti*, *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 14/2 (2005–16.01.2005.), str. 147-160, fusnota 1.

<sup>5</sup> Heidegger, Martin: *Being and Time* (prevod: John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson). Harper & Row, 1962, str. 23.



## 1. In Search for Natural Faith

I am sure, the Jews and Christians have their own internal theological differences and extreme groups that should be their own internal concern. We are told in a *ḥadīth*, narration by the Prophet Muhammad, a.s., which was reported by 'Awf bin Malik that the Prophet said: "Jews were divided into 71 sects. One of them is in Heaven, seventy of them are in Hell. Christians are split into 72 sects. Seventy-one of them are in Hell, the one is in Heaven. I swear to Allah whose mighty hands hold the Muhammad's will, beyond any doubt, my *ummah*, nation, will be divided into 73 sects. One will be in Heaven, seventy-two will be in flames. 'Oh, the Messenger of Allah! Who are they?' They are *al-jamā'ah* (the group or community that holds themselves together).<sup>4</sup>

Obviously, I will not dwell on the Jewish and Christian theological differences and extreme groups. I am concerned with natural faith of Islam and its formal or artificial religious/theological interpretations that are sometimes unrecognizable to its original nature. Indeed, I want to find my innate sense of trust in God in order to be able to deal with a formal or artificial belonging to a theology, whatever it might be. Because the belonging to a particular religious group (*al-jamā'ah*) is not necessarily genuine faith but may be a delusive loyalty to deceitful leaders of a fake ideology. In fact, I want to prove to myself, before anyone else, that 'faith' is an innate trust in God, which is common to and shared by all mankind. I want to grasp the idea that 'faith' is a self-evident entity just as 'Being' (Heidegger's 'Sein') "is all concepts the one that is self-evident". Paraphrasing further Heidegger's notion of indefinability of 'Being', we may say that "whenever one comports oneself towards entities, even towards oneself, some use is made" of 'Faith', i.e., 'Trust' in God; "and this expression is held to be intelligible 'without further ado', just as everyone understands 'The sky is blue'..."<sup>5</sup> Thus, like 'Being' (*al-wujūd*), 'Faith' (*al-īmān*) is the most obvious spiritual entity, and yet it is the most hidden both essentially and conceptually. Just as there is no

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<sup>4</sup> Mevlüt Özler divides the different narrative versions of the 73 sects *ḥadīth* into four groups: 1. Narratives declaring only the number of sects into which the Muslim community will divide (al-Tirmidhī, Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Māja, al-Nīsābūrī, al-Bayḥakī, Ibn Ḥibbān), 2. Narratives saying that only one sect will be saved while the other will be in Hell (al-Dārimī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal), 3. Narratives explaining the exact identity of the saved sect (Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Māja, al-Tirmidhī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, al-Nīsābūrī), 4. Narratives stating that all sects will be in Heaven except for one only (al-'Ajlūnī, al-Suyūṭī, 'Alī al-Qārī, Ibn 'Arrāq).

For these narratives, see Özler, Mevlüt: *İslâm Düşüncesinde 73 Fırka Kavramı* (Istanbul: Nün, 1996), pp. 21-28. Another researcher, Ahmet Keleş, evaluates the narratives of the 73 sects *ḥadīth* under five groups: 1. Narratives stating that the Islamic community will divide into various sects, 2. Narratives determining identities of sects that will go to Heaven and Hell, 3. Narratives describing the saved sect that will go to Heaven, 4. Narratives describing the sects that will go to Hell, 5. Narratives suggesting to follow the community (*al-jamā'ah*).

For details, see Ahmet Keleş, *73 Fırka Hadisi Üzerine Bir İnceleme, Marife* 5/3 (2005), pp. 25-45. None of the narratives of the 73 sects *ḥadīth* is mentioned in al-Bukhārī, Muslim, and al-Nasā'ī. For further details of the different narrative versions of the 73 sects *ḥadīth* and the investigation of narrators, see Ismā'īl b. Muḥammad al-'Ajlūnī, *Kashf al-khafā'* (Beirut: Dar İhyā al-turāth al-'arabī, 1932), pp. 149-151; Abdullah Eren, *İftirak Hadislerinin Tahrir, Tahkik ve Yorumu* (M.A. Thesis, Uludağ University, 1998); Sayın Dalkıran, *Yetmişüç Fırka Hadisi ve Düşündürdükleri*, EKEV Akademi Dergisi 1/1 (1997), pp. 97-116.

See, Kadir Gömbeyaz, *The Influence of the 73 Sects Ḥadīth on the Classification of Theological Sects in Islamic Heresiographical Literature*, *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 14/2 (2005): pp. 147-160, footnote 1.

<sup>5</sup> Heidegger, Martin: *Being and Time* (translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson), Harper & Row, 1962, p. 23.



nema potrebe da se definira „čisto biće” zbog njegove samodokazivosti, nema potrebe ni da se definira „čista vjera” zbog njenog samodokazivog manifesta. Dakle, vjera je prirodno stanje ljudske duše. Jer, ono što je čisto i samo po sebi razumljivo jeste i samo po sebi određivo; a ono što je samo po sebi određivo nema ni rod ni vrstu koja bi ga definirala u odnosu na drugi entitet drugačije osobenosti. Čista vjera je Božiji dar o kojem ljudski um nema ništa za reći osim da je prihvati takvu kakva jest ili zanemari ili odbaci.<sup>6</sup>

Budući da se urođeno stanje humanog duha vjere (trust) u Boga u širem smislu ne stječe iskustvom, već se dobije rođenjem, stoga: *Ti okreni lice svoje izvornoj vjeri, tj. prirodnoj vjeri (fiṭratallah), kojom je On obdario ljude. Nema promjene u Allahovom stvaranju. To je prava vjera, ali većina ljudi to ne znaju.*<sup>7</sup> *Dakako, svako dijete je rođeno na prirodan način kroz Božije stvaranje ('alā fiṭrah)...*<sup>8</sup>



ILUSTRACIJA – Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn al-Nafīs i Ibn Sinā – ... vjera je prirodno stanje čiste ljudske duše i čovjekovog čistog uma. U njegovoj čistoj prirodi leži urođena vjera (trust) u Boga, odnosno leži prirodna vjera.

ILLUSTRATION – Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn al-Nafīs and Ibn Sinā – ... faith is the natural state of a pure human soul and human pure mind. In his pure nature lies innate faith (trust) in God, that is, natural faith.

Iako su drevni filozofi, poput Aristotela i stoika, imali ideju o *tabula rasi*, ta ideja nije bila široko razrađena sve do jedanaestog stoljeća kada je perzijski muslimanski filozof Ibn Sinā (980–1037) ustanovio frazu *al-ṣafḥah al-bayḍā'* (prazna ploča ili *tabula rasa*). Andaluzijski filozof i romanopisac Ibn Ṭufayl (1105–1185) razvio je Ibn Sinaovu ideju *tabula rasa* u teoriju reflektivnog eksperimenta pokazujući razvoj uma kod divljeg dječaka na pustom ostrvu.<sup>9</sup> U trinaestom stoljeću Toma Akvinski (1225–1274) uveo je ovu ideju ili teoriju *tabula rasa* u kršćansku teološku i filozofsku misao preuzevši je od Aristotela i Ibn Sināa. U modernom dobu daljnja razrada ideje o *tabula rasi* pripisuje se Johnu Lockeu

<sup>6</sup> Vidjeti: Barret, Justin L.: *Born Believers, the Science of Children's Religious Beliefs*. Atria Books, 2012.

<sup>7</sup> *Kur'an*, 30:30.

<sup>8</sup> *Ḥadīth*, Abu Hurayrah.

<sup>9</sup> Ibn Ṭufayl: *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* („The Living Son of the Awake”). Vidi i: Goodman, Lenn Evan: *Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqzān*. The University of Chicago Press, 2003.

need to define 'Pure Being' because of its self-evidence, there is no need to define 'Pure Faith' because of its self-evident manifesto. Thus, faith is natural state of human soul. For, what is pure and self-evident is definable in itself; and what is definable in itself has neither genus nor species that would define it in relation to other entity of a different trait. 'Pure Faith' is a gift of God about which the human mind has nothing to say but to accept it as it is or neglect or reject it.<sup>6</sup>

Being an innate state of human spirit, the trust in God or faith in a broad meaning is not acquired in experience, but it is given by birth. Therefore, *turn your face to the natural way of creation (fiṭratallah), the way that all people were created by God because there is no alteration of God's creation..."*<sup>7</sup>; Indeed, *every child is born in a natural way of God's creation ('alā fiṭrah)..."*<sup>8</sup>



ILLUSTRATION ~ Aristotle: ... *the idea of faith as a soul by birth tabula rasa*; John Locke: ... *man is born with an innate mental structure, of which selfishness is the most obvious*; Thomas Hobbes: ... *the natural state of man is 'war of all against all'*.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Aristotel: ... *ideja vjere kao duša po rođenju tabula rasa*; John Locke: ... *čovjek se rađa s urođenom mentalnom strukturom, od koje je sebičnost najočitija*; Thomas Hobbes: ... *prirodno stanje čoveka je 'rat svih protiv svih'*.

Although ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle and the Stoics, had the idea of *tabula rasa*, it was not widely elaborated though until the eleventh century when the Persian Muslim philosopher Ibn Sīnā (980-1037) forged his phrase *al-ṣafḥah al-bayḍā'* ("white paper" or "tabula rasa"). The Andalusian philosopher and novelist Ibn Ṭufayl (1105-1185) developed Ibn Sīnā's idea of *tabula rasa* into a theory of reflective experiment by showing the development of the mind in a wild boy on a desert island.<sup>9</sup> In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) introduced this idea or theory of *tabula rasa* into Christian theological and philosophical thought from Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā. In the modern age, further elaboration of the idea of the theory of *tabula rasa* is attributed to John

<sup>6</sup> See: Barret, Justin L.: *Born Believers, the Science of Children's Religious Beliefs*. Atria Books, 2012.

<sup>7</sup> *Qur'ān*, 30:30

<sup>8</sup> *Ḥadīth*, Abu Hurayrah.

<sup>9</sup> Ibn Ṭufayl: *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān (The Living Son of the Awake)*. See: Goodman, Lenn Evan: *Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqzān*. The University of Chicago Press, 2003.

(1632–1704), koji je vjerovao da sve znanje dolazi iz iskustva, jer je naša duša po rođenju *tabula rasa*, bez prethodnih pravila. Stoga je svaka duša ili svaki um slobodan da se oblikuje svojom voljom na osnovu vlastitog iskustva. Za razliku od Johna Lockeja, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) je vjerovao da se čovjek rađa s urođenom mentalnom strukturom, od koje je sebičnost najočitija. Otuda je Hobbes smatrao da je prirodno stanje čoveka „rat svih protiv svih” (*bellum omnium contra omnes*), kao i svoju zloglasnu opasku da je „čovjek čovjeku vuk” (*lupus est homo homini*).<sup>10</sup>

Suprotno ovom pesimističkom pogledu na prirodu čovjeka, islamska perspektiva čovjeka je da u njegovoj čistoj prirodi leži urođena vjera (*trust*) u Boga, leži prirodna vjera. Ovu prirodnu vjeru Svevišnji Bog je iz Svoje milosti udahnuo čovjeku od Svoga duha (*nafkḥah rūḥiyyah*) u čovjekovu čistu dušu i čovjekov čisti um. O tome svjedoče dva epska zapisa. Jedan se zove *Živi sin budnog* (*Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān*), a drugi se *Plemeniti sin govornika* (*Fāḍil bin Naṭīq*). Priču o prvom prenio je Ibn Ṭufayl,<sup>11</sup> a o drugom Ibn al-Nafis.<sup>12</sup> Obojica su posudili ideju prirodne teologije<sup>13</sup> od Ibn Sināa,<sup>14</sup> koji je prije njih zamišljao *Živog sina budnog*.<sup>15</sup> Ibn Sinaov *Živi sin budnog* ne liči na Robinzona Krusoa, niti Daniel Defoe<sup>16</sup> liči na Ibn Ṭufayla ili Ibn al-Nafisa. Robinzon Kruso je avanturista na pustom morskom ostrvu, dok je Ibn Ṭufaylov *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān* radoznalo ljudsko biće na pustom ostrvu u potrazi za istinom o svojoj ljudskoj prirodi i prirodi oko sebe. Defoeov junak je avanturista koji ima samo jednu želju, a to je da preživi na pustom ostrvu, očekujući spas od nekoga. Ibn al-Nafisov *Fāḍil bin Naṭīq* nije avanturista. On je dječak koji se spontano rodio bez majke i oca na pustom ostrvu. Ibn al-Nafis je svjestan da postoje ljudi koji ne prihvataju da se čovjek može roditi bez oca i majke.

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<sup>10</sup> Pogledajte link, pristupljeno 12. augusta 2021.: [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&trct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwipjV0pKvyAhXZ\\_rsIHe6xCKIQFnoECB8QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.co.cr%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DO\\_QyCDsmdZsC&usg=AOvVaw2-hjZxXzi54CAo2\\_PrGgWV](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&trct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwipjV0pKvyAhXZ_rsIHe6xCKIQFnoECB8QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.co.cr%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DO_QyCDsmdZsC&usg=AOvVaw2-hjZxXzi54CAo2_PrGgWV).

<sup>11</sup> Ibn Ṭufayl (1105–1185) je arapski andaluzijski muslimanski polimatičar, pisac, filozof, teolog, liječnik i vezir. Najpoznatiji je kao autor knjige *Živi sin budnog*, koju mnogi smatraju prvim filozofskim romanom u historiji književnosti.

<sup>12</sup> Ibn al-Nafis (1213–1288) jedan je od najpriznatijih ljekara u historiji medicine. Otkrio je plućnu cirkulaciju ili mali protok krvi. Vjeruje se da je napisao svoj prvi teološki roman: *Al-Risālah al-Kāmiliyyah*, što se na Zapadu prevodi kao: *Theologus Autodidactus*.

Vidjeti i: al-Qurashī, Ibn al-Nafis, 'Alā'u al-Dīn 'Alī bin al-Haram: *Al-Risālah al-Kāmiliyyah fi al-Sirah al-Nabawiyyah* (*Theologus Autodidactus of Ibn al-Nafis*), Oxford, Max Meyerhof & Joseph Schacht, At the Clarendon Press, 1968.

<sup>13</sup> Prirodna teologija, nekada nazivana i fiziko-teologija, vrsta je teologije koja daje argumente za postojanje Boga zasnovane na razumu i uobičajenom iskustvu prirode.

<sup>14</sup> Ibn Sina (980–1037), vodeći muslimanski filozof i neoplatonista perzijskog porijekla. Osim što je bio vodeći filozof, Ibn Sina je bio i astronom, hemičar, geolog, hafiz Kur'ana, islamski psiholog, teolog, logičar, paleontolog, matematičar, mektebski učitelj, fizičar, pjesnik i naučnik. Ibn Sina je također autor knjige: *Ḥayy ibn Jaḡzān*, koja je bila inspiracija Ibn Ṭufaylu da napiše svoju knjigu *Živi sin budnog*. Treba napomenuti da je Šahabuddin Suhrawardi al-Maqtūl između 1191. i 1208. napisao knjigu *Qiṣṣat al-ghurba al-gharbiyyah* (*Priča o zapadnom egzilu*), koja liči na priču *Ḥayy ibn Jaḡzān*.

<sup>15</sup> Vidjeti: Amin, Ahmad: *Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzan – Ibn Sina, Ibn Ṭufayl, al-Sahruwardi*, Al-Āfāq, 2018.

<sup>16</sup> Daniel Defoe (1659–1731) bio je engleski pisac, novinar i pamfletičar. Rođen je kao Daniel Foe, sin londonskog mesara Jamesa Foya, ali je kasnije svom prezimenu dodao „de”, kako bi zvučao elegantnije. Njegov najpoznatiji roman je *Robinson Crusoe* iz 1719.

Locke (1632-1704), who believed that all knowledge comes from experience, because our soul is by birth a “tabula rasa” without prior rules. Therefore, every soul or every mind is free to shape itself of its own free will on the basis of its own experience. Unlike John Locke, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), believed that man is born with an innate mental structure, of which selfishness is most obvious. Hence, Hobbes considered the natural state of man to be “a war of all against all” (“bellum omnium contra omnes”), as well as his infamous remark that “man is wolf to man” (“lupus est homo homini”).<sup>10</sup>

Contrary to this pessimistic view of the nature of man, the Islamic perspective of man is that in his pure nature lies an innate trust in God, his natural faith. This natural faith of man is the grace of God’s spiritual breathe (*nafkhaḥ rūḥiyyah*) into man’s pure soul as well as a dictate of his pure mind. Two epic witnesses testify to this fact. One is called the ‘Living Son of the Awake’ (‘Ḥayy ibn Yaḳẓān’) and the other is called the ‘Noble Son of the Speaker’ (‘Fāḍil bin Nāṭiq’). The story of the former was narrated by Ibn Ṭufayl,<sup>11</sup> and the story of the latter was reported by Ibn al-Nafīs.<sup>12</sup> They both borrowed the idea of natural theology<sup>13</sup> of Ibn Sīnā,<sup>14</sup> who had imagined the ‘Living Son of the Awake’ before them.<sup>15</sup> Ibn Sīnā’s ‘Living Son of the Awake’ does not resemble Robinson Crusoe, nor does Daniel Defoe<sup>16</sup> resemble either Ibn Ṭufayl or Ibn al-Nafīs. Robinson Crusoe is an adventurer at sea on a desert island, while Ibn Ṭufayl’s ‘Ḥayy ibn Yaḳẓān’ is a curious human being on a desert island in search for the truth of his human nature and the nature around him. Defoe’s hero is an adventurer who had one wish only and that is to survive on a desert island while expecting a salvation from someone else. Ibn al-Nafīs’ ‘Fāḍil bin Nāṭiq’ is not an adventurer. He is a boy who is born spontaneously without his mother and father on a desert island. Ibn al-Nafīs is aware that there are people who do not accept that man can be born without father and mother. Nevertheless, he is detriment to tell the story of a human being who came out without a mother and father.

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<sup>10</sup> See link available on August 12, 2021: [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwipjV0p-KvyAhXZ\\_rslHe6xClIQFnoECB8QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.co.cr%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DO\\_QyCDsmdZsC&usg=AOvVaw2-hjZxXzi-54CAo2\\_PrGgWV](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwipjV0p-KvyAhXZ_rslHe6xClIQFnoECB8QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.co.cr%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DO_QyCDsmdZsC&usg=AOvVaw2-hjZxXzi-54CAo2_PrGgWV)

<sup>11</sup> Ibn Ṭufayl (1105-1185) is an Arab Andalusian Muslim polymath, writer, philosopher, theologian, physician and vizier. He is best known as the author of the book: *The Living Son of the Awake*, which is considered by many to be the first philosophical novel in the history of literature.

<sup>12</sup> Ibn al-Nafīs (1213-1288) is one of the most recognized physicians in the history of medicine. He discovered pulmonary blood circulation or small blood flow. He is believed to have written his first theological novel: *Al-Risālah al-Kāmiliyyah*, which is in the West translated as: *Theologus Autodidactus*.

See: al-Qurashī, Ibn al-Nafīs, ‘Alā’u al-Dīn ‘Alī bin al-Haram: *Al-Risālah al-Kāmiliyyah fī al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah*, (*Theologus Autodidactus of Ibn al-Nafīs*), Oxford, Max Meyerhof & Joseph Schacht, At the Clarendon Press, 1968.

<sup>13</sup> Natural theology, once also termed physico-theology, is a type of theology that provides arguments for the existence of God based on reason and ordinary experience of nature

<sup>14</sup> Ibn Sīnā (980-1037) was a leading Muslim philosopher and Neoplatonist of Persian descent. In addition to being a leading philosopher, Ibn Sīnā was also an astronomer, chemist, geologist, ḥafīz of the Qur’an, Islamic psychologist, Islamic theologian, logician, paleontologist, mathematician, *maktab* teacher, physicist, poet and scientist. Ibn Sīnā is also the author of the book: *Ḥayy ibn Yaḳẓān*, which was the inspiration for Ibn Ṭufayl to write his book *The Living Son of the Awake*. It should be mentioned that Shahabuddin Suhrawardi al-Maqtūl between 1191 and 1208 wrote a book entitled *Qiṣṣat al-ghurbat al-gharbiyyah*, which resembles *Ḥayy ibn Yaḳẓān*.

<sup>15</sup> See: Amin, Ahmad: *Ḥayy ibn Yaḳẓān – Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Ṭufayl, al-Sahruwardī*. Al-Āfāq, 2018.

<sup>16</sup> Daniel Defoe (1659-1731) was an English writer, journalist and pamphleteer. He was born as Daniel Foe, the son of London butcher James Foy, but later added *de* – to his surname, to sound more elegant. His most famous novel is *Robinson Crusoe* (1719).





ILUSTRACIJA - Uloga božanske riječi ili objave je da oblikuje prirodnu materiju (*hulē*) vjere (*al-īmān*) u oblik vjere (*al-dīn*), tj. božanski zakon (*al-sharī'ah*).



ILLUSTRATION - The role of the divine word or revelation is to shape the natural matter (*hulê*) of faith (*al-îmân*) into the form of religion (*al-dîn*), i.e., the divine law (*al-sharî'ah*).



Za razliku od Ibn Ṭufaylovog *Ḥayya ibn Yaqzāna*, koji kao beba odrasta uz pomoć gazele, Ibn al-Nafīsov Kāmil izlazi iz pećine kao dječak sâm i započinje život bez ičije pomoći. Ibn Ṭufaylov heroj sâm upoznaje vatru i sâm uči koja obuća i odjeća mu trebaju, dok Ibn al-Nafīsov junak sve to uči od svojih posjetitelja. Možda nenamjerno, ali Ibn al-Nafīs je na ovaj način naglasio ideju, za razliku od Ibn Ṭufayla, da život postaje civiliziran samo u ljudskom društvu. Nakon svega što je vidio i doživio, Živi sin budnog dolazi do zaključka da čovjek može razumjeti prirodu svoje duše i doći do suštine Boga kroz svoj čisti nepomućeni um.

Iako Ibn Nafīsov *Savršeni čovjek* ne poriče moć čistog uma, ali čovjeku je ipak potrebna pomoć Božijih vjerovjesnika, posebno u pogledu organizacije ljudske zajednice. Dakle, Ibn Nafīsov junak otkriva ne samo neophodnost čovjekove pobožnosti i društvene solidarnosti, već i neophodnost periodičnog vjerovjesničkog pojavljivanja. Također, životna historija Posljednjeg Vjerovjesnika i Smak svijeta sa određenim znacima, koji tome prethode, važni su pomagači pravoj istini. Ibn Ṭufaylov heroj susreće zajednicu vjernika ili Božijih povjerenika koji slijede prethodne Božije vjerovjesnike. Ibn Nafīs ne spominje nijednu vjeru imenom, ali se podrazumijeva da je to islam, koji nije samo posljednji autentični diktat vjere za sva vremena i mjesta, već je i najsigurniji odgovor na pitanje kako vjerovati, kako djelovati i kako se spasiti.



ILUSTRACIJA - Portret Al-Fārābīja. Stranica iz latinskog prijevoda Gerarda od Kremone iz Al-Farabijeve knjige *Kitab ihṣā' al-'ulūm*.  
ILLUSTRATION - Portrait of Al-Fārābī. A page from Gerard of Cremona's Latin translation of Al-Farabi's book *Kitab ihṣā' al-'ulūm*.

Thus, Ibn al-Nafis' Fāḍil bin Nāṭiq ('Noble Son of the Speaker') tells the story of a hero, called the Perfect (Kāmil), who is spontaneously born without a father and mother after a flood on a lonely island with a temperate climate and an abundance of plants, fruits and vegetables. The flood brings to the island new ingredients of clay, which is deposited in the cave, whereby a fermentation takes place, from which the organs of the human body are formed, from which man is created. In the cave one feels the air, which gives the heart breath or spirit (*rūḥ*), which when mixed with purified blood gives a vital soul, which keeps Kāmil alive in the cave until he strengthens so that, like a chicken from an egg, he can go out in a white world.

Unlike Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, who, as a baby grows up with the help of a gazelle, Ibn al-Nafis' Kāmil emerges from the cave as a boy alone and begins life without anyone's help. Ibn Ṭufayl's hero himself comes to know about fire and learns for himself what shoes and clothes he needs, while Ibn al-Nafis' hero learns all this from his visitors. Perhaps unintentionally, but Ibn al-Nafis in this way emphasized the idea, unlike Ibn Ṭufayl, that life becomes civilized only in human society. After all what the Living Son of the Awake had seen and experienced, he comes to the conclusion that man can understand the nature of his soul and reach the essence of God through his pure unaided mind.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Part of the issue on Islamic philosophy in the Western market.  
 ILUSTRACIJA ~ Dio izdanja o islamskoj filozofiji na zapadnom tržištu.



Očigledno, Ibn Tufayl je kroz ovaj jedinstveni filozofsko-romaneskni žanr želio da ukaže na razliku između formalnog ili tradicionalnog vjerovanja, koje se zasniva na simbolima, alegorijama ili metaforama, i filozofsko-mističkog ili umjetničko-elitističkog vjerovanja, koje se oslanja na čisti um ili čistu neposrednu spoznaju, koja se postiže upornim vježbama čiste duše. Ali Ibn Tufayl nije prvi koji je napravio tu razliku. Za tako nešto u islamskoj filozofiji najzaslužniji je Al-Fārābī (870–950), koji smatra da se objava (*wahy*) može shvatiti kao kombinacija najvišeg filozofskog znanja s najvišim oblikom vjerovjesništva. Al-Fārābī ne osporava funkcionalnost objave za mase, ali preferira razum, koji služi inteligentnoj eliti. Ibn Nafīs je, s druge strane, imao drugu namjeru, a to je da pobije mišljenja muslimanske filozofske elite, prije svega Ibn Sinaa, elite koja se previše zaljubila u svoj um. Konkretno, kaže Ibn Nafīs, život (*sīrah*) posljednjeg Božijeg Poslanika je paradigma zasnovana na principu „najboljeg ili uvijek najboljeg rješenja za sve životne situacije”.

## 2. Prirodna vjera vis-à-vis Božanskog diktata

**n**aveli smo ovdje dvije priče Ibn Tufayla i Ibn Nafīsa da bismo pokazali potencijalnu moć urođene prirode vjere (*al-īmān*) u usporedbi s mogućnošću formalne ili naučene religije (*al-dīn*) kao Božanskog diktata. Koliko god je prirodna, vjera je i Božanski diktat ili imperativ. Dakle, pravi izazov za čovjeka je shvatiti i prihvatiti ovaj Božji apsolutni diktat: *Budi – i to bude*. Od prvog „Čistog Bića” kao „svjetlost svih svjetlosti” (*nūrun 'ala nūr*) do posljednje „Čiste vjere” kao „spasenja svih spasenja”, čovjek ima moć vjerovati da je Bog Prvi i Posljednji (*al-awwal wa al-ākhir*), da je On imanentan i transcendentan (*al-zāhir wa al-bāṭin*) u isto vrijeme. Čovjek ima tu moć, ali možda nema volje da slijedi svoje vjerovanje u apsolutnu istinu kao temelj za sve druge istine. Prema tome, tvrdnja da je „vjera diktat” ima smisla za one koji dobrovoljno prihvate prvu tvrdnju: „Bog je apsolutni Gospodar svih svjetova”, tj. ne jedan univerzum, već mnogo multiverzuma. Ima ljudi koji to razumiju, ali ne prihvataju, kao što postoje i oni koji to prihvataju, ali ne razumiju. Ovdje nas zanimaju oni ljudi koji formalno prihvataju da je Bog prvi i najvažniji *al-Āmir*, Onaj koji poziva čovjeka na određenu radnju i *al-Nāhī*, Onaj koji čovjeka odgovara od određene radnje. Ali, oni, ekstremisti, ne shvataju u potpunosti krajnju svrhu Božanskih zapovijedi, koje imaju za cilj stvaranje bratstva među ljudima. Oni su ti koje ovdje želimo podvrgnuti kritičkom posmatranju u svjetlu kritike čiste vjere na koju se odnose. Svjestan sam oni da odbacuju naše zapažanje i našu kritiku jer su uvjereni da su samo oni na pravom putu kojeg mi ne razumijemo. Ali čak i kada bismo nekako shvatili njihov „pravi put”, mi ne bismo bili njihovi jer oni nisu naši. Dakle, ne radi se ovdje o njihovoj i našoj vjeri, već o njihovoj i našoj pripadnosti. Ljudi nisu razdvojeni vjerom jer je vjera zajednička vrijednost svih. Ljude razdvaja pripadnost buduću da je pripadnost privatna vrijednost određene grupe. Vjera je svjetlost uma; pripadnost je sljepilo

Ibn Nafis' "Perfect Man" does not deny the power of the pure mind, but man still needs the help of God's messengers, especially with regard to the organization of the human community. Thus, Ibn Nafis's hero reveals not only the necessity of man's piety and social solidarity, but also the necessity of a periodic prophetic appearance. Ibn Tufayl's hero meets a community of believers or God's trustees who follow God's previous messengers and prophets. Ibn Nafis does not mention any religion by name, but it is understood that it is Islam, which is not only the last authentic dictate of religion for all times and places, but it is also the surest answer to the question of how to believe, how to act and how one might be saved.

Obviously, through this unique philosophical-romantic genre, Ibn Tufayl intended to point out the difference between formal or traditional belief, which is based on symbols, allegories or metaphors, and philosophical-mystical or artistic-elitist belief, which relies on pure mind or pure immediate cognition, which is achieved by persistent exercises of the pure soul. However, Ibn Tufayl was not the first one to make that distinction. Al-Fārābī (870–950) was most responsible for something like this in Islamic philosophy, who thought that revelation (*wahy*) can be understood as a combination of the highest philosophical knowledge with the highest form of prophecy. Al-Fārābī does not dispute the functionality of revelation to the masses, but prefers reason, which serves the intelligent elite. Ibn Nafis, on the other hand, had another intention, and that was to refute the opinions of the Muslim philosophical elite, above all Ibn Sīnā, an elite who had fallen too much in love with their minds. In particular, says Ibn Nafis, the life (*sīrah*) of the last Messenger of God is a paradigm, based on the principle of "the best or always the best solution for all life situations".

## 2. Natural Faith *vis-à-vis* Divine Dictate

I have brought these two stories of Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Nafis to show the potential power of the innate nature of faith (*al-īmān*) as compared to the power of formal or instructive religion (*al-dīn*) as a divine dictate or imperative. For as much as it is natural, faith is a divine dictate as well. So, the real challenge for man is to grasp and accept this God's absolute dictate: 'Be – and it is'. From the first 'Pure Being' as the 'light of all lights' (*nūrun'ala nūr*) to the last 'Pure Faith' as the 'salvation of all salvations', man is impowered to believe that God is the First and the Last (*al-awwal wa al-ākhir*), that He is the Immanent and the Transcendent (*al-zāhir wa al-bāṭin*) at the same time. Man has that power, but he may not have the will to follow his belief in the absolute truth as a foundation for all other truths. Therefore, the proposition: "faith is a dictate" makes sense for those who willingly accept the first proposition: "God is the absolute Lord of all worlds", i.e., not one uni-verse but many – multi-verse. There are people who understand it but do not accept it, just as there are those who accept it but do not understand it. We are interested here in those people who formally accept that God is the First and foremost *al-āmir*, the One who calls man to certain actions and *al-Nāhi*, the One who distracts man from certain actions. But they, extremists, do not comprehend fully the ultimate purpose of divine commandments which aim at making the brotherhood of

razuma; mrak nastaje kada se svjetlo ugasi. Pripadnost otuđenoj grupi počinje kada se izgubi čista prirodna vjera.

Koliko god je važno da čovjek razumije i prihvati da je vjera Božiji diktat za njegovo djelovanje ili nedjelovanje, toliko je važno da zna razliku između Božijeg i ljudskog govora ili Božijih i ljudskih zapovijesti. Na ovom detalju prikazano je cijelo pitanje čiste vjere, čistog uma i čiste ruke. Kada kaže: „Bog je rekao ili naredio”, čovjek je u poziciji da se uzdigne do „svjetlosti svog svjetla” ili da padne u „bezdan svih bezdana”. To je onaj most koji je tanji od dlake i oštiji od sablje, preko kojeg čovjek treba hodati ne samo onog vječnog dana, već i ovog prolaznog iskušenja. Ovaj zemaljski most nije ni privilegija ni prokletstvo neke posebne vjere, već je uobičajeno iskušenje svake vjere. Ali u kasnom dvadesetom i ranom dvadeset prvom stoljeću *Milada*, rođenje Isa/Isusa, a.s., što odgovara kasnom četrnaestom i ranom petnaestom stoljeću *Hidžre*, selidbi poslanika Muhammeda, a.s., iz Mekke u Medina, islam i muslimani se suočavaju s ovim iskušenjem više nego bilo koja druga formalna religija na svijetu. Muslimani su danas suočeni s iskušenjem značenja čiste vjere za razliku od nečiste religije neodgovornih grupa koje tvrde da brane islam. Božija čista vjera islama bila je zamagljena nečistim ljudskim umovima do te mjere da čak ni najčistiji umovi nisu ostali netaknuti. Možda je utjeha u tome što su mnogi u svijetu odustali ili su na putu da se odreknu vjere kao takve i stoga ih ne zanima ni čista ni nečista vjera, osim muslimana, koji se ne odriču svoje urođene vjere u Boga. Čini se da su oni najglasniji od svih u odbrani svojih vjerskih uvjerenja. Ali, pitanje je da li muslimani to rade na način da ih drugi razumiju ili, možda, ne postoji način da ih drugi razumiju ma koliko se religiozno predstavili. U svijetu u kojem vjera nije prvorazredna vrijednost nije lahko biti vjernik. No, to ne smije biti razlog da nečisti um skrnavi čistu vjeru jer drugi ne cijene miris vaše vjere, niti razumiju ukus vašeg uma, niti uživaju u pravdi vaše ruke. Da biste vratili volju i ljubav prema vjeri onima koji su odustali od vjere, morate im srcem svoje ljubavi, umom svojih bistrih misli i rukom svoje pravde pokazati da vas je vjera podigla da biste bili istinoljubiv čovjek, koji ima srce ljubavi, koji ima razum razumijevanja i koji ima ruku pravde svih ljudi dobre volje. Svi ljudi su Božija stvorenja. Bog zna zašto ih je stvorio.

Drugi vjernici imali su isti izazov kao i muslimani danas, ali izazov s kojim se muslimani danas suočavaju je najteži od svih. Ovaj izazov nije u teoriji, već u praksi. Ako iko na ovom svijetu ima Svetu Knjigu u kojoj je sve zapisano od početka do kraja ljudskog života na Zemlji, onda muslimani imaju tu Knjigu. Oni nasljeđuju Božiju Knjigu u kojoj im je sve objašnjeno; u kojoj su upozoreni na opasnost od nečistog ljudskog uma koji onečišćuje čistu vjeru; u kojem im se sugerira kako uvesti čisto srce koje vjeruje, zdrav um koji misli i ruku pravednu koja djeluje u jednu cjelinu. Šta se dogodilo u međuvremenu? Gdje i kada je prekinuta veza između čistog srca, zdravog uma i pravedne ruke kod muslimana? Ta veza je svakako postojala. O ovoj povezanosti muslimanskog srca, uma i ruke brinuli su ljudi koji su također bili svjesni da je Bog *al-Āmir*, Onaj koji poziva na časno djelo i *al-Nāhi*, Onaj koji odvraća od sramotnog djela. Razlika nije u kur'anskoj poruci, niti u učenju i praksi Sunneta.

humanity. They are the ones we want to subject here to critical observation in the light of the critique of the pure faith to which they refer. I am aware that they reject our observation and our criticism because they are confident that only they are on the right path, which we do not comprehend. But even if we understand somehow their “right path,” we would not be theirs because they are not ours. Therefore, this is not about their and our faith, but about their and our affiliation. People are not separated by faith because faith is the common value of all. People are separated by belonging because belonging is a private value of a certain group. Faith is the light of the mind; affiliation is the blindness of reason; darkness arises when the light is turned off. Belonging to an alienated group begins when pure natural faith is lost.

As important as it is for man to understand and accept that faith is God’s dictate for his action or inaction, it is so important that he knows the difference between God’s and man’s speech or God’s and man’s commandments. On this detail the whole question of pure faith, pure mind, and pure hand is featured. When he says, “God has spoken or commanded,” man is in a position to rise to the “light of all lights” or to fall into the “abyss of all abysses.” It is that bridge, which is thinner than a hair and sharper than a saber, over which man should walk not only on that eternal due day, but also on this passing test time. This earthly bridge is neither a privilege nor a curse of any particular faith, but it is a common temptation for every faith. But in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries of the *Milād*, the birth of Isa/Jesus, a.s., which corresponds to the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries of *al-Hijrah*, migration of the Prophet Muhammad, a.s., from Mecca to Medina, Islam and Muslims face this temptation more than any other formal religion in the world. Muslims today are faced with the temptation of the meaning of pure faith as opposed to an impure religion of irresponsible groups who claim to defend Islam. God’s pure faith of Islam was clouded by impure human minds to such an extent that even the purest minds were not left unaffected. Perhaps there is consolation here in that that many in the world have given up or are on their way to give up the faith as such and therefore they are not concerned with either pure faith or impure religion, except Muslims, who do not give up their innate trust in God. It appears that they are the loudest of all in a defense of their religious beliefs. But the question is whether Muslims do it in a way that others understand them or, perhaps, there is no way for others to understand them no matter how religiously they present themselves. In a world where faith is not a first-rate value, it is not easy to be a believer. But this must not be a reason for the unclean mind to defile pure faith because others do not appreciate the smell of your faith, nor understand the taste of your mind, nor enjoy the justice of your hand. In order to return the will and love for the faith to those who have given up the faith, you must show them with the heart of your love, with the mind of your clear thoughts and with the hand of your justice that faith raised you to be a truthful man, who has the heart of love, who has the mind of understanding and who has the hand of justice of all people of good will. All people are God’s creatures. God knows why He created them.

Other people of faith have had the same challenge as Muslims have today, but the challenge that the Muslims face today is the most difficult of all. This challenge is not in theory, but in practice. If anyone in this world has a Holy Book in which everything is written from the beginning to the end of human life on earth, then Muslims have that Book.





ILUSTRACIJA - Dvolist prijepisa Kur'ana - nasljeđe muslimana gdje im je sve objašnjeno; knjiga u kojoj su upozoreni na opasnost od nečistog ljudskog uma koji onečišćuje čistu vjeru.





ILLUSTRATION - A two-page copy of the Qur'an - the heritage of Muslims where everything was explained to them; a book in which they were warned about the danger of an impure human mind that pollutes pure faith.



Razlika je u pozadini onih koji poruku čitaju naopačke, onih koji pogrešno razumiju Božije zapovijedi i onih koji pogrešno primjenjuju zapovijedi na način koji ne povezuje čisto osjećanje srca sa zdravom mišlju uma s moralnom radnjom ruke.

Uzaludno je pozivati se na čisto osjećanje srca, zdravu misao uma i moralno djelovanje ruke protiv onih koji se pozivaju na Knjigu Božiju i na praksu Poslanika bez osjećaja čiste vjere. Iako u manjini, oni šire utisak da su dominantni u vjeri, vjeri koja nije ni bez čistog srca, ni bez zdravog razuma, niti bez prave ruke, ali je bez jasne ideje, koja bi mogla zaustaviti bezosjećajnost, ludilo i bespomoćnost. Nije nam namjera da se bavimo francuskim pjesnikom Andréom Bretonom, koji je početkom prošlog stoljeća okupio umjetnike oko svog *Manifesta nadrealizma* pozivajući ih na „diktat misli, bez kontrole razuma, mimo svake estetske ili moralne preokupacije”, nego da istaknemo da je ova ideja vrlo slična ideji takozvane Islamske države Iraka i Levanta (ISIL), koja poziva na „diktat vjere, bez kontrole značenja, izvan svake etike ili morala”. Nekadašnji Bretonov poziv na „diktat misli bez razuma i morala” ostao je na nivou umjetničke imaginacije ili naivne gluposti, ali poziv na „diktat vjere bez razuma i morala” danas nikoga ne ostavlja ravnodušnim i spokojnim, a posebno ne – muslimane. Igra oko „bezumnih diktata vjere” nije ni umjetnička mašta ni naivna umjetnost, već egzistencijalni izazov na koji muslimani moraju odgovoriti egzistencijalnim uvjerenjem i slobodom.

Naravno, aktueliziranjem pitanja „diktata vjere” ili „vjere diktata” svjesno otvaramo jednu od najtežih teoloških dilema otkako čovjek postoji na zemlji. Čovjekova je potreba da čuje glas izvan sebe. Ta potreba nije slučajnost, već urođeni osjećaj njegove svijesti, kao ovisnost o nekome ko je negdje i njemu apsolutno nadređen. Ovakvo stanje čovjekove situacije je paradoks jer je on u isto vrijeme slobodan i ovisan o nečemu izvan sebe. Zaista, ovaj paradoks čovjeka najviše zbunjuje i sprečava ga da shvati svoj pravi položaj u svijetu. Kad misli da je apsolutno slobodan, javlja se apsolutna sila koja ga vraća u stanje relativne slobode, ali i kada pomisli da mu sudbina od nekoga kobno zavisi, u njemu se javlja pobuna protiv zavisnosti od bilo koga. Čovjek zna da nije sam na zemlji. Svjestan je da pripada nekome ko ga je stvorio. Ali on ne zna ko. U potrazi za otkrivanjem kome pripada izvan i iznad sebe, čovjek sluša neki glas odozgo koji je kompatibilan s njegovim glasom iznutra o tome kako može vjerovati, kako može misliti, kako može djelovati i kako može biti spašen. Tajna je, dakle, u tom glasu koji čovjek čuje izvan sebe, ali i u sebi; tajna je u tom diktatu, koji čovjek prima s vjerom da je to diktat od onoga koji će ga dovesti do uspjeha na ovom svijetu i spasa na ahiretu. Ne samo da su različite generacije naroda kroz historiju drugačije slušale glas i drugačije primale diktat, već su različiti pojedinci čuli i različite glasove s neba. Tako je to nekada bilo. Ali danas se na zemlju ne spušta samo uobičajeni nebeski glas, niti se s neba šalje samo autentični nebeski diktat. Danas se glasovi dižu sa zemlje na nebo kao diktati, koji se onda vraćaju na zemlju, pa su mnogi zbunjeni, jer nisu u stanju razlučiti pravi od pogrešnog glasa koji čuju s neba, niti mogu razlikovati pravi od pogrešnih diktata. Oni nisu u stanju oduprijeti se lažnim glasovima i lažnim diktatima koji se danas

They inherit God's Book in which everything is explained to them; in which they are warned of the danger of an impure human mind, which defiles pure faith; in which they are suggested how to import a pure heart that believes, a healthy mind that thinks, and a righteous hand that acts into one whole. What happened in the meantime? Where and when the connection between a pure heart, a healthy mind and a just hand was broken in Muslims? That connection certainly existed. This connection of the Muslim heart, mind and hand was cared for by people who were also aware that God is *al-Āmir*, the One who calls for honorable deed and *al-Nāhi*, the One who deters shameful act. The difference is not in the Qur'anic message, nor in the Sunnah teaching and practice. The difference is in the background of those who read the message upside down, those who misunderstand God's commandments, and those who misapply the commandments in a way that does not connect the pure feeling of the heart with the healthy thought of the mind with the moral action of the hand.

It is in vain to invoke the pure feeling of the heart, the sound thought of the mind, and the moral action of the hand against those who invoke the Book of God and the practice of the Prophet without a sense of pure faith. Although a minority, they spread the impression that they are dominant in the faith, a faith that is neither without a pure heart, nor without a common sense nor without a righteous hand, but it is without a clear idea, which could stop the insensitivity, insanity and helplessness. It is not our intention to deal with the French poet André Breton, who gathered artists around his "**Manifesto of Surrealism**" at the beginning of the last century, calling them to "the dictates of thought, without control of reason, beyond any aesthetic or moral preoccupation," but to point out that this idea is very similar to the idea of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), who call for "the dictates of faith, without control of meaning, beyond any ethics or morals." Breton's former call for the "dictate of thought without reason and morality" has remained at the level of artistic imagination or naive folly, but the call for "the dictate of faith without reason and morality" today leaves no one indifferent and serene, especially non-Muslims. The play around the "mindless dictates of faith" is neither artistic imagination nor naive folly, but an existential challenge to which Muslims must respond with existential conviction and freedom.

Of course, by actualizing the question of the "dictates of faith" or the "faith of dictates," we consciously open one of the most difficult theological dilemmas since man has existed on earth. It is man's need to hear a voice outside of himself. This need is not an accident but an innate sense of his consciousness, as his addiction to someone who is somewhere and absolutely superior to him. This state of man's situation is a paradox because he is at the same time free and dependent on something beyond him. Indeed, this paradox confuses man the most and prevents him from realizing his true position in the world. Just as he thinks that he is absolutely free, an absolute force appears, which returns him to a state of relative freedom, but also when he thinks that his destiny is fatally dependent on someone, a rebellion against dependence on anyone appears in him. Man knows that he is not alone on earth. He is aware that he belongs to someone who created him. But he doesn't know who. In the quest to find out to whom he belongs outside and above himself, man listens to some voice from above, which is compatible with his voice from within about how he can believe, how he can think, how he can act and how he can be saved. The secret, then, is in that voice, which man hears outside himself, but also within himself; the secret is in that dictation, which man



šire nebom i zemljom. Sve im se pomiješalo u srcu i umu, pa ruka postaje nepravedna. Zato je potrebno vratiti se čistoj prirodnoj vjeri, koja čisti ljudsko srce, čisti ljudski um i čisti ljudsku ruku od nepravde.



ILUSTRACIJA – Muhammed, a.s., je po diktatu čiste vjere ostavio sve svoje u Mekki da bi spasio sve u Medini.

ILLUSTRATION – Prophet Muhammad, a.s., according to the dictates of pure faith, left everything he owned in Mecca to save everything in Medina.

Nema jačeg diktata niti jačeg motiva od diktata i motiva čiste vjere. Nuh, a.s., je sagradio brod spasa po diktatu čiste vjere; Ibrahimu, a.s., je čista vjera naložila da žrtvuje svog sina; Musa, a.s., se suočio s faraonom po diktatu čiste vjere; Isa, a.s., je patio po diktatu čiste vjere; Muhammed, a.s., je po diktatu čiste vjere ostavio sve svoje u Mekki da bi spasio sve u Medini. Onima koji su zaduženi za afirmaciju čiste vjere kao diktata nije teško braniti ovu tvrdnju. Oni koji su već u vjeri, ili su s vjerom u svojoj duši kao neupitnom istinom, prihvataju diktate čiste vjere kao konačnu stvar u kojoj nema sumnje i rasprave. Ustvari, ovo je značenje religioznog diktata: bez sumnje, to je konačno Božansko dobro. Bog je dobar i stoga je sve što Bog zapovijeda dobro samo po sebi. Ne mora postojati neposredna jasna korist ili dobit od Božanske zapovijesti, ali duša mora biti pokorna da primi i izvrši zapovijed – odmah.

receives with faith that it is a dictation from the one who is to lead him to success in this world and salvation in the Hereafter. Not only have different generations of peoples throughout history listened to the voice differently and received the dictation differently, but different individuals have also heard different voices from heaven. That is how it used to be. But today not only the usual heavenly voice descends to earth, nor is only authentic heavenly dictation sent from heaven. Today, voices rise from the earth to the sky as dictations, which then return to the earth, so many are confused, because they are not able to distinguish the right from wrong voices they hear from the sky, nor are they able to distinguish right from wrong dictates. They are incapable of resisting to the false voices and false dictates that are spreading across heaven and earth today. Everything is mixed in their heart and mind, so the hand becomes unjust. That is why it is necessary to return to pure natural faith, which purifies the human heart, clears the human mind and cleans the human hand of injustice.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Prophet Noah, a.s., built the ark of salvation according to the dictates of pure faith.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Nuh, a.s., je sagradio brod spasa po diktatu čiste vjere.

There is neither a stronger dictation nor a stronger motive than the dictation and the motive of pure faith. Noah, a.s., built a ship by the dictates of pure faith; Ibrahim, a.s., was dictated by pure faith to sacrifice his son; Musa, a.s., confronted Pharaoh by the dictates of pure faith; Isa, a.s., suffered all by the dictates of pure faith; Muhammad, a.s., by the dictates of pure faith left everything in Mecca to save everyone in Medina. It is not difficult for those in charge of affirming pure faith as a dictation to defend this claim. Those who are already in faith, or are with faith in their souls as unquestionable truth, accept the dictates of pure faith as a final thing in which there is no doubt

Koliko je neka zapovijed korist ili dobitak, čovjek će kasnije spoznati ili nikada neće spoznati, ali će uvijek vjerovati da je svaka Božija zapovijed za njega i dobra i korisna. Bog je stvorio čovjeka i zato bolje od čovjeka zna šta je za njega najbolje. Čovjek je neznalica. Na to ga treba stalno podsjećati kako bi shvatio da mora čitati i učiti da zna i razumije gdje mu je mjesto u svijetu. Ako se pokuša takmičiti s Bogom, čovjek je na gubitku. Ne zato što mu Bog ne dozvoljava da sazna istinu, već zato što u trenutku zaboravljanja svog položaja u odnosu na Boga, svog Stvoritelja, čovjek misli da je sâm sebi dovoljan, kao i da ga Stvoritelj sputava na putu do „sveznajućeg” čovjeka iako nije u stanju spoznati ni samoga sebe. Jasno je da samo onda kada spozna samoga sebe, čovjek može spoznati svog Stvoritelja, a time i svoje mjesto u svijetu. Sufije, muslimanski mistici, bi rekli: *man 'arafa nafsahū fa qad 'arafa rabbehū* („Onaj koji pozna samoga sebe, spoznao je svog Gospodara”). Ali po svojoj prirodi, čovjek voli da zna ono što ne treba da zna i čime ne treba da se bavi, a ne ono što bi trebao znati i čime se mora baviti. Najviše od svega čovjek mora znati „ko je i šta je” i mora se baviti sa pitanjima „zašto je ovdje i sada”.

### 3. Prirodna vjera vis-à-vis zavjeta

**d**osad smo upoređivali prirodnu vjeru sa diktatom vjere kako bismo pokazali mogući pomak od čiste materije vjere (*al-īman*) do oblikovane religije (*al-dīn*), odnosno teologije ili ideologije. Koliko god da je plemenit u svojoj svrsi, diktat vjere, ako nije pravilno shvaćen, mogao bi biti katastrofalan. Od stanja ljudske duše, srca, uma i ruke zavisi kako će se diktat vjere razvijati u povijesti.

Sada bismo željeli uporediti prirodnu vjeru s idejom Božanskog zavjeta s čovjekom ili čovjekovog zavjeta s Bogom. Prvo, recimo da je zavjet čista teorija vjere, kao što je zakon čista teorija prava. Pod pojmom „čista teorija vjere” želim naglasiti da je potrebno definirati vjeru tako što će se ukloniti svi elementi koji ne pripadaju čistoj vjeri, tj. koji vjeru čine nečistom. To je metodološka osnova kojom se čista vjera oslobađa od stranih elemenata, koji zamagljuju njenu čistotu i kvare njenu ljepotu. Na prvi pogled to izgleda i normalno i razumljivo, ali u historiji nije bilo ni normalno ni razumljivo. Bilo je normalno pripisivati vjeri mnogo toga što joj ne pripada. Naime, normalno je bilo pripisivati vjeri sve što čovjeku padne na pamet da istakne sebe i svoju misao; i bilo je razumljivo da vjera sve opravdava da bi čovjek mogao zavladatai svijetom. Otuda postoji stalna potreba da se čista vjera zaštititi ili očisti od stranih elemenata, koji joj po svojoj prirodi ne pripadaju. To treba činiti teorijski, metodološki i praktično kako bi se očuvala čistoća vjere, njena ljepota i njena uzvišenost, slično kao što je austrijski teoretičar prava Hans Kelsen upozoravao da se pravo, kao osnova za uređenje međuljudskih odnosa u društvu, mora očistiti od elemenata koji mu ne pripadaju. Kelsen je primijetio da je tokom devetnaestog i dvadesetog stoljeća pravo izgubilo svoju čistoću, rekao bih svoju nevinost, jer se metodološki spojilo sa disciplinama kao što su psihologija, sociologija,

and no discussion. In fact, this is the meaning of religious dictate: without question it is the ultimate Divine good. God is good and therefore everything God commands is good in itself. There does not have to be an immediate clear benefit or gain from the Divine commandment, but the soul must be submissive to receive and carry out the commandment – immediately. About how much a commandment is a benefit or a gain, man will know later or will never know, but he will always believe that every commandment of God is both useful and gainful for him. God created man and that is why He knows better than man what is best for him. Man is ignorant. He needs to be constantly reminded of this in order to understand that he must read and learn to know and understand where his place is in the world. If he tries to compete with God, man is loser. Not because God does not allow him to know the truth, but because in the moment of forgetting his position in relation to God, his Creator, man thinks that he is self-sufficient, as well as that the Creator hinders him on the path of knowing everything although he is not able to know even himself. It is clear that only when Man knows himself, can he know his Creator, and thus his place in the world. The Sufi, Muslim mystic, would say: *man 'arafa nafsahū fa qad 'arafa rabbahū* (“He who knows himself, has known his Lord”). But by his nature, man likes to know what he needs not know and what he needs not be concerned with rather than what he should know and what he must be concerned with. Most of all man must know “who and what he is” and he must be concerned with “why he is here and now”.

### 3. Natural Faith *Vis-à-vis* Covenant

So far, I have compared the natural faith with the dictate of faith in order to show a possible shift from the pure matter of faith (*al-īmān*) to the form of religion (*al-dīn*) of theology nay ideology. As much as it is noble in its purpose, the dictate of faith, if not properly comprehended, might be a disaster. It depends on the state of human soul, heart, mind and hand how the dictate of faith will be worked out in history.

Now, we would like to compare the natural faith with the idea of divine covenant with man or the man’s covenant with God. First, let’s say that a covenant is a pure theory of faith, just as a law is a pure theory of law. Under the term “pure theory of faith” I want to emphasize that it is necessary to define faith by removing all the elements that do not belong to pure faith, which makes faith impure. It is a methodological basis by which pure faith frees itself from foreign elements, which obscure its purity and spoil its beauty. At first glance, this seems both normal and understandable, but in history it has been neither normal nor understandable. It was normal to attribute to faith much that did not belong to it. Namely, it was normal to ascribe to faith all that came to man’s mind to emphasize himself and his thought; and it was understandable that faith justifies all so that man may rule over the world. Hence, there is a constant need to protect or cleanse the pure faith from foreign elements, which by its nature do not belong to it. This should be done theoretically, methodologically and practically in order to preserve its purity, its beauty and its sublimity, similarly as the Austrian theorist of law Hans Kelsen warned that law, as a basis for regulating interpersonal relations in society, must be cleansed of elements that do not belong to it.



etika i politička teorija. Ako je to slučaj sa pravom, šta je onda sa vjerom, koja je mnogo podložnija manipulaciji ljudske samovolje i zloupotrebe.<sup>17</sup>

Zaista je mnogo teže sačuvati čistotu ili nezavisnost vjere koja je poput pravog dragulja, koja se krije u najdubljem dijelu ljudske duše, ali se ponekad i otkriva kao lažni dragulj u najplićoj ljudskoj „volji da vlada”, nego da se očuva čistoća ili nevinost prava, koje se rađa kao najdublja ljudska želja za društvenim poretkom, ali se i narušava iz najpliće ljudske pokvarenosti i sebičnosti. Koliko je vjera „čisto pravo” (nomokratija), toliko je i pravo „čista vjera” (demokratija). Ove dvije vrijednosti su toliko međusobno ovisne da nije moguće zamisliti vjeru bez prava, niti pravo bez vjere. Zato je interesantna Kelsenova teza o „čistoj teoriji prava”, kao što je i njegova potreba da pročisti pravnu nauku od svih elemenata koji striktno ne pripadaju pravu, vrijedna naše pažnje. Ustvari, ovo nam još više nameće zadatak da religioznu nauku pročistimo od svih elemenata koji striktno ne pripadaju prirodnoj vjeri, jer ona postaje mnogo važnija i mnogo značajnija. Zaista, vjerujemo da je Posljednji Božanski zavjet – Kur’ān – krajnji pokušaj da se vjera pročisti od svih elemenata koji joj striktno, teorijski, metodološki i praktično ne pripadaju.

Ali, treba naglasiti da zavjet prethodi pravu, kao što propis prethodi konačnom zakonu. Zavjet je apodiktičan<sup>18</sup> dok je zakon kazuistički propis.<sup>19</sup> Apodiktički vjerski propis, kao zavjet, je zapovijest (*al-amr*) ili zabrana (*al-nahy*) u obliku imperativa: „reci”, „poštuj”, „čuvaj”, „učini” to i to... i „nemoj da radiš” ili „ne radi” to i to... Reci: „Bog je jedan!”, „Poštuj svoje roditelje!”, „Drži se Božijeg užeta!”, „Čini dobro drugima!” Ali isto tako: „Ne ubij!” „Ne kradi!”, „Ne razbijaj zajednicu!”, „Nemoj biti pokvaren!” Ovi negativni imperativi mnogo su jači u apodiktičkom pravu od pozitivnih, jer implikacije ukazuju na prirodnu sklonost čovjeka da čini ono što ne smije činiti, tj. da ne smije „ubiti”, „krasti”, „lagati”, da „ne smije biti korumpiran” itd. Dakle, čovjek se upozorava da to ne čini iako je to u njegovoj prirodi, jer je to protuzakonito. Prema tome, „apodiktički zakon ili zapovijest je vječni Božiji zavjet o kojem nema rasprave. Nema rok trajanja. Apodiktički zakon je vječna Božija zapovijest. Apodiktički zakon nije primijenjeni zakon, već bezuvjetni i nepromijenjeni zavjet Boga čovjeku, kao i čovjekov zavjet Bogu da je primio poruku koja uvijek treba da mu je na umu i svijesti. S druge strane, kazuistički zakon je primijenjeni Božiji zakon, izveden iz Božijeg apodiktičkog zakona, koji je obično u obliku kondicionala: ‘ako...’ se dogodi ova *protasis*, ‘onda...’ će biti ta *apodosis*.” Kazuističko pravo je najbliže

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<sup>17</sup> Vidjeti, Kelsen, Hans: *Pure Theory of Law*, University of California Press, 1967.

<sup>18</sup> *Apodiktičan* (gr. *apodeiktikos evidentiary*), u običnom govoru: odlučan, odlučan, siguran; u logici *apodiktički sud*, kod Aristotela dokazni sud za razliku od problematičnog. Kod Immanuela Kanta matematički aksiomi su apodiktični jer su zasnovani na apriornoj svijesti o njihovoj nužnosti.

<sup>19</sup> *Kazuistički* (lat. *casus*: slučaj pada). Kazuističko pravo nastaje kao pravo za određene potrebe pojedinca ili društva u svjetlu Božijeg apodiktičkog zakona. To je induktivni zakon od slučaja do slučaja na osnovu kojeg se donosi pravna norma, a ne deduktivni zakon, gdje su pravne norme već poznate i služe za usvajanje potrebnih pravnih podnormi na osnovu njih.

Kelsen observed that during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries law lost its purity, I would say its innocence, because it methodologically blended with disciplines such as psychology, sociology, ethics, and political theory. If this is the case with the law, then what about faith, which is much more susceptible to the manipulation of human arbitrariness and abuse.<sup>17</sup>

Indeed, it is much harder to preserve the purity or independence of faith which is like a true gem and which hides itself in the deepest part of the human soul, but also sometimes reveals itself, as a false gem in the shallowest human “will to power”, than to preserve the purity or innocence of law which is born as a deepest human desire for social order, but is also violated from the shallowest human corruption and complacency. As much as faith is “pure law” (“nomocracy”), so much is the law “pure faith” (“democracy”). These two values are so interdependent that it is not possible to imagine faith without a law, nor a law without faith. That is why Kelsen’s thesis on the “pure theory of law” is interesting, just as it is his need to purify legal science from all elements, which strictly do not belong to law, is worthy of our attention. In fact, this imposes on us even more the task of purifying religious science from all elements, which strictly do not belong to the natural faith, because it becomes much more important and much more meaningful. Indeed, we believe that the Last Divine Covenant – the Qur’ān is the ultimate attempt to purify the faith from all these elements, which do not belong to it strictly, theoretically, methodologically and practically.

But it should be emphasized that a covenant precedes a law, just as a regulation precedes the final bill. A covenant is apodictic<sup>18</sup> while a law is a casuistic regulation.<sup>19</sup> Apodictic religious precept, as a covenant, is a commandment (*al-amr*) or prohibition (*al-nahy*) in the form of imperatives: “say”, “respect”, “keep”, “do” this and that ... and “you shall not do” or “don’t do” this and that ... Say: “God is One!” “Respect your parents!” “Stick to the rope of God!” “Do good to others!” But also: “You shall not kill!” “You shall not steal!” “You shall not fall apart!” “You shall not spoil!” These negative imperatives are much stronger in apodictic law than positive ones, because the implications indicate man’s natural tendency to do what he must not do, i.e., “kill,” “steal,” “lie,” “be corrupt,” and so on. This is why man is warned not to do it even though it is in his nature because it is illegal. Thus, apodictic law is an eternal covenant of God about which there is no debate. It has no expiration date. Apodictic law is the eternal commandment of God. Apodictic law is not an applied law, but an unconditional and unaltered covenant from God to man, as well as man’s vow to God that he has received a message, which should always be present in his mind and consciousness. On the other hand, casuistic law is an applied law of God, derived from God’s apodictic law, which is usually in the form of a conditional: “if ...” this *protasis* occurs, “then ...” it will be

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<sup>17</sup> Kelsen, Hans: *Pure Theory of Law*. University of California Press, 1967.

<sup>18</sup> *Apodictic* (Gre. *apodeiktikos evidentiary*), in ordinary speech: resolute, determined, sure; in logic *apodictic judgment*: in Aristotle the evidentiary judgment as opposed to a problematic one. In Immanuel Kant mathematical axioms are apodictic because they are based on a priori awareness of their necessity.

<sup>19</sup> *Casuistic* (lat. *casus*: fall case). Casuist law arises as a right for certain needs of an individual or society in the light of God’s apodictic law. It is an inductive law on a case-by-case basis on the basis of which a legal norm is adopted, and not a deductive law, where legal norms are already known and serve to adopt the necessary legal sub-norms on the basis of them.

induktivnom ili anglosaksonskom pravu, koje je izvedeno iz konkretnih životnih slučajeva za razliku od deduktivnog ili rimskog prava, koje se uglavnom zasniva na utvrđenim pravnim aksiomima, iz kojih se po potrebi mogu izvesti i druge pravne podnorme. Ova deduktivna ili induktivna metodologija u pravu prisutna je u šerijatskom pravu na takav način da Kur'ān sadrži i apodiktički i kazuistički zavjet ili pravnu odrednicu.



ILUSTRACIJA - Čovjek ima od Boga datu inteligenciju koja ima moć da razumije Božiju knjigu. Odlomak iz Kur'āna; Arapski poluotok (moguće) 675.-800.

ILLUSTRATION - Man has a God-given intelligence that has the power to understand God's book. Fragment from the Qur'an; Arabian Peninsula (possibly) 675-800.

that *apoptosis*. Casuistic law is closest to inductive or Anglo-Saxon law, which is derived from specific life cases as opposed to deductive or Roman law, which is mainly based on established legal axioms, from which other legal sub-norms can be derived as needed. This deductive or inductive methodology in law is present in *Shari'ah* law in such a way that the Qur'an contains both an apodictic and a casuistic covenant or legal narrative.



ILLUSTRATION ~ The seal of God in the soul of man is indelible, just as the seal of God in the book of God is indisputable. Excerpt from the Qur'an, Persia, 10-11. century, Dallas Museum of Art.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Pečat Božiji u duši čovjeka je neizbrisiv, kao što je neosporan i pečat Božiji u knjizi Božijoj. Odlomak iz Kur'ana, Perzija, 10.-11. stoljeće, Dallas Museum of Art.



Zapravo, egzegetska disciplina *asbāb al-nuzūl* (uzročno-posljedični razlog za Božiju objavu određenih ajeta) predstavlja jedan od najboljih načina da se razumije kur'ansko-zavjetna ili kur'ansko-pravna poruka u smislu apodiktičko-deduktivne i kazuističko-induktivne metode, što ljudskom umu olakšava da shvati razliku između vječnog i prolaznog, između nepromjenjivog i promjenjivog, između živog i neživog, između razumne i nerazumne ideje i prakse u životu čovjeka koji se zavjetovao Bogu da će biti svjestan Božije prisutnosti kao što je svjestan samoga sebe, jer bez samosvijesti čovjek ne može biti svjestan Boga. Zapravo, sve što „jeste” u ovom prolaznom svijetu ima smisla za čovjeka onoliko koliko je čovjek toga svjestan. Bog živi i djeluje bez obzira na to da li čovjek ima svijest o Bogu, ali čovjekov život i ljudska djela nemaju smisla ako nema čovjekove svijesti o Bogu. Čovjek to zna, ali ponekad to ne priznaje dok je ovdje u ovom prolaznom svijetu. Ali na kraju ga ovo priznanje čeka na ahiretu.

U Časnom Kur'ānu riječ *mīthāq* (zavjet) spominje se 25 puta. Evo primjera *mīthāqa*, zavjeta koji je Svemogući Bog sklopio sa sinovima Israilovim, zavjeta koji Kur'an prenosi iz *Tewrāta* (Tore, Stari zavjet). Ovaj zavjet važi za sva vremena kao i za čitavo čovječanstvo: – *I kada smo od sinova Israilovih uzeli zavjet: da se nećete klanjati nikome osim Bogu, Jedinom Bogu; (2) da ćete biti dobročinitelji svojim roditeljima, (3) da ćete biti dobrotvori svojim rođacima; (4) da ćete biti dobročinitelji siročadi; (5) da ćete biti dobročinitelji siromašnima; (6) da ćete ljudima govoriti ljubazne riječi; (7) da ćete održavati vezu sa Bogom kroz molitvu (ṣalāh); (8) i da ćete od svoje imovine izdvojiti za opće dobro (zakāt). Ali vi ste se odrekli tog zavjeta, osim jedne manjine.*<sup>20</sup>

Naravno, svaka od ovih osam zavjetnih normi, koje je Svemogući Bog propisao sinovima Israilovim u Starom zavjetu (*Tewrāt*), koje Svemogući Bog ponavlja u Posljednjem zavjetu (*Kur'ān*), predstavlja vrhunac apodiktičko-deduktivnog prava i morala. Ovaj vječni zavjet sadrži cjelovit svjetonazor, kao opći pogled na svijet. Ovaj pogled na svijet obuhvata najviše principe života. Onaj ko svjesno prihvati ove zavjetne principe može imati određenu sliku svijeta, što može biti u skladu s mišljenjem M. Heideggera da je „pogled na svijet preontološko oblikovanje slike svijeta” ili urođena moć da čovjek ima sliku svijeta, sliku koja mu omogućava da na osnovu nje odlučuje o suštinskim pitanjima smisla i značenja svijeta. Jer razumijevanje vjere i morala proizlazi iz svjetonazora, ideala, životnih principa iz kojih proizlaze politička, etička, estetska, ekološka i druga uvjerenja. Misao i vjerovanje da je Bog jedan, kao zavjetna norma, obavezuje čovjeka na slobodu od ropstva lažnim bogovima, koji su svuda oko njega u jednom lažnom svijetu. Dakle, sloboda nije izbor, već zavjetni nalog da čovjek bude ono što jeste u odnosu na Boga Svevišnjeg, a to je da mora prihvatiti Božiji dar slobode kao najvišu zavjetnu vrijednost. Zato je ova prva zavjetna norma uvjet svih ostalih zavjetnih normi. Jer, onaj ko je svjestan Jednog i Jedinog Boga, svjestan je svoje obaveze prema roditeljima, rodbini, siročadi i siromašnima, svjestan je vrijednosti lijepe riječi, svjestan je da je održavanje odnosa sa Stvoriteljem najsigurniji

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<sup>20</sup> *Kur'ān*, 2:83.

In fact, the exegetical discipline of *asbāb al-nuzūl* (the cause-and-effect reason for God's revelation of certain verses) represents one of the best ways to understand the Qur'ānic-votive or Qur'ānic-legal message both in terms of apodictic-deductive and in terms of the casuistic-inductive method, which makes it easier for the human mind to comprehend the difference between the eternal and the transient, between the unchangeable and the changeable, between the living and the non-living, between the reasonable and the unreasonable ideas and practices in the life of man who took a vow to God that he will be aware of God's presence as he is aware of himself, for without self-awareness, man cannot be aware of God. In fact, everything that "is" in this transient world makes sense to man as much as man is aware of it. God lives and acts regardless of whether man has an awareness of God, but man's life and man's actions have no meaning if there is no man's awareness of God. Man knows this, but sometimes he does not admit it while here in this transient world. But ultimately this recognition awaits him in the Hereafter.

In the Holy Qur'ān the word *mīthāq* ("covenant") is mentioned 25 times. Here is an example of *mīthāq*, a covenant made by God Almighty with the sons of Isrā'īl, a covenant transmitted by the Qur'ān from the Torah (the "Old Testament"). This covenant is valid for all times as well as for the entire humanity: – *And when we took from the sons of Isrā'īl vow: (1) that you will worship no one but God, the One and Only God; (2) that you will be benefactors to your parents, (3) that you will be benefactors to your relatives; (4) that you will be benefactors to orphans; (5) that you will be benefactors to the poor; (6) that you will speak kind words to people; (7) that you will maintain a connection with God through prayer (ṣalāh); (8) and that you will set aside from your property for the common good (zakāh). But you have renounced that vow, except for one minority.*<sup>20</sup>

Of course, each of these eight covenant norms, which God Almighty prescribed to the sons of Isrā'īl in the Old Testament ("Tawrāt") and which God Almighty repeats in the Last Testament ("Qur'ān"), represents the culmination of apodictic-deductive law and morality. This eternal covenant contains a complete worldview, as a general view of the world. This worldview encompasses the highest principles of life. One who consciously accepts these votive principles may have a certain image of the world, which may be in line with M. Heidegger's thought that "the worldview is a pre-ontological shaping of the image of the world" or the innate power to have a picture of the world, a picture that allows him to decide on the basis of it the essential questions of the meaning and significance of the world. Because the understanding of faith and morals is derived from the worldview, ideals, life principles from which political, ethical, aesthetic, ecological and other beliefs are derived. The thought and belief that God is One as a votive norm obliges man to freedom from slavery to false gods, who are all around him in one false world. Therefore, freedom is not a choice, but a votive mandate for man to be what he is in relation to God the Highest, and that is that he must accept God's gift of freedom as the highest votive value. That is why this first votive norm is a condition of all other votive norms. For, he who is aware of the One and Only God, is aware of his obligation to parents, relatives, orphans and the poor ... is aware of the value of the beautiful word ...

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<sup>20</sup> Qur'ān, 2:83.

način da bude psihički zdravi i duhovno bogat, svjestan je da je rad za opće dobro vrijednost, koja čovjeka čini sretnim.

Naš argument ovdje je očigledan, naime, da postoje dva pečata zavjeta vjere između Boga i čovjeka, čovjeka i Boga. Jedan je utisnut u duši čovjeka, a drugi je zapisan u Božijoj knjizi za čovjeka. Svemogući Bog je utisnuo oba pečata svojom „rukom”.<sup>21</sup> Čovjek je vezan za ova dva zavjetna pečata čiste vjere, bez obzira na to da li ih je svjestan ili ne, i da li ih savjesno i odgovorno ispunjava. Čovjek ima Bogom dani dâr uma, koji ima moć da čita zavjet vjere u njegovoj duši; čovjek ima od Boga datu inteligenciju koja ima moć da razumije Božiju knjigu. Da čovjek nema dâr uma, onda zavjet vjere u njegovoj duši sa Božijim pečatom ne bi imao smisla. Isto tako, ako čovjek ne bi imao dâr inteligencije, onda zavjet vjere u Božiju knjigu ne bi imao svrhe. Pečat Božiji u duši čovjeka je neizbrisiv, kao što je neosporan i pečat Božiji u knjizi Božijoj. Tajna čiste prirodne vjere (*al-īmān*) je u Božanskom dodiru ljudske duše da prepozna u sebi Božanski zavjetni dâr formalne i normativne religije (*al-dīn*); tajna čiste vjere je u božanskom nadahnuću uma da u Knjizi Božijoj prepozna Božansku zavjetnu milost Božanskog zakona kao formalnu i normativnu moć ljudskog individualnog i društvenog života.

#### 4. Odstupanje od čiste prirodne vjere

**T**eško je precizno odrediti kada i kako dolazi do odstupanja od čiste prirodne vjere. Međutim, moglo bi se pretpostaviti da počinje onda kada se zloupotrebljava diktat vjere i krši njen zavjet. Ali, ko je sudija da odluči da je neko zloupotrijebio diktat vjere i prekršio zavjet vjere? Rečeno nam je da je Svevišnji Bog jedini sudija u ovim stvarima na ahiretu, tako da mi ne trebamo raspravljati jedni s drugima ovdje i sada, jer bi nas to moglo dovesti do neprijateljstva jednih prema drugima. Trebali bismo biti tolerantni jedni prema drugima dok razgovaramo jedni s drugima. Trebali bismo izbjegavati donošenje oštrih osuda o drugima u pitanjima vjere, vjerovanja i religije. Jer nikome nije drago da bude proklet ili izopćen iz svoje religijske zajednice, bez obzira na to kakav je grijeh. Svjestan ove fiziologije čovjeka, šejhul-islam Mustāfa Šabrī je izdao ovu zanimljivu fetvu:<sup>22</sup>

Onaj ko zaista pije vino i čini *al-zinā* (preljub) ne smatra se *kafrirom* (nevjernikom) sve dok vjeruje da je to *ḥarām* (zabranjeno). Počinilac ovog djela je samo grešnik (*fāsiq*) ali ne i *kāfir*, dok onaj koji

<sup>21</sup> Ovaj izraz „Božija ruka” ne smije se shvatiti doslovno, već se mora shvatiti metaforički, kako ga tumače muslimanski racionalisti, kao što je Fakhrudin al-Razī, u smislu da je to pojam „Božija moć”, a nikako „Božija ruka” kao „tjelesni organ”.

<sup>22</sup> Mustafa Sabri Efendi (1869–1954) bio je jedan od posljednjih šejhul-islama u Osmanskom Carstvu. Bio je više puta imenovan na položaj šejhul-islama na nekoliko mjeseci i smijenjen tokom 1919. i 1920. godine. Na kraju je progнан u Egipat, gdje je proveo ostatak svog života. Umro je u Egiptu, gdje je i sahranjen. Posljednji, 131. po redu, šejhul-islam u Osmanskom Carstvu bio je časni Mehmet Nuri-efendija od 1920. do 1922. godine, kada je zvanična institucija šejhul-islama definitivno ukinuta. U Bosni je ova institucija zamijenjena institucijom Reisl-uleme i Velikog muftije bosanskog 1882.

is aware that maintaining a relationship with the Creator is the surest way to be mentally healthy and spiritually rich ... is aware that working for the common good is a value, which makes a person happy...

Our argument here is obvious, namely, that there are two seals of the covenant of faith between God and man, man and God. One is imprinted in the soul of man, and the other is written in God's book for man. God Almighty imprinted both seals with his "hand".<sup>21</sup> Man is bound by these two votive seals of pure faith, whether he is aware of them or not, and whether he fulfills them conscientiously and responsibly. Man has the God-given gift of the mind, which has the power to read the vow of faith in his soul; man has a God-given intelligence, which has the power to understand the book of God. If man did not have the gift of the mind, then the vow of faith in his soul with the seal of God would make no sense. Likewise, if man did not have the gift of intelligence, then the vow of faith in God's book would have no purpose. The seal of God in the soul of man is indelible, just as the seal of God in the book of God is undeniable. The secret of pure natural faith (*al-īmān*) is in the Divine touch of the human soul to recognize in itself the Divine votive gift of formal and normative religion (*al-dīn*); the secret of pure faith is in the Divine inspiration of the mind to recognize in the Book of God the Divine votive grace of divine law as a formal and normative may of human individual and societal life.

#### 4. Deviation from Pure Natural Faith

It is hard to determine precisely when and how the deviation from the pure natural faith occurs. However, it might be assumed that it starts when the dictate of faith is being abused and the covenant of faith is being broken. But who is the judge to decide that someone has abused the dictate of faith and has broken the covenant of faith? We are told that God Almighty is the only judge in these matters in the Hereafter so that we humans should not dispute with each other here and now because it could lead us to hostility against each other. We should be tolerant with each other while dialoging with each other. We should avoid passing harsh judgements on each other in matters of faith, belief and religion. Because no one is pleased to be cursed or excommunicated from his/her faith community no matter what he/she sin might be. Being aware of this physiology of man, Sheikh al-Islam Mustāfa Ṣabrī issued this interesting fatwa of his time:<sup>22</sup>

One who actually drinks wine and commits *al-zinā* (adultery) is not considered as to be a *kāfir* (infidel) as long as he believes that it is *ḥarām* (forbidden). The perpetrator of this act is only a sinner (*fāsiq*) but not *kāfir*, while

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<sup>21</sup> This phrase "God's hand" must not be taken literally, but must be understood metaphorically, as interpreted by Muslim rationalist, such as Fakhruddin al-Rāzī, in the sense that it is the notion of "God's power" and by no means "God's hand" as the "bodily organ".

<sup>22</sup> Mustafa Sabri Efendi (1869-1954) was one of the last Sheikh al-Islam in the Ottoman Empire. He was repeatedly appointed to the position of Sheikhu-l-Islam for several months and removed during 1919 and 1920. He was eventually exiled to Egypt, where he spent the rest of his life. He died in Egypt, where he was buried. The last, 131st in a row, Sheikh al-Islam in the Ottoman Empire was the Honorable Mehmet Nuri Efendi from 1920 to 1922, when the official institution of Sheikh al-Islam was definitively abolished. In Bosnia, this institution was replaced by the institution of Rais-l-ulama or the Grand Mufti of Bosnia in 1882.



zapravo ne pije vino niti čini preljubu, ali smatra da su ta djela *ḥalāl* (dozvoljena), tj. vjeruje da pijenje alkohola i preljuba nije grijeh, smatra se nevjernikom (*kāfir*).<sup>23</sup>

Bez obzira na konkretan razlog, ova fetva Šabrī-efendije je najdrastičniji izraz teoloških dilema s kojima se muslimanska zajednica suočavala od samog početka, odnosno zajednica muslimanske *'ulemā'*/učenjaka ili teologa. Zapravo, sve je počelo ubistvom trećeg zakonitog halife, 'Uthman bin 'Affāna (644–656). Nakon toga, rasprava o tome ko je zapravo „pravi ili čisti musliman” nikada nije prestala. Isto pitanje je i danas: „Šta je čista vjera?”; „Gdje je skrivena čista vjera?”; „Kako se čista vjera dokazuje i pokazuje?”; „Ko je kompetentan ili ovlašten da ocjenjuje kvalitetu čiste vjere?”; „Da li je čista vjera isto što i čisto djelo, ili je čista vjera odvojena od čistog djela – morala?”; „Da li se čista vjera povećava ili smanjuje?”

Prvi koji su dali odgovor na ova teška pitanja bili su haridžiti. Haridžiti (ar. *Khawāridž* sing. *Kharidžī*) bili su prva prepoznatljiva pobunjenička sekta u islamu. Njihov identitet je nametnut u vrijeme kada je muslimanska *'ulemā'* pokušala definirati stanje u kojem musliman ponekad može odstupiti od idealnih normi islama, ali i dalje zadržava pravo da se naziva „muslimanom”. Haridžiti su po ovom pitanju imali izuzetno ekskluzivan stav u smislu da je onaj ko počini teški ili smrtni grijeh odstupio od čiste vjere (*al-īmān*) i formalne vjere (*al-dīn*). On je otpadnik (*al-murtadd*) od čiste vjere. Dakle, on zaslužuje smrtnu kaznu. Ovaj isključivi i neodrživ stav haridžija bio je razlog da mudra i odgovorna muslimanska *'ulemā'*/učenjaci ustanu u odbranu „racionalne vjere” u smislu očuvanja „racionalne muslimanske zajednice” od ekstremnih haridžija, čiji su stavovi počeli dovoditi u pitanje cjelokupnu muslimansku zajednicu i društvo. Zbog toga su dobili ime *khawāridž*, što znači oni koji su izašli iz glavne zajednice (*al-sawād al-a'azam*).

Zahvaljujući ranoj savjesnoj muslimanskoj *'ulemi'*/učenjacima, haridžiti su brzo teoretski ili apologetski poraženi, ali ostaci njihovih latentnih militantnih stavova nisu nestali. Prijetili su miru i sigurnosti glavne muslimanske zajednice sve do kraja osmog stoljeća nove ere. Historijski gledano, haridžiti su ostali samo kao loš primjer ortodoksne muslimanske *'ulema'*/učenjaka u njihovim argumentima za „racionalnu vjeru”, koja ne pribjegava *tekfīru*, osporavanju vjere drugima. *'Ulemā'* je koristila argument protiv *tekfīra*, *hadīthom*: „Ako neko uskrati vjeru svom bratu, onda je jedan od njih nevjernik.” (*Idhā kaffara al-radžulu akhāhu fa qad bā'a bihā ahaduhumā*).<sup>24</sup>

Najizazovniji odgovor na ovaj drastičan haridžitski ekstremizam došao je od murdž'īta (ar. *murdž'īah*). Murdž'īti su također jedna od ranih sekti u islamu koja se pobunila protiv haridžita, proklamirajući svoje teološko učenje o grijehu koje je dijametralno suprotno haridžijskom, u smislu da odgađaju

<sup>23</sup> Vidjeti: Šabrī, Mustāfa: *Mawqif al-'aqli wa al-'ilmi wa al-'ālimi min rabb al-'ālamīn wa 'ibādihī al-mursalīn*, al-Maktaba al-ašriyyah, Beirut, 2018, str. 16.

<sup>24</sup> *Hadīth* zabilježen u Muslimovoj zbirci.

the one who does not actually drink wine nor does he commit adultery, but believes that these acts are *ḥalāl* (permissible), i.e. he believes that drinking alcohol and adultery are not sins is considered to be an infidel (*kāfir*).<sup>23</sup>

Regardless of the specific reason, this Ṣabrī-effendi fatwa is the most drastic expression of the theological dilemmas faced by the Muslim community from the very beginning, i.e., the community of Muslim '*ulamā*'/scholars or theologians. In fact, it all began with the assassination of the third rightful caliph, 'Uthmān bin 'Affān (644–656). After that, the debate over who was, in fact, a "true or pure Muslim" never ended. The same question is now as it was then: "what is pure faith?"; "where is pure faith hidden?"; "how is pure faith proven and shown?"; "who is competent or authorized to assess the quality of pure faith?"; "is pure faith the same as pure deed, or is pure faith separate from pure deed – morality?"; "Does pure faith increase or decrease?"

The first to come out with an answer to these difficult questions were the Kharijites. The Kharijites (ar. *Khawārij*, sing. *Kharījī*) were the first recognizable rebellious sect in Islam. Their identity is imposed at a time when the Muslim '*ulamā*' have tried to define a state in which a Muslim can sometimes deviate from the ideal norms of Islam, but still retain the right to be called a "Muslim". It is on this issue that the Kharijites had an extremely exclusive view in the sense that one who commits a grave or mortal sin has departed from pure faith (*al-imān*) and formal religion (*al-dīn*). He is an apostate (*al-murtadd*) from pure faith. Therefore, he deserves the death penalty. This exclusive and unsustainable attitude of the Kharijites was the reason for the wise and responsible Muslim '*ulamā*'/scholars to stand up in defense of the "realistic faith" in terms of preserving the "realistic Muslim community" from extreme Kharijites, whose views began to call into question the entire Muslim community and society. That is why they were given the name "khawārij", which means those who have defected from the mainstream community (*al-sawād al-a'azam*).

Thanks to the early conscientious Muslim '*ulamā*'/scholars, the Kharijites were theoretically or apologetically defeated quickly, but the remains of their latent militant attitudes had not disappeared. They had been threatening the peace and security of the mainstream Muslim community until the end of the eighth century AD. Historically, the Kharijites have remained only as a bad example to the orthodox Muslim '*ulamā*'/scholars in their argument for "realistic faith," which does not resort to *takfīr*, an utter denial of the faith of others. The '*ulamā*' used an argument against *takfīr* the *ḥadīth*, narrative, of the Prophet Muhammad, a.s, who said: "If one denies the faith to his brother, then one of them is an infidel". (*Idhā kaffara al-rajulu akhāhu fa qad bā'a bihā ahaduhumā*).<sup>24</sup>

The most challenging response to this drastic Kharijite extremism came from the Murj'ites (ar. *Murdj'iah*). The Murj'ites are also one of the early sects in Islam, who rebelled against the Kharijites by proclaiming their theological teaching on sin, which is diametrically opposed to the Kharijite, in the sense that they delay the

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<sup>23</sup> See: Ṣabrī, Muṣṭafa: *Mawqif al-'aqli wa al-'ilmi wa al-'ālimi min rabb al-'ālamīn wa 'ibādhi al-mursalīn*. al-Maktaba al-aṣriyyah, Beirut, 2018, p. 16.

<sup>24</sup> *Ḥadīth* by Muslim.

osudu grijeha, prepuštajući to Božijoj presudi na Sudnjem danu, jer je Bog samo nadležan da sudi ljudima o njihovoj unutrašnjoj vjeri i njihovom vanjskom ponašanju. Ova murdžitska teološka doktrina bila je posebno u upotrebi između atentata na halifu 'Uthmana bin 'Affāna i atentata na četvrtog zakonitog halife 'Alija bin Abu Ṭāliba (656–661). Shodno tome, doktrina murdž'ita odigrala je ključnu ulogu u održavanju dinastije Umejada, koju je u Damasku uspostavio Mu 'āwiya ibn Abī Sufyān (661–680). Mu 'āwiya je, dakle, uveo dinastiju u instituciju *khalifata*, koji se više nikada nije vratio svojoj prvobitnoj svrsi i funkciji, ovlašćujući svog sina Yazida bin Mu 'āwiyu (680–683) da ga naslijedi po osnovu porodične pripadnosti, a ne na zasluge vjerske i moralne dosljednosti. Ovo nije moglo proći nezapaženo od strane muslimanske '*uleme*'/učenjaka, koji su to vidjeli kao izazov da objasne odnos između čiste vjere (*al-īmān*) i formalne religije (*al-islām* ili *al-dīn*) u teoriji vjere i praksi morala.



ILUSTRACIJA - Rasprava muslimanske *uleme*/učenjaka oko odnosa između čiste vjere (*al-īmān*) i formalne religije (*al-islām* ili *al-dīn*).  
ILLUSTRATION - A debate among Muslim ulema/scholars over the relationship between pure faith (*al-īmān*) and formal religion (*al-islām* or *al-dīn*).

Haridžiti su, kao što smo vidjeli, bili poraženi, dok murdž'iti nisu bili ni potpuno prihvaćeni ni potpuno odbačeni. Nadalje, dok je haridžitska doktrina prijetila fizičkom postojanju muslimanskog društva, doktrina murdž'ita je relativizirala suštinu muslimanskog sistema moralnog mišljenja i prakse. Može se reći da su murdž'iti imali amoralni odnos prema javnom moralu, u smislu da su izbjegavali da donose moralne sudove o ljudskom ponašanju. Murdž'iti su iz ove premise izveli svoj zaključak da „čista vjera” nema veze sa „dobrim djelom”. Naime, „čista vjera” (*al-īmān*) nije isto što i „formalna vjera” (*al-islām*), što znači da *al-īmān* ima svoju nezavisnu suštinu u odnosu na *al-islām*, tj. vjera i praksa su dva različita pojma i stoga su vjera i moral odvojeni entiteti. Otuda, murdž'itski stav je da se „čista vjera” ne

judgment of sin while leaving it to God's judgment on the Day of Judgment because God is only competent to judge people about their inner faith and their outer behavior. This Murj'ite theological doctrine was specially in use between the assassination of Caliph 'Uthmān bin 'Affān and the assassination of the fourth rightful Caliph 'Alī bin Abū Ṭālib (656-661). Consequently, the Murj'ite doctrine played a crucial role in the maintenance of the Umayyad dynasty, established in Damascus by Mu'āwiya ibn Abī Sufyān (661-680). Mu'āwiya, therefore, introduced the dynasty into the institution of the *caliphate*, which has never again returned to its original purpose and function, by authorizing his son Yazīd bin Mu'āwiya (680-683) to succeed him on the merits of family affiliation, not on the merits of religious and moral consistency. This could not go unnoticed by Muslim '*ulamā*'/scholars, who saw this as a challenge to explain the relationship between pure faith (*al-īmān*) and formal religion (*al-islām* or *al-dīn*) in the theory of faith and the practice of morality.



ILLUSTRATION ~ A debate among Muslim *ulema*/scholars over the relationship between pure faith (*al-īmān*) and formal religion (*al-islām* or *al-dīn*).  
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Rasprava muslimanske *uleme*/učenjaka oko odnosa između čiste vjere (*al-īmān*) i formalne religije (*al-islām* ili *al-dīn*).

The Kharijites, as we have seen, had been defeated, while the Murj'ites were neither fully accepted nor completely rejected. Furthermore, while the Kharijite doctrine threatened the physical existence of Muslim society, the Murj'ite doctrine relativized the essence of the Muslim system of moral thought and practice. It can be said that Murj'ites had an amoral attitude towards public morality, in the sense that they avoided making moral judgments about human behavior.<sup>25</sup> It is this premise that the Murj'ites have derived their conclusion: "pure faith" has nothing to do

<sup>25</sup> In ethics, as the science of morality, we have terms: "moral", "immoral", and "amoral". "Moral" term indicates to a acceptable standpoint of what is good, just, and beautiful act; contrary to that is the term "immorality" as an unacceptable bad, unjust and ugly act. "Amoral" term, on the other hand, is an act about which there is no moral judgment. Thus, the Murj'ites can be said to have



povećava niti smanjuje pod utjecajem „dobrog” ili „loših” djela, već je čista vjera iskonska vrijednost s kojom se čovjek rađa, živi i umire pod uvjetom da je svjestan toga u svom srcu. Čovjek to ne mora nužno potvrditi svojim djelom.

Tako je *fetva* jednog od posljednjih osmanskih šejhul-islama Mustafe Šabri-efendije usvojena u duhu murdž’itske doktrine da „čista vjera” nije suštinski dio „dobrog djela” ili „lošeg djela”. Međutim, čovjek mora biti svjestan lošeg djela da je to *ḥarām* (zabranjeno). Ono što se danas dešava u muslimanskom svijetu može se vidjeti u kontekstu ova dva suprotstavljena moralna stava, haridž’itskog i murdž’itskog, koji današnja muslimanska *‘ulemā*/učenjaci nastoje nadmašiti nudeći ideju *al-waṣatiyye*, srednjeg inkluzivnog ili integralnog puta. Ovo je prvenstveno važno za muslimane koji žive u mješovitim zajednicama i društvima i na zapadu i na istoku.

Trenutna moralna kriza u svijetu u velikoj je mjeri rezultat trijumfalnog povratka formalne religije ili teologije na svjetsku scenu nakon što je, prije više od jednog stoljeća, bila bačena na marginu povijesnih zbivanja, ali nije sposobna da adekvatno odgovori zahtjevima vremena. Zvuči paradoksalno, zar ne? Nije li povratak religije iz ateističko-komunističkog „zatvora” bio istovremeno i povratak religije moralnoj „slobodi” izbora dobra? Nažalost, ne. Savremena religijska ili teološka misao ne samo da je moralno zakrčljala, već je postala moralno neodrživa jer, u moralnom smislu, gubi svrhu svog postojanja. Današnja formalna ili instruktivna religijska misao nije u dijalogu sa suprotnim nereligioznim stavovima, koji bi joj pomogli da se vidi u ogledalu. Zaista, formalna religija danas nije u dijalogu ni s kim. Danas je, s moralne tačke gledišta, formalna religija u sukobu sa svima osim s onima koji je politički zloupotrebljavaju. Zašto su se kritičari religiozne misli povukli? Oni su nam danas potrebniji nego ikad da očistimo čistu vjeru od nečiste religiozne misli, koja pravi kompromise na račun moralne savjesti. Religija je danas u krizi ne zato što je nema, već zato što je ima na pogrešan način i na pogrešnom mjestu. Na isti način kao i ranije, pročišćavanje religiozne ili teološke misli nije moguće izvana, već iznutra, pod uvjetom da oni unutar formalnog vjerskog ili teološkog kruga prepoznaju opasnost izvana. Za sada, oni koji su unutra nemaju straha, a oni koji su vani nemaju ni znanja ni hrabrosti da se bave vjerskim pitanjima. Ali, čista prirodna vjera mora ponovo progovoriti, jer ljudska duša ne može dugo tolerirati Luciferovu prevaru. Prvi uvjet za pravi lijek je priznanje da bolest postoji. Stoga, priznajmo: religiozna ili teološka misao je u krizi jer je svijetom zavladala moralna kriza, koja dolazi kao rezultat korištenja čiste prirodne vjere za potrebe nečiste savjesti.

Završavajući ovaj članak, svjedočimo o povratku talibana u Kabul u Afganistanu. Svi su bili iznenađeni čak i sâmi talibani svojom brzom pobjedom nakon dvadeset godina poricanja i osude svijeta zbog 11. septembra 2001. godine. Dvadesetogodišnji rat protiv navodnog talibanskog terora okončano je povratkom talibana na vlast u afganistanskoj državi u centralnoj Aziji. Sada je svijet u velikom strahu od vladavine talibana, iako još niko ne zna šta znači njihov dolazak na vlast. Ali jedno je sigurno, njihov dolazak znači ukidanje demokratije u Afganistanu. Ovo je svakako najveći i najneizvjesniji izazov ne

with “good deed,” namely, that “pure faith” (*al-īmān*) is not the same as formal religion “*al-islām*”, which means that *al-īmān* has its independent essence in relation to *al-islām*, i.e. faith and practice are two different concepts and thus faith and morality are separate entities. Hence, the Murj’ite view that “pure faith” does not increase or decrease under the influence of “good deed,” or “bad deeds”, but pure faith is the primordial value with which man is born, lives and dies provided man is aware of it in his heart. He does not necessarily confirm this by his work.

Thus, the *fatwa* of the one of the last Ottoman Sheikh al-Islam Muṣṭafa Ṣabrī Effendi was adopted in the spirit of the Murj’ite doctrine that “pure faith” is not essential part of “good deed”, or “bad deed”. However, one must be aware of a bad deed to be sinful *ḥarām* (forbidden) or not. What is happening in the Muslim world today it can be seen in the context of these two conflicting moral attitudes, the Kharijite and the Murj’ite, which today’s Muslim *‘ulamā’*/scholars seek to transcend by offering the idea of *Al-Wasaṭiyyah*, the middle inclusive ground or an integral path. This is primarily important for Muslims who live in plural mixed communities and societies both in the West and in the East.

The current moral crisis in the world is largely the result of the triumphant return of formal religion or theology to the world stage after it was, more than a century ago, thrown to the end of its inability to meet the demands of the times. It sounds paradoxical, doesn’t it? Was not the return of religion from atheistic-communist “prison” at the same time the return of religion to moral “freedom” to choose good? Unfortunately, it is not. Contemporary religious or theological thought has not only morally stunted, but has become morally unsustainable because, in a moral sense, it loses the purpose of its existence. Today’s formal or instructive religious thought is not in dialogue with the opposite non-religious views, which would help it to see itself in a mirror. Indeed, formal religion today is not in dialogue with anyone. Today, from a moral point of view, formal religion is in conflict with everyone except with those who need its political and amoral support. Why did the critics of religious thought withdraw? We need them today more than ever to cleanse the pure faith of impure religious thought, which makes compromises at the expense of moral conscience. Religion is in crisis today not because it does not exist, but because it exists in the wrong way and in the wrong place. In the same way as before, the purification of religious or theological thought is not possible from the outside but from within, provided that those within the formal religious or theological circle recognize the danger from the outside. For now, those who are inside have no fear, and those who are outside have neither knowledge nor courage to deal with religious issues. But pure natural faith must speak out again, because the human soul cannot tolerate Lucifer’s deception for long. The first condition for a real cure is the recognition that there is a disease. Therefore, let us admit: religious or theological thought is in crisis because the world has been ruled by a moral crisis, which comes as a result of using pure natural faith for the needs of an unclean conscience.

Concluding this article, we witness the return of the Taliban to Kabul in Afghanistan was announced. Everyone was surprised even the Taliban themselves by their swift victory after twenty years of denial and condemnation by the world because of the 11<sup>th</sup> September of 2001. The twenty years of war against the alleged Taliban terror ended by

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advocated an “amoral” attitude towards public morality, which is very close to the current state of moral and civilizational state of mind in the world.

samo za muslimane, već i za cijeli svijet – talibani ukidaju ili redefinišu „demokratiju” kao način vladavine državom. Glavno pitanje za muslimane je: koji su temelji i prepreke demokratiji u islamskoj političkoj misli? Odgovor na ovo pitanje može se dobiti fokusiranjem na dva politički relevantna islamska koncepta: *šūra* (savjetodavno vijeće odabranih) i *bay'ah* (uvjetna zakletva vjernosti koja se daje novom vladaru ili novoj vlasti). Ova dva koncepta moći su u talibanskoj opciji. Talibani vjeruju da se ova dva koncepta mogu reinterpretirati tako da predstavljaju teorijsku osnovu izborne demokratije u islamu. Bit će zanimljivo čuti talibanske antidemokratske argumente u islamskoj političkoj misli u korist „Božanskog suvereniteta”. Nije li, uostalom, i u kršćanskoj političkoj teologiji u Evropi, ne tako davno, bila dominantna teza o „Božanskom suverenitetu”, prema kojoj je Bog vrhovni autoritet te da su sve stvari pod Božijom kontrolom? Bog je „suvereni Gospodar svega po neospornom pravu [stvaratelja]... vlasnik i posjednik neba i zemlje”.



ILUSTRACIJA - Talibanski zvaničnici proglašavaju pobjedu na aerodromu u Kabulu 31. avgusta 2021. (J. Huylebroek/The New York Times).  
ILLUSTRATION - Taliban officials declare victory at the Kabul airport on Aug. 31, 2021. (Jim Huylebroek/The New York Times).

Vjerujem da će kršćani, ne samo u Evropi nego i širom svijeta, moći ostati ravnodušni prema ovom talibanskom izazovu da čovjeku oduzmu relativni suverenitet nad ljudskim životom i predaju ga apsolutnom suverenitetu Boga kojem pripada. Naravno, bit će zanimljivo slušati raspravu na ovu vječnu moralnu i političku temu o tome ko je „vlasnik i posjednik neba i zemlje” te ko je vlasnik i posjednik ljudskog života na zemlji – Bog ili čovjek? Dolazak ili povratak talibana može biti razlog za ovu debatu, gdje niko još ne zna pravo rješenje. Sada je to više stvar srca nego uma. Ljudski um je rekao sve što je imao. Ostaju nam samo osjećaji srca, osjećaji koji su najskriveniji i najmisteriozniji.

a coming back of the Taliban to the power of the Afghan state in Central Asia. Now, the world is in great fear of the Taliban's rule although no one knows yet what their coming to power means. But one thing is certain, their arrival means the abolition of democracy in Afghanistan. This is certainly the biggest and most appealing challenge not only for Muslims, but for the whole world – the Taliban abolishing or redefining “democracy” as a manner of state crafting. The main question for Muslims now is: what are the foundations and obstacles to democracy in Islamic political thought? The answer to this question can be obtained from a focus on two politically relevant Islamic concepts: *shūra* (consultation) and *bay'ah* (a conditional oath of allegiance given to a new ruler). These two concepts of power are in the Taliban option. The Taliban believe that these two concepts can be reinterpreted to constitute the theoretical basis of electoral democracy in Islam. It will be interesting to hear the Taliban's anti-democratic arguments in Islamic political thought in favor of “divine sovereignty”. Was it not, after all, also in Christian political theology in Europe, not so long ago, that the dominant thesis was of “divine sovereignty,” according to which God is the supreme authority and that all things are under God's control? God is “the sovereign Lord of all by the indisputable right [of] the creator ... the owner and possessor of heaven and earth”.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Although Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid promised on 17 August 2021 that the Taliban would honour women's rights within Islamic law, violence against women continues. No good future for Afghan women under the Taliban. (Sanchita Bhattacharya, EastAsiaForum, 4 September 2021).

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Iako je glasnogovornik talibana Zabihullah Muđzahid obećao 17. augusta 2021. da će talibani poštovati prava žena u okviru islamskog zakona, nasilje nad ženama se nastavlja. Nema dobre budućnosti za afganistanske žene pod Talibanima. (Sanchita Bhattacharya, EastAsiaForum, 4. septembar 2021.).

I believe that Christians, not only in Europe but around the world, will be able to remain indifferent to this Taliban challenge of taking away relative sovereignty over human life from man and surrendering it to the absolute



Štaviše, mnogi Afganistanci se plaše talibanskog *šerijatskog* zakona. Međutim, još uvijek ne znamo o kakvom *šerijatu* govore talibani. Ali znamo kako su talibani prakticirali *šerijat* prije dvadeset godina kada su bili na vlasti. Takva primjena *šerijata* je neprihvatljiva prema slovu i duhu samog *šerijata*. Dakle, zloglasni talibanski *šerijat* iz prošlosti bio je protiv *šerijata*, što znači da autentični *šerijat* ima pet osnovnih neupitnih normi za sva vremena i sva mjesta. Ove norme su: 1. pravo svakog čovjeka na život (*al-nafs*); 2. pravo svakog čovjeka na vjeru (*al-dīn*); 3. pravo svakog čovjeka na slobodu (*al-'aql*); 4. pravo svakog čovjeka na imovinu (*al-māl*); i 5. pravo svakog čovjeka na čast (*al-'ird*). Ovo je osnovno značenje *šerijata*, koje su veliki muslimanski umovi davno definirali u slobodi svog duha i u stanju svoje političke i vojne moći, kao svoje pravo i moralnu dužnost da štite manjinske zajednice u svom većinskom muslimanskom okruženju. Onaj ko ignorira ili poriče to značenje *šerijata* radi protiv *šerijata*, uključujući i zabranu školovanja ženskoj djeci. Talibani su očigledno odustali od te zabrane, ali još nisu odustali od miješanja u živote žena na neprihvatljiv način. Slažem se, Zapad nije model kako žene trebaju biti odjevene, ali nije ni model „talibanskog” *nikaba*, gdje se prikriva ličnost žene. Nije li *hidžāb* ili *maḥrama* model, gdje žena pokriva glavu, ali otkriva svoje lice kao svoju plemenitu ličnost. Uostalom, mnogo je važnije ono što je u nečijoj glavi nego ono što je na glavi. Kur'ānsko učenje je jasno: *Odjeća moralnog karaktera u pobožnosti je najbolja*.

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sovereignty of God, to whom it belongs. Of course, it will be interesting to listen to a discussion on this eternal moral and political topic of who is “the owner and possessor of heaven and earth,” and who is the owner and possessor of human life on earth – God or man. The arrival or return of the Taliban may provide a reason for this debate – no one knows the solution yet. It is now a matter of more heart than mind. The human mind said everything it had. We are left only with the feelings of the heart, the feelings which are the most hidden and mysterious.

Furthermore, many Afghans are afraid of the Taliban *Sharī'ah* law. However, we still don't know what kind of *Sharī'ah* the Taliban are referring to. But we know how the Taliban practiced *Sharī'ah* twenty years ago when they were in power. Such application of *Sharī'ah* is unacceptable according to the letter and spirit of *Sharī'ah* itself. Thus, the infamous Taliban *Sharī'ah* from the past was anti-*Sharī'ah*, which means that the authentic *Sharī'ah* has five fundamental unquestionable norms for all times and all places. These norms are: 1) the right of every man to life (*al-nafs*); 2) the right of every man to religion (*al-dīn*); 3) the right of every man to liberty (*al-'aql*); 4) the right of every man to property (*al-māl*); and 5) the right of every man to honor (*al-'ird*). This is the basic meaning of *Sharī'ah* that is defined by great Muslim minds in the freedom of their spirit and in a state of their political and military power, as their right and moral duty to protect minority communities in their majority Muslim environment. One who ignores or denies that meaning of *Sharī'ah*, works against *Sharī'ah*, including banning female children from schooling. Apparently, the Taliban have given up on that ban, but they have not yet given up on interfering in women's lives in an unacceptable way. I agree, the West is not a model of how women should be dressed, but neither is the model of the “Taliban” *niqāb*, where a woman's personality is covered up. Isn't the *hijāb* or *maḥram* a model, where a woman covers her head but reveals her face as her noble personality? After all, what is in someone's head is much more important than what is outside on someone's head. The Qur'ānic teaching is clear: “Clothes of a moral character in piety are the best.”



ILLUSTRATION ~ What does their future hold? AFP  
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Što nosi njihova budućnost?



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**TRAGOVI PRAVNOG NATURALIZMA  
U JEZIČKOJ METODI TUMAČENJA ŠERIJATSKOG PRAVA KOD  
ZAYNUDDĪNA BIN IBRĀHĪMA IBN NUDŽAYMA**

**TRACES OF LEGAL NATURALISM  
IN THE LANGUAGE METHOD OF INTERPRETING SHARĪ'A LAW BY  
ZAYNUDDĪN BIN IBRĀHĪM IBN NUJAYM**



## Sažetak

Zaynuddīn bin Ibrāhīm, poznat kao Ibn Nudžaym (1520–1563), jedan je od najplodonosnijih autora hanefijskog mezheba iz perioda rane osmanlijske vladavine. U svoje vrijeme bio je jedan od predavača na glasovitom Al-Azharu. Pročuo se po svom djelu *Al-Ašbāh wa an-Nazāir* iz područja pravnih (fikhskih) pravila, u kojem je, na teoretskoj ravni, pokazao značaj i ulogu pravnih pravila u razumijevanju i tumačenju prava, prema hanefijskoj pravnoj doktrini. Autor je velikog komentara pod naslovom *Al-Baḥr ar-Rāiq* o djelu *Kanz ad-Daqāiq* ‘Abdullaha Ḥāfiẓuddīna an-Nasafija (1240–1310), u kojem je izložio svoje razumijevanje klasične hanefijske doktrine šerijatskog prava. Nažalost, djelo nije uspio završiti, jer ga je u tome pretekla rana smrt. Značajan dio njegovog opusa predstavlja izučavanje metodologije šerijatskog prava. Svoja stajališta iz ove oblasti iznio je u djelu *Miškāt al-Anwār fī Uṣūl al-Manār*, poznatom kao *Fatḥ al-Ghaffār bi Šarḥ al-Manār*. Nastalo je kao komentar djela ‘Abdullaha Ḥāfiẓuddīna an-Nasafija *Al-Manār*. Glavne postavke na kojima počiva teorija tumačenja prava kod Ibn Nudžayma jesu njegova stajališta da tumačenje prava predstavlja način utvrđivanja značenja pravne norme. Pravna norma može biti tumačena na više načina istovremeno. Takav pristup daje mogućnost pravniku da se opredijeli za jedno od mogućih tumačenja za koje smatra da je najsvrsishodnije u tom trenutku. Ibn Nudžaym smatra da se pravna norma, koja se odnosi na neki pravni posao, može tumačiti pomoću nekoliko pravnih metoda koje pravniku stoje na raspolaganju. Najčešće metode koje su pravници koristili su: jezička, logička, prirodnopravna ili vrijednosna i teleološka ili ciljna metoda. U ovom radu osvrnut ćemo se na Ibn Nudžaymovo razumijevanje prirodnopravne ili vrijednosne metode tumačenja prava.

**Ključne riječi:** tumačenje prava, šerijatskoppravna norma, šerijatskoppravna odredba, pravna metoda, pravni adresat.

## Abstract

Zaynuddīn bin Ibrāhīm, known as Ibn Nujaym (1520-1563) is one of the most prolific authors of the Hanafī Madhhab from the period of the early Ottoman rule. In his time, he was one of the lecturers at the famous Al-Azhar. He became famous for his work *Al-Ashbāh wa an-Nẓāir* in the area of legal (*fiqh*) rules, in which, on a theoretical level, he demonstrated the importance and role of legal rules in the understanding and interpretation of law, according to the Hanafī legal doctrine. He is the author of a large commentary entitled *Al-Baḥr ar-Rāiq* on the work *Kanz ad-Daqāiq* by ‘Abdullah Ḥāfiẓuddīn an-Nasafī (1240-1310), in which he expounded his understanding of the classical Hanafī doctrine of Sharia law. Unfortunately, he did not manage to finish the work, because he was overtaken by an early death. A significant part of his opus is the study of Sharia law methodology. He presented his views in this area in the work *Mishkāt al-Anwār fī Uṣūl al-Manār*, known as *Fatḥ al-Ghaffār bi Sharḥ al-Manār*. It was created as a commentary on the work of ‘Abdullah Ḥāfiẓuddīn an-Nasafī *Al-Manār*. The main assumptions on which the theory of legal interpretation in Ibn Nujaym rests are his views that the interpretation of law is a way of determining the meaning of a legal norm. A legal norm can be interpreted in several ways at the same time. Such an approach gives the lawyer the opportunity to opt for one of the possible interpretations that he considers to be the most expedient at that moment. Ibn Nujaym believes that a legal norm, which refers to some legal work, can be interpreted using several legal methods available to the lawyer. The most common methods used by lawyers are: linguistic, logical, natural-legal or value-based and teleological or objective method. In this paper, we will look at Ibn Nujaym’s understanding of the natural-law or value-based method of interpreting law.

**Key words:** *interpretation of law, Sharia-legal norm, Sharia-legal provision, legal method, legal addressee.*

## TRAGOVİ PRAVNOG NATURALIZMA U JEZIČKOJ METODI TUMAČENJA ŠERIJATSKOG PRAVA KOD ZAYNUDDĪNA BIN IBRĀHĪMA IBN NUDŹAYMA

### 1. Uvod

Pojam tumačenja prava najčešće se razumijeva kao otkrivanje ili utvrđivanje značenja pravne odredbe. Potreba za tumačenjem nastaje onda kada pravna odredba ne otkriva jasno značenje, ili onda kada postoji potreba da se utvrdi značenje pravne odredbe koje najviše odgovara okolnostima u kojima se ona ima primjenjivati. Nejasnoća kod njene primjene može biti u nedorečenosti, ili zbog promijenjenih okolnosti u kojima se ona treba primjenjivati. Muslimanski pravници su se veoma rano susreli s potrebom tumačenja pravnih odredbi, sadržanih u primarnim izvorima – Kur'anu i sunnetu – ili onih pravnih odredbi koje su nastale putem konsenzusa prve zajednice muslimana, iz prvog stoljeća po Hidžri. Oni su se držali stava da je šerijatsko pravo potpuno, savršeno i pravedno, te da je dato za sva vremena i da je moguće naći rješenje za njegovu primjenu u svakom vremenu koristeći se nekom od metoda tumačenja prava.

Vremenom su se među muslimanskim pravnicima uvriježila dva pristupa u tumačenju pravnih odredbi: subjektivni i objektivni.

*Subjektivni pristup* se ogledao u tome što su pravници smatrali da se putem jezičke, logičke i prirodnopravne metode može uskladiti značenje pravne odredbe s nastalom promjenom i da se putem jezičkog tumačenja, logičkog zaključivanja i razumskog vrijednosnog suda može doći do proširivanja značenja pravne odredbe na nove slučajeve.

*Objektivni pristup* je zahtijevao da se prethodno utvrdi cilj postojanja pravne odredbe. Šta je to šta Zakonodavac njome smjera i zbog čega ona postoji? To bi značilo da pravnik treba otkriti namjeru Zakonodavca, na prvi pogled skrivenu, kojom se Zakonodavac rukovodio kod donošenja pravne odredbe. Za objektivni pristup jezik pravne odredbe, mada je važan, ipak nije presudan. Ciljno tumačenje ove odredbe otkriva namjeru Zakonodavca i daje mogućnost da se pravo prilagodi novim uvjetima života. U objektivno tumačenje pravne odredbe spada ciljno tumačenje prava.

# TRACES OF LEGAL NATURALISM IN THE LANGUAGE METHOD OF INTERPRETING SHARI'A LAW BY ZAYNUDDĪN BIN IBRĀHĪM IBN NUJAYM

## 1. Introduction

The concept of legal interpretation is most often understood as discovering or determining the meaning of a legal provision. The need for interpretation arises when a legal provision does not reveal a clear meaning, or when there is a need to determine the meaning of a legal provision that best suits the circumstances in which it is to be applied. Ambiguity in its application may be due to vagueness, or due to changed circumstances in which it should be applied. At an early stage Muslim jurists encountered the need to interpret legal provisions contained in the primary sources of the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah*; or those legal provisions that arose through the consensus of the first community of Muslims, from the 1<sup>st</sup> century AD. They adhered to the position that *Sharia law* is complete, perfect, and just, and that it was provided for all time and that it is possible to find a solution for its application in every time, using one of the methods of interpreting the law.

Over time, two approaches to the interpretation of legal provisions have become established among Muslim jurists: the subjective and the objective approach.

*The subjective approach* was reflected in the fact that the lawyers considered that the meaning of the legal provision can be harmonized with the resulting change through linguistic, logical, and natural law methods, and that through linguistic interpretation, logical reasoning and rational value judgment, the meaning of the legal provision can be expanded to new cases.

*The objective approach* required that the objective of the existence of the legal provision be determined beforehand. What is the legislator aiming at and why does it exist? This would mean that the lawyer should discover the intention of the legislator, hidden at first glance, by which the legislator was guided when enacting a legal provision. For an objective approach, the language of the legal provision, although important, is not decisive. The objective interpretation of this provision reveals the intention of the legislator and gives the possibility to adapt the law to the new conditions of life. The objective interpretation of the legal provision includes the objective interpretation of the law.



Ibn Nudžaym, kao i njegovi prethodnici, svoju pažnju je usmjerio na subjektivno tumačenje pravne odredbe. U svom djelu *Miškāt al-Anwār fī Uṣūl al-Manār*, poznatom i kao *Fatḥ al-Ghaffār bi Šarḥ al-Manār*, u kojem dominira jezičko-logička metoda tumačenja prava, jedan odjeljak je, u okviru govora o imperativu ili preskripciji u pravnoj odredbi, posvetio vrijednosnoj ili prirodnopravnoj metodi, smatrajući da je ljudski razum sposoban razdvojiti korisno od štetnog ponašanja ljudi. Ova metoda, smatra on, može biti dobra osnova za uređenje pravnih odnosa među ljudima. Mada ju je razmatrao unutar jezičke metode tumačenja prava, što je bila ustaljena praksa i kod ostalih metodičara koji su preferirali subjektivni pristup, vidljivo je da se radi o metodi koja može biti sama za sebe. Ibn Nudžaym je na prirodnopravnu metodu gledao s aspekta njenog položaja u okviru preskripcije (naredbe i zabrane), tako da je smatrao da je naredba dobra po pravnog adresata, jer naređuje ono što je korisno, a i zabrana, također, jer zaprečava put onome što je loše.

## 2. Vrijednosne karakteristike sadržaja šerijatskopravne odredbe

Oslanjajući se na An-Nasafijev *Al-Manār*, koji mu služi kao polazište, Ibn Nudžaym zauzima stav da predmet pravne odredbe (*al-ma' mūr bihi*) koja u sebi sadrži pozitivnu ili negativnu preskripciju mora u sebi nužno (*bi aḍ-ḍarurah*) sadržavati karakteristiku (*šifah*) lijepog (*al-ḥusn*) u značenju pravednog,<sup>1</sup> dobrog i korisnog za obveznika (*mukalafa*), odnosno ružnog i štetnog (*al-qubḥ*) za njega. To proizlazi iz uvjerenja koje su šerijatski pravници zastupali da Zakonodavac ne zahtijeva čin ili činidbu koja nije lijepa, tj. pravedna, dobra i korisna po pravnog adresata (obveznika), odnosno da zahtijeva sustezanje od neke činidbe, jer je ona ružna i loša, tj. nepravedna, štetna po pravnog adresata.<sup>2</sup>

Za Ibn Nudžayma, značenje lijepog i ružnog, s aspekta vrijednosne karakteristike, u jeziku se pojavljuje u tri značenja: a) ugodnog ili neugodnog za ljudsku prirodu ili narav, poput slatkog ili gorkog okusa; b) potpune ili nepotpune vještine ili spoznaje o nečemu, poput znanja ili neznanja; c) nečeg uvjetno povezanog s nečim, kao što je trenutna pohvala ili odgođena nagrada, trenutni grijeh i odgođena kazna, poput posluha i neposluha prema Naredbodavcu.<sup>3</sup>

U prva dva slučaja, prema mišljenju Ibn Nudžayma, radi se o racionalnoj spoznaji. To znači da je ljudski razum sposoban spoznati lijepo i ružno, korisno i štetno po osobu, bez potrebe za dodatnom arbitražom. Postojanje uvjetovane veze između posluha i neposluha, pohvale i nagrade, grijeha i kazne jeste predmet različitog gledanja na te pojave od strane eš'arija, mu'tazila i hanefija. Eš'arije smatraju da

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<sup>1</sup> Abū Barakāt 'Abdullah Ḥāfizuddīn an-Nasafī, *Kašf al-Asrār*, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1986, vol. I, str. 91.

<sup>2</sup> Zaynuddīn bin Ibrāhīm Ibn Nujaym, *Fatḥ al-Ġaffār bi Šarḥ al-Manār*, Maktabah Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, Kairo, 1936, vol. I, str. 58, 60.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. I, str. 58.

Ibn Nujaym, like his predecessors, focused his attention on the subjective interpretation of the legal provision. In his work *Mishkāt al-Anwār fī Uṣūl al-Manār*, also known as *Fatḥ al-Ghaffār bi Sharḥ al-Manār*, in which the linguistic-logical method of legal interpretation dominates, one section is, within the framework of speaking about the imperative or prescription in a legal provision, dedicated to the value or natural-law method, considering that human reason is capable of separating useful from harmful behaviour among people. This method, he believes, can be a good basis for regulating legal relations between individuals. Although he considered it within the linguistic method of law interpretation, which was an established practice among other methodologists who preferred a subjective approach, it is evident that it is a method that can stand on its own. Ibn Nujaym looked at the natural-law method from the aspect of its position within prescription (orders and prohibitions), so he considered that the order is good for the legal addressee, because it orders what is useful, and the prohibition, too, because it blocks the way to that which is bad.

## 2. Value characteristics of the content of Sharia-law provisions

Relying on An-Nasafī's *Al-Manār*, which serves as his starting point, Ibn Nujaym takes the position that the subject of a legal provision (*al-mā'mūr bihi*) that contains within itself a positive or negative prescription must necessarily (*bi aḍ-ḍarurah*) contain the characteristic (*ṣifah*) of appeal (*al-ḥusn*) in the sense of righteous,<sup>1</sup> good and useful for the addressee (*mukalaf*), that is, ugly and harmful (*al-qubḥ*) for him. This results from the belief advocated by Sharia lawyers that the Legislator does not require an act or action that is not appealing, i.e. just, good and beneficial for the legal addressee (obligee), i.e. that he requires restraint from some action, because it is ugly and bad, i.e. unjust, harmful to the legal addressee.<sup>2</sup>

For Ibn Nujaym, the meaning of appealing and ugly, from the aspect of value characteristic, appears in language in three meanings: a) pleasant or unpleasant for human nature or character, like sweet or bitter taste; b) complete or incomplete skills or knowledge about something, such as knowledge or ignorance; c) something conditionally connected with something, such as immediate praise or deferred reward, immediate sin and deferred punishment, such as obedience and disobedience to an order.<sup>3</sup>

In the first two cases, according to Ibn Nujaym, it is about rational cognition. This means that human reason can know what is appealing and ugly, useful and harmful to a person, without the need for additional arbitration. The existence of a conditional relationship between obedience and disobedience, praise and reward, sin and punishment are the subject of different views on these phenomena by the Ash'ari, Mu'tazili and Hanafis. The Ash'ari believe that beauty and ugliness, which stand in relation to obedience and disobedience, cannot be determined

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<sup>1</sup> Abū Barakāt 'Abdullah Ḥāfiẓuddīn an-Nasafī, *Kashf al-Asrār*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1986., Vol. I, p. 91.

<sup>2</sup> Zaynuddīn bin Ibrāhīm Ibn Nujaym, *Fatḥ al-Ghaffār bi Sharḥ al-Manār*, Cairo. Maktabah Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1936., Vol. I, p. 58, 60.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 58.

se lijepo i ružno, koje stoji u vezi s poslušom i neposlušom, ne može utvrditi razumom već isključivo Vjerezakonom od strane Zakonodavca, prihvatajući potrebu za arbitrom kod tumačenja pravne odredbe. S druge strane, dio hanefija i mu'tazila smatra da ljepota i ružnoća ljudskih djela, koji se nalažu u pravnoj odredbi, ishode iz samog sadržaja odredbe, tj. njihova vrijednost određuje se iz same pravne odredbe, bez potrebe za vanjskim arbitrom.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Ibn Nuđzajm, predstavnik klasične hanefijske doktrine šerijatskog prava, kopija originala iz 16. stoljeća.  
ILLUSTRATION ~ Ibn Nuğaym, representative of the classical Hanafī doctrine of *Sharia* law, copy of the original from the 16<sup>th</sup> century.

Ibn Nuđzajm ukazuje na postojanje razlika u razumijevanju naredbe koja u sebi sadrži karakteristiku lijepog i ružnog kod mu'tazila i hanefija. Prema mu'tazilama, razum je sudija (*al-hākim*) koji presuđuje o lijepom i ružnom. On je onaj koji može imati neophodno znanje o tome. Na drugoj strani, hanefije imaju nešto drugačiji pristup. Oni smatraju da Zakonodavac presuđuje o tome šta je lijepo a šta ružno, dok je razum sredstvo, odnosno alatka, pomoću koje se stječe neophodno znanje o njima. Zakonodavac stvara

by reason but exclusively by the Law of Religion on the part of the Lawgiver, accepting the need for an arbitrator when interpreting a legal provision. On the other hand, part of the Hanafis and Mu'tazils believe that the beauty and ugliness of human acts, which are ordered in a legal provision, result from the content of the provision itself. Which means that their value is determined from the legal provision itself, without the need for an external arbitrator.



ILLUSTRATION - Fakhr al-Din Hasan bin Mansur bin abi al-Qasim Mahmud bin 'Abd al-'Aziz known as Qadi Khan al-Uzjandi: *al-Fatawa* (Vol.III of III of this seminal work on Hanafi law). Muwaqqa' al-Gharbi al-Shafi'i, Mamluk Egypt, 15<sup>th</sup>. Christie's, LOT 264.

ILUSTRACIJA - Fakhr al-Din Hasan bin Mansur bin abi al-Qasim Mahmud bin 'Abd al-'Aziz, poznat kao Qadi Khan al-Uzjandi: *al-Fatawa* (tom III od III dijela ovog temeljnog djela o hanefijskom pravu). Muwaqqa' al-Gharbi al-Shafi'i, mamlučki Egipat, 15. Christie's, LOT 264.

Ibn Nujaym points to the existence of differences in the understanding of the order that contains the characteristic of beautiful and ugly among the Mu'tazilites and the Hanafis. According to the Mu'tazilites, reason is the judge (*al-ḥākim*) that judges the beautiful and the ugly. He is the one who can have the necessary knowledge about it. On the other hand, the Hanafis have a slightly different approach. They believe that the Legislator judges what is beautiful and what is ugly, while reason is a means, that is, a tool, by means of which the necessary knowledge about them is acquired.



znanje kod čovjeka posredstvom uvida razuma, tako da je znanje o korisnom i štetnom posredovano znanje. Lijepo i ružno, sadržano u naredbi ili zabrani, kod eš'arija se poznaje isključivo putem Božije Riječi i putem postupanja Vjerovjesnika, dok kod hanefija poznaju se razumom, tako što to znanje o njima stvara Zakonodavac posredstvom razuma. No, lijepo i ružno u pravnoj odredbi i kod hanefija se može spoznati putem Kur'ana i Vjerovjesnika, kao što je slučaj s većim dijelom šerijatskih propisa. Međutim, kod njih se lijepo i ružno poznaju iz onoga na šta ukazuje naredba u pravnoj odredbi, dakle iz same pravne odredbe, za razliku od eš'arija kod kojih se to poznaje iz same naredbe, a ne iz onoga na šta ona ukazuje, bez posrednog zaključivanja.<sup>4</sup>

Za Ibn Nudžayma, vrijednosno tumačenje pravnih odredbi je teološko i ono se oslanja na razlikovanje utvrđenog značenja ili pojma (*al-madlūl*) od povoda (*al-mūgib*). Po njemu, *utvrđeno značenje* ili *pojam* u sebi sadrži značenje na koje se ukazuje izvana, poput naredbe<sup>5</sup> koja ukazuje na ljepotu nekog čina koju potvrđuje razum. S druge strane, *povod* je ono što ostavlja traga na nečemu, po čemu se poznaje. U vezi s ovim je i pitanje poznavanja odredbe (*al-ḥukm*) o obavezi vjerovanja prije slanja vjerovjesnika. Kod eš'arija, poznavanje te odredbe nije obaveza adresata, jer je ono povezano s naredbom i zabranom, a ne sa samim činom adresata. S druge strane, Abū Maṣṣūr al-Māturīdī je zauzeo stav da je pitanje postojanja odredbe (*al-ḥukm*) o vjerovanju ili nevjerovanju racionalno pitanje, čiju obavezu razum može razumjeti, dok je pitanje nagrade ili kazne povezano sa slanjem vjerovjesnika.<sup>6</sup> Na ovaj način Ibn Nudžaym prihvata mogućnost reguliranja pravnih odnosa putem pravnih odredbi, kao i njihovo vrijednosno tumačenje putem razuma, dok se prisustvo vjerovjesnika uzima kao oduzimanje alibija za nepoznavanje pravne odredbe (*al-ḥukm*) od strane pravnog adresata.

### 3. Racionalna pojmljivost pravnog propisa

**m**ogućnost razumijevanja pravnog propisa od strane pravnog adresata, sadržanog u pravnoj odredbi, jedna je od najvažnijih pretpostavki vrijednosnog tumačenja pravne odredbe uopće. Polazeći od pretpostavke da Zakonodavac ništa ne naređuje niti zabranjuje, osim onoga što je lijepo, odnosno dobro (*al-ḥusn*) ili onoga što nije ružno, odnosno loše (*al-qubḥ*) po pravnog adresata, naredba ili zabrana, koja je sadržana u pravnoj odredbi, mora biti takva da je pojmljiva razumom od strane pravnog adresata, kako bi je on sa svoje strane mogao tumačiti. Vrijednosna kvalifikacija, izražena u

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. I, str. 58-59.

<sup>5</sup> Prema Abū Zaydu ad-Dabūsiju, naredba je ono što zahtijeva da se stvar nađe (da se izvrši), a općenito se odnosi na obavezivanje (*al-wuğūb*). Ukoliko je naredba od Zakonodavca (Allaha, dž.š.), kaže Abū Zayd ad-Dabūsī, ono što je naređeno, postaje naša obaveza prema Zakonodavcu zbog njene ljepote kod Zakonodavca.

Vidi: Abū Zayd ad-Dabūsī, *Taqwīm al-Adillah fi Usūli l-Fiqh*, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 2001, str. 44.

<sup>6</sup> Zaynuddīn bin Ibrāhīm Ibn Nujaym, *Fatḥ al-Ġaffār bi Šarḥ al-Manār*, vol. I, str. 59.

The Legislator creates knowledge in man through the insight of reason, so that knowledge about useful and harmful is mediated knowledge. The beautiful and the ugly, contained in an order or a prohibition, among the Ash'ari are known exclusively through the word of God in the Qur'an and through the actions of the Prophet, while among the Hanafis, they are known through reason, as this knowledge is created by the Legislator through reason. However, the beautiful and the ugly in the legal provisions and among the Hanafis can be known through the Qur'an and the Prophets, as is the case with most of the Sharia regulations. However, with them, beautiful and ugly are known from what the order in the legal provision points to, that is, from the legal provision itself, in contrast to the Ash'ari, who know it from the order itself, and not from what it points to, without indirect reasoning.<sup>4</sup>

For Ibn Nujaym, the value interpretation of legal provisions is theological, and it relies on distinguishing the established meaning or concept (*al-madlūl*) from the occasion (*al-mūjib*). According to him, an established meaning or concept contains within itself a meaning that is indicated from the outside, such as a command<sup>5</sup> which indicates the beauty of an act, which is confirmed by reason. On the other hand, a cause is what leaves a mark on something, by which it is known. Related to this is the question of knowing the ruling (*al-ḥukm*) on the obligation to believe before sending a prophet. In Ash'ari, knowledge of that provision is not the addressee's obligation, because it is related to the order and prohibition, and not to the addressee's act itself. On the other hand, Abū Maṣṣūr al-Māturīdī took the position that the question of the existence of a ruling (*al-ḥukm*) on belief or disbelief is a rational question, the obligation of which can be understood by reason, while the question of reward or punishment is related to the sending of prophets.<sup>6</sup> In this way, Ibn Nujaym accepts the possibility of regulating legal relations through legal provisions, as well as their value interpretation through reason, while the presence of a prophet is taken as the removal of an alibi for ignorance of a legal provision (*al-ḥukm*) by the legal addressee.

### 3. Rational comprehensibility of the legal regulation

The possibility of understanding the legal regulation by the legal addressee, contained in the legal provision, is one of the most important assumptions of the value interpretation of the legal provision in general. Starting from the assumption that the provision does not order or forbid anything, except what is beautiful, i.e. good (*al-ḥusn*) or what is not ugly, i.e. bad (*al-qubḥ*) according to the legal addressee, the order or prohibition, which is contained in the legal provision, it must be such that it is comprehensible by reason on the part of the legal addressee, so that he, on his part, could interpret it. The value qualification, expressed in the order contained in the legal provision,

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., Vol. I, p. 58-59.

<sup>5</sup> According to Abū Zayd ad-Dabūsī, a command is that which requires a thing to be found (to be done), and generally refers to an obligation (*al-wujūb*). If the order is from the Legislator (Allah, may God bless him and grant him peace), says Abū Zayd ad-Dabūsī, what is ordered becomes our obligation to the Legislator because of its beauty with the Lawgiver.

See: Abū Zayd ad-Dabūsī, *Taqwīm al-'Adillah fī Usūl al-Fiqh*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 2001, p. 44.

<sup>6</sup> Zaynuddīn bin Ibrāhīm Ibn Nujaym, *Fatḥ al-Ghaffār bi Sharḥ al-Manār*, Vol. I, p. 59.

naredbi koja je sadržana u pravnoj odredbi, ukazuje na jedno od dvoga: a) ili na samo postojanje (*al-īqā'*) vrijednosne kvalifikacije u pravnoj odredbi, b) ili na njeno nastajanje (*al-iḥdāt*)<sup>7</sup> u toku tumačenja pravne odredbe. Ukoliko se jedna od ovih vrijednosnih kvalifikacija nađe u pravnoj odredbi, ona ukazuje na to da je činidba ili sustezanje od činidbe dobra ili loša po sebi (*li 'aynihi*), odnosno dobra ili loša po nečemu drugom (*li ġayrihi*), ili pak dobra po sebi, a loša zbog nečega drugog, odnosno loše po sebi, a dobro zbog nečega drugog (*mulḥiq li ġayrihi*). Drugim riječima, onaj koji tumači pravnu odredbu mora voditi računa o tome da li je ono do čega se došlo tumačenjem korisno ili štetno po obveznika na individualnoj razini, odnosno da li je moralno ili nemoralno na općoj, društvenoj razini, da li je s aspekta javnog morala prihvatljivo za zajednicu. Pravnik koji tumači pravnu odredbu mora imati u vidu da pravna odredba uređuje društvene odnose, one koji su od značaja za zajednicu, tako da pitanje vrijednosnog suda se mora uzeti u obzir, uz uvažavanje individualnih prava pojedinaca u najvećoj mogućoj mjeri.



ILUSTRACIJA - *Grupa derviša* (detalj), Uzbekistan, Buhara, početak 16. stoljeća, Metropolitan Museum, Pristupni broj: 20.120.262.

ILLUSTRATION - *Group of Dervishes* (detail), Uzbekistan, Bukhara, early 16th century, Metropolitan Museum, Accession Number: 20.120.262.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. I, str. 60.



indicates one of two things: a) or the very existence (*al-ibqā'*) of the value qualification in the legal provision, b) or its emergence (*al-iḥdāth*)<sup>7</sup> in the course of interpreting the legal provision. If one of these value qualifications is found in a legal provision, it indicates that an action or avoidance of an action is good or bad in itself (*li 'aynihī*), that is, good or bad in terms of something else (*li ghayrihī*), or good in itself, and bad because of something else, i.e. bad in itself, but good because of something else (*mulḥiq li ghayrihī*). In other words, the one who interprets a legal provision must consider whether what has been arrived at through the interpretation is beneficial or harmful for the addressee on an individual level, i.e., whether it is moral or immoral on a general, social level, whether it is from the aspect of public morals acceptable to the community. A lawyer who interprets a legal provision must keep in mind that the legal provision governs social relations, those that are of importance to the community, so the issue of value judgment must be considered, while respecting the individual rights of individuals to the greatest extent possible.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Ahmad ibn Kamal ibn Yahya al-Ansari al-Mutatabbib: *Qur'an*. Cairo (Egypt), 1332-1336. Chester Beatty Library, Dublin, CBL 1476.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Ahmad ibn Kamal ibn Yahya al-Ansari al-Mutatabbib: *Kur'an*. Kairo (Egipat), 1332.-1336.  
Chester Beatty Library, Dublin, CBL 1476.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 60.





ILUSTRACIJA - Predavanje unutar hanefijskog mesheba iz područja pravnih (*fikhskih*) pravila.





ILLUSTRATION ~ Lecture within the Hanafi Madhhab in the area of legal (*fiqh*) rules.

#### 4. Svrshodnost pravne odredbe u odnosu na pravnog adresata

Svrshodnost pravne odredbe ogleda se u njenoj orijentaciji tako što pravnog adresata angažira na postupanje u određenom pravcu koji je, po Zakonodavcu, pravedan, u namjeri da se postigne pravedni cilj. Svrshodnost odredbe je ono iza čega stoji namjera Zakonodavca, te se ona može razumjeti samo ukoliko se otkrije svrha postojanja odredbe kao takve. Polazeći od stava da pravna odredba ima za cilj da ljudsko ponašanje dovede u vezu s vladavinom prava, Ibn Nudžaym je stao na stanovištu da pravna odredba, koju donosi Zakonodavac, treba biti najsvrshodnija pravna odredba (*al-aṣlah*) i da ju, kao takvu, pravni adresat prepozna i slijedi ukoliko ona otkriva ono u čemu se ta svrshodnost ogleda.<sup>8</sup> Njegova rasprava o svrshodnosti pravne odredbe odvija se unutar rasprave o apsurdnosti obavezivanja pravnog adresata onim što nije u stanju podnijeti (*istiḥālah taklīf mā lā yuṭāq*). Ibn Nudžaym je afirmirao stajalište, koje su zauzeli mu'tazile i hanefije, da pravo ne smije počivati na propisima koji nisu svrshodni, jer bi takvo pravo bilo besmisleno i za pojedinca i za zajednicu i predstavljalo bi svojevrsan apsurd. Na taj način donesena pravna odredba od strane Zakonodavca bila bi apsurdna, odnosno nemoguća;<sup>9</sup> njeno postojanje samo po sebi bi bilo besmisleno, a za pravnog adresata bi bila u potpunosti beskorisna; stoga je ona nemoguća od strane Zakonodavca. Hanefijski pravници, jednako kao i mu'tazile, smatraju da je apsurdno obavezivati pravnog adresata onim u čemu nema nikakve svrhe, odnosno onim u čemu za njega nema koristi. Međutim, njihova polazišta u razumijevanju svrshodnosti pravne odredbe u odnosu Zakonodavca naspram nje su različita. Za mu'tazile, Zakonodavac je obavezan donijeti svrshodne pravne propise i to je Njegova dužnost (*wadżib*).<sup>10</sup> S druge strane, hanefijska škola, kako vidi Ibn Nudžaym, iako je podržala stav o svrshodnosti pravne odredbe, smatra da je zahtjev mu'tazila prema Zakonodavcu krut. On, poput drugih hanefijskih pravnikā, nije mogao prihvatiti stav po kojem se zakonodavna moć Zakonodavca ograničava, već je stav mu'tazila nastojao ublažiti stavom Mas'uda ibn 'Umara at-Taftāzānija (u. 1390) koji je smatrao da obavezu Zakonodavca da donosi korisne odredbe ne treba razumjeti tako da On zasluđuje kaznu ako izostavi svrshodnost propisa, već se radi o mudrosti obavezivanja, a ne o izostavljanju svrshodnosti propisa.<sup>11</sup> Tvrdnja da nije dozvoljeno obavezivanje onim što adresat nije u stanju podnijeti temelji se na tome da to nije u skladu s mudrošću, jer u tvrdnji da Zakonodavac ima obavezu napustiti obavezivanje onim što adresat ne može podnijeti iz počasti prema adresatima je, prema Ibn Nudžaymu, svrha govora o svrshodnosti propisa. A ako bismo prihvatili tvrdnju da

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. I, str. 64.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

#### 4. Expediency of the legal provision in relation to the legal addressee

The expediency of the legal provision is reflected in its orientation, as it engages the legal addressee to act in a certain direction which, according to the Lawgiver, is just, with the intention of achieving a just goal. The expediency of the provision is what is behind the intention of the Legislator, and it can only be understood if the purpose of the existence of the provision as such is revealed. Starting from the position that the legal provision aims to bring human behaviour into relation with the rule of law, Ibn Nujaym took the position that the legal provision, made by the Lawgiver, should be the most expedient legal provision (*al-aṣḥab*) and that, as such, it, the legal addressee recognizes and follows if it reveals what this expediency is reflected in.<sup>8</sup> His discussion of the expediency of the legal provision takes place within the discussion of the absurdity of binding the legal addressee with what he is unable to bear (*istiḥālah taklīf mā lā yuṭāq*). Ibn Nujaym affirmed the point of view, which was taken by the Muʿtazilites and the Hanafis, that law should not rest on regulations that are not expedient, because such law would be meaningless both for the individual and for the community and would represent a kind of absurdity. A legal provision adopted in this way by the legislator would be absurd, that is, impossible;<sup>9</sup> its existence would be meaningless, and for the legal addressee it would be completely useless; therefore, it is impossible by the Lawgiver. Hanafi jurists, just like Muʿtazila, consider it absurd to oblige the legal addressee with that which has no purpose, that is, with that which is of no use to him. However, their starting points in understanding the expediency of the legal provision in relation to the Legislator are different. For Muʿtazilites, the Legislator is obliged to enact expedient legal regulations and that is His duty (*wājib*).<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, the Hanafi school, as seen by Ibn Nujaym, although it supported the position on the expediency of the legal provision, considers that the request of the Muʿtazila to the Legislator is rigid. He, like other Hanafi jurists, could not accept the position according to which the legislative power of the Legislator is limited, but tried to soften the Muʿtazila position with the position of Masʿūd ibnʿUmar at-Taftāzānī (d. 1390), who believed that the Legislator's obligation to enact useful provisions should not understand so that He deserves punishment if he omits the expediency of the precepts, but it is about the wisdom of the obligation, not about the omission of the expediency of the precepts.<sup>11</sup> The claim that it is not permissible to oblige with what the addressee is unable to bear is based on the fact that it is not in accordance with wisdom, because in the claim that the Legislator has the obligation to abandon the obligation with what the addressee cannot bear out of respect for the addressees, according to Ibn Nujaym, the purpose talk about the expediency of regulations. And if we were to accept the claim that the Legislator is not allowed to omit the obligation of what the addressee is unable to bear, but to

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 64.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*



Zakonodavcu nije dozvoljeno da izostavi obavezivanje onoga što adresat nije u mogućnosti podnijeti, već da to čini iz počasti prema adresatu i iz dobročinstva prema njemu, onda možemo reći da se ovdje ne radi o nedozvoljenosti, već o nepostojanosti takvog obavezivanja.<sup>12</sup>

Za Ibn Nudžayma, postojanje pravne odredbe koja je donesena od strane Zakonodavca znači da je postojala potreba da se takva odredba donese. Da bi se nešto smatralo pravom, njegove odredbe moraju biti u stanju ispuniti suštinsku funkciju svrhovitog uređenja ljudskih odnosa. Postojanje pravne odredbe kojom se reguliraju pravni odnosi opravdava svrhu njena postojanja. Ibn Nudžaym, za razliku od ranijih pravnikâ, zaključuje da raspravu o svrsishodnosti pravnih odredbi ne treba svoditi na pitanje dozvoljenosti ili nedozvoljenosti njihova postojanja u odnosu na moć adresata da ih provede, iz prostog razloga što takve odredbe Zakonodavac ne donosi i one jednostavno, kao takve, ne postoje (*'adam al-wuqū'*).<sup>13</sup> On se zalaže za tumačenje pravnih odredbi putem otkrivanja svrhe njihovog postojanja, a ne same dopustivosti ili nedopustivosti njihovog postojanja iz razloga nemogućnosti njihove provedbe. Prema Ibn Nudžaymu, nemogućnost otkrivanja svrsishodnosti postojanja pravne odredbe ne znači samo da to ima za posljedicu nemogućnost njene provedbe od strane pravnog adresata, već se time dovodi u pitanje postojanje prava uopće.

## 5. Određenost pravnog propisa u odnosu na pravnog adresata

**O**dređenost pravnog propisa od strane Zakonodavca bitna je pretpostavka koju treba sadržati pravna odredba. Postojanje pravnog propisa treba biti stvarno, ne pretpostavljeno, a njegov sadržaj takav da zahtjev koji sadrži bude ostvariv za pravnog obveznika. U slučaju da pravna odredba sadrži kontradiktorne propise, koji su, po svojim zahtjevima, oprečni jedni drugima, ona i njen propis bi se smatrali neodređenim, odnosno nejasnim u pogledu postupanja prema zahtjevima koji sadrže. Također, ukoliko bi pravna odredba sadržavala mnoštvo propisa u kojima su zahtjevi Zakonodavca upućeni pravnom obvezniku da ih realizira u ograničenom vremenskom periodu, a on to nije u stanju učiniti, ona i njen propis bi se smatrali konfuznim i nepogodnim za postupanje. Pravni propis je određen ukoliko u sebi sadrži zahtjev, obavezu (naredbu ili zabranu), preporuku ili dopuštenje neke radnje, odnosno da se nešto čini ili ne čini, da je nešto preporučljivo ili pokuđeno ili je činidba za Zakonodavca u sferi dopuštenog, prepušteno volji pravnog obveznika.

Ukoliko pravna odredba sadrži zahtjev za obavezno ili poželjno postupanje pravnog subjekta, neophodno je da u sebi sadrži atribuciju koja na to ukazuje, jer prosta, obična karakteristika koja

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

do so out of respect for the addressee and out of charity towards him, then we can say that this is not about impermissibility but about the impermanence of such an obligation.<sup>12</sup>

For Ibn Nujaym, the existence of a legal provision that was enacted by the Legislator means that there was a need to enact such a provision. For something to be considered a law, its provisions must be able to fulfil the essential function of the purposeful regulation of human relations. The existence of a legal provision regulating legal relations justifies the purpose of its existence. Ibn Nujaym, unlike earlier jurists, concludes that the discussion about the expediency of legal provisions should not be reduced to the question of the permissibility or impermissibility of their existence in relation to the power of the addressee to implement them, for the simple reason that such provisions are not made by the legislator simply, as such, do not exist (*'adam al-wuqū'*).<sup>13</sup> He advocates the interpretation of legal provisions by revealing the purpose of their existence, and not the permissibility or inadmissibility of their existence due to the impossibility of their implementation. According to Ibn Nujaym, the impossibility of discovering the expediency of the existence of a legal provision does not only mean that it results in the impossibility of its implementation, by the legal addressee, but it also calls into question the existence of law at all.

## 5. Certainty of the legal regulation in relation to the legal addressee

The determination of the legal regulation by the legislator is an essential assumption that the legal provision should contain. The existence of a legal regulation should be real, not assumed, and its content should be such that the requirement it contains is achievable for the legal law maker. In the event that a legal provision contains contradictory regulations, which, according to their requirements, contradict each other, it and its regulation would be considered indefinite, that is, unclear in terms of handling the requirements they contain. Also, if the legal provision contained a multitude of regulations in which the requirements of the Legislator are addressed to the legal addressee to realize them in a limited period, and he is unable to do so, it and its regulation would be considered confused and unsuitable for action. A legal regulation is determined if it contains a request, obligation (order or prohibition), recommendation or permission for an action, i.e., that something is done or not done, that something is recommended or attempted, or that the action for the legislator is within the sphere of the permissible, left to the will of the legal addressee.

If the legal provision contains a requirement for mandatory or desirable behaviour of the legal entity, it is necessary that it contains an attribution that indicates this, because a simple, ordinary characteristic that indicates benefit or damage to the legal entity is not sufficient to initiate the existence of an imperative norm in the legal provision. The determination of the legal regulation by the legislator on the question of benefit or damage to the legal obligor can stand by itself. That is, obligations to do, not to do, or recommendations can stand on their own without

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

ukazuje na korist ili štetu po pravnog subjekta nije dovoljna da bi inicirala postojanje imperativne norme u pravnoj odredbi. Određenost pravnog propisa od strane Zakonodavca po pitanju koristi ili štete po pravnog obveznika može stajati sama za sebe. Odnosno, obaveza činjenja, nečinjenja ili preporuke mogu stajati same za sebe bez potrebe da ih se podupire s drugim zahtjevima, tj. u ovom slučaju pravna odredba sadrži pravni propis u cijelosti. Međutim, pravni propis može biti izražen, određen u više pravnih odredbi s različitim oblicima zahtjeva za ispunjenje propisa, kao što su različiti uvjeti ili posebne karakteristike čina koje se očekuju od pravnog subjekta.

Ibn Nudžaym raspravlja o položaju, odnosno karakteru lijepog i ružnog, korisnog i štetnog unutar pravnog propisa, pitajući se da li su ove karakteristike trajnog ili privremenog karaktera, odnosno da li je neki čin dobar po sebi pa se naređuje, ili loš po sebi pa se zabranjuje, ili je pak dobar ili loš zbog nečega drugog što leži izvan samog čina pa je zbog toga nareden ili zabranjen. Ibn Nudžaym nastoji napraviti razliku između onih propisa o teološkim pitanjima i onih koja su čisto pravne, društvene naravi. On smatra da kod teoloških pitanja i propisa koji reguliraju ova pitanja karakter lijepog i ružnog je nepromjenjiv, vjerovanje (*īmān*) je uvijek dobro, a nevjerstvo (*kufr*) je uvijek loše. To se, po njemu, ne može promijeniti ni onda kada se osoba posluži olakšicom (*ruḥṣah*) u slučaju izgovaranja riječi nevjerstva pod prisilom. Međutim, kod pravnih pitanja, propisi koji reguliraju to područje, karakter lijepog i ružnog je promjenjiv i nestalan s obzirom na vrijeme, mjesto i položaj pravnog obveznika. Ibn Nudžaym to objašnjava na primjeru namaza, čija je naredba dobra i korisna sama po sebi za šerijatskog obveznika, ali ona nekada prelazi u zabranu ukoliko se promijeni položaj šerijatskog obveznika, kao što je slučaj ženske osobe u danima nečistoće, u postporođajnom periodu (*nifās*) ili u toku mjesečnog pranja (*ḥayḍ*). Na ovaj način, Ibn Nudžaym sugerira da se pravni propisi mijenjaju s obzirom na status šerijatskog obveznika, te s obzirom na mjesto ili vrijeme njihove primjene.<sup>14</sup>

## 6. Mogućnost primjene pravnog propisa od strane pravnog adresata

Jedna od tema koja se povezuje s pitanjem pravne odredbe jeste pitanje sposobnosti, spremnosti i mogućnosti obveznika da primijeni pravnu normu koju pravna odredba sadrži. Ibn Nudžaym odmah na početku naglašava da ovo pitanje ne ulazi u sastav govora o pravnom propisu budući da nije njegov dio, ali on ga indirektno veže za pravni propis, jer je ono jedan od uvjeta primjene pravnog propisa. On vidi sposobnost obveznika (*al-qudrah*) kao vezu između pravnog propisa, koji stoji sam za sebe, i pravnog adresata od koga se očekuje da taj propis primjenjuje u stvarnom životu, s jedne strane, i Zakonodavca, s druge strane. Ova veza se, po njemu, održava iz razloga što bi obavezivanje nesposobnog lica (*al-‘ādžiz*) od strane Zakonodavca bilo ružno po razumu (*al-qabīḥ*), prema mišljenju

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, str. 62.

needing to be supported by other requirements. Which means that in this case the legal provision contains the legal regulation in its entirety. However, a legal regulation can be expressed, determined in several legal provisions with different forms of requirements for the fulfilment of the regulation, such as different conditions or special characteristics of the act expected from the legal entity.

Ibn Nujaym discusses the position or character of beautiful and ugly, useful and harmful within legal regulations, asking whether these characteristics are permanent or temporary, i.e. whether an act is good in itself, so it is ordered, or bad in itself, so is forbidden, or else it is good or bad because of something else that lies outside the act itself, and therefore it is ordered or forbidden. Ibn Nujaym tries to make a distinction between those regulations that are related to theological issues and those that are purely legal, social in nature. He believes that in theological questions and the regulations that regulate these questions, the character of beautiful and ugly is unchanging, belief (*īmān*) is always good, and unbelief (*kufr*) is always bad. According to him, this cannot be changed even when a person makes use of the relief (*rukḥṣah*) in the case of uttering the words of infidelity under duress. However, in legal matters, the regulations that regulate that area, the character of beautiful and ugly is changeable and unstable with respect to the time, place and position of the legal obligor. Ibn Nujaym explains this on the example of prayer, the order of which is good and beneficial in itself for the Shariah-obligator, but it sometimes turns into a prohibition if the position of the Shariah-obligator changes, such as the case of a female person during the days of impurity, in the post-partum period (*nifās*) or during the monthly ablution (*ḥayḍ*). In this way, Ibn Nujaym suggests that legal regulations change with respect to the status of the Shariah addressee, and with respect to the place or time of their application.<sup>14</sup>

## 6. Possibility of application of legal regulations by the legal addressee

One of the topics that is connected with the issue of the legal provision is the question of the addressee's ability, willingness and ability to apply the legal norm contained in the legal provision. Ibn Nujaym emphasizes right at the beginning that this question does not enter into the composition of the speech about the legal regulation, because it is not part of it, but he indirectly ties it to the legal regulation, because it is one of the conditions for the application of the legal regulation. He sees the capacity of the addressee (*al-qudrah*) as the link between the legal regulation, which stands on its own, and the legal addressee who is expected to apply that regulation in real life, on the one hand, and the Lawgiver, on the other. According to him, this connection is maintained for the reason that binding an incompetent person (*al-ʿājiz*) by the Legislator would be ugly according to reason (*al-qabīḥ*), according to the opinion of the Hanafis and Muʿtazilites, that is, according to the law (*al-sharʿ*), according to the opinion of the Esharia.<sup>15</sup> Ibn Nujaym warns that the theological schools of al-Maturidi, i.e. Hanafi, Muʿtazila

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.



hanefija i mu'tazila, odnosno po Zakonu (*aš-šar'u*), prema mišljenju eš'arija.<sup>15</sup> Ibn Nudžaym upozorava na to da su teološke škole maturidija, odnosno hanefija, mu'tazila i eš'arija, složne u tome da je sposobnost obveznika uvjet kod izvršavanja pravnog propisa, koji je sadržan u pravnoj odredbi, ali se oni razlikuju u tome odakle to proizlazi. Hanefije i mu'tazile smatraju da se to razumije po razumu, jer bi bilo ružno pripisati Zakonodavcu da bi on mogao propisati nešto što sam ne bi mogao ispuniti. Po njima, to razum ne može prihvatiti, a i Zakonodavac se obavezao da će biti pravedan prema obveznicima. Eš'arije su imale drugačiji pristup. Smatrale su da se Zakonodavac u svojoj volji ne može ograničiti i da ne postoji ništa što bi joj bilo nedopušteno, niti je on sam sebe na nešto ograničio. Međutim, smatraju da se obavezivanje obveznika na nešto što prevazilazi njegove sposobnosti nije dogodilo u Vjerozakonu (*aš-šar'u*).<sup>16</sup>

Ibn Nugaym upozorava i na to da, iako su stavovi hanefija i mu'tazila slični, ipak imaju različita polazišta. Dok mu'tazile smatraju da je Zakonodavac obavezan da propisuje ono što je za obveznika korisnije (*al-ašlah*), što proizlazi iz principa Božije pravde (*al-'adl*), hanefije su smatrale da se to temelji na Božijoj mudrosti i dobroti (*al-ḥikmah wa al-faḍl*), a ne na obavezi Zakonodavca da propisuje ono što je korisnije za obveznika.<sup>17</sup>

Ono što je uočljivo u ovoj cijeloj raspravi, koju Ibn Nudžaym donosi na stranicama svoga djela, jeste to da su teološke škole islama u raspravi o ljudskoj mogućnosti ili sposobnosti izvršenja šerijatskog propisa, indirektno unijele raspravu o ograničavanju Zakonodavca u njegovoj volji kod donošenja pravnog propisa. Najdalje su u tome otišle mu'tazile. Potpuno je vidljivo da ova teološka škola islama traži od Zakonodavca da poštuje vlastiti princip pravde, na koju se obavezao, vodeći računa o interesu ljudi, njihovim potrebama i mogućnostima. S druge strane, ova rasprava mogla bi se razumjeti i kao odlučan zahtjev obveznika da se poštuje njegovo pravo i da mu se ne nameću propisi koji nisu u njegovom interesu.

I dok su se mu'tazile i hanefije pozivale na proklamirane principe koji trebaju obavezivati sve, pa i samog Zakonodavca, koji mora donositi pravedne zakone u interesu obveznika, vodeći računa o obvezniku koji treba biti njihov korisnik, eš'arije su ostale pri stavu da se volja Zakonodavca ne može ničim ograničiti. Slične rasprave vodile su se i među evropskim pravnicima kod ograničavanja volje monarha u evropskim monarhijama.



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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, str. 64.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

and Ash'ari, agree that the capacity of the addressee is a condition for the execution of the legal regulation, which is contained in the legal provision, but they differ in where it comes from. The Hanafi and Mu'tazila believe that this is understood by reason, because it would be undesirable to attribute to the Legislator that he could prescribe something that he himself could not fulfil. According to them, reason cannot accept that, and the Legislator has committed himself to be fair to the debtors. The Ash'ari had a different approach. They believed that the Legislator cannot limit himself in his will and that there is nothing that would be impermissible to him, nor did he limit himself to anything. However, they believe that obligating the addressee to something that exceeds his abilities, did not happen in religious law (*al-shar'*).<sup>16</sup>

Also, Ibn Nujaym warns that, although the views of the Hanafis and the Mu'tezilites are similar, they still have different starting points. While the Mu'tazila believe that the Legislator is obliged to prescribe what is more beneficial for the addressee (*al-aṣḥaḥ*), which derives from the principle of God's justice (*al-'adl*), the Hanafis believed that it is based on God's wisdom and goodness (*al-ḥikmah wa al-faḍl*), and not on the obligation of the Legislator to prescribe what is more beneficial for the addressee.<sup>17</sup>

What is noticeable in this entire discussion, which Ibn Nujaym brings to the pages of his work, is that the theological schools of Islam have indirectly brought into the discussion about the human possibility or ability to execute the Sharia regulation, the discussion about limiting the Legislator in his will when passing a legal regulation. Mu'tazilites went the furthest in this. It is completely visible that this theological school of Islam asks the Legislator to respect his own principle of justice, to which he committed himself, taking into account the interests of people, their needs and possibilities. On the other hand, this discussion could also be understood as a determined request of the addressee to respect his right and not to impose regulations that are not in his interest.

And while the Mu'tezilites and Hanafis referred to the proclaimed principles that should bind everyone, including the Legislator himself, who must enact just laws in the interest of the addressee, taking into account the addressee who should be their beneficiary, the Ash'aris remained of the position that the will of the Legislator cannot be limited by anything. Similar discussions were held among European jurists regarding the limitation of the monarch's will in European monarchies.



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<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*



ILUSTRACIJA - Muslimanski pravnik u ispisivanju pravnih odredbi. U pozadini nalazi se pribor za fino kaligrafsko pisanje.



وفي ما يلي الأحكام القانونية  
الأخرى في هذا الصدد  
ويجب أن تتمشي جميع الأحكام  
القانونية الأخرى، التي هي أدنى  
مستوى من ذلك، مع هذه المبادئ

ILLUSTRATION ~ A Muslim jurist in writing legal provisions. In the background there is a utensil for fine calligraphic writing.



## Zaključak

Ibn Nudžaym spada među velike pravnike hanefijske pravne škole koji se pojavio u 16. stoljeću. Rođen je u Egiptu, neposredno nakon osmanlijskog zauzimanja te zemlje 1512. godine, i smatra se jednim od najistaknutijih osmanlijskih pravnika. Bio je pod utjecajem velikog teologa i pravnika ‘Abdullaha an-Nasafija (1240–1310), čija je djela komentirao. Njegovo djelo *Al-Ašbāh wa an-Nazāir* (o pravnim pravilima) izazvalo je veliku pažnju među pravnicima, svojom originalnošću i jezikom kojim je napisano, a njegovo bavljenje metodologijom šerijatskog prava (*uṣūl al-fiqh*) također zavređuje našu pažnju. Neke od njegovih postavki, koje možemo iščitati u komentaru *Fatḥ al-Ġafār bi Šarḥ al-Manār*, skreću nam pažnju na to da se radi o stavovima pravnika koji je nastojao razumjeti principe na kojima počiva šerijatsko pravo, ali i otvoriti neka nova pitanja, kako ona o kojima su se raniji pravnici razilazili, tako i ona koje je donijelo njegovo vrijeme. Da bi se nešto smatralo pravnim propisom, koji bi se mogao uključiti u pravni sistem, mora ispuniti suštinsku funkciju svrhovitog uređenja ljudskih odnosa, smatra on. Zalaže se za tumačenje pravnih odredbi putem otkrivanja svrhe njihova postojanja. Nemogućnost otkrivanja te svrhe, po njemu, postavlja pred nas pitanje mogućnosti postojanja prava uopće. Drugim riječima, čemu pravna odredba ukoliko nije moguće otkriti svrhu njena postojanja. On zahtijeva da pravni propis opravda svrhu svog postojanja tako što će njegovo propisivanje donijeti korist za obveznika. Također, referira se i na mogućnost provedbe pravne odredbe u okolnostima u kojima se ona pojavljuje u odnosu na pravnog obveznika. Ukoliko se pravna odredba ne može primijeniti, zbog nekih okolnosti, zalaže se za njenu promjenu i donošenje nove odredbe, koja će odraziti interes pravnog obveznika i zadovoljiti njegovu potrebu. Neosporno je da se radi o velikom hanefijskom pravniku, koji zaslužuje da se njegovo djelo približi našoj muslimanskoj javnosti. Ovo je samo mali pokušaj na tom putu.

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AD-DABŪSĪ, ABŪ ZAYD: *Taqwīm al-Adillah fi Uṣūli al-Fiqh*, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 2001.

## Conclusion

Ibn Nujaym belongs to the great jurists of the Hanafi school of law, which appeared in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. He was born in Egypt, immediately after the Ottoman conquest of that country in 1512 and is considered one of the most prominent Ottoman jurists. He was influenced by the great theologian and jurist 'Abdullah An-Nasafi (1240-1310), whose works he commented on. His work *Al-Ashbāh wa an-Nazā'ir* (On Legal Rules) has attracted much attention among jurists, for its originality and the language in which it is written, and his dealing with the methodology of Shariah law (*uṣūl al-fiqh*) also deserves our attention. Some of his statements, which we can read in the commentary *Fatḥ al-Ghafār bi Sharḥ al-Manār*, draw our attention to the fact that these are the views of a jurist who tried to understand the principles on which Sharia law rests, but also to open some new questions, both those on which earlier jurists differed, and those brought about by his time. For something to be considered a legal regulation, which could be included in the legal system, it must fulfil the essential function of the purposeful regulation of human relations, he believes. He advocates the interpretation of legal provisions by revealing the purpose of their existence. The impossibility of discovering that purpose, according to him, poses the question of the possibility of the existence of rights at all. In other words, what is a legal provision if it is not possible to discover the unitality of its existence. It requires that the legal regulation justifies the purpose of its existence by the fact that its enactment will bring benefit to the addressee. Also, he refers to the possibility of implementing a legal provision in the circumstances in which it appears in relation to a legal obligor. If the legal provision cannot be applied, due to some circumstances, he advocates for its change and the adoption of a new provision, which will reflect the interest of the legal addressee and satisfy his need. It is undeniable that he is a great Hanafi jurist, who deserves to have his work brought closer to our Muslim public. This is just a small attempt on that path.





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**Mersiha Jusić** graduated from the Department of Psychology at Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo in 2004, with her research-based final paper on the topic of religious orientation in adolescents. She received the title of master of psychological science in 2012. from the same department. She worked as a senior assistant at Islamic pedagogical faculty of Zenica, and was active in the field of women-related NGO projects and youth activism. She received her PhD in psychological science from the International University of Sarajevo in 2019, where she currently holds the position of assistant professor. She authored a handbook „Interreligious guide for secondary school students“, and published a number of articles in peer-reviewed journals.

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**AL-DŽĀHILIJJAH I ANTIINTELEKTUALIZAM  
SUVREMENOG SVIJETA**

**AL-JĀHILIYYAH AND ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM  
OF THE MODERN WORLD**



## Sažetak

Autori analiziraju pitanje odnosa prema konceptu antiintelektualizma u savremenim društvima tragajući za njegovom povezanošću s tradicionalnim konceptom *al-džāhilijah* unutar muslimanske tradicije. Posebno se fokusira na manifestacije i moguće uzroke savremenog *al-džāhilijah* i posebnosti, ali i posljedice, odnosa postmodernih društava, kako na Zapadu tako i u većinski muslimanskim državama, prema učenosti i neprimjetnom usponu općeg antiintelektualizma.

**Ključne riječi:** *antiintelektualizam, al-džāhilijah (neznanje), savremeni mediji.*

## Abstract

The authors analyze the question of the relationship to the concept of anti-intellectualism in contemporary societies, searching for its connection with the traditional concept of *al-jāhiliyyah* within the Muslim tradition. It especially focuses on the manifestations and possible causes of contemporary *al-jāhiliyyah* and the peculiarities, but also the consequences, of the relationship of postmodern societies, both in the West and in majority Muslim countries, towards scholarship and the imperceptible rise of general anti-intellectualism.

**Key words:** anti-intellectualism, *al-jāhiliyyah* – ignorance, contemporary media.

## AL-DŽĀHILIJJAH I ANTIINTELEKTUALIZAM SUVREMENOG SVIJETA

*Neznanje vodi u strah, strah vodi u mržnju, mržnja vodi u nasilje.*

Ibn Rušd – Averroes (1126–1198)

**'a**li bin Muḥammad bin 'Alī al-Džurdžānī (740–816 h.g.) u svom djelu *Al-T'arīfāt* („Definicije“) definirajući pojam *džahl* (neznanje) piše: to je vjerovanje u nešto što je suprotno od onoga što jeste, te dodaje da su se neki protivili ovakvoj definiciji tvrdeći da *džahl* može biti i prema nečemu što ne postoji. Međutim, on smatra da to nije valjan argument, jer je ovaj pojam po njemu imaginaran, odnosno on je samo u ljudskom umu. Zatim navodi još dva pojma koja pokušava definirati i to *al-džahl al-basīṭ* (prosto neznanje), koji je prema njemu neznanje onoga što bi se trebalo znati, i *al-džahl al-murakkab* (složeno neznanje), što je čvrsto uvjerenje koje se ne podudara s realnošću.<sup>1</sup>

Ustvari, to nam govori da u klasičnoj islamskoj misli pod *džahlom* nisu podrazumijevali neznanje, nego *iluziju znanja*. To je utoliko bitnije što je kada bolje razmislimo iluzija znanja gora i opasnija od neznanja. Da je *džahl* neznanje, neznalice bi znale da nešto ne znaju, pa bi tragale za spoznajom i prije ili kasnije se iz tog svog stanja izvukle. Ovako, *džāhil* je uvjeren da zna ili da zna onoliko koliko misli da mu je dovoljno, i zato je sam sebi zatvorio vrata spoznaje.

Zato je jedini izlaz iz neznanja da čovjek sumnja u svoje znanje i da ne bude slijepo uvjeren u to da sve zna, nego da uvijek traga za istinom. Priznanje neznanja je vrhunac znanja.

U Kur'anu Časnom se kaže: *Bojte se Allaha i Allah će vas podučiti, a samo Allah sve zna.*<sup>2</sup>

Ali, takva bogobojaznost koja se spominje u ovom ajetu nije strah od Boga koliko strahopoštovanje. Čovjek se ne treba plašiti Boga koji je, kako je rekao Poslanik Muhammed „milostiviji prema ljudima od majke prema njenom djetetu“,<sup>3</sup> nego čovjek treba imati strahopoštovanje pred Božijom veličinom. E to strahopoštovanje Svevišnji postavlja kao preduvjet za ljudsku spoznaju, odnosno za postizanje znanja. Bog je za muslimane *Al-'Ālim*, on je Sveznajući, on je apsolutno znanje. On je, kako kaže u Kur'anu, ljudima *od znanja dao samo malo.*<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> 'Alī bin Muḥammad bin 'Alī al-Jurjānī, *Al-T'arīfāt*, Dār al-kitāb al-'arabī, Beirut, 1996. p. 108.

<sup>2</sup> *Kur'an*, 2:282

<sup>3</sup> *Ḥadīth*: Al-Bukhārī & Muslim.

<sup>4</sup> *Kur'an*, 17:85.

## AL-JĀHILIYYAH AND ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM OF THE MODERN WORLD

*Ignorance leads to fear, fear leads to hatred, hatred leads to violence.*

Ibn Rushd – Averroes (1126–1198.)

**a**lī bin Muḥammad bin'Alī al-Jurjāni (740-816h) in his work *Al-T'arīfāt* ("Definitions"), defining the term *jahl* (ignorance), writes: "*Jahl* is the belief in something which is the opposite to what it is". He adds that "some objected to this definition, claiming that *jahl* can also be of something that does not exist". However, al-Jurjāni believes that this is not a valid argument, because according to him this concept is imaginary, that is, it is only in the human mind. He then lists two more terms that he tries to define, namely *al-jahl al-basīṭ* (simple ignorance), which according to him is ignorance of what should be known, and *al-jahl al-murakkab* (complex ignorance), which is a firm conviction that does not coincide with reality.<sup>1</sup>

In fact, this tells us that in classical Islamic thought, *jahl* was not meant as *ignorance*, but as the *illusion of knowledge*. This is all the more important because when we think about it, the illusion of knowledge is worse and more dangerous than ignorance. If *jahl* was ignorance, ignorant people would know that they do not know something, so they would search for knowledge and sooner or later would get out of that state of ignorance. In this way, the *jāhil*, the ignorant, is convinced that he knows, or that he knows as much as he thinks is enough. That is why he closes the door of knowledge to himself.

However, the only way out of ignorance is for a person to doubt his knowledge. He should not be blindly convinced that he knows everything, but should always search for the truth. Admitting ignorance is the pinnacle of knowledge.

God Almighty said in the Qur'an: "Be aware of Allah and Allah will teach you. Only Allah knows everything".<sup>2</sup>

But the kind of Godliness mentioned in this verse is not fear of God but awe. Man should not fear God who is, as the Prophet Muhammad said in a *ḥadīth*: "More merciful to men than a mother to her child."<sup>3</sup> Thus, man should be in awe of God's greatness. This awe is set by the Almighty God as a prerequisite for human cognition, that is, for the attainment of knowledge. God is for Muslims *Al-'Ālim*, the Omniscient, He is absolute knowledge. As He Almighty says in the Qur'an: "He gives a little knowledge to men".<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> 'Alī bin Muḥammad bin'Alī al-Jurjāni, *Al-T'arīfāt*, Dār al-kitāb al-'arabī, Beirut, 1996. p. 108.

<sup>2</sup> *Qur'an*, 2:282

<sup>3</sup> *Ḥadīth*: Al-Bukhārī & Muslim.

<sup>4</sup> *Qur'an*, 17:85



Da bi spoznali, da bi bili otvoreni za učenje, ljudi prvo trebaju pokazati strahopoštovanje pred Znanjem, odnosno u slučaju vjerujućih ljudi, pred Bogom kao simbolom konačnog znanja. Al-Zamakhsharī čak tvrdi kako je etimološko značenje riječi *Allah* „Onaj pred čijom su Veličinom ljudi zaprepašteni, zbunjeni, začuđeni, smeteni...”<sup>5</sup>

Ni spoznaja ni znanje ne mogu se postići uz aroganciju i umišljenost. Imati strahopoštovanje pred Istinom, pred Znanjem, prvi je korak ka uzdizanju iz okova *džahla*. Arogancija postmodernog čovjeka, njegova uvjerenost da sve zna i da je mjera svega je korijen iz kojeg niče i buja postmoderna *džāhilijah*. Savremena *džāhilijah* je zato kompleksno neznanje utemeljeno na lažnoj iluziji sveznanja i aroganciji konačnih istina.

Teško bi bilo opisati sve manifestacije ovog savremenog *džāhiliyyah*, ali neke su jednostavno preočite da ih se ne može ne primijetiti.

### Antiintelektualizam kao savremena *džāhilijah*

Jedna od manifestacija savremenog *džāhilijah* je rastući trend uspona antiintelektualizma u svijetu. Obrazovanje, ali i sama nauka, umjetnost i žeđ za spoznajom više nisu na cijeni. Njih sve više zamjenjuje zabava kao jedini predmet zanimanja, ignorancija, sveznalost i samodovoljnost, te namjerna glupost i svjesno projektirano zaglupljivanje masa. Pandemija COVID-19 i način na koji smo kao čovječanstvo na nju odgovorili u prvi plan gurnula je ovaj zastrašujući trend antiintelektualizma i pokazala svu snagu i privlačnost površnog, teoriji zavjere sklonog i antinaučnog pokreta needuciranih masa osnaženih društvenim mrežama na kojima se lahko uvezuju i sebi sami kreiraju „alternativne činjenice”, ali i alternativnu stvarnost.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Upozorenje na Covid 19.

ILLUSTRATION ~ Covid 19 warning.

<sup>5</sup> Enes Karić, *Prilozi za enciklopedijski leksikon Kur'ana*, I svezak str, 5.

In order to understand, to be open to learning, people must first show awe before Knowledge, that is, in the case of faith people, to show their awe before God as the ultimate knowledge. Al-Zamakhsharī even claims that the etymological meaning of the word *Allah* is the One before whose Greatness people are astonished, confused, amazed, disturbed...<sup>5</sup>

Self-realization, let alone knowledge, cannot be achieved with arrogance and conceit. To be in awe of the Truth, of Knowledge, is the first step towards rising from the shackles of *jahl*. The arrogance of the postmodern man, his conviction that he knows everything as well as that he is the measure of everything is the root from which the postmodern *jāhiliyyah* sprouts and flourishes. Contemporary *jāhiliyyah* is, therefore, a complex ignorance based on the false illusion of omniscience and the arrogance of ultimate truths.

It would be difficult to describe all the manifestations of this contemporary *jāhiliyyah*, but some are simply too obvious to be noticed.

### Anti-intellectualism as contemporary *jāhiliyyah*

One of the manifestations of contemporary *jāhiliyyah* is the growing trend of the rise of anti-intellectualism in the world. Education, but also science itself, art and the thirst for knowledge are no longer valued. They are increasingly being replaced by entertainment as the sole object of occupation, ignorance, omniscience and self-sufficiency, as well as deliberate stupidity and consciously designed dumbing down of the masses. The COVID-19 pandemic and the way we, as humanity, have responded to it has pushed this frightening trend of anti-intellectualism to the fore. Also, it has shown all the power and appeal of a superficial, conspiracy theory-prone as well as an anti-scientific movement for uneducated masses. This conspiracy is empowered by social networks where people can easily bind themselves to create “alternative facts” but also an alternative reality.



ILLUSTRATION ~ *Hospital in the atmosphere of Covid 19.*

ILUSTRACIJA ~ *Bolnica u atmosferi Covida 19.*

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<sup>5</sup> Enes Karić, *Prilozi za enciklopedijski leksikon Kurana*, Volume I, p. 5.

## Trijumf antiintelektualizma

**n**ešto ozbiljno se dešava s našim svijetom. Nema društva u kojem se ne počinju osjećati posljedice sada već decenijskog zaglupljivanja masa u kojem učestvuju mediji, političke elite i sada sve više kvaziakademski paralelni svijet. Bilo je čudo očekivati da se srozavanje obrazovnih sistema i forsiranje zaglupljujućih sadržaja neće ozbiljno odraziti na svijet u kojem živimo. Ta slika svijeta o tome kako će obrazovane elite voditi svijet i gurati točak civilizacije naprijed, makar mase i ne bile prosvijećene i ostajale uljuljane u svom izmišljenom svijetu neukosti i jeftine zabave, sada je ozbiljno poljuljana. U svijetu u kojem vladaju nominalni principi demokratije, realno je da vlada većina. Ako je ona neprosvijećena, sigurno će naći načina da svijet oblikuje prema svojoj volji. Njihovi stavovi, prioriteti i vizija svijeta će kroz izbore vrlo brzo postati politička i društvena realnost kojoj će se svi morati prilagoditi.

One „prosvijetljene elite” koje su se u svojim salonima zgražavale nad primitivizmom masa sada se čude što te mase ne dijele njihove vrijednosti i što im biraju političke predstavnike s kojima se te mase mogu poistovijetiti a ne prepoznaju veličinu i briljantnost elita.

Svakojake elite i kod nas i u svijetu su se odrodile od naroda i sada se čude kada ih te mase više ne doživljavaju kao lidere kojima se dive, nego traže one koji su bliži njima.

U Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama, kao lideru modernog pa i postmodernog svijeta i onima koji već decenijama svijetu nameću trendove, ovaj proces je, prema nekim autorima, otišao najdalje. Dokaz tome može biti i popularnost republikanskoga predsjednika Donalda Trumpa, kao i politika koju vodi, „argumentacija” kojom se služi, vizija svijeta i simplistička rješenja kompleksnih problema koje promovira.



ILUSTRACIJA - Donald Trump je rekao kako svaki dan pije lijek za koji zdravstveni stručnjaci upozoravaju da može imati fatalne posljedice. (19.05.2020.)

ILLUSTRATION - Donald Trump said he takes a drug every day that health experts warn can have fatal consequences. (May 19, 2020).

## The triumph of anti-intellectualism

Something serious is happening to our world. There is no society in which the consequences of the decades-long dumbing down of the masses, where the media, political elites as well as increasingly a quasi-academic parallel are being created without a sign of ending. It would be a wonder to expect that the collapse of educational systems and an ending of the content of dumbing down have not a serious impact on the world we live in. That image of the world about how the educated elites will lead the world as well as push the wheel of civilization forward, even if the masses were not enlightened and even if they remained lulled in their imaginary world of indolence and cheap entertainment, is now seriously shaken. In a world where the nominal principles of democracy rule, it is realistic that the majority rules. If the majority is unenlightened, it will for sure find a way to shape the world according to its will. Through the elections, the majority's attitudes, priorities and vision of the world will very quickly become a political and social reality to which everyone has to adapt.

Those "enlightened elites" who in their salons were horrified by the primitivism of the masses are now surprised that these masses do not share their values and that they elect political representatives with whom these masses can identify and do not recognize the greatness and brilliance of the elites.

All kinds of elites both in our country and in the world have been born among their people. But they are surprised when their people, the masses, no longer perceive them as their leaders, but look for those who are closer to them.

It is obvious that there is a feeling among the broad masses that they have been left behind by elites who are corrupt and flirt with the political and economic power for their own benefit. All kinds of elites no longer have authority because the masses feel that they have given birth to their problems, fears and hopes, thus opening up space for others who will fill that void. The ignorant betrayed by the learned now lead themselves.




ILLUSTRATION ~ USA: Withdrawal of approval for the use of antimalarial drugs (hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine) in the treatment of COVID-19 (June 15, 2020).

ILUSTRACIJA ~ SAD: Povučeno odobrenje za upotrebu lijekova (hidroksiklorokin i klorokin) protiv malarije u liječenju COVID-19 (15.06.2020.).



Ray Williams sa portala [psychologytoday.com](https://www.psychologytoday.com) napravio je odličan pregled nekih stavova autora koji su upozoravali na ovaj trend koji je dugo već uveliko uzeo maha u Sjedinjenim Državama.<sup>6</sup>

Tako je Susan Jacoby, autorica knjige *The Age of American Unreason*, u tekstu objavljenom u *The Washington Post*-u napisala: „Definicija gluposti, da parafraziram pokojnog senatora Daniela Patricka Moynihana, nekoliko decenija postepeno se snižavala i to kombinacijom do sada neodoljivih sila. Te sile podrazumijevaju trijumf kulture videa nad onom štampanom, raskol između američkog uspona nivoa formalne edukacije i pada njihovog općeg poimanja osnova geografije, prirodnih nauka i historije, i fuzije antiracionalizma sa antiintelektualizmom.”<sup>7</sup>



ILUSTRACIJA - Richard Hofstadter; Susan Jacoby.

I, uistinu, postoji duga tradicija antiintelektualizma u Americi, čak daleko duža nego što je to slučaj u drugi zapadnim zemljama. Dobitnik Pulitzerove nagrade iz 1964. Richard Hofstadter u tom djelu je opisao kako su postavljeni temelji antielitizma, antiracionalizma i antinaučnog sentimenta u američkom društvu i kako su postali sastavni dio njihovog političkog i društvenog tkiva. Tako on u knjizi *Anti-Intellectualism In American Life*, za koju je i dobio prestižnu nagradu, piše: „Postoji kult neznanja u SAD-u, i oduvijek ga je bilo. Nit antiintelektualizma se oduvijek provlačila kroz mustru našeg političkog i kulturnog života, hranjena pogrešnim stavom da demokratija znači da moje neznanje vrijedi kao i tvoje neznanje.”<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Ray Williams, *Anti-Intellectualism and The Dumbing Down of America*, June 2014.

<sup>7</sup> Prema tekstu u: *The Week*, „How dumb can we get?“, 09.01.2015.

<sup>8</sup> Isaac Asimov, „A Cult of Ignorance“, *Newsweek*, 21.01. 1980.

In the United States of America, as the leader of the modern and postmodern world and those who have been imposing trends on the world for decades, this process, according to some authors, has gone the furthest. The popularity of Republican President Donald Trump, as well as the policy he led, the “argument” he used, his vision of the world and the simplistic solutions to complex problems he promoted can be the proof of that.

Ray Williams of psychologytoday.com has done an excellent overview of some of the views of authors who have warned against this trend that has long been taking hold in the United States.<sup>6</sup>

Similarly, Susan Jacoby, the author of the book “The Age of American Unreason”, wrote in a piece published in *The Washington Post*: “The definition of stupidity, to paraphrase the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, has gradually



ILLUSTRATION ~ Mark Bauerlein; Charles Pierce.

been lowered for several decades by a combination of hitherto irresistible forces. These forces include the triumph of video culture over print culture, the split between America’s rising level of formal education and the decline of their general understanding of the basics of geography, natural sciences, history, and the fusion of anti-rationalism with anti-intellectualism.<sup>7</sup>

Indeed, there is a long tradition of anti-intellectualism in America, far longer than in other Western countries. The 1964 Pulitzer Prize winner Richard Hofstadter described in how the foundations of anti-elitism, anti-rationalism and anti-scientific sentiment were laid in American society and how they became an integral part of their political and social fabric. He writes in his book “Anti-Intellectualism in American Life”, (he was given a prestigious award for it) the following: “There is a cult of ignorance in the USA, and it has always been there. The thread

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<sup>6</sup> Ray Williams, *Anti-Intellectualism and The Dumbing Down of America*, June 2014.

<sup>7</sup> Quoted according to *The Week*, *How dumb can we get?*, 09.01.2015.

Mark Bauerlein u svojoj knjizi *The Dumbest Generation* otkriva kako se čitava generacija mladih zaglupljuje njihovom averzijom prema čitanju ičega vrijednog (supstantnog) i njihovom ovisnošću o digitalnom „sra...” na društvenim medijima.<sup>9</sup>

Novinar Charles Pierce, autor knjige *Idiot America*, nudi jednu drugačiju perspektivu istog problema: „Uspon današnje idiotske Amerike predstavlja – a čemu je konačan cilj postizanje profita, ali da cinizam bude veći i političke prednosti u borbi za vlast – posljedicu prestanka postojanja koncenzusa oko toga da je stjecanje znanja dobro. Ono također predstavlja pobjedu stava prema kojem najmanje trebamo vjerovati ljudima koji najbolje znaju o čemu govore. U vremenu novih medija svako je ekspert.”<sup>10</sup> Nerijetko smo svjedoci da se u javnom medijskom prostoru u dijaloškim emisijama sučeljavaju „obični ljudi” i eksperti i „raspravljaju” o usko specijaliziranim temama, poput vakcinacije ili globalnog zagrijavanja. To stvara dojam da je sasvim normalno imati kao laik mišljenje o temama kojima se neko bavi cijeli život, i čiji je rad kao takav podvrgavan rigoroznim naučnim kriterijima. Otvara se prostor za odobravanje ili neodobravanje javnosti zasnovano na paušalnim kritikama ili osporavanjima, o čemu detaljnije govori Asa Wikforss u svojoj knjizi *Alternativne činjenice*. Alternativne činjenice, ma koliko se kao legitimne plasirale u javnosti, po prirodi stvari ne mogu postojati. O činjenicama se ne bi trebalo raspravljati i od njih se ne mogu praviti kontraverzne teme.<sup>11</sup>

„Postoji perverzna sumnjičavost prema pravima, privilegijama, znanju i specijalizaciji”, kaže Catherine Liu, autorica *American Idyll : Academic Antielitism as Cultural Critique* („Američka idila : akademski antielitizam kao kulturna kritika“). Ova profesorica studija filma i medija sa University of California tvrdi da se misija univerziteta promijenila: „Mi više ne educiramo ljude. Mi ih obučavamo da nađu posao.”<sup>12</sup>

Ali, nije to tako samo u Americi. Kao i u mnogo čemu drugome, Amerika je samo malo ispred ostatka svijeta. Polahko, ali sigurno, taj trend se širi svijetom koji je barem u jednom periodu svoje historije prošao period prosvjetiteljstva. Onaj koji nije, već dugo tavori u neslobodnim i diktatorskim državama kojim vladaju silom nametnute političke elite. Ljudi su, čini se, bili pretjerano sigurni u sebe i svoja društva i u to da se točak civilizacije uvijek mora kretati naprijed. To je krajnje neutemeljena pretpostavka. Historija nas uči da to nije tako i da se točak civilizacijskog napretka lahko može zakotrljati unazad.

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<sup>9</sup> Mark Bauerlein, *The Dumbest Generation : How the Digital Age Stupefies Young Americans and Jeopardizes Our Future*, Penguin, New York, 2008.

<sup>10</sup> Charles P. Pierce: *Idiot America How Stupidity Became a Virtue in the Land of the Free*, Doubleday, New York, 2009.

<sup>11</sup> Asa Wikforss: *Alternativne činjenice- o znanju i njegovim neprijateljima*, Naklada OceanMore, 2021.

<sup>12</sup> Catherine Liu: *American Idyll: Academic Antielitism as Cultural Critique*, University of Iowa Press, Iowa City, 2011.

of anti-intellectualism has always run through the pattern of our political and cultural life, fed by the mistaken attitude that democracy means that my ignorance is as valid as yours.”<sup>8</sup>

Mark Bauerlein in his book, “The Dumbest Generation” reveals how an entire generation of young people is being dumbed down by their aversion to reading anything of value (substance) and their addiction to digital “shit...” on social media.<sup>9</sup>

Journalist Charles Pierce, author of the book “Idiot America” offers a different perspective of the same problem when he writes: “The rise of today’s idiotic America represents – the ultimate goal of which is to achieve profit, but for cynicism to be greater and political advantages in the struggle for power – the consequence of the cessation of existence consensus that acquiring knowledge is good. It also represents a victory for the attitude that we should least trust the people who know best what they are talking about. In the age of new media, everyone is an expert.”<sup>10</sup> We often witness that in the public media space, in dialogue shows, “ordinary people” and experts face each other and “discuss” narrowly specialized topics, such as vaccination or global warming. This creates the impression that it is quite normal to have a layman’s opinion about topics that one deals with all his life, and whose work as such is subjected to rigorous scientific criteria. It opens up a space for public approval or disapproval based on blanket criticisms or objections, which Asa Wikforss discusses in more detail in his book “Alternative Facts”. Alternative facts, no matter how legitimate they are marketed to the public, by the nature of things cannot exist. Facts should not be discussed and cannot be made into controversial topics.<sup>11</sup>

“There is a perverse suspicion of entitlement, privilege, knowledge, and specialization,” says Catherine Liu, author of *American Idyll : Academic Anti-elitist as Cultural Critique*. This professor of film and media studies from the University of California claims that the university’s mission has changed: “We are no longer educating people.” We train them to find a job”<sup>12</sup>.

But this is not the case only in America. As in many other things, America is just a little ahead of the rest of the world. Slowly but surely, this trend is spreading throughout the world, which has for a while in its history, passed the period of enlightenment. The other world which did not experience the enlighten, is in an agony of unfree and dictatorial state ruled by forcefully imposed political elites for a long time. People, it seems, were overly confident in themselves and in their societies as well as in the belief that the wheel of civilization must always move forward. This is a completely unfounded assumption. History teaches us that this is not the case and that the wheel of civilizational progress can easily roll backwards.

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<sup>8</sup> Isaac Asimov, in *Newsweek A Cult of Ignorance*, 21.01. 1980.

<sup>9</sup> Mark Bauerlein: *The Dumbest Generation : How the Digital Age Stupefies Young Americans and Jeopardizes Our Future*, Penguin, New York, 2008

<sup>10</sup> Charles P. Pierce: *Idiot America How Stupidity Became a Virtue in the Land of the Free*, Doubleday, New York, 2009.

<sup>11</sup> Asa Wikforss: *Alternativne činjenice – o znanju i njegovim neprijateljima*, Naklada OceanMore, 2021.

<sup>12</sup> Catherine Liu: *American Idyll: Academic Anti-elitism as Cultural Critique*, University of Iowa Press, Iowa City, 2011.





ILUSTRACIJA – Danas većina stanovništva ima pristup brzim internetskim mrežama koje su promijenile način na koji živimo, radimo, učimo i igramo se.



ILLUSTRATION – Today, most population have access to high-speed internet networks that have changed the way we live, work, learn and play.

Kažu da je komičar George Carlin rekao „da nikada ne treba potcijeniti opasnosti budala u velikim skupinama”.<sup>13</sup> Zato su danas ideje prosvjetiteljstva, rada s ljudima i edukacije masa ponovo tako aktuelne. Ali da bi se tim putem krenulo, mediji, političari, akademska zajednica i svi drugi moraju prestati podilaziti masama i trčati za profitom, a to je žrtva na koju niko nije spreman. Do tada će pametniji popuštati, budale vladati a *džāhilijah* trijumfirati.

Neznanje je moćno oružje. Možda nije jače od znanja, ali sigurno jeste destruktivnije i podložnije za manipulaciju.

## Površnost

Savremena *džāhilijah* ima još jednu upečatljivu posebnost. On počiva na površnosti, na intelektualnom i emotivnom neunošenju, na odsustvu kompleksnog mišljenja. Ubrzani svijet ne dozvoljava da se bilo čemu, bilo kojoj ideji ili čak emociji posvetimo. On današnjeg čovjeka tjera na ishitrene zaključke, neosnovane i površne procjene koje vode ka hirovitosti i fanatizmu koji treba nadomjestiti nesigurnost i neutemljenost površnih svjetonazora i stavova.

Nicholas Carr u svojoj knjizi *Plitko*<sup>14</sup> iz 2010., pišući o tome šta internet čini našem mozgu, kao jednu od sveopćih promjena načina na koji većina ljudi razmišlja i doživljava svijet, vidi u pretjeranoj izloženosti internetu i svijetu društvenih medija virtuelne stvarnosti. On piše o tome da mediji nisu samo informacijski kanali. Oni ljude opskrbljavaju materijalom za razmišljanje, ali i oblikuju proces mišljenja.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Internet konekcija u službi čovjeka.  
ILLUSTRATION ~ Internet connection at the service of man.

<sup>13</sup> Iselin Aspen: *Never Underestimate the Power Of Stupid People In Large Groups – In Memory of Comedian George Carlin*, Medium, 12.05.2021. <https://medium.com/the-collector/never-underestimate-the-power-of-stupid-people-in-large-groups-1cf0bcb68cc2>.

<sup>14</sup> Nicholas Carr: *Plitko – Što Internet čini našem mozgu*, Naklada Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb, 2011.

It is said that the comedian George Carlin said that: “Never underestimate the dangers of fools in large groups”<sup>13</sup>. That is why today the ideas of enlightenment, working with people and educating the masses are once again so relevant. But in order to take that path, the media, politicians, the academic community and everyone else must stop pandering to the masses and running after profit. That is a sacrifice that no one is ready to do it. Until then, the wise will yield, the fools will rule and the *jāhiliyyah* will triumph.

Ignorance is a powerful weapon. It may not be stronger than knowledge, but it is certainly more destructive and more susceptible to manipulation.

## Superficiality

Contemporary *jāhiliyyah* has another striking feature. It rests on superficiality, on intellectual and emotional non-introduction, on the absence of complex thinking. The accelerated world does not allow us to devote ourselves to anything, any idea or even emotion. He forces today’s man to make hasty conclusions, baseless and superficial assessments that lead to capriciousness and fanaticism, which should replace the insecurity and ungroundedness of superficial worldviews and attitudes.

Nicholas Carr in his book “Shallow”<sup>14</sup> from 2010, writing about what the internet is doing to our brains as one of the sweeping changes in the way most people think and experience the world, he sees overexposure to the internet and the virtual reality social media world. He writes about how media are not only information channels. They provide people with material for thinking, but also shape the thinking process.



ILLUSTRATION - The internet infrastructure is simply a network of networks.  
ILUSTRACIJA - Internetska infrastruktura jednostavno je mreža mreža.

<sup>13</sup> Iselin Aspen, *Never Underestimate the Power Of Stupid People In Large Groups – In memory of comedian George Carlin*, Medium, 12.05.2021. <https://medium.com/the-collector/never-underestimate-the-power-of-stupid-people-in-large-groups-1cf0bcb68cc2>

<sup>14</sup> Nicholas Carr: *Plitko – Što Internet čini našem mozgu*, Naklada Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb, 2011.



Tako on tvrdi da je čovječanstvo, baš kao što je McLuhan bio predvidio, stiglo do važne prekretnice u intelektualnoj i kulturnoj povijesti, i ušlo u prelazno razdoblje između dva načina mišljenja. „U zamjenu za bogatstva interneta – a samo bi luda okrenula glavu od skrivenog blaga – lišili smo se onoga što Karp zove ‘stari postupak linearnog mišljenja’. Miran, usredotočen, neometen, linearni um ustupa mjesto novoj vrsti uma koji želi i treba srkati i izbacivati informacije u kratkim, isprekidanim, često i prepletenim naletima – što brže, to bolje.”<sup>15</sup> John Batelle, svojevremeno urednik jednog časopisa i profesor novinarstva koji danas vodi tvrtku za reklamiranje na internetu, ovako opisuje intelektualni ushit koji doživljava dok peca po web-stranicama:

„Kad izvodim *bricolage* u realnom vremenu i to potraje satima, ‘osjećam’ kako mi mozak postaje lahak, i ‘osjećam se’ kao da postajem pametniji.”<sup>16</sup> Većina nas je doživjela nešto slično. Ti su osjećaji opojni – u toj mjeri da nam mogu odvratiti pažnju od dubljih kognitivnih učinaka interneta.<sup>17</sup>

U proteklih pet stoljeća, otkad je s Gutenbergovom presom čitanje knjiga postalo općenarodni pothvat, linearni, književni um bio je u središtu umjetnosti, znanosti i društva. Podatan i suptilan, bio je to maštovit um renesanse, racionalni um prosvjetiteljstva, inventivni um industrijske revolucije, čak i subverzivni um modernizma. Taj i takav um uskoro bi mogao otići u ropotarnicu historije”, piše Carr.<sup>18</sup> On nadalje piše kako deseci studija psihologa, neurobiologa, edukologa i web-dizajnera ukazuju na isti zaključak: ulaskom na internet stupamo u okruženje koje potiče površno čitanje, rastreseno i ishitreno razmišljanje, te površno učenje.<sup>19</sup>

Jordan Grafman, voditelj Odjela za kognitivnu neuroznanost pri Nacionalnom institutu za neurološke poremećaje i moždani udar, objašnjava da neprestano prebacivanje pažnje dok smo na internetu može učiniti naš mozak okretnijim u multitaskingu, ali s razvijanjem naše sposobnosti dijeljenja pažnje kržlja naša sposobnost dubinskog i kreativnog mišljenja.<sup>20</sup>

Teško da je internet jedini krivac za površnost savremenog čovjeka, ali vjerovatno jeste faktor koji je doprinio odgoju nove generacije koja svijet oko sebe probavlja poput protočnog bojlera. Ničemu ne mogu i ne žele posvetiti dovoljno vremena kako bi iz strahopoštovanja pred znanjem nešto pokušali shvatiti. Jer, pretjerani poticaji stalno nude novi sadržaj prema kojem se moraju očitovati, zauzeti stav. A izloženost mnoštvu tih poticaja koji se predstavljaju kao „informacije” i „činjenice”, a vrlo često su sumnjivog karaktera, stvaraju lažni osjećaj da se sve zna.

Nadalje, taj postmoderni čovjek preplašen kompleksnošću Svijeta bježi u njegova redukcionistička

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, str. 17.

<sup>16</sup> John Battelle: *Google : Making Nick Carr Stupid, But It's Made This Guy Smarter*, John Battelle's Searchblog, 10.6.2008.

<sup>17</sup> Nicholas Carr: *Plitko – Što Internet čini našem mozgu*, Naklada Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb, 2011, str. 17.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, str. 18.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, str. 146.

<sup>20</sup> Citirano u: *Don Tapscott, Grown Up Digital* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009), str. 108-9, prema Carr 2011.

Thus, he claims that humanity, just as McLuhan had predicted, has reached an important turning point in intellectual and cultural history, and has entered a transitional period between two ways of thinking. “In exchange for the riches of the Internet – and only a madwoman would turn her head away from hidden treasures – we’ve stripped ourselves of what Karp calls ‘the old linear thinking process.’ The calm, focused, undistracted, linear mind is giving way to a new kind of mind that wants and needs to siphon and spew out information in short, intermittent, often interlaced bursts – the faster, the better.<sup>15</sup> John Batelle, once a magazine editor and professor of journalism who now runs an Internet advertising company, describes the intellectual exhilaration he experiences while surfing the web like this:

“When I do *bricolage* in real time and it takes hours, I ‘feel’ my brain getting lighter, and I ‘feel’ like I’m getting smarter”.<sup>16</sup> Most of us have experienced something similar. These feelings are intoxicating – to the extent that they can distract us from the deeper cognitive effects of the Internet.<sup>17</sup>

In the past five centuries, since Gutenberg’s press made book reading a universal endeavor, the linear, literary mind has been at the center of art, science, and society. Subtle and subtle, it was the imaginative mind of the Renaissance, the rational mind of the Enlightenment, the inventive mind of the Industrial Revolution, and even the subversive mind of Modernism. Such and such a mind could soon go to the dustbin of history” – writes Carr.<sup>18</sup> He further writes that dozens of studies by psychologists, neurobiologists, educationalists and web designers point to the same conclusion: by entering the Internet, we enter an environment that encourages superficial reading, distracted and hasty thinking, and superficial learning.<sup>19</sup>

Jordan Grafman, head of the Division of Cognitive Neuroscience at the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, explains that constantly shifting our attention while we’re online can make our brains more nimble at multitasking, but as our ability to divide our attention develops, our ability to think deeply and creatively stunts.<sup>20</sup>

The Internet is hardly the only culprit for the superficiality of modern man, but it is probably a factor that has contributed to the upbringing of a new generation that digests the world around it like a flow boiler. They cannot and do not want to devote enough time to anything to try to understand something out of awe of knowledge. Because excessive incentives constantly offer new content, according to which they must express themselves, take a stand. And the exposure to a lot of these incentives that are presented as “information” and “facts” and are very often of a dubious nature, create a false feeling that everything is known.

Furthermore, that postmodern man, frightened by the complexity of the world, flees into its reductionist interpretations that give us a false image of simplicity and security. Today, black and white are triumphing,

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, p. 17.

<sup>16</sup> John Battelle: *Google: Making Nick Carr Stupid, But It’s Made This Guy Smarter*, John Battelle’s Searchblog, 10. 6.2008.

<sup>17</sup> Nicholas Carr: *Plitko – Što Internet čini našem mozgu*. Naklada Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb, 2011. p. 17.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, p. 18

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, p. 146.

<sup>20</sup> Cited in Don Tapscott, *Grown Up Digital* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009), p. 108-9, quoted according to Carr 2011.

tumačenja koja nam daju lažnu sliku jednostavnosti i sigurnosti. Danas trijumfiraju crno-bijele, tj. pojednostavljene slike svijeta sa jednostavnim utopijskim rješenjima za kompleksne probleme i zato trijumfiraju takva tumačenja vjere, politike i stvarnosti. Ljudi slušaju i konzumiraju samo ono što je površno, ono što mogu bez većeg napora shvatiti.

## Nepoznavanje Drugog

**I**ako bi se opisivanje svih manifestacija savremenog *džāhilijah* i njegovih posljedica ne samo po muslimanska društva, već i po budućnost čovječanstva oduljilo, još jedna njegova manifestacija je bitna za primijetiti. Naime, doskora nazivan moderni čovjek živi još jednu posebnu vrstu *džāhilijah* u kojem ne samo da ne zna ništa o Drugom i drugačijem, nego, zbog apsurdne arogancije, ne želi da zna. On je uvjeren da je on sam mjera svega. Možda u neka davna vremena ljudi nisu imali priliku upoznati druge narode i civilizacije. Čovjek se mogao roditi i umrijeti a da ne napusti svoje selo ili grad. Izuzmu li se trgovci i hodočasnici, koji su bili privilegirana elita, malo je onih kojima se stoljećima pružala prilika da dođu u interakciju s različitim nacijama i civilizacijama.

Bilo je to vrijeme rasizma i kolonizirajuće svijesti. Rasizam je potisnut, ako ni zbog čega drugog, zbog razvoja genetike kao nauke, ali ga je zato zamijenio civilizacionizam, ideologija koja počiva na isključujućoj praksi i diskriminaciji prema manje vrijednim, ako ne pojedincima, a ono njihovim kulturama, vjerama i civilizacijama. Ovaj novi rasizam počiva upravo na arogantnom *džāhilijah* koji slijepo vjeruje u vlastitu superiornost i koji ne želi učiti o Drugome a kamoli ga akomodirati. I dok se ta arogantna eurocentričnost i zapadocentričnost mogla razumjeti u prošlosti, s tim da razumjeti ne znači i opravdati, jer su multikonfesionalna i multietnička društva, naročito u zapadnoj Evropi, bila prava rijetkost, moralno i etičko opravdanje za kolonijalizam je moralo počivati na tadašnjem civilizacionizmu koji nije priznavao da izvan Zapadne Evrope postoje civilizacije niti civilizirani ljudi.

Danas, u globaliziranom svijetu, iskustvo Drugog i drugačijeg dostupno je svakome ko želi preći preko stereotipa i stvoriti vlastita iskustva. Ali, te želje je sve manje, naročito kod mladih. Komplicirani svijet se lakše shvata kroz predrasude i davno uspostavljene stereotipe. Znatiželja i želja za spoznajom više nisu vrlina. Svi imaju osjećaj da znaju sve i da je samo stvar kako uvjeriti što više ljudi u vlastiti stav i viziju svijeta. Tolerantni su samo prema onima koji su kao „mi” i koji priznaju superiornost „našeg načina života”.

Neznanje rađa strah. Valjda po nekoj svojoj prirodi, ljudi se plaše nepoznatog. I to nas dovodi do ozbiljnog problema, do „moći košmara” koja vlada današnjim društvima ušančenim u iluziji sveznanja.

i.e. simplified pictures of the world with simple utopian solutions for complex problems. That is why such interpretations of faith, politics and reality triumph. Today, people listen to and consume only what is superficial, what they can understand without much effort.

## Ignorance of the Other

**a**lthough it would take too long to describe all the manifestations of contemporary *jāhiliyyah* and its consequences not only for Muslim societies, but also for the future of humanity, one more of its manifestations is important to note. Namely, the so-called modern man lives another special type of *jāhiliyyah* in which he not only knows nothing about the Other and the different, but, due to his absurd arrogance, does not want to know. He is convinced that he himself is the measure of everything. Perhaps in ancient times, people did not have the opportunity to meet other peoples and civilizations. A man could be born and die without leaving his village or town. With the exception of merchants and pilgrims, who were a privileged elite, few were given the opportunity to interact with different nations and civilizations over the centuries.

It was a time of racism and colonizing consciousness. Racism was suppressed, if anything, due to the development of genetics as a science, but it was replaced by civilizationism, an ideology based on exclusionary practices and discrimination against less valuable, if not individuals, and their cultures, religions and civilizations. This new racism rests precisely on the arrogant *jāhiliyyah*. These racists blindly believe in their own superiority and do not want to learn about the Other, let alone accommodate them. While this arrogant Eurocentricity and Western-centricity could be understood in the past, understanding does not mean justifying it, because multi-confessional and multi-ethnic societies, especially in Western Europe, were a real rarity. In addition, the moral and ethical justification for colonialism had to rest on the civilizationism of the time, which did not recognize that civilizations or civilized people existed outside of Western Europe.

Today, in a globalized world, the experience of the Other and the different is available to anyone who wants to go beyond stereotypes and create their own experiences. But that desire is less and less. Especially among young people. A complicated world is easier to be understood through prejudices and long-established stereotypes. Curiosity and the desire for knowledge are no longer a virtue. Today, everyone has the feeling that they know everything and that it is only a matter of how to convince as many people as possible of their own attitude and vision of the world. They are only tolerant of those who are like “us” and who recognize the superiority of “our way of life”.

Ignorance breeds fear. I guess by nature, people are afraid of the unknown. That brings us to a serious problem, brings us to the “power of nightmares” that rules today’s societies ensnared in the illusion of omniscience.





ILUSTRACIJA ~ Propagandna fotografija ISIL-a.



ILLUSTRATION - Propaganda photo of ISIL.

## Muslimani i savremeni *džāhilijah*

Ovogtrends i izazova nisu pošteđena ni muslimanska društva, ali sa brojnim specifičnostima i posebnostima koja proizlaze iz kulturnog, historijskog i svakog drugog naslijeđa i okolnosti u kojima se ta društva razvijaju.

Današnji „prosječni“ i „učeni“ muslimani uvjereni su u to da je doba *džāhilijah* iza njih, ali kada bi imali dovoljno intelektualne hrabrosti da sagledaju realnosti svijeta u kojem žive, shvatili bi da su se, iako ih je njihov Poslanik tako često na to upozoravao, vratili „tragovima pete svojih (*inqalabū 'alā 'aqibaihim*) u period *džāhilijah*“, koji nije više samo njihov, već globalni trend u koji su oni unijeli svoje posebnosti. Ta nova *džāhilijah ummeta* nije samo u tome da su zapostavili učenje, ne samo ono vjersko nego opću učenost, intelektualizam, žeđ za spoznajom kao takvom, što je očito na svim parametrima društvenog razvoja njihovih društava. Ta nova *džāhilijah* se ogleda u njihovoj hirovitosti, slijepoj *'ašabiyyah* i isključivošću prema svemu drugačijem, novom i stranom. Ponovo je u dijelovima *ummeta* trijumfirao tribalistički duh *džāhilijah* kojeg je islam oplemenio.

Opet su se neki muslimani vratili onom predislamskom *džāhilijah* društvenom pravilu koje je vladalo među Arapima „pomoz svome bratu kada mu se čini nasilje ali i kada je on nasilnik“. Kad smo posljednji put vidjeli da su muslimani spremni priznati svoje greške i osuditi one među njima koji čine nasilje? Ako je takvih osuda i bilo, kao što je slučaj sa osudama zločina ISIL-a, one su vrlo često za mnoge među njima, ali naravno ne za sve, bile iznuđene pritiskom svjetskih sila, strahom od posljedica i često praćene različitim relativizacijama zločina.

Tribalizacije svijesti, dominacija emotivnih i refleksnih reakcija ozbiljno prijete današnjem *ummetu*, što se odlično uklapa ali i pojačava globalnim trendom antiintelektualizma, površnosti i redukcionizma. Tek se ponekad čini da muslimani u svojim društvima vode posebnu unutrašnju borbu s ovim modernim manifestacijama *džāhilijah*.

Muslimani na provokacije reagiraju, prisjetimo se samo reakcija na karikature Poslanika, a.s., na način na koji bi reagirali predislamski Arapi – agresivno, žrtvujući sve samo kako bi sačuvali svoju umišljenju čast (tzv. *šaraf*), koja je bila imaginarni konstrukt razvijen unutar društvene dinamike plemena. Daleko je ta reakcija bila od one kojoj je Svevišnji preko Svog Poslanika podučavao u *džāhilijah* ogrezle stanovnike Arabije. U Kur'anu čitamo: *A kada ih pozoveš na pravi put oni ne čuju, vidiš ih kako u tebe zure ali oni ne vide. A ti se drži oprosta, pozivaj na dobro i kloni se nezalica (džāhila)*<sup>21</sup>.

Ustvari, Karen Armstrong ima jedno zanimljivo tumačenje ne samo pojma *džāhilijah* nego i toga što je misija poslanika Muhammeda, a.s., predstavljala i na koji je način dokinula taj mračni period u

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<sup>21</sup> Kur'an, 7:198-199.

## Muslims and contemporary *jāhiliyyah*

**m**uslim societies are not spared from this trend and challenge either, but with numerous specificities and particularities arising from cultural, historical and any other heritage and circumstances in which these societies develop.

Today's "average" and "learned" Muslims are convinced that the age of *jāhiliyyah* is behind them, but if they had enough intellectual courage to look at the realities of the world they live in, they would realize, even though their Prophet so often warned them against it, that they have returned: "with the traces of their heels" (*inqalabū 'alā 'aqibaihim*) to the *jāhiliyyah* period, which is no longer just theirs but a global trend into which they brought their peculiarities. This new *jāhiliyyah* of the *ummah* is not only in the fact that they have neglected learning, not only religious but general learning, i.e., intellectualism, the thirst for knowledge as such, which is evident in all parameters of the social development of their societies. This new *jāhiliyyah* is reflected in their capriciousness, blind *'aṣabiyyah* and exclusivity towards everything different, new and foreign. Once again, the tribalistic spirit of *jāhiliyyah* has triumphed, the *jāhiliyyah* which Islam had modified.

Again, some Muslims returned to that pre-Islamic *jāhiliyyah* social rule that prevailed among the Arabs "help your brother when violence is done to him but also when he is a violent one". When was the last time we saw Muslims willing to admit their mistakes and condemn those among them who commit violence? If there were such convictions, as is the case with the convictions of ISIL's crimes, they were very often for many of them, but of course not for all, forced by the pressure of world powers, fear of consequences and often accompanied by different relativization of the crime.

The tribalization of consciousness, the dominance of emotional and reflexive reactions seriously threatens today's *ummah*, which perfectly fits but is also reinforced by the global trend of anti-intellectualism, superficiality and reductionism. Only sometimes it seems that Muslims in their societies are fighting a special internal struggle with these modern manifestations of *jāhiliyyah*.

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historiji Arabije. U knjizi *Polja krvi, religija i historija nasilja* piše: „Muslimani tradicionalno nazivaju predislamski period *džāhilijjah*, koji se uobičajeno prevodi kao ‘vrijeme neznanja’. Ali, izvorno značenje korijena DŽ-H-L jeste ‘plahovitost’ ili ‘razdražljivost’, oštra osjetljivost na čast i prestiž, pretjerana arogancija te, iznad svega, hronična sklonost ka nasilju i osveti.”<sup>22</sup>

Muhammed, a.s., bijaše itekako svjestan obiju stvari, ugnjetavanja Mekelija i ratoborne opasnosti *džāhilijjah*.

Fundamentalna poruka Kur’ana nije bila neka nova nejasna doktrina, kao ona koja je razdirala Bizant, već prosto jedan „podsjetnik” o onome šta čini pravedno društvo a što je dovodilo u izazov strukturalno nasilje koje je nastajalo u Mekki: da je pogrešno gomilati privatno bogatstvo, a dobro dijeliti svoje bogatstvo sa siromašnim i ranjivim, prema kojima se mora odnositi pravično i s poštovanjem. Muslimani su sačinjavali *ummet*, jednu zajednicu koja je osiguravala alternativu pohlepi i sistemskoj nepravdi mekansko kapitalizma. Naposljetku će religija Muhammedovih, a.s., sljedbenika biti nazvana *islam*, jer je zahtijevala da se pojedinci predaju svojim cijelim bićem Allahu. Musliman je bio jednostavno muškarac ili žena koji bijahu učinili tu predaju. Ali, u početku nova vjera se nazivala *tazakkā*, riječju koja se može okvirno prevesti kao *pročišćenje*.<sup>23</sup> Umjesto gomilanja bogatstva i zanemarivanja teškog stanja siromašnih, muslimani su podsticani da preuzmu odgovornost jedni za druge i nahrane oskudne, čak i onda kada su sami bili gladni.<sup>24</sup> Plahovitost *džāhilijjah* zamijenili su tradicionalnom arapskom vrlinom *hilm* – popustljivost, strpljivost i blagost.<sup>25</sup>



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Dokument kojim se potvrđuje emancipacija roba ('Itq); Khurasan, maj – juni 777. Zbirka Khalili DOC II (AR14).

ILLUSTRATION ~ Document Confirming the Emancipation of a Slave ('Itq); Khurasan, May – June 777. Khalili Collections DOC II (AR14).

<sup>22</sup> R.A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs*, Cambridge, 1953, str. 83. Citirano prema: Karen Armstrong, *Polja krvi religija i historija nasilja*, Buybook, Sarajevo, 2016, str. 174.

<sup>23</sup> W. Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad at Mecca*, Oxford, 1953, str. 83. Citirano prema *ibid.*, str. 175.

<sup>24</sup> *Kur'an*, 90:13-17.

<sup>25</sup> Izutsu, *Ethico-Religious Concepts*, str. 28. Prema: Karen Armstrong, *Polja krvi religija i historija nasilja*, Buybook, Sarajevo, 2016, str. 176.

Muslims react to provocations. Let's just remember the reactions to caricatures of the Prophet, (a.s), in the way pre-Islamic Arabs would have reacted; aggressively, sacrificing everything just to preserve their presumptuous honor (so-called *sharaf*), which was an imaginary construct developed within the social dynamics of the tribe. This reaction was far from the one to which the Almighty God through His Messenger taught the inhabitants of Arabia steeped in *jāhiliyyah*. We read in the Qur'an: „And when you call them to the right path they don't hear; you see them staring at you but they don't see. You hold on to forgiveness, call for good and stay away from the ignorant (*jāhil*)“<sup>21</sup> (El-Araf 198-199.)

In fact, Karen Armstrong has an interesting interpretation not only of the concept of *jāhiliyyah*, but also of what the mission of Prophet Muhammad, (a.s.), represented and in what way it ended that dark period in the history of Arabia. In her book “Fields of Blood, Religion and the History of Violence,” she writes:

„Muslims traditionally refer to the pre-Islamic period as *jāhiliyyah*, which is loosely translated as ‘time of ignorance’. But the original meaning of the root J-H-L is ‘timidity’ or ‘irritability’, a sharp sensitivity to honor and prestige, excessive arrogance and, above all, a chronic penchant for violence and revenge.“<sup>22</sup>

Muhammad (a.s.) was well aware of both things, both the oppression and injustice of Mecca, and the warlike danger of *jāhiliyyah*.

The fundamental message of the Qur'an was not some new vague doctrine, like the one that tore apart Byzantium, but simply a “reminder” of what constitutes a just society, and which challenged the structural violence that arose in Mecca: that it is wrong to accumulate private wealth, and good to share one's wealth with the poor and vulnerable, who must be treated fairly and with respect. Muslims constituted an *ummah*, a community that provided an alternative to the greed and systemic injustice of Meccan capitalism. Eventually, the religion of Muhammad's followers is called *Islam* because it required individuals to surrender their whole being to Allah. A Muslim was simply a man or woman who had made that surrender. But, in the beginning, the new faith was called *tazakkā*, a word that can roughly be translated as *purification*.<sup>23</sup> Instead of hoarding wealth and ignoring the plight of the poor, Muslims were encouraged to take responsibility for one another and feed the needy, even when they themselves were hungry.<sup>24</sup> They replaced the timidity of *jāhiliyyah* with the traditional Arab virtue of *hilm* – leniency, patience and gentleness.<sup>25</sup>

By taking care for the vulnerable, freeing slaves, and performing small acts of kindness every day, even hourly, they believed that they would gradually acquire a trusting, merciful spirit and cleanse themselves of selfishness.

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<sup>21</sup> Qur'an, 7:198-199.

<sup>22</sup> R.A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs*, Cambridge, 1953. p. 83., quoted according to Karen Armstrong: *Polja krvi religija i historija nasilja*, Buybook, Sarajevo, 2016. p 174.

<sup>23</sup> W. Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad at Mecca*, Oxford, 1953, str.83., quoted according to IBID p 175.

<sup>24</sup> Qur'an, 90 :13 -17.

<sup>25</sup> Izutsu, *Ethico-Religious Concepts*, p. 28. quoted according to Karen Armstrong: *Polja krvi religija i historija nasilja*, Buybook, Sarajevo, 2016. p 176.

Brinući o ranjivima, oslobađajući robove i obavljajući mala djela ljubaznosti svakoga dana, pa i sata, vjerovali su da će postepeno steći pouzdan, milosrdan duh i očistiti se od sebičnosti. Za razliku od pripadnika plemena koji su uzvraćali nasilnički i na najmanju provokaciju, muslimani ne smiju uzvraćati, već osvetu prepustiti Allahu,<sup>26</sup> dosljedno se odnoseći prema svima drugima s blagošću i ljubaznošću.<sup>27</sup>

### Džahilijjah protiv džahilijjah

**b**ilo je među muslimanima onih koji su na tragovima mišljenja Sejjida Qutba<sup>28</sup> i njegovih istomišljenika počeli govoriti o tome kako su muslimanska društva druge polovine prošlog stoljeća ustvari *džahilijjska*, ali je većina njih došla samo do zaključka kako su ta društva, a samim tim i oni koji u njima žive, prestali biti vjernici jer ne sude po „Božijim zakonima”.

Mnogi od onih koji su se borili protiv *džāhilijjah* ideologije nisu vidjeli da su ustvari zagovarali da jednu ideologiju zamijene drugom. U jeku ideološke borbe Istoka i Zapada, komunizma i kapitalizma, oni su od islama hjeli napraviti tek treću ideologiju sa svim negativnostima koje se vežu za ideologije. Borili su se za slobodu ljudi protiv navodne tiranije ne vidjevši da su i sami postajali tirani. Govorili su da ljudi ne trebaju služiti jedni drugima, da ne vladaju ljudi nad ljudima nego da njima vlada njihov Stvoritelj. Ali kada su se upuštali u realizaciju te svoje ideologije, onda su oni sami sebe proglašavali „advokatima Božijim na zemlji”. Oni su ljudima tumačili šta Bog od njih traži i nisu se libili koristiti silu kako bi ih vratili u „okrilje Božije milosti”.

Iako su javno zagovarali i branili teokratiju, ustvari su nudili klerokratiju i ne samo u smislu nekog imaginarnog sveštenstva kao nikada definiranog kruga ljudi s jasnim članstvom, nego puku vladavinu onih koji sebe uvjere da djeluju u ime Boga. Obično među njima nije bilo mjesta za tradicionalnu *'ulamā'* koju su optuživali da je izdala principe islama, da nije dovoljno aktivna i odlučna u nametanju islamskih vrijednosti. Oni su pod krinkom borbe protiv *džāhilijjah* muslimanski svijet gurnuli u još veći *džāhilijjah*.

Danas, kada se svijet suočava s novim manifestacijama *džāhilijjah*, znanje, spoznaja i učenost mogu, kao i toliko puta kroz historiju čovječanstva, biti jedini put ka izlazu, ali je prvi korak na putu stjecanja znanja spoznaja vlastitog neznanja.

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<sup>26</sup> *Kur'an*, 14:47, 39: 37, 15:79, 30:47, 44:16.

<sup>27</sup> *Kur'an*, 25:63.

<sup>28</sup> Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) bio je egipatski pisac, pedagog, islamski učenjak, teoretičar, revolucionar, pjesnik i vodeći član egipatskog Muslimanskog bratstva 1950-ih i 1960-ih. Godine 1966. osuđen je za planiranje atentata na egipatskog predsjednika Gamala Abdel Namera i pogubljen vješanjem. Smatra se „ocem selefijskog džihadizma”, vjersko-političke doktrine koja podupire ideološke korijene globalnih džihadističkih organizacija kao što su Al-Qā'idah i ISIL.

Unlike the tribesmen who retaliated violently at the slightest provocation, Muslims must not retaliate, but leave revenge to Allah<sup>26</sup>, consistently treating all others with gentleness and kindness.<sup>27</sup>

### Using *jāhiliyyah* against *jāhiliyyah*

Among the Muslims, there were those who, following the ideas of Sayyid Qutb<sup>28</sup> and his like-minded people, began to talk about how the Muslim societies of the second half of the last century were actually *jāhiliyyah*, but most of them only came to the conclusion that these societies and, therefore, those who live in them have ceased to be believers because they do not judge by “God’s laws”.

Many of those who fought against *jāhiliyyah* ideology did not see that they were actually advocating to replace one ideology with another. In the midst of the ideological struggle between East and West, communism and capitalism, they wanted to make Islam only a third ideology with all the negativity associated with ideologies. They fought for people’s freedom against alleged tyranny without seeing that they were becoming tyrants themselves. They said that people should not serve each other, that people should not rule over people, but that they should be ruled by their Creator. But when they embarked on the realization of their ideology, then they proclaimed themselves “lawyers of God on earth”. They explained to people what God was asking of them and did not hesitate to use force to bring them back to the “arms of God’s grace”.

Although they publicly advocated and defended theocracy, they actually offered clericalism and not only in the sense of some imaginary priesthood as a never-defined circle of people with clear membership, but the mere rule of those who convince themselves that they act in the name of God. Usually, there was no place among them for the traditional ‘*ulamā*’, who were accused of betraying the principles of Islam, of not being active and decisive enough in imposing Islamic values. Under the guise of fighting *jāhiliyyah*, they pushed the Muslim world into even greater *jāhiliyyah*.

Today, when the world is facing new manifestations of *jāhiliyyah*, knowledge, cognition and learning can, as so many times throughout the history of mankind, be the only way out, but the first step on the path to knowledge is the realization of one’s own ignorance.

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<sup>26</sup> *Qur`an*: 14:47, 39: 37, 15:79, 30:47, 44:16

<sup>27</sup> *Qur`an*: 25:63.

<sup>28</sup> Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) was an Egyptian author, educator, Islamic scholar, theorist, revolutionary, poet, and a leading member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1966, he was convicted of plotting the assassination of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and was executed by hanging. He is considered as “the Father of Salafi jihadism”, the religio-political doctrine that underpins the ideological roots of global jihadist organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIL.




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ILLUSTRATION - Émile Deckers, *Portraits of three members of the traditional 'ulamā'*. Algeria, 1959.  
ILUSTRACIJA - Émile Deckers, *Portreti trojice pripadnika tradicionalne ulame*. Alžir, 1959.



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**VODA I ČOVJEK: „DOBRE VODE“ KOD FOČE**

**WATER AND MAN: „GOOD WATERS“ NEAR FOČA**



## Sažetak

Kompleks „DOBRE VODE“ („GOOD WATERS“) je lociran u općini Foča (geografske koordinate: 43°35'12.91"N, 18°39'34.56"E, elevation: 1043). Od Foče je udaljen oko 13 km, od Goražda oko 28 km, a od Sarajeva oko 40 km (zračnim linijama). Najbliža sela ovom lokalitetu su Kolun i Zarudine.

Tema 'VODA' je u velikom kapacitetu prisutna u svakodnevnom životu ljudi u Bosni i Hercegovini. Posebno je specifično njeno značenje u 'filozofsko-religijskom smislu' gdje ima sveto-simboličko značenje, kao 'izvor života'. U ovom radu je predstavljeno jedno geografsko područje – 'Dovište Dobre Vode', sa statusom 'svetog mjesta'.

Cilj ovog rada je promocija značenja i uloge vode u svakodnevnom životu ljudi, ali i kao temeljnog resursa za život na planeti Zemlji.

Teme je elaborirana prema znanstvenoj metodologiji koja je obrađena u autorovoj knjizi: Hadrovic, A. (2007). *Defining Architectural Space on the Model of the Oriental Style CityHouse in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia*, Booksurge, LLC, North Charleston, SC, USA.

**Ključne riječi:** Foča, Dobre vode, održivost.

## Abstract

The 'DOBRE VODE' ('GOOD WATERS') complex is located in the municipality of Foca (Geographical coordinates: 43°35'12.91"N, 18°39'34.56"E, elevation: 1043). It is about 13 km from Foča, about 28 km from Goražde, and about 40 km from Sarajevo (by air). The nearest villages to this locality are Kolun and Zarudine.

The theme 'WATER' is present in a large capacity in the daily life of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its meaning in the 'philosophical-religious sense' is particularly specific, where it has a sacred-symbolic meaning, as the 'source of life'. In this paper, one geographical area is presented – 'Place of outdoor prayer Dobre Vode' ('Dovište Dobre Vode'), with the status of 'sacred place'.

The aim of this paper is to promote the meaning and role of water in people's daily lives, but also as a fundamental resource for life on planet Earth.

The topics are elaborated according to the scientific methodology that is covered in the author's book: Hadrovic, A. (2007). *Defining Architectural Space on the Model of the Oriental Style CityHouse in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia*, Booksurge, LLC, North Charleston, SC, USA.

**Key words:** *Foča, Good waters ('Dobre vode'), sustainability.*

## VODA I ČOVJEK: „DOBRE VODE“ KOD FOČE

### Uvod

**K**ompleks „DOBRE VODE“ („GOOD WATERS“) je lociran u općini Foča (geografske kordinate: 43°35'12.91"N, 18°39'34.56"E, nadmorska visina: 1043). Od Foče je udaljen oko 13 km, od Goražda oko 28 km, a od Sarajeva oko 40 km (zračnim linijama). Najbliža sela ovom lokalitetu su Zarudine, Kolun i Potkolun (ilustracija 1). U Kolunu je 1991. godine živjelo 178 stanovnika, a 2013. godine svega 20 (što je rezultat rata 1992-1995) [1, 2].



ILUSTRACIJA 1 ~ Komplex „DOBRE VODE“ („GOOD WATERS“). Lokacija.

Izvor: [https://visitmycountry.net/bosnia\\_herzegovina/bh/index.php/turizam/27-vmc/geografija](https://visitmycountry.net/bosnia_herzegovina/bh/index.php/turizam/27-vmc/geografija), pristupljeno: 8.1.2022., lijevo; Google Earth, pristupljeno: 8.1.2022., desno.

Autor se u ovom radu bavi temom 'održivosti'. U tom smislu je obišao cijeli prostor Bosne i Hercegovine i prikupio bogatu građu koju je dobrim dijelom ugradio u svoje knjige [3, 4] i znanstvene radove.

Bosna i Hercegovina je krajnje kompleksan prostor u pogledu prirodnog i društvenog okruženja te njezinog stanovništva. Ovdje žive tri najbrojnije etničke skupine (Bošnjaci, Srbi i Hrvati), a zahvaljujući svojoj bogatoj historiji, i brojni ljudi različitog porijekla: Židovi, Nijemci, Poljaci, Česi, Italijani, Mađari... Sastav stanovništva se vremenom mijenjao, ali su ostali materijalni i duhovni

## WATER AND MAN: „GOOD WATERS“ NEAR Foča

### Introduction

The 'DOBRE VODE' ('GOOD WATERS') complex is located in the municipality of Foča (Geographical coordinates: 43°35'12.91"N, 18°39'34.56"E, elevation: 1043). It is about 13 km from Foča, about 28 km from Goražde, and about 40 km from Sarajevo (by air). The nearest villages to this locality are Zarudine, Kolun and Potkolun (figure 1). In 1991, 178 inhabitants lived in Kolun, and in 2013, only 20 (as a result of the 1992-1995 war) [1, 2].



FIGURE 1 ~ *The 'DOBRE VODE' ('GOOD WATERS') complex. Location.*

In this paper, the author deals with the topic of 'sustainability'. In this sense, he visited the entire area of Bosnia and Herzegovina and collected rich material, which he incorporated for the most part into his books [3,4] and scientific works.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is an extremely complex area in terms of the natural and social environment and its population. The three most numerous ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats) live here, and thanks to its rich history, numerous people of different origins: Jews, Germans, Poles, Czechs, Italians, Hungarians... The composition



tragovi njihovog života na prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine. Kompleksnost Bosne i Hercegovine vidljiva je i u njenoj arhitekturi. Otuda je za elaboriranje teme održivosti (u ovom radu na primjeru lokaliteta 'DOBRE VODE' („GOOD WATERS“) kod Foče) bila najpogodnija znanstvena metodologija [5] koja je obrađena u njegovoj knjizi: Hadrovic, A. (2007). *Defining Architectural Space on the Model of the Oriental Style CityHouse in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia*, Booksurge, LLC, North Charleston, SC, USA.

Cilj ovog rada je predstavljanje jednog izuzetnog geografskog prostora koji ilustrira odnos čovjeka prema prirodnom okruženju i njegovom duhovnom nasljeđu koje je iskazano naročitim fizičkim strukturama: otvorenim molitvenim prostorom ('*musalla*'), mauzolejem ('*turbe*') i par posebno pobožnih ljudi ('*dervişi*'), te kompleksom javnih fontana ('*çeşme*'), na jednom mjestu i duž puta Grebak-'Dobre Vode'.

Lokalitet 'Dobre Vode' je situiran u istočnom dijelu Bosne i Hercegovine, u rejonu sela Zarudina i Kolun. Slično nekim drugim lokalitetima u Bosni i Hercegovini koji su bogati vodom (Bjeljevine kod Rudog, Svetinja kod Čave [općina Bužim u Bosanskoj Krajini], Djevojačka pećina u Brateljevićima kod Kladnja...) i na lokalitetu 'Dobre Vode' se sveke godine (tradicionalno 'prvi utorak poslije Jurjeva') održava masovni narodni skup i kolektivna molitva (*dova*), kao znak ljudske zahvalnosti Bogu na daru-vodi koji je osnova života.



Šire određenje lokaliteta 'DOBRE VODE' kod Foče. Izvor: Google Earth, pristupljeno: 10.10.2022.  
Wider definition of the 'GOOD WATER' site near Foča. Source: Google Earth, accessed: 10.10.2022.

of the population changed over time, but remained material and spiritual traces of their life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The complexity of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also visible in its architecture. Hence, for elaborating on the topic of sustainability (in this paper, using the example of the site 'GOOD WATERS' near Foča) the most suitable scientific methodology [5] was the most suitable, which is covered in his book: Hadrovic, A. (2007). Defining Architectural Space on the Model of the Oriental Style CityHouse in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia, Booksurge, LLC, North Charleston, SC, USA.

The aim of this work is to present an exceptional geographical space that illustrates the relationship of man to the natural environment and his spiritual heritage, which is expressed by special physical structures: an open prayer space (tur. 'musalla'), a mausoleum (tur. 'türbe') and a couple of particularly pious people (tur. 'dervişes'). ) and a complex of public fountains (tur. 'çeşme'), in one place and along the Grebak-'Dobre Vode' road.

The 'Dobre Vode' locality is situated in the eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the region of the villages of Zarudina and Kolun. Similar to some other localities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are rich in water (Bjeljevine near Rudo, Svetinja near Čava [municipality of Bužim in Bosnian Krajina], Djevojačka pecina [The Girl's cave] in Brateljevići near Kladanj...) and in the locality 'Dobre Vode' every year (traditionally 'the first Tuesday after George') holds a mass public meeting and collective prayer (tur. *dua*), as a sign of human gratitude to God for the gift of water, which is the basis of life.



*Closer determination of the 'GOOD WATER' site near Foča. Source: Google Earth, accessed: 10.10.2022.  
Blíže određenje lokaliteta 'DOBRE VODE' kod Foče. Izvor: Google Earth, pristupljeno: 10.10.2022.*

## 1. Životno okruženje

Pod 'okruženjem' podrazumijevamo svaku mogućnost u prostoru u kojoj čovjek može ostvariti svoje postojanje [4].

### 1.1. Prirodno okruženje

Pod 'prirodnim okolišem' podrazumijevamo sve one značajke koje je priroda dala, a na koje čovjek (uglavnom) nije ostvario svoj utjecaj: geografski položaj, geomorfologiju, vodotoke i akumulacije, biljni i životinjski svijet, raspoloživo tlo, klimu [4] ...

Najvažniji prirodni resursi lokaliteta „Dobre Vode“ jesu: voda, šume, obradive njive i livade te šašnjaci. Šume su bogate 'šumskim plodovima' (divlje voće, borovnice, gljive...).

Uz makadamski put Grebak-'Dobre Vode' nailazimo na veći broj javnih fontana ('hair-česama'), koje se, sve bez izuzetka, odlikuju vrlo izdašnim tokom i pitkom vodom. Na svakoj je česmi vidljivo nastojanje da se ona, ma kolika bila, uradi u kamenu, zanatski savršeno, i s ciljem da traje vječno. Ove česme su najbolji mogući putokazi na putu do svetog mjesta – 'Dovišta Dobre Vode' (ilustracije 2-8).



ILUSTRACIJA 2 - Javna česma, Grebak, (na raskrnicu puta Trnovo-Grebak-Goražde i Dobre Vode). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)  
FIGURE 2 ~ Public fountain, Grebak, (at the intersection of the Trnovo-Grebak-Goražde and 'Dobre Vode' roads). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)



## 1. Environment

**b**y 'environment' we mean every possibility in the space in which man can realize his existence [4].

### 1.1. *Natural environment*

By 'natural environment', we mean all those features that nature gave, and on which man (mostly) did not exert his influence: geographical location, geomorphology, watercourses and reservoirs, plant and animal life, available soil, climate [4] ...

The most important natural resources of the locality 'Dobre Vode' ('Good Waters') are: water, forests, arable fields and meadows, and sedge groves. The forests are rich in 'forest fruits' (wild fruits, blueberries, mushrooms...).

Along the gravel road Grebak-'Dobre Vode' we come across a large number of public fountains ('hair-çeşme'), which, without exception, are characterized by a very generous flow and drinking water. Every fountain shows the effort to make it, no matter how big, in stone, with perfect craftsmanship, and with the goal of lasting forever. These fountains are the best possible signposts on the way to the holy place – 'Dovišta Dobre Voda' ('The venue for the Good Water prayer'), (figures 2-8).



FIGURE 3 ~ *Public fountain* (along the Grebak-'Dobre Vode' road). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

ILUSTRACIJA 3 ~ *Javna česma* (uz put Grebak-Dobre Vode). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)



Svaka česma je uklopljena u prirodni ambijent, i predstavlja pogodno mjesto za odmor (pa čak i duže izlete u prirodi). U većini slučajeva, natpisi na česmama su kratki, krajnje sublimirani i bez nastojanja saopštavanja 'velikoh mudrosti i poruka'.

Na dvije česme zatičemo natpis (ilustracija 4):

HAIR ČESMA  
HILMO ČOKO  
SA PORODICOM



ILUSTRACIJA 4 - *Hair-česma*, (uz put Grebak-Dobre Vode). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

FIGURE 4 - *Hair fountain*, (along the Grebak-'Dobre Vode' road). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

Jedna od česama je situirana na finoj, relativno prostranoj zaravni uz put Grebak-'Dobre Vode'. Kako je uz česmu sada urađen prostor za odmor (stol i klupe od masivne drvene građe), očekivati je da će ovdje, u dogledno vrijeme, biti izgrađen i veći i fizički postojaniji objekat.

I na ovoj česmi je ispisan krajnje sublimiran natpis (ilustracija 5):

HAIR ČESMA  
PORODICE DUDO  
PAŠO  
HASAN  
DŽAFER I AHMO

Each fountain is integrated into the natural environment, and represents a suitable place for rest (and even longer excursions in nature). In most cases, the inscriptions on the fountains are short, highly sublimated and without any attempt to communicate 'great wisdom and messages'.

On two fountains we find an inscription (figure 4):

**HAIR FOUNTAIN**  
**HILMO ČOKO**  
**WITH THE FAMILY**



FIGURE 4 - *Hair fountain*, (along the Grebak-'Dobre Vode' road). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

ILUSTRACIJA 4 - *Hair-česma*, (uz put Grebak-Dobre Vode). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

One of the fountains is situated on a fine, relatively spacious plain along the Grebak-'Dobre Vode' road. As a rest area has now been built next to the fountain (table and benches made of solid wood), it is expected that a larger and more physically stable facility will be built here in due course. This fountain also has an extremely sublimated inscription (figure 5):

**HAIR FOUNTAIN**  
**THE DUDO FAMILY**  
**PAŠO**  
**HASSAN**  
**JAFER AND AHMO**





ILUSTRACIJA 5 ~ *Hair-česma*, (uz put Grebak-Dobre Vode). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

FIGURE 5 ~ *Hair fountain*, (along the Grebak-'Dobre Vode' road). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)



ILUSTRACIJA 6 ~ *Hair-česma*, (uz put Grebak-Dobre Vode). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

FIGURE 6 ~ *Hair fountain*, (along the Grebak-'Dobre Vode' road). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)





FIGURE 5 - *Hair fountain*, (along the Grebak-'Dobre Vode' road). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

ILUSTRACIJA 5 - *Hair-česma*, (uz put Grebak-Dobre Vode). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)



FIGURE 6 - *Hair fountain*, (along the Grebak-'Dobre Vode' road). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

ILUSTRACIJA 6 - *Hair-česma*, (uz put Grebak-Dobre Vode). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)



Jedna od mnogih hair-voda na lokalitetu 'Dobre Vode' podignuta je u spomen svih umrlih i poginulih mještana lokalnog sela Zarudina.

Česma je rađena od fino klesanog kamena-krečnjaka sa vidnim nastojanjem da bude i lijepa i trajna. U bijeloj mermernoj ploči uklesan je natpis (ilustracija 7):

الفاطحة

HAIR ČESMA

NEKA OVOM VODOM TEKU SEVAPI  
PRED DUŠE SVIH UMRLIH I POGINULIH  
MJEŠTANA SELA ZARUDINA

2008.



ILUSTRACIJA 7 ~ Hair-česma, Dobre Vode (u blizini turbeta). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

FIGURE 7 ~ Hair fountain, 'Dobre Vode' (near the mausoleum – turbe). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

U neposrednoj blizini centralnog kompleksa Dobre Vode, diskretno uz pristupni put, u istom stilu gradnje kao što su građeni objekti kompleksa Dobre Vode, stoji hair-česma čiji je natpis mentalno veže za kompleks 'Dobre Vode' (ilustracija 8):

NEKA SA OVOM ILADŽ VODOM  
TEKU SEVAPI PRED DUŠU

One of the many hair-waters in the locality 'Dobre Vode' was built in memory of all the dead and fallen residents of the local village of Zarudina.

The fountain is made of finely carved limestone with a visible effort to be both beautiful and durable. An inscription is carved into the white marble slab (figure 7):

الفاطحة  
HAIR FOUNTAIN  
LET SEVAPI FLOW THROUGH THIS WATER  
BEFORE THE SOULS OF ALL THE DEAD AND PERISHED  
LOCAL VILLAGES OF ZARUDINA  
in 2008



FIGURE 7 - *Hair fountain, 'Dobre Vode'* (near the mausoleum - turbe). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

ILUSTRACIJA 7 - *Hair-česma, Dobre Vode* (u blizini turbeta). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

In the immediate vicinity of the central Dobre Vode complex, discreetly by the access road, in the same construction style as the buildings of the Dobre Vode complex, there is a hair-fountain whose inscription is mentally linked to the 'Dobre Vode' complex (figure 8):

LET IT BE WITH THIS ILADJ WATER  
SWAPIS FLOW IN FRONT OF THE SOUL



RAHMETLI MUNIBE HANUME

1922.-1997.

SA TIM NIJETOM,

UZ BOŽIJE ODOBRENJE,

OBNOVI OVU HAJR ČESMU

SIN MUNIBE HANUME

2007. godine

U neposrednoj blizini ove hair-česme, stoji fino uređeni informacijski pano čiji dizajn i materijalizacija nemaju nikakve veze sa hair-česmom, ali se i pano i tekst ispisan na njemu mogu dojmiti kao nečiji 'oficijelni' stavovi:

**KASIMOVO VRELO**

- LJEKOVITA VODA ZA OČI -

Obavezno posjetiti Kasimovo vrelo-ljekovitu vodu za oči,  
Ili prije ili poslije proučene dove.

Voda sa ovog izvora preporučuje se svima, a posebno onima  
Koji imaju poteškoća sa vidom. Prilikom ispiranja očiju leđa okrenuti prema česmi, rukama  
ispruženim prema česmi zahvatiti vode i isprati oči,  
A sve radnje raditi po tri puta.

Po završetku aktivnosti ne ostavljati otpatke bilo koje vrste u blizini vrela.



ILUSTRACIJA 8 - Hair-voda, Dobre Vode. Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

RAHMETLI MUNIBA HANUMA  
1922-1997  
WITH THAT NOTHING,  
WITH GOD'S APPROVAL,  
RENEW THIS HAIR FOUNTAIN  
SON OF MUNIBA HANUMA  
in 2007

In the immediate vicinity of this hair-fountain, there is a finely arranged information board whose design and materialization have nothing to do with the hair-fountain, but both the board and the text written on it seem like someone's 'official' views:

**KASIM'S SPRING**  
**- MEDICATING EYE WATER -**

You must visit Kasim's hot medicinal water for the eyes,  
Either before or after the recited prayer.

Water from this source is recommended to everyone, especially those  
Who have vision problems. When washing your eyes, turn your back to the fountain,  
reach the water with your hands outstretched towards the fountain and wash your eyes,  
And do all actions three times. At the end of the activity, do not leave waste of any kind near the spring.



FIGURE 7 ~ *Hair-water*, 'Dobre Vode'. Source: Author (5.8.2011.)



## 1.2. Društveno okruženje

Pod 'društvenim okruženjem' podrazumijevamo sve ono što je čovjek kreirao i što ga odvaja od svijeta ostalih živih bića [4]. Uključuje i fizičke strukture (razne materijalne, više ili manje uređene produkte njihove djelatnosti) i nematerijalni svijet koji spoznajemo intelektom (znanost, filozofija, religija, pravo, moral) kroz uređeni sistem apstraktnih simbola (pismo, znakovi) [4].

**Historija lokaliteta Dobre vode.** Na uskom brdovitom području udaljenom tek nekoliko stotina metara jedno od drugog u Zarudini nalaze se tri bitne znamenitosti: turbe šejha Murata i šejha Saliha te dva ljekovita izvora: 'Dobre Vode' i 'Kasimovo vrelo', oko kojih se muslimani Foče, Goražda, Ustikoline i okolnih krajeva svake godine okupljaju i neprestano im se vraćaju tragajući za Božijim bereketom, zdravljem i napretkom u životu. Prema tradiciji, Zarudina se pohodi tri puta. U utorak prije Jurjeva na 'Boni utorak' sami ili s njegovateljima, pješice ili jašući, dolazili su bolesnici, ali i zdrave osobe koje su željele sačuvati zdravlje. Kada bi naišli pokraj turbeta uvaženih šejhova, poselamili bi ih, proučili Fatihu, darovali dobrovoljni prilog, a zatim bi nastavljali prema izvoru 'Dobre Vode' gdje bi pristupili obredu iscjeljenja koji se sastojao od umivanja i kupanja vodom iz izvora. Za tu namjenu ispred izvora su bila napravljena, a danas su obnovljena, dva kupatila (hamami), po jedno za žene i muškarce. Oni hrabriji i zdraviji kupali bi se hladnom izvorskom vodom, dok bi se za osobe narušenog zdravlja pored vrela ložile vatre i u velikim ibricima grijala voda kojom bi se kupali. Svi koji su se namjeravali okupati na 'Boni utorak' donosili bi sa sobom peškire i novu odjeću koju bi oblačili dok bi odjeću u kojoj su došli i koja je prekrivala bolesno tijelo, zajedno sa korištenim peškirim bacali, odbacujući na taj način od sebe i samu bolest. Nakon toga, ko je imao problema s vidom odlazio bi na 'Kasimovo vrelo' smješteno nedaleko od 'Dobre Vode' i tu bi tri puta potirao bolne oči čime se obred iscjeljenja završavao.

**Arhitektonsko kulturno-historijsko nasljeđe lokaliteta Dobre vode.** Glavna svečanost na 'Dovištu Dobre Vode' organizuje se u vrijeme drugog pohoda Zarudini u prvi utorak poslije Jurjeva. Ove 2017. godine svečanost je bila u utorak 09. maja. U organizaciji džemata Mrežice i Medžlisa IZ Foča, a pod pokroviteljstvom Muftijstva goraždanskog, na dovištu se okupilo nekoliko stotina vjernika koje ni kiša ni hladno vrijeme nije spriječilo da ne dođu njegujući na taj način drevnu tradiciju i običaj. A običaji su se danas u pojedinim segmentima izmijenili. Većina vjernika danas dolazi autobusima ili ličnim automobilima koje najčešće parkiraju na Turjaku, proplanku iznad dovišta, od kojeg jedan put vodi ka izvoru 'Dobre Vode', a drugi ka turbetu, tako da se dešava da oni koji odu putem ka 'Dobrim Vodama' uopće ne posjećuju turbe. Rijetko danas bolesnici dolaze na 'Boni utorak'. Iako su pored izvora 'Dobre Vode' sagrađena dva moderna kupatila, danas se rijetko ko kupava. Umjesto toga posjetioci najčešće svojim kućama odnose kanistere i plastične flaše pune vode iz oba izvora - 'Dobre Vode' i 'Kasimovog vrela'. Na pitanje šta čine s tom vodom odgovorili su nam da je koriste u momentima ako i kada se oni

## 1.2. *Social environment*

By 'social environment' we mean everything that man has created and that separates him from the world of other living beings [4]. It includes both physical structures (various material, more or less ordered products of their activity) and the immaterial world that we know with the intellect (science, philosophy, religion, law, morality) through an ordered system of abstract symbols (letters, signs) [4].

**History of the 'Dobre vode'** ('Good Waters') locality. On a narrow hilly area only a few hundred meters from each other in Zarudina, there are three important landmarks: the turbes of Šeih Murat and Šeih Salih and two healing springs: 'Good Waters' ('Dobre Vode') and 'Kasim's spring' ('Kasimovo vrelo'), around which the Muslims of Foča, Goražde, Ustikoline and the surrounding regions gather every year and constantly return to them in search of God's blessing, health and progress in life. According to tradition, Zarudina is visited three times. On the Tuesday before St. George's Day, sick people, as well as healthy people who wanted to preserve their health, came to 'Good Tuesday' alone or with caregivers, on foot or on horseback. When they came across the turbets of respected sheikhs, they would greet them, recite the Fatiha, give a voluntary donation, and then proceed to the source of 'Good Waters' where they would begin the healing ritual, which consisted of washing and bathing with water from the spring. For this purpose, two baths (tur. 'hamam'), one for women and one for men, were built in front of the spring, and today they have been renovated. The braver and healthier ones would bathe in cold spring water, while for people with impaired health, fires would be lit next to the spring and the water used to bathe would be heated in large tubs. Everyone who intended to take a bath on 'Boni Tuesday' would bring towels and new clothes to wear, while the clothes they came in and which covered the sick body, together with the used towels, would be thrown away, thereby rejecting themselves and themselves. disease. After that, anyone who had vision problems would go to the 'Kasim's spring' ('Kasimovo vrelo'), located not far from 'Good Waters' ('Dobre Vode'), and there he would rub his sore eyes three times, ending the healing ritual.

**The architectural, cultural and historical heritage of the 'Good Waters'** ('Dobre vode') locality. The main ceremony at The 'Place of outdoor prayer Good Waters' ('Dovište Dobre Vode') is organized during the second Zarudina campaign on the first Tuesday after St. George. In 2017, the ceremony was held on Tuesday, May 9. Organized by the congregation (tur. 'cemaat') of Mrezica and Foča Majlis, and under the auspices of the Mufti of Goražda, this year several hundreds of believers gathered at the 'Place of outdoor prayer' ('Dovište'), and neither the rain nor the cold weather prevented them from coming to cherish the ancient tradition and custom. And today's customs have changed in certain segments. Today, the majority of believers come by bus or private car, which most often park on Turjak, a glade above the dovišt, from which one road leads to the 'Good Waters' ('Dobre Vode') source, and the other to the mausoleum (tur. 'türbe'), so it happens that those who go on the road to 'Dobre Vode' at all they don't visit mobs. Nowadays, patients rarely come to 'Boni Tuesday'. Although two modern baths were built next to the source of 'Dobre Voda', nowadays hardly anyone bathes. Instead, visitors usually take canisters and plastic bottles

ili njihovi ukućani razbole. Kada smo jednog od njih upitali: Da li voda pomaže bolesnim? odgovorio je: „Samo Dragi Bog pomaže.“

Ranije su vjernici Zarudinu posjećivali i u drugi utorak iza Jurjeva, što bi bio treći pohod, ali takva praksa se u današnje vrijeme nije održala.

Dva mjeseca nakon 7. jula Zarudinu, su posjećivali pravoslavci iz okolnih mjesta. Poput muslimana i oni bi obišli turbe koje su izdašno darivali, a potom i izvore 'Dobre Vode' i 'Kasimovo vrelo' nakon čega bi se okupljali na 'Lopatama' gdje su taj dan teferičili. Zajedno s njima teferičili su i muslimani.

## 2. Čovjek

**P**rostor dobiva smisao samo onda ako stoji u nekom odnosu prema čovjeku. Taj se odnos kreće od relacija već saznatih dimenzija prostora, preko onih koje se naslućuju, pa do onih koje su trenutno van domašaja ljudske imaginacije. Pojam 'čovjek' ogromno je pitanje čiju bit on sam pokušava dešifrirati u svojim granicama, u granicama Zemlje i granica Svemira [5]. Zajedno s ostalim živim svijetom sudjeluje u procesu kruženja materije i energije u prirodi, dijeleći s njom istu sudbinu, rađajući se i umirući protiv njezine volje. Obdaren razumom, voljom i osjećajima, on jedini u živom svijetu može otkriti zadane zakone ustrojstva prirode.

Na geografskom prostoru 'Dobre Vode', uz izdašne izvore pitke vode, čovjek je njegov najveći resurs. Interesantno je da su dvojica izuzetnih ljudi, Šeh-Murat (oko 1737) i njegovog sin Šeh-Salih, svojim izuzetnim ljudskim kvalitetama ostali u memoriji ljudi ovog kraja sve do danas. Njihovi grobovi (u turbetu) skoro tri stoljeća privlače ljudi da obnove svoju duhovnu energiju.

## 3. Granice: arhitektura kao životni okvir

**G**ranice su ona mjesta u okruženju na kojima zatečena stanja bivaju kontrolirana prema sasvim konkretnim čovjekovim potrebama. Stanja su sve one otkrivene i neotkrivene pojave u prostoru koje na čovjeka djeluju stimulirajuće ili degradirajuće. Granice, stoga, imaju zadaću da omoguće selekciju utjecaja. U arhitektonskom smislu one ograđuju, ali i uključuju čovjeka u stanja određenog okruženja [5].

Da li zbog vode ili iz nekih drugih razloga,<sup>1</sup> na lokalitetu 'Dobre Vode' se od perioda uprave

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<sup>1</sup> Tekija u Blagaju je podignuta na samom vrelu rijeke Bune, a prvu tekiju u Bosni (u Sarajevu) podigao je njegov utemeljitelj Isa-beg Ishaković (1462).

full of water from both sources – 'Dobre Vode' ('Good Waters') and 'Kasimovo vrelo' ('Kasim's Spring') to their homes. When asked what they do with that water, they answered that they use it in moments if and when they or their family members get sick. When we asked one of them: Does water help the sick? he answered: "Only Dear God helps".

Earlier, the faithful visited Zarudin on the second Tuesday after the St. George's Day (Jurjev), which would have been the third pilgrimage, but such a practice has not been maintained nowadays.

Two months after July 7, Zarudin was visited by Orthodox people from the surrounding towns. Like the Muslims, they would also visit the turbans, which they generously gave away, and then the springs of 'Dobre Voda' and 'Kasimovo vrelo', after which they would gather at 'Lopata', where they celebrated that day. Together with them, the Muslims also marched.

## 2. Man

**S**pace acquires meaning only if it stands in some relation to man. This relationship ranges from the relations of the already known dimensions of space, through those that can be sensed, to those that are currently beyond the reach of human imagination. The term 'man' is a huge question, the essence of which he himself tries to decipher within his own limits, within the limits of the Earth and the limits of the Universe [5]. Together with the rest of the living world, it participates in the process of circulation of matter and energy in nature, sharing the same fate with it, being born and dying against its will. Endowed with reason, will and feelings, he is the only one in the living world who can discover the given laws of the organization of nature.

In the geographical 'Good Waters' ('Dobre Vode') area, along with generous sources of drinking water, man is its greatest resource. It is interesting that two exceptional people, Šeih-Murat (circa 1737) and his son Šeih-Salih, remained in the memory of the people of this region until today with their exceptional human qualities. Their graves (in turbet) have been attracting people to renew their spiritual energy for almost three centuries.

## 3. Boundaries: architecture as a framework of life

**b**oundaries are those places in the environment where the situations encountered are controlled according to very specific human needs. Conditions are all those discovered and undiscovered phenomena in space that have a stimulating or degrading effect on humans. Borders, therefore, have the task of enabling the selection of influences. In the architectural sense, they enclose, but also include a person in the conditions of a certain environment [5].

Whether because of the water or for some other reason<sup>1</sup>, at the 'Dobre Vode' site, from the period of the

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<sup>1</sup>The tekke in Blagaj (Tekija u Blagaju) was built at the source of the Buna river, and the first tekija in Bosnia (in Sarajevo) was built by its founder Isa-beg Ishaković (1462).



Osmanske imperije iskazivalo naročito poštovanje prema Bogu, kroz formu 'naročite snažne molitve' ('zikir') u praksi derviša.

Danas se, nakon iskazivanja poštovanja prema dvojici dobrih ljudi-šejhova pokopanih u turbetu, obavlja molitveno pranje ('abdest') pored turbeta i obavlja podnevna molitva i uči posebna molitva (dova) kao obraćanje čovjeka Bogu, kojim potvrđuje pokoravanje Bogu ali i traže od Boga zdravlje i druga dobra (ilustracije 9, 10).

Nedavno je na samom lokalitetu 'Dobre Vode', oko tristotine metara daleko od turbeta dvojici šejhova, uređen prostran otvoreni prostor ('musalla') za obavljanje masovne molitve ljudi. Neposredno uz prostor musalle, podignuto je više česama te jedan natkriveni prostor-kupaonica, u kome se obavlja 'kupanje ozdravljenja', u toploj i u hladnoj vodi (ilustracije 9, 11, 12).



ILUSTRACIJA 9 - Lokalitet 'Dobre Vode'. Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

FIGURE 9 - The 'Dobre Vode' locality. Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

administration of the Ottoman Empire, special respect for God was shown, through the form of 'special strong prayer' (tur. 'zikh') in the practice of dervishes.

Today, after showing respect to the two good people-sheikhs buried in the turbet, ablution is performed next (tur. 'ābdest') to the turbet and the midday prayer is performed and a special prayer is recited as a man's address to God, with which he confirms obedience to God but also asks God's health and other good things (figures 9, 10).

Recently, a spacious open space (tur. 'musalla') was arranged in the very locality of 'Dobre Vode', about three hundred matars away from the turbet of the two sheikhs, for the mass prayer of people. Directly next to the musalla area, several water fountains and one covered bathroom area were built, in which 'healing baths' are performed, in warm and cold water (figures 9, 11, 12).



FIGURE 10 ~ *The Šeih-Murat (around 1737) and (of his son) Šeih-Salih mausoleum (turbe)* – ('Dobre Vode', Zarudina village).

Informant Fadil Budnjo, B.Sc. Eng. geology. Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

ILUSTRACIJA 10 ~ *Turbe Šeih-Murata (oko 1737) i (njegovog sina) Šeih-Saliha* – ('Dobre Vode', selo Zarudina).

Informator Fadil Budnjo, dipl. inž. geol. Source: Author (5.8.2011.)



Sve što je ikada rečeno i zapisano o fenomenu 'Dobrih Voda', današnji vakif-obnovitelj ovog bisera duhovne kulture Bošnjaka u Bosni i Hercegovini, pokušao je saopštiti kroz kratak i jezgrovit tekst na više natpisa u kompleksu 'Dobre Vode'. Svi su natpisi uklesani u bijelom kamenu sa zadivljujućom majstorskom izvedbom.



ILUSTRACIJA 11 ~ '*Musalla Dobre Vode*'. (Izvođač radova i vakif Fadil Budnjo, dipl. inž. geol.). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

FIGURE 11 ~ '*Musalla Dobre Vode*'. (Contractor and foundation Fadil Budnjo, B.Sc. Eng. geol.). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

Na majstorski savršeno izvedenom zidu česme sa tri snažna istočičta pitke vode, na njegovoj desnoj strani, u bijeloj kamenoj ploči uklesan je tekst natpisa

SEVAPOM MJEŠTANA OVOG KRAJA  
UZ BOŽIJE ODREĐENJE  
PRED DUŠU SVOGA OCA  
RAHMETLI BEGLER-BEGA  
1920.-1988.  
OBNOVI OVU HAIR ČESMU  
SIN BEGLER-BEGOV  
- 2007. godine -

Everything that has ever been said and written about the phenomenon of 'Dobre Vode', today's vakif-renovator of this pearl of Bosniak spiritual culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina, tried to communicate through a short and concise text on several inscriptions in the 'Dobre Vode' complex. All the inscriptions are sculpted in white stone with stunning masterwork.



FIGURE 12 ~ '*Hair-voda Dobre Vode*' ('*Hair-water Good Waters*'), Source: Author (5,8.2011.)

ILUSTRACIJA 12 ~ '*Hair-voda Dobre Vode*'. Source: Author (5,8.2011.)

On the masterfully executed wall of the fountain with three powerful sources of drinking water, on its right side, the text of the inscription is sculpted in a white stone slab:

ALL THE INHABITANTS OF THIS REGION  
WITH GOD'S ORDINANCE  
BEFORE THE SOUL OF HIS FATHER  
RAHMETLI BEGLER-BEG  
1920-1988  
RENEW THIS HAIR FOUNTAIN  
SON OF BEGLER-BEGOV  
- 2007. years -



Na lijevoj strani zida česme, u bijelom kamenu je uklesan tekst natpisa:

OVOM VODOM  
U KOJOJ JE ILADŽ I BEREKET  
SU SE ABDESTILI  
VAŠI OČEVI I DJEDOVI  
I DJEDOVI VAŠIH DJEDOVA,  
DOLAZEĆI NA OVO DOVIŠTE  
KROZ VIŠE VIJEKOVA



ILUSTRACIJA 12 - 'Hair-voda Dobre Vode' – tekst natpisa je isklesan u bijeloj kamenoj ploči. Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

FIGURE 12 - 'Hair-voda Dobre Vode' ('Hair-water Good Waters') – the text of the inscription is sculpted in a white stone slab. Source: Author (5.8.2011.)

On the left side of the wall of the fountain, the text of the inscription is carved in white stone:

WITH THIS WATER  
IN WHICH IS ILADŽ AND BEREKET  
THEY AVOIDED themselves  
YOUR FATHERS AND GRANDFATHERS  
AND THE GRANDFATHERS OF YOUR GRANDFATHERS,  
ARRIVING AT THIS PLACE  
THROUGH MANY CENTURIES



FIGURE 12 ~ 'Hair-voda Dobre Vode' ('Hair-water Good Waters'). Source: Author (5.8.2011.)


ILUSTRACIJA 12 ~ 'Hair-voda Dobre Vode'. Source: Author (5.8.2011.)



#### 4. Zaključak (Perspektive)

**P**od pojmom 'perspektive' (u okviru teorije o Arhitektonski definiranom prostoru) podrazumijevamo „onaj dinamički odnos koji povezuje sada – buduće, postojeće – moguće, ostvareno – željeno” [5]. Nastanak nekog naselja (grada, sela) ili arhitektonsko-inženjerske strukture nikada nije slučajna, već je rezultat sinergije na relaciji prirodno i društveno okruženje-čovjek [5].

Iako su tijekom rata 1992-1995 godine u Bosni i Hercegovini svi stanovnici sa prostora 'Dobrih Voda' bili prinudno raseljeni, većina njih se po završetku rata vratila i obnovila svoje kuće. Međutim, manji dio njih ondje je osto da živi, i dolaze na odmor te da obnavljaju svoje posjede (njive i voćnjake). Godišnja manifestacija masovne molitve ('Dove na Dobrim Vodama') je glavni razlog što se vraćaju u svoj rodni kraj koji im 'obavlja životnu energiju'.




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#### 4. Conclusion (Perspectives)

**b**y By the term 'perspective' (in the framework of the theory of Architecturally Defined Space) we mean „that dynamic relationship that connects now – future, existing – possible, achieved – desired“ [5]. The emergence of a settlement (hamlet, village) or architectural-engineering structure is never accidental, but is the result of a synergy between the natural and social environment-man [5].

Although during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina all the inhabitants of the 'Dobre Vode' area were forcibly displaced, most of them returned after the end of the war and rebuilt their houses. However, few of them live there permanently, and come to rest and restore their properties (fields and orchards). The annual manifestation of mass prayer ('Dove na Dobrim Vodama') is the main reason that they return to their native region, which 'provides them with vital energy'.







Prof. dr Stefan Jakob Wimmer je orijentalista u Bavarskoj državnoj biblioteci i Univerzitetu u Minhenu/Njemačka, autor i urednik u oblastima antičkih bliskoistočnih studija, religijske istorije i međuverskog dijaloga. Najvrjednijih sedam godina svog života proveo je u Jerusalemu (up. *illuminatio/svjetionik/almanar* 2, 2020, str. 215 i dalje), i od tada je intimno angažovan i u izraelskom i u palestinskom sektoru. Kao posvećeni Jerusalimac, on sebe smatra "Jerušalmijem" i "Kudsijem" u isto vrijeme.

On je direktor Društva prijatelja Abrahama u Minhenu, aktivan je u Vijeću religija, Minhenskom Lehrhausu (Madrassa/Bet Midrash) religija i u Minhenskom forumu za islam.

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Stefan Jakob WIMMER

**NEĆE BITI MIRA ZA IZRAEL BEZ SLOBODE PALESTINACA –  
I NEĆE BITI SLOBODE ZA PALESTINCE BEZ MIRA ZA IZRAEL**

**Na svakom od nas je da prekinemo začarani krug!**

**THERE WILL BE NO PEACE FOR ISRAEL WITHOUT FREEDOM FOR  
THE PALESTINIANS – AND THERE WILL BE NO FREEDOM FOR THE  
PALESTINIANS WITHOUT PEACE FOR ISRAEL**

**It's onto each of us, to break the vicious circle!**

## Sažetak

Dok se Sarajevo, poznato kao evropski Jerusalem, još uvijek nosi s neriješenim posljedicama rata prije 25 godina, u Jerusalemu, Svetoj zemlji – na arapskom *Al-Kuds* – nastavljaju bjesniti sukobi. Nedavna eskalacija planula je na kraju ramazana u džamiji Al-Aksa. Autor je blisko upoznat sa situacijom u Palestini/Izraelu na obje strane. Umjesto priželjkivanja i ideoloških fantazija, on podešava sliku o stvarnosti sukoba. Čak i za one koji nisu direktno dio sukoba, ali suosjećaju sa bilo kojom stranom, implikacije predstavljaju izazov, jer ćemo možda morati da prilagodimo naše obaveze: One ne bi trebale biti usklađene prema etničkim ili religijskim linijama. A to može biti tako i za druge sukobe.

**Ključne riječi:** *Bliskoistočni sukob, Jerusalem, Palestina, Izrael, džamija Al-Aksa, Gaza, cionizam, zloupotreba religije(a).*

## Abstract

While Sarajevo, known as the European Jerusalem, is still coping with the unresolved consequences of war 25 years ago, conflict keeps on raging in Jerusalem of the Holy Land, *Al-Quds* in Arabic. The recent escalation ignited at the end of Ramadan at Al-Aqsa Mosque. The author is intimately acquainted with the situation in Palestine/Israel on both sides. Instead of wishful thinking and ideological phantasies, he tunes the picture down to the realities of the conflict. Even for those, who are not directly part of the conflict, but empathize with either side, the implications pose a challenge, as we might have to adjust our commitments: These should not run along the lines of ethnicities or religions. And that, in turn, may be true for other conflicts as well.

**Key words:** *Middle East conflict, Jerusalem, Palestine, Israel, Al-Aqsa Mosque, Gaza, Zionism, misuse of religion(s).*



## **NEĆE BITI MIRA ZA IZRAEL BEZ SLOBODE PALESTINACA – I NEĆE BITI SLOBODE ZA PALESTINCE BEZ MIRA ZA IZRAEL**

Na svakom od nas je da prekinemo začarani krug!

### **Provokacija i eskalacija u Jerusalemu: déjà vu**

**U** maju 2021. ponovo smo bili svjedoci: provokacija i eskalacija, nasilja na svetom kompleksu Al-Haram ash-Sharif, zatim „u odbranu džamije Al-Aksa“ ispaljeni su projektili iz Gaze, i zauzvrat velikog izraelskog napada. Stotine ubijenih, mnogo više fizički povrjeđenih, a još više razorenih u svojim dušama i umovima. Scenario je bio katastrofalan déjà-vu. Opetovano ovo gledamo – i, kao što se mora fatalistički predvidjeti, vidjet ćemo to ponovo.

U Jerusalemu i Svetoj zemlji, ovaj vijek je započeo gestom svjetskog vjerskog vođe. Istorijska posjeta regiji pape Ivana Pavla II u martu 2000. navodno je potaknula nadu da bi pravedno i mirno rješenje dugog sukoba ipak moglo biti postignuto. Mnogi su tada još uvijek polagali takve nade u procese nakon Sporazuma iz Osla iz 1990-ih. Ali pregovori su propali u ljeto iste godine, a u septembru, Arijel Šaron, koji će kasnije postati premijer – ali je tada bio krajnje desničarski opozicioni lider i bivši ministar odbrane i general vojske s dosijeom odgovornosti za svirepe masakre nad palestinskim izbjeglice tokom izraelske invazije na Bejrut – posjetio je kompleks Al-Aksa okružen sa više od hiljadu pripadnika policijskih snaga. Kao što se i očekivalo, ovo je shvaćeno kao namjerna provokacija i podstaklo je nestabilnu situaciju. To je rezultiralo takozvanom Al-Aksa-Intifadom koja je trajala do 2005. godine i uzrokovala između četiri i šest hiljada smrtnih slučajeva, većinom Palestinaca. Godine 2006. bjesnio je rat između takozvanog „Hezbollah“ u Libanu i Izraelu, s Gazom kao drugim frontom, sa mnogo hiljada ubijenih, od kojih su većina, značajna, bili Libanci i Palestinci. U decembru 2008. sukob je ponovo eskalirao u katastrofalan rat u Gazi, sa više od hiljadu poginulih, od kojih su većina bili Palestinci. Sljedeći rat u Gazi se razvio u novembru 2012. Na stotine je ubijeno, od kojih su većina bili Palestinci. Ponovo je u augustu i septembru 2014. godine umrlo više od dvije hiljade ljudi, od kojih su većina bili Palestinci.

**THERE WILL BE NO PEACE FOR ISRAEL WITHOUT FREEDOM FOR THE  
PALESTINIANS – AND THERE WILL BE NO FREEDOM FOR  
THE PALESTINIANS WITHOUT PEACE FOR ISRAEL**

It's onto each of us, to break the vicious circle!

### Provocation and escalation in Jerusalem: déjà vu

In May 2021 we witnessed it again: Provocation and escalation, violence on the sacred compound of Al-Haram ash-Sharif, then, “in defence of Al-Aqsa Mosque”, missiles were launched from Gaza, and in return large scale Israeli attacks were inflicted. Hundreds were killed, many more injured physically, and even more devastated in their minds and souls. The scenario was a disastrous déjà-vu. We have seen it over and over again—and, as has to be fatally predicted—we will see it again.

In Jerusalem and the Holy Land, this century started with a gesture by a world religious leader. The historic visit to the region by Pope John Paul II in March 2000 ostensibly fostered hopes that a just and peaceful solution to the long conflict might after all still be achieved. Many had then still been pinning such hopes to the processes following the Oslo Accords of the 1990s. But talks broke down in summer the same year, and in September, Arik Sharon, who would later become Prime Minister, but was then a far-right opposition leader, former defence minister and army general with a record of accountability for ferocious massacres on Palestinian refugees during the Israeli invasion of Beirut, paid an unsolicited visit to the Al-Aqsa compound, surrounded by more than a thousand police force. As was to be expected, this was perceived as a deliberate provocation, and ignited the volatile situation. The resulting so-called Al-Aqsa-Intifada lasted until 2005 and brought about between four and six thousand fatalities, most of them were Palestinians. In 2006, war raged between so-called “Hizbollah” in Lebanon and Israel, with Gaza as a second front, with many thousands killed, most of them, by far, were Lebanese, and Palestinians. In December 2008, the conflict escalated again into a disastrous war in Gaza, with more than a thousand fatalities, most of them, by far, were Palestinians. The next Gaza war evolved in November 2012. Hundreds were killed, most of them, by far, were Palestinians. Then again in August and September 2014, more than two thousand people died, most of them, by far, were Palestinians.

## Ponavljajući i predvidljivi obrasci

Obrasci, kojima uporno svjedočimo, ponavljaju se i predvidljivi su: ova trajna ljudska katastrofa se ne događa zbog prirodne katastrofe, niti zato što je bilo koja od uključenih strana po prirodi agresivna. Njeni mehanizmi su vezani za nepodnošljive uslove i pritisak koji se stalno vrši na palestinski narod, bez ikakve perspektive za olakšanje. A kada se uvijek iznova rakete iz Pojasa Gaze ispaljuju na Izrael, rezultati su također predvidljivi: kada, u neravnopravnom sukobu, relativno slaba strana napadne vojno izrazito nadmoćniju stranu, onda učinak može biti ograničena šteta kao i, vjerovatno važnije, osjećaj stalne prijetnje i nesigurnosti za – u ovom slučaju – izraelsko civilno stanovništvo. Ali daleko dramatičnije, kao brutalno logična posljedica, ogromna patnja će biti nanesena civilnom stanovništvu prve strane. U ovom slučaju organizacije koje prizivaju „otpor“ ili „džihad“ u svojim imenima, moraju biti svjesne, i sigurno su potpuno svjesne, posljedica svog djelovanja: daleko najveći dio patnje će podnositi Palestinci. Oni to prihvataju svjesno i namjerno, i moraju se suočiti sa posljedicama čak i kada to ni ne namjeravaju, jer rezultati medijskog izvještavanja o bombardovanju stambenih prostorija, čak i o pogođenim školama i bolnicama, zbrisanim porodicama i očajnim roditeljima i djecom, očekivano je da će podstaći veću svijest i solidarnost sa Palestincima kao žrtvama brutalnog agresora.

Ovi obrasci daju priželjkivane rezultate, opetovano, sa fatalnom upornošću i kao *perpetuum mobile*: uzrok i posljedica se uzajamno hrane. I sve dok se ovi obrasci ne naruše, ne može se pristupiti rješenju.

Ali kako mi, koji nismo direktno dio sukoba – jer nismo ni Palestinci ni Izraelci – kako i gdje možemo krenuti da bismo prekinuli začarani krug?



ILUSTRACIJA – Palestinci ispred Kupole na stijeni u kompleksu Brda hrama.  
ILLUSTRATION – Palestinians in front of the Dome of the Rock in the Temple Mount complex.

## Repetitive and predictable pattern

**t**he patterns, we have been witnessing again and again, are repetitive and predictable: This enduring human catastrophe is happening not because of a natural disaster, nor because any of the involved sides was aggressive by nature. Its mechanisms are related to the unbearable conditions and pressure that keep being exerted on the Palestinian people, without any perspective for relief. And when, time and again, rockets are launched from the Gaza Strip into Israel, the results are predictable as well: When, in an unequal conflict, a relatively weak party attacks a militarily heavily superior party, then the effect can be some limited damage and, probably more important, a feeling of constant threat and insecurity for—in this case—Israeli civilian population. But far more dramatic, in brutally logical consequence, tremendous suffering will be brought upon the first party's own civilian population. In this case the organisations that invoke “Resistance” or “Jihad” in their names must be aware and for sure are indeed fully aware, about the consequences of their actions: most of the suffering, by far, will be on the Palestinians. They accept this consciously and deliberately, and they must be confronted with the suspicion if they not even intend it, as the resulting media coverage of living quarters being bombed, even schools and hospitals affected, families wiped out and desperate parents and children, can be expected to foster more awareness and solidarity with Palestinians as victims of a brutal aggressor.

These patterns are working, again and again, with fatal persistency and like a *perpetuum mobile*: cause and effect keep feeding each other reciprocally. And as long as these patterns will not be breached, no solution can be approached.

But how could we, who are not directly part of the conflict, being neither Palestinian nor Israeli, how and where could we set in to breach the vicious circle?



ILLUSTRATION ~ Jewish worshippers take part in a priestly blessing during Passover at the Western Wall in Jerusalem's Old City. (Reuters)

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Jevrejski vjernici sudjeluju u svećeničkom blagoslovu za vrijeme Pashe na Zidu plača u starom gradu Jeruzalema.





ILUSTRACIJA ~ Južni pojas Gaze. Plamen i dim rastu tokom izraelskih zračnih napada na palestinsku teritoriju.  
ILLUSTRATION ~ The southern Gaza Strip. Flames and smoke rise during Israeli air strikes to the Palestinian territory. REUTERS.



ILLUSTRATION - Rockets are launched toward Israel from Rafah, in the south of the Gaza Strip, controlled by the Palestinian Hamas. AFP via Getty.  
ILUSTRACIJA - Rakete se lansiraju prema Izraelu iz Rafaha, na jugu Pojasa Gaze, pod kontrolom palestinskog Hamasa.

## Ponavljajuće i predvidljive reakcije

Ono što važi za mehanizme samog sukoba, odražava se i na reakcije širom sveta. Kada je zadnji put izbilo nasilje u Jeruzalemu u maju 2021., glasovi iz cijelog svijeta bili su ponavljani i predvidljivi kao i same akcije i reakcije. S jedne strane, gnjevni demonstranti u takozvanom muslimanskom svijetu i izvan njega žalili su zbog skrnavljenja džamije Al-Aksa od strane izraelskih oružanih snaga. Ipak, po pravilu, nisu spominjali niti žalili što su Jevreji, koji su se molili na svom najsvetijem mjestu, Zapadnom zidu, a koji se direktno naslanja na drevno Brdo hrama, identično Al-Haram Ash-Sharifu, bili napadnuti od strane bacača kamenja iz džamije iznad; da su u molitvenoj sali Al-Aksa unaprijed skupljene gomile kamenja i flaša kako bi se isprovocirale, a zatim sukobile oružane snage da upadnu u džamiju. Palestinci, Arapi i muslimani širom svijeta su naširoko podržavali stranu Palestinaca, iznova bacajući svu krivicu na jevrejsku državu, braneći ili opravdavajući taj način ponašanja, a „ Hamas“ je „reagovao“ u ostvarivanju svog prava na samoodbranu.

S druge strane, napetost koja je bila žestoka u Jeruzalemu zbog evidentnog izbacivanja Palestinaca iz njihovih domova, spremno je bila izdvojena iz konteksta koji je vodio do eskalacije, koja će predvidljivo buknući posljednjeg petka ramazana. Izraelci i Jevreji, i veliki dio takozvanog „Zapada“, naširoko su podržavali stranu Izraela, iznova optužujući Palestince i braneći ili opravdavajući taj način ponašanja kojim se tvrdi da je jevrejska država „reagovala“ u ostvarivanju svog prava na samoodbranu.



ILUSTRACIJA - Palestinci prosvjeduju na okupiranoj Zapadnoj obali.

ILLUSTRATION ~ Palestinians protest in the occupied West Bank. AFP

## Repetitive and predictable reactions

**W**hat holds true for the mechanisms of the conflict itself, is reflected as well by reactions around the world. When violence last erupted in Jerusalem in May 2021, the voices from around the globe were as repetitive and predictable as were the actions and re-actions themselves. On one side, angry protesters in and beyond the so-called Muslim World deplored the desecration of Al-Aqsa Mosque by Israeli armed forces. Yet, as a rule, they did not mention or deplore that Jews praying at their holiest site, the Western Wall, directly adjoining the ancient Temple Mount, identical with Al-Haram Ash-Sharif, were attacked by stone throwers from the mosque compound above; that inside the prayer hall of Al-Aqsa, piles of stones and bottles had been collected in advance to provoke and then confront the armed forces into storming the mosque. Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims all over the world were widely supporting the cause of the Palestinians, pouring out all the blame on the Jewish State all over again, and defending or excusing the way, “ Hamas ” was “ reacting ” in exercise of their right to self-defence.

On the other side, the tension that had been virulent in Jerusalem due to the immanent eviction of Palestinians from their homes, was readily set aside from the context leading the way to the escalation, that predictably would erupt on the last Friday of Ramadan. Israelis and Jews, and much of the so-called “ West ” were widely supporting the cause of Israel, blaming the Palestinians all over again, and defending or excusing the way, the Jewish State was “ reacting ” in exercise of its right to self-defence.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Protesters near the house of a Palestinian family, which an Israeli court had ordered to be evicted while declaring Israeli settlers to be the legal owners, in Sheikh Jarrah. AFP

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Prosvjednici u blizini kuće palestinske obitelji, za koju je izraelski sud naredio deložaciju dok je izraelske doseljenike proglasio zakonitim vlasnicima, u Sheikh Jarrahu.



## Ko je kriv?

Očigledno, ovo neće voditi nijednu stranu naprijed u odnosu na prethodnih nekoliko decenija. Također neće doprinijeti oslobađanju ili miru, već će prije podsticati sukob, sve više i više i predvidljivo će dovesti do sljedećeg kruga eskalacije sa stotinama i hiljadama žrtava. Većina njih će, u značajnoj mjeri, biti Palestinci. Ipak, nije „druga strana“ kriva za ovaj mehanizam. To nisu ni Izrael ni „cionisti“, ni Palestinci. To smo zapravo mi, kada upadnemo u zamku naše instinktivne i nereflektirane solidarnosti sa „našom stranom“! Ovaj sukob oko Jerusalema, oko zemlje koja se zove Palestina, koja se zove Izrael, koja se zove Sveta zemlja, nije sukob Palestinaca i Arapa ili muslimana protiv Izraelaca i Jevreja ili „Zapada“. Na obje strane ima onih koji žele da prevaziđu ovaj sukob i bore se da ga konačno riješe – naravno mirnim sredstvima, jer je sve drugo dio sukoba, a ne njegovo rješenje. I na obje strane ima onih koji raspiruju sukob zbog nacionalističkog ili vjerskog fanatizma, ili zato što na ovaj ili onaj način služi njihovim vlastitim interesima. Ovo je očigledno tačno za one koji su godinama dominirali izraelskom politikom. A istina je, isto tako, i za ekstremističke organizacije koje terorizam pogrešno nazivaju „otporom“ i zloupotrebljavaju islam za promicanje nasilja i mržnje. Kada pokažemo svoju slijepu solidarnost sa bilo kojom od ovih strana, onda smo i mi dio sukoba, a ne rješenja.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Rabin pregledava štetu unutar vjerske škole u središnjem izraelskom gradu Lodu. Školu je navodno zapalila rulja lokalnih Arapa.

ILLUSTRATION ~ A rabbi inspects the damage inside a religious school in the central Israeli city of Lod. The school was allegedly torched by a mob of local Arab residents. (AFP)

## Who is to blame?

Obviously, this will not lead any side any further, than it has for so many decades. This will by no means contribute to liberating or bringing peace on anyone, but it will rather fuel the conflict, more and more, and it will predictably lead into the next rounds of escalation, with hundreds and thousands of fatalities. Most of them, by far, will be Palestinians.

Yet, it is not “the other side”, who is to blame for this mechanism. It is neither Israel or “the Zionists”, nor the Palestinians. It is in fact *us*, when we fall into the trap of our instinctive and un-reflected solidarity with “our side”!

This conflict over Jerusalem, over the land called Palestine, called Israel, called the Holy Land, is *not* Palestinians and Arabs or Muslims against Israelis and Jews or the “West”. On both of these sides, there are those, who want to overcome this conflict, and are struggling to eventually solve it—by peaceful means, of course, as anything else is part of the conflict, not of its solution. And on both of these sides there are those, who fuel the conflict, for nationalist or religious fanaticism, or because in one way or another it serves their own interests. This is demonstrably true for those who have dominated Israeli politics for many years. And it is true, just the same, for extremist organisations who mislabel terror “resistance” and abuse Islam for promoting violence and hatred. When we demonstrate our blind solidarity with any of these sides, then we, too, are part of the conflict, not of the solution.



ILLUSTRATION ~ A Palestinian father carries his wounded daughter from the rubble of a destroyed house after an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City. EPA  
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Otac Palestinac nosi svoju ranjenu kćer iz ruševina uništene kuće nakon izraelskog zračnog napada na gradu Gazi.



ILUSTRACIJA - Mladi palestinski demonstrant protestira u "danu bijesa", tokom sukoba s izraelskim sigurnosnim snagama na istočnoj periferiji grada Gaze, u blizini granice s Izraelom.



ILLUSTRATION ~ A young Palestinian protester protests in "day of rage", during clashes with Israeli security forces on the eastern outskirts of Gaza City, near the border with Israel.



## Ovo nije vjerski sukob

**N**i ovaj sukob nije vjerski sukob. Za razliku od toga što neki žele da vjerujemo, nije bilo sukoba između Abrahamovih sinova, Ismaila i Isaka, ni u Kur'anu ni u Bibliji. I dugi niz stoljeća nije bilo konkurencije oko drevnog Brda hrama, koji je postao Al-Haram Ash-Sharif. Prije nego što je izbio moderni sukob, muslimani su naravno bili svjesni da je svetost stijene koja je služila poslaniku Muhammedu (neka je mir s njim!) kao određište za Al-Isra' i tačka odakle se može doživjeti Al-Mi'râdž, neodvojiva od ranijeg mjesta klanjanja Jednome, Svemogućem i Milostivom, gdje je Poslanik i kralj Izraela Solomon (Šelomoh, Sulejman, neka je mir s njim!) dao izgraditi hram za Njega, gdje je poslanik Zakarija, (neka je mir s njim!) obavljao svoju službu kao jevrejski sveštenik i brinuo se o mladoj Mariji (neka je mir s njom!), koja će postati djevica majka Isusa Krista (neka je mir s njim!), koji je širio njegovu poruku u ovom hramskom kompleksu.<sup>1</sup> Čuveni francuski muslimanski filozof Roger Garaudy ispravno je opisao kultnu Kupolu na stijeni kao *“simbol jedinstva i kontinuiteta abrahamske, odnosno jevrejske, kršćanske i muslimanske vjere.”*<sup>2</sup> A palestinski učenjak Sari Nusseibeh, bivši predsjednik Univerziteta Al-Kuds, eksplicitno navodi: *“Ali bez obzira da li je neko mjesto u početku i samo po sebi sveto, ili to postaje kroz praksu, ili čak nakon nekog čudesnog iskustva, još uvijek je teško vidjeti kako se Bog može ,natjerati da se osjeća bolje‘ tako što se ljudi bore oko tog mjesta, ubijaju i bivaju ubijeni zbog toga, demolirajui ili ruše, ili bilo šta drugo. (...) U konačnoj analizi, proljevanje (ljudske) krvi preko Stijene može biti samo sekularna praksa, a ne božanska želja ili naredba!”*<sup>3</sup>

Upravo je politički sukob oko zemlje, počevši od kasnog 19. stoljeća i dominirajući cijelim 20. stoljećem, sve više i više iskrivljenih vjerskih percepcija i tradicija zavodio vjernike Abrahamove religije, da jedni drugima osporavaju tradiciju i prava. Nije duboko jevrejski tvrditi da Jerusalem isključivo pripada judaizmu, kao da mnogi vijekovi nisu bili relevantni. Niti je duboko jevrejsko lišiti palestinski narod bilo kojeg od njegovih prava, uključujući palestinsku državu u (barem dijelovima) Palestine, sve dok se i tamo poštuju jevrejska (i sva ostala) prava. Prije je to zloupotreba judaizma, kada se to radi iz političkih razloga. Nije duboko islamski suprotstaviti se bilo čemu jevrejskom oko Al-Haram Ash-Sharifa. Niti je duboko islamski boriti se protiv jevrejske države u (barem dijelovima) Palestine, sve dok su muslimani (i svi ostali) slobodni da tamo prakticiraju svoju vjeru bez ograničenja. To je, prije, zloupotreba islama iz političkih razloga.

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<sup>1</sup> O Jerusalemskom hramu u islamu usp. S.J. Wimmer, Der Tempel von Jerusalem im Koran, u: *Blätter Abrahams. Beiträge zum interreligiösen Dialog* 9, 2010, 79-90, i u id., “Ein Tag wie tausend Tage“. Die Bedeutung Jerusalems für den Islam, in: *Blätter Abrahams. Beiträge zum interreligiösen Dialog* 19, 2019, 61-73.

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.cyberistan.org/islamic/domerock.htm> (zadnji pregled: 07. 11. 2021).

<sup>3</sup> O. Grabar/B.Z. Kedar (eds.), *Where Heaven and Earth Meet: Jerusalem's Sacred Esplanade*, Jerusalem 2009, p. 369.

## Not a religious conflict

**t**his conflict is not a religious conflict either. Unlike some want us to believe, there has been no conflict between the sons of Abraham, Ismael and Isaac, neither in the Quran nor in the Bible. And for many centuries, there was no competition over the ancient Temple Mount, which has become Al-Haram Ash-Sharif. Before the modern conflict arose, Muslims were of course aware that the sanctity of the rock that served the Prophet Muhammad (may peace be upon him!) as the point of destination for Al-Isrâ' and the point from where to experience Al-Mi'râj, was inseparable from the previous site of adoration of the One, Almighty and Merciful, where the Prophet and King of Israel Solomon (Shelomoh, Sulaymân, may peace be upon him!) had the temple built for Him, where the Prophet Zakaria (may peace be upon him!) performed his service as a Jewish priest, and cared for young Mary (may peace be upon her!), who would become the virgin mother of Jesus Christ (may peace be upon him!), who spread his message in this temple compound.<sup>1</sup> The famous French Muslim philosopher Roger Garaudy correctly described the iconic Dome of the Rock as *"the symbol of the oneness and continuity of the Abrahamic, i.e. Jewish, Christian and Muslim faith."*<sup>2</sup> And the Palestinian scholar Sari Nusseibeh, former president of Al-Quds University, states in explicit terms: *"But whether a spot is initially and inherently sacred, or becomes so through practice, or even following upon the occurrence of some miraculous experience, it is still hard to see how God can 'be made to feel better' by men fighting over that spot, killing and getting killed over it, dismantling or demolishing it, or whatever. (...) In the final analysis, spilling (human) blood over the Rock can only be a secular practice, not a divine wish or command!"*<sup>3</sup>

It was the political conflict over the land, starting in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and dominating the entire 20<sup>th</sup> century, that more and more distorted religious perceptions and traditions seduced believers of the religions of Abraham, to dispute each other's traditions and rights. It is not profoundly Jewish, to claim Jerusalem exclusively for Judaism, as if many centuries were of no relevance. Nor is it profoundly Jewish to deprive the Palestinian people of any of their rights, including a Palestinian State in (at least parts of) Palestine, as long as Jewish (and all others') rights are respected there as well. It is, rather, misuse of Judaism to do so for political reasons. It is not profoundly Islamic to oppose anything Jewish around Al-Haram Ash-Sharif. Nor is it profoundly Islamic to fight a Jewish State in (at least parts of) Palestine, as long as Muslims (and all others) are free to practice their religion there without restrictions. It is, rather, misuse of Islam for political reasons.

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<sup>1</sup> For the Temple of Jerusalem in Islam cf. S.J. Wimmer, Der Tempel von Jerusalem im Koran, in: *Blätter Abrahams. Beiträge zum interreligiösen Dialog* 9, 2010, 79-90, and id., "Ein Tag wie tausend Tage". Die Bedeutung Jerusalems für den Islam, in: *Blätter Abrahams. Beiträge zum interreligiösen Dialog* 19, 2019, 61-73.

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.cyberistan.org/islamic/domerock.htm> (last consulted: 07.11.2021).

<sup>3</sup> O. Grabar/B.Z. Kedar (eds.), *Where Heaven and Earth Meet: Jerusalem's Sacred Esplanade*, Jerusalem 2009, p. 369.



ILUSTRACIJA - "Nije duboko jevrejski tvrditi da Jerusalem isključivo pripada judaizmu, kao da mnogi vijekovi nisu bili relevantni. Niti je duboko jevrejsko lišiti palestinski narod bilo kojeg od njegovih prava, uključujući palestinsku državu u (barem dijelovima) Palestine, sve dok se i tamo poštuju jevrejska (i sva ostala) prava." ... "Ali rješenje neće biti trajno potiskivanje ili protjerivanje palestinskog naroda iz njegove domovine. Niti će to biti uništenje jevrejske države u zemlji Izrael. Jer ni jedno ni drugo neće se desiti."



ILLUSTRATION ~ "It is not profoundly Jewish, to claim Jerusalem exclusively for Judaism, as if many centuries were of no relevance. Nor is it profoundly Jewish to deprive the Palestinian people of any of their rights, including a Palestinian State in (at least parts of) Palestine, as long as Jewish (and all others') rights are respected there as well." ... "The solution will not be the enduring suppression or the the expulsion of the Palestinian people from its homeland. Nor will it be the destruction of the Jewish State in the Land of Israel. Because neither will ever happen."





## Izazovi istine

**Z**apravo, ovaj sukob je između onih – bilo da su Palestinci, Arapi, muslimani ili Izraelci, Jevreji, ili bilo ko – koji nastoje da riješe sukob, i onih – bilo da su Palestinci, Arapi, muslimani ili Izraelci, Jevreji, ili bilo ko – koji potpiruju sukob.

Ne pomažemo, kada smo uz „Izrael“ ili „Palestince“. Ako želimo pokazati solidarnost, ne bismo trebali, odnosno ne smijemo je pokazivati u skladu sa etničkim ili religijskim linijama – da ne bismo zloupotrijebili naše religije. Radije to moramo pokazati onima – s obje strane! – koji žele pravdu i mir za sve, a protiv onih koji žele ili pravdu ili mir samo za sebe. To je lako.

Bez ikakve sumnje, rješenje će na kraju doći, jer ovo, u suštini, nije vjerski i vječni sukob, već savremeni i politički sukob. Ne možemo znati kada, niti kako će to izgledati. Ali rješenje neće biti trajno potiskivanje ili protjerivanje palestinskog naroda iz njegove domovine. Niti će to biti uništenje jevrejske države u zemlji Izrael. Jer, to se sa sigurnošću može reći, ni jedno ni drugo neće se desiti. Ove jednostavne činjenice svi moraju priznati kao osnovu za rješavanje sukoba. Istina u ovom sukobu je komplementarna, kao medalja sa dvije strane. Možda vam se obje komponente ne sviđaju podjednako, ali morate zagovarati obje, ako želite postići jednu od njih:

*Neće biti slobode za Palestince, bez mira za Izrael. I neće biti mira za Izrael, bez slobode za Palestince.*

Ako želimo da doprinesemo jednom i drugom, moramo ciljati na oba! To posljedično zahtijeva ogroman korak u našoj svijesti: to znači ništa manje nego da „Zapad“, Jevreji, Izraelci i njihovi zagovornici moraju na prvom mjestu, otvoreno i autentično, iznijeti argumente za puna prava palestinskog naroda da uživaju sva ljudska i građanska prava, da žive u dostojanstvu i slobodi. Tada, i samo tada, mogu vjerodostojno zahtijevati mir i za Izrael.

To znači ništa manje nego da muslimani širom svijeta, Arapi i Palestinci i njihovi zagovornici moraju na prvom mjestu, otvoreno i autentično, dokazati pravo jevrejske države u (barem dijelovima) Palestine da postoji u miru. Tada, i samo tada, mogu vjerodostojno tražiti slobodu i za Palestince.



## Challenging truths

In fact, this conflict is between those—be they Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims or Israelis, Jews, or whoever—, who strive to solve the conflict, and those—be they Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims or Israelis, Jews, or whoever—, who are fuelling the conflict.

We are not helping, when we side by either “Israel” or “the Palestinians”. If we want to show solidarity, we should not, we must not show it along the lines of ethnicities or religions—lest we misuse our religions. We must rather show it to those—on both sides!—who want justice *and* peace for all, and against those, who want either justice or peace for themselves alone. It is as easy as that.

Without any doubt, the solution will eventually come around, because this is not, in essence, a religious and eternal conflict, but a contemporary political one. We cannot know, when, nor how it will look like. But the solution will not be the enduring suppression or the expulsion of the Palestinian people from its homeland. Nor will it be the destruction of the Jewish State in the Land of Israel. Because, this can be said for sure, neither will ever happen. These simple facts all must acknowledge as the basis for solving the conflict. The truth in this conflict is complementary, like a medal with two sides. You may not equally like both components, but you must advocate both, if you want to achieve one of them:

*There will be no freedom for the Palestinians, without peace for Israel. And there will be no peace for Israel, without freedom for the Palestinians.*

If we want to contribute to either, we must aim at both! This requires in consequence a tremendous step in our consciousness: It means nothing less than the “West”, Jews, Israelis and their proponents must in the first place, openly and authentically, make the case for the full rights of the Palestinian people to enjoy all human and civil rights, to live in dignity and freedom. Then, and only then, they can credibly demand peace for Israel as well.

It means nothing less than Muslims all around the world, Arabs and Palestinians and their proponents must in the first place, openly and authentically, make the case for the right of the Jewish State in (at least parts of) Palestine to exist in peace. Then, and only then, they can credibly demand freedom for the Palestinians as well.

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Ismet Fatih Čančar diplomirao je ekonomiju na Sarajevskoj školi nauke i tehnologije i Univerzitetu u Buckinghamu, a magistrirao međunarodnu političku ekonomiju na King's College London. Bio je gost istraživač na programu Partnerstvo za mir na NATO fakultetu odbrane u Rimu od marta do jula 2022. godine. Trenutno obnaša dužnost savjetnika ministra sigurnosti Bosne i Hercegovine. Autor je brojnih stručnih radova i novinskih članaka. Njegova stručnost i istraživački interes su podijeljeni između međunarodne političke ekonomije i sigurnosnih odnosa, vanjske politike i energetske sigurnosti. Njegovo istraživanje se fokusira na geopolitiku zapadnog Balkana, euroatlantsku sigurnost Bosne i Hercegovine i procese demokratizacije i razvoja tranzicijske države.

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Ismet Fatih ČANČAR

**BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA NA RAZMEĐU –  
NOVA POLITIČKA PARADIGMA ILI AGONIJA  
ETNO-NACIONALNOG EKSKLUZIVITETA**

**BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AT CROSSROADS -  
NEW POLITICAL PARADIGM OR AGONY  
OF ETHNO-NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY**



## Sažetak

Europska kolektivna sigurnost iz temelja je uzdrmana ruskom invazijom na Ukrajinu. U tom kontekstu, Bosna i Hercegovina je prepoznata kao jedna od najranjivijih tačaka europskog sigurnosnog okvira. Ovaj rad analizira poziciju BiH u širem kontekstu regionalne balkanske sigurnosti. Pozivajući se na historiju BiH u 20. stoljeću i njene odnose sa susjedima, analiza otvara najbitnija pitanja sigurnosti i stabilnosti BiH u borbi sa dva velikodržavna projekta: „Velike Srbije“, danas poznate kao *Srpski svet*, i „Velike Hrvatske“, na posredan način, kroz formiranje trećeg hrvatskog entiteta na teritoriji BiH. Rad analizira i geopolitički kontekst aktuelnih dešavanja u Europi da bi objasnio kako se ruska uloga uklapa u pozadinu euroatlantskih integracija BiH. Ta uloga se pokazuje kroz konstantnu podršku različitim srpskim i hrvatskim akterima koji rade na destabilizaciji političkog i teritorijalnog integriteta BiH. Ovaj rad također nudi novu političku paradigmu kao alternativu etno-nacionalnom ekskluzivitetu na kojem se temelji Dejtonski mirovni sporazum. Nova politička paradigma BiH zagovara izgradnju proširenih kapaciteta države koji bi je učinili samoodrživom i sposobnom da samostalno ispunjava sve svoje međunarodne obaveze.

**Ključne riječi:** *Bosna i Hercegovina, Bošnjaci, Balkan, Rusija, euro-atlantska sigurnost, Srpski svet, „Velika Srbija“, „Velika Hrvatska“, nova politička paradigma, etno-nacionalni ekskluzivitet.*

## Abstract

European collective security has been fundamentally shaken by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this context, Bosnia and Herzegovina is recognized as one of the most vulnerable points of the European security framework. This paper analyses the position of BiH in the wider context of regional Balkan security. Referring to the history of BiH in the 20th century and its relations with its neighbours, the analysis dives into the most important issues of security and stability of BiH in the struggle with two "Greater-state" projects: "Greater Serbia", today known as *Srpski svet*, and "Greater Croatia", indirectly, through the formation of the third Croat entity on the territory of BiH. The paper also analyses the geopolitical context of current events in Europe to explain how Russia's role fits into the background of BiH's Euro-Atlantic integration. This role is demonstrated through constant support to various Serb and Croat actors who are working to destabilize the political and territorial integrity of BiH. As such, the paper offers a new political paradigm as an alternative to the ethno-national exclusivity on which the Dayton Peace Agreement is based. The new political paradigm in BiH entails the formation of expanded capacities of the state that would make it self-sustainable and capable of independently fulfilling all its international obligations.

**Key words:** *Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosniaks, Balkan, Russia, Euro-Atlantic security, Srpski svet, "Greater Serbia", "Greater Croatia", new political paradigm, ethno-national exclusivity.*

## BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA NA RAZMEĐU - NOVA POLITIČKA PARADIGMA ILI AGONIJA ETNO-NACIONALNOG EKSKLUZIVITETA

### Uvod

**S**a ruskom invazijom na Ukrajinu, rat se vratio u Europu. Ispoljeno varvarstvo u Buči, Irpinu i drugim gradovima Ukrajine podsjetilo je na brutalnost rata u Bosni i Hercegovini (u daljem tekstu BiH) krajem prošlog stoljeća. Kako je BiH nedavno obilježila 27 godina od genocida u Srebrenici, događaji u Ukrajini oživjeli su strah od moguće kulminacije nestabilnosti u zemlji koja bi se lahko mogla preliti u regionalnu sigurnosnu krizu.

BiH je država koja ima svoje političke, geografske, ekonomske, demografske, kulturne, vjerske i civilizacijske karakteristike koje je čine jedinstvenom na Balkanu. Tokom svog trajanja jedna je od najstabilnijih država čije su granice vjekovima definisane prirodnim geografskim obilježjima na europskom kontinentu, što je čini intrigantnim prostorom na svjetskoj političkoj mapi. BiH je kroz povijest ležala na geografskom prostoru gdje su se sukobljavale velike imperije, od Osmanskog carstva preko Austro-Ugarske Monarhije do Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije. Dok su ove epohe značajno oblikovale civilizacijski prostor BiH, zemlja je uspjela održati svoj međunarodni subjektivitet u gotovo originalnom obliku; kao Bosanska kraljevina u srednjem vijeku, kao Bosanski ejalet za vrijeme osmanske vladavine, kao *Corpus separatum* za vrijeme austrougarske vladavine i kao jedna od šest republika u sastavu Jugoslavije.<sup>1</sup>

Ovakva realnost BiH u aktuelnom vremenu u suprotnosti je sa prirodom tekuće ruske agresije na Ukrajinu gdje sila jače zemlje zauzima teritorije slabije zemlje. U ovakvoj stvarnosti, BiH je prepoznata kao ranjiva, slaba tačka europskog sigurnosnog okvira.<sup>2</sup> Brojni su pokazatelji koji upućuju na moguće oživljavanje sukoba u BiH zbog dvodecenijske kampanje susjednih država da ostvare neostvarene ratne ciljeve, a koji se nisu mogli ostvariti ni upotrebom tenkova i artiljerije. To je jasno vidljivo u djelovanju

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<sup>1</sup> Za detaljan prikaz historije Bosne kroz epohe, vidjeti knjigu Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, New York University Press, 1994.

<sup>2</sup> Vidjeti Harun Karčić, *Why NATO Should Worry About the Balkans*, Foreign Policy, March 30, 2022, i Janine di Giovanni, *The Virulent Nationalism That Led to Srebrenica is Back in Bosnia*, Foreign Policy, July 11 2022.

# BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AT CROSSROADS - NEW POLITICAL PARADIGM OR AGONY OF ETHNO-NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY

## Introduction

With the Russian invasion into Ukraine, war has returned to the Europe. The displayed barbarism in Bucha, Irpin and other cities in Ukraine reminded of the brutality of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH) at the end of the last century. As BiH recently marked 27 years since the Srebrenica genocide, the events in Ukraine have revived fears of the possible culmination of instability in the country that could easily spill over into a regional security crisis.

BiH is a country that has its own political, geographic, economic, demographic, cultural, religious and civilizational characteristics that make it unique in the Balkans. In its lifetime, it has been one of the most stable states whose borders have been defined by natural geographical features on the European continent for centuries, making it an intriguing space on the world political map. Throughout history, BiH has lied on the border of fault lines where great empires clashed, from the Ottoman Empire to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. While these epochs significantly shaped the civilizational space of BiH, the country has managed to maintain its international subjectivity in an almost original form; as the Bosnian Kingdom in the Middle Ages, as Bosnia during the Ottoman rule, as *Corpus separatum* during the Austro-Hungarian rule, and as one of six republics within Yugoslavia.<sup>1</sup>

This reality of BiH in contemporary times is in conflict with the nature of the ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine, where a greater power uses force to seize certain or entire parts of the state territory of a weaker power. In this reality, BiH has been recognized as a vulnerable, weak point of the European security framework.<sup>2</sup> There are many indicators that point to a possible revival of conflict in the BiH, not least because of the ongoing two-decade campaign by neighbouring countries to complete the unfinished war-time goals that have failed to materialize through the use of tanks and artillery. This is clearly visible in the actions of anti-state actors, secessionist forces in Bosnian Serbs and Croats, who have planned, put into motion and executed a number of

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<sup>1</sup> For detailed account of history of Bosnia through epochs, see Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, New York University Press, 1994.

<sup>2</sup> See Harun Karčić, *Why NATO Should Worry About the Balkans*, Foreign Policy, March 30, 2022, and Janine di Giovanni, *The Virulent Nationalism That Led to Srebrenica is Back in Bosnia*, Foreign Policy, July 11 2022.



antidržavnih aktera, secesionističkih snaga bosanskih Srba i Hrvata, koji su planirali, pokrenuli i provode niz mjera koje imaju za cilj podjelu zemlje. Podrška Srbije i Hrvatske ovakvim planovima je permanentna. U takvoj konstalaciji odnosa, ruska podrška ovim akterima dodatno ugrožava stabilnost Balkana, a samim tim i stabilnost europskog kontinenta. Kako je rat u Ukrajini uzdrmao sigurnost europskog kontinenta, opravdano je postaviti pitanje kako se ruska uloga uklapa u ambicije susjednih zemalja u odnosu na BiH.

Ovaj rad nudi uvid u najbitnija pitanja za budući euroatlantski put BiH, uzimajući u obzir regionalne izazove i implikacije koje su duboko ukorijenjene u historijske konstante. Rad počinje objašnjavanjem državnosti BiH kroz historiju, te njene borbe za očuvanje međunarodnog subjektiviteta, suvereniteta i teritorijalnog integriteta. Drugi dio daje razumijevanje ideoloških i strateških planova Srbije i Hrvatske prema BiH u njihovim pokušajima destabilizacije, te kako se uloga Rusije uklapa u ovo okruženje geopolitičke borbe između euroatlantskog i ruskog svijeta. Prije zaključka, rad nudi novu političku paradigmu kao vodeći princip razvoja, odbrane i zaštite BiH od „velikodržavnih“ aspiracija, s ciljem da nova politička paradigma omogući izgradnju širih samoodrživih kapaciteta čvrsto utemeljenih u euroatlantsku strukturu.



ILUSTRACIJA - BOSNA, tokom svog desetostoljetnog trajanja jedna je od najstabilnijih država čije su granice stoljećima definirane prirodnim geografskim obilježjima na evropskom kontinentu.

measures that aim towards the partition of the country. The support of native Serbia and Croatia is not absent in these plans, since the politics of those neighbouring countries is to achieve what has failed during the previous war. In such a constellation of relations, Russian support to these actors additionally threatens the stability of the Balkans, and therefore the stability of the European continent. As the war in Ukraine has unravelled the security of the European continent, it is justified to ask how the Russian role fits into the ambitions of neighbouring countries in relation to BiH.

This paper offers an insight into the most pressing issues for BiH's future Euro-Atlantic path, taking in consideration the regional challenges and implications that are deeply rooted in historical constants. The paper starts by explaining BiH's statehood through history, and its struggle to preserve its international subjectivity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Second part provides an understanding of the policy and plans, of ideological and strategic nature, of Serbia and Croatia towards BiH in their destabilization attempts, and how Russia's role fits into this environment of geopolitical struggle between Euro-Atlantic and Russian position. Before concluding, the paper offers a new political paradigm as a guiding principle for development, defence, and protection of BiH against "Greater-state" aspirations, with the aim that the new political paradigm enables building broader self-sustainable capacities firmly woven into the Euro-Atlantic alliance.



ILLUSTRATION ~ BOSNA/BOSNIA, during its ten-century duration, it is one of the most stable states whose borders have been defined for centuries by natural geographical features on the European continent.



## Bosna i Hercegovina kroz historiju

**K**ao što je Zbignjev Bžežinski istakao u svojoj, po mnogima najboljoj knjizi “Velika šahovska tabla”, region Zapadnog Balkana je često poznat kao “globalni Balkan”. To je prostor stalne nestabilnosti koji karakteriše posredovanje moćnih centara, od kojih svaki ima za cilj da uspostavi svoju hegemonističku dominaciju nad regionom.<sup>3</sup> U srcu medijacije na Balkanu leži BiH sa svojim geografskim, geopolitičkim, geokulturnim i geoekonomskim karakteristikama.<sup>4</sup> Na aktuelnoj geopolitičkoj mapi BiH je usidrena između dvije članice NATO-a, Hrvatske i Crne Gore. Kao teritorija u regiji koja je sve više povezana sa globaliziranim europskim kontinentom, BiH ima nekoliko važnih puteva i željezničkih pruga koje se dalje granaju prema europskim ravninama. Svojom teritorijom ovo područje povezuje Jadransko i Sredozemno more preko srednje Europe sa obalama Crnog mora. Zbog svog položaja, ali i zbog bogate istorije povezivanja Istoka i Zapada BiH je doprinijela značaju geopolitičkog prostora Zapadnog Balkana u međunarodnoj areni.

S druge strane, historija BiH koja se odigravala na raskršću između Istoka i Zapada potvrđuje stalne pokušaje susjednih država, Srbije i Hrvatske, da manipuliranjem historijskim činjenicama pripoje teritorije BiH svojim državama. Ovaj neprestani poriv da se konstantno dovodi u pitanje kontinuitet i međunarodni subjektivitet BiH dio je dobro organizirane, sistemski uspostavljene strategije u kojoj BiH može egzistirati samo pod uvjetima koje propisuju njeni susjedi. Iako je pitanje međunarodnog statusa BiH riješeno 1992. godine Rezolucijom Vijeća sigurnosti 757 kojom je formalno odobreno članstvo u Ujedinjenim nacijama, to nije spriječilo susjedne zemlje da posljednje dvije decenije potroše na potpirivanje raznih kriza.<sup>5</sup> Svaka od ovih kriza, od pokušaja stvaranja autonomnih ili paralelnih institucija, do poricanja i revizije historijskih i pravno utvrđenih činjenica, ima za cilj institucionalno razoružanje BiH. To bi BiH učinilo lahkim plijenom za njene susjede zbog nejasne perspektive i slabe funkcionalnosti državnog aparata.

U posljednje vrijeme bilježimo porast aktivnosti nacionalističkih srpskih i hrvatskih aktera koji tvrde da je BiH konstrukcija koju je nemoguće održati, aberacija koja nema budućnost, zbog svojih unutrašnjih etničkih različitosti. Ovakvi stavovi nisu novost. Dosadašnja znanstvena rasprava na desnom političkom spektru pokušala je upotrijebiti teoriju Samuela Huntingtona o sukobu civilizacija kao opravdanje za nemogućnost BiH. Ovi argumenti našli su uporište u raspravi o raspadu Jugoslavije,

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<sup>3</sup> Vidjeti Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, Podgorica, 2001, p.117.

<sup>4</sup> Za više informacija vidjeti Selmo Cikotić, *Security Prospectives of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Sarajevo: Vijeće Kongresa Bošnjačkih intelektualaca, 2010.

<sup>5</sup> Vidjeti *Rezoluciju Ujedinjenih naroda 757* koju je usvojilo Vijeće sigurnosti na 3082. Sjednici, 30. maja 1992. godine.

## BiH through history

As Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out in his seminal book “The Grand Chessboard”, the region of the Western Balkans is often known as the “global Balkans”. It is a space of constant instability characterized by the mediation of powerful centres, each of which aims to establish its hegemonic dominance over the region.<sup>3</sup> At the heart of mediations in the Balkans lies BiH with its geographical, geopolitical, geocultural and geoeconomic traits.<sup>4</sup> Its borders divide the Balkans into an area between the EU and NATO, and the country itself is anchored between two NATO members, Croatia and Montenegro. As a territory in a region that is increasingly interconnected with the globalized European continent, Bosnia and Herzegovina contains a number of important road and railway lines that branch further towards the European plains. With sea access, this area connects the Adriatic and Mediterranean seas, Central Europe with the Black Sea basin. Thus, BiH, because of its position, and because of the rich history of connecting the Occident and the Orient, has contributed to the importance of the geopolitical space of the Western Balkans in the international arena.

The history of BiH on the fault lines between East and West reminisces the attempts of neighbouring countries, Serbia and Croatia, to annex territories of BiH into their own states through the manipulation of various historical facts. This incessant urge to constantly question the continuity and international subjectivity of BiH is part of a well-organized, systemically established strategy in which BiH can only coexist under the conditions prescribed by its neighbours. Although the issue of BiH’s international status was resolved in 1992 by the Security Council resolution 757 in which formal membership to United Nations was granted, this did not prevent the neighbouring countries from spending the last two decades in trying to fuel various crises.<sup>5</sup> Each of these crises, from attempts to create autonomous or parallel institutions, to the denial and revision of historically and legally established facts, aim to institutionally disarm BiH. This would render BiH an easy prey for its neighbours due to the unclear perspective and weak functionality of the state apparatus.

Recent period has seen an upsurge of claims by nationalist Serbian and Croat actors that BiH is a construct impossible to survive, an aberration that has no future, due to its ethnic differences and diversity. This line of thought is not new. Previous scholarly debate has tried to employ Samuel Huntington’s theory of Clash of Civilizations as a justification for the impossibility of BiH. These arguments found roots in discussion about Yugoslavia, in which the diverse number of religions has been rendered incompatible with each other, and as such, served as the main argument for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the wars that ensued in

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<sup>3</sup> See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, Podgorica, 2001, p.117.

<sup>4</sup> For more information, see Selmo Cikotić, *Security Prospectives of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Sarajevo: Vijeće Kongresa Bošnjačkih intelektualaca, 2010.

<sup>5</sup> See *United Nations Resolution 757* adopted by the Security Council at its 3082<sup>nd</sup> meeting, on May 30 1992.



u kojoj su različite religije pridonijele njenom raspadu i izazvale ratove u cijelom regionu.<sup>6</sup> Međutim, tim argumentima je tada nedostajala suština iz istih razloga iz kojih i danas nedostaje. Ako se posmatra sa stanovišta teologije i filozofije, nijedna od glavnih monoteističkih religija ne poziva na netoleranciju prema nekome ko pripada drugoj religiji. Štaviše, sve ove religije se zalažu za mir i suživot, za međusobno poštivanje i zajedništvo, te stavljaju naglasak na važnost vjerskih sloboda i podstiču razumijevanje prema drugim religijama. Nadalje, historijske konstante BiH državnosti kroz različite epohe svjedoče o raznolikom okruženju različitih vjera i uvjerenja koje su stoljećima u miru i slozi koegzistirale u BiH. U toj teoriji, kako tada, tako i danas, svjesno se zanemaruje uloga nacionalizma i mehanizama koje političke elite koriste da mobilišu ideologiju za sukob.<sup>7</sup>



ILUSTRACIJA - Grafit u Banja Luci, Republika Srpska: "Nema predaje!" - na karti su obrisali granica Srbije, Kosova, BiH i Crne Gore.  
 ILLUSTRATION - Graffiti in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska: "No surrender!" - the map shows the borders of Serbia, Kosovo, BiH and Montenegro.

<sup>6</sup> Vidjeti Fiona S. Ong, *Huntington's Clash of Civilization in Yugoslavia*, *Inquires Journal*, 2011, Vol.3, No.10, str.1.

<sup>7</sup> Vidjeti Florian Bieber, *The Conflict in Yugoslavia as a "Fault Line" War?*, *Balkanologie*, 1999, 3:1, str. 33-48.

the region.<sup>6</sup> However, these arguments lacked substance then for the same reasons they lack substance today. If observed from the point of theology and philosophy, none of the major monotheistic religions teach intolerance towards someone who belongs to another religion. Moreover, all these religions stand for peace and coexistence, for protection and togetherness, and puts emphasis on the importance of religious freedom and encourages understanding towards other religions. Furthermore, historic constants of Bosnian statehood through different eras testify to a diverse environment of different religions and beliefs that coexisted in BiH for centuries in peace and harmony. However, like in Yugoslavia, what was neglected then is neglected today – the role of nationalism and the mechanisms used by political elites to mobilize ideology for conflict.<sup>7</sup>



ILLUSTRATION – Galloping nationalism: Why is patriotism more important to some Croats than daily bread?  
ILUSTRACIJA – Galopirajući nacionalizam: Zašto je domoljublje nekim Hrvatima važnije od kruha svagdanjeg?

<sup>6</sup> See Fiona S. Ong, *Huntington's Clash of Civilization in Yugoslavia*, *Inquires Journal*, 2011, Vol.3, No.10, p.1.

<sup>7</sup> See Florian Bieber, *The Conflict in Yugoslavia as a "Fault Line" War?*, *Balkanologie*, 1999, 3:1, pp.33-48.



Posmatrajući sadašnjost, možemo pronaći konkretne primjere koji podržavaju ovaj argument. Bosna i Hercegovina i Crna Gora su regionalni susjedi bez otvorenih pitanja, koji imaju odlične bilateralne političke, ekonomske i međuljudske odnose. Ova realnost ukazuje da izvor problema na Balkanu nisu navodno nepomirljive vjerske i nacionalne razlike među ljudima, već „velikodržavna“ ambicija Srbije i Hrvatske prema BiH. Niz presuda međunarodnih sudova i istraživanja međunarodnih organizacija jasno su utvrdile sadržaj i suštinu ova dva „velikodržavna“ srpska i hrvatska projekta – pretenzije da anektiraju i vladaju teritorijom BiH.<sup>8</sup> U postizanju takvih ciljeva Beograd i Zagrebi su koristili i etničke i vjerske faktore za raspirivanje međunacionalne mržnje, nepovjerenja i nestabilnosti, što je kulminiralo masovnim ratnim zločinima, etničkim čišćenjem i genocidom u BiH.

Borba BiH za očuvanje međunarodnog subjektiviteta, suvereniteta i teritorijalnog integriteta pred iredentističkom politikom susjednih država još uvijek je živa. U toj borbi Beograd i Zagreb su kroz historiju uživali podršku pojedinih europskih centara moći, kao i podršku niza uticajnih europskih ksenofobičnih pojedinaca koji su se pridružili stavu da je BiH za njih „nemoguća“ i da je stoga treba podijeliti, zarad „bolne obnove kršćanske Europe“.<sup>9</sup> Ta podrška se temeljila na stavu o zajedničkom neprijatelju u BiH: islamu i muslimanima. U tom valu borbe protiv islama, tokom agresije na Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu (RBiH), europske političke elite najviše su se pribojavale mogućnosti stvaranja jedne živahne muslimanske države na jugoistoku Europe – „one koja bi mogla postati bogata, militantna i inspiracija za etničke ili građanske sukobe negdje drugdje“.<sup>10</sup> Apokrifna osuda Srba stavljanjem „prsta na ovo zlo“ više je poslužila maskiranju i ublažavanju stvarnih pozicija europskih centara moći – da je agresija na BiH protumačena kao prirodan način odbrane Europe,

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<sup>8</sup> Ako se traži historijska orijentacija, sporazumom Cvetković-Maček iz augusta 1939. Bosna je podijeljena – određeni dijelovi anektirani Banovini Hrvatskoj, ostali prisvojeni u postojeće Vrbaska i Drinska banovina u okviru Srpske banovine; za noviju političku orijentaciju vidi “Odluku o strateškim ciljevima srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini” koju je usvojila Skupština Republike Srpske 16. maja 1992. godine u kojoj strateški cilj 3 nalaže “...eliminisanje rijeke Drine kao granice između srpskih država” ; i SANU (Srpska akademija nauka i umjetnosti) Memorandum 2 iz 2011. godine koja je zacrtala modernizovanu strategiju izgradnje države za nastavak projekta „Velika Srbija” i njeno finaliziranje u miru; za pravni presedan vidi presude kao što je sažetak odluke Raspravnog vijeća MKSJ u predmetu protiv Slobodana Miloševića u kojoj se navodi da su projekti „Velike Srbije“ i „Velike Hrvatske“ stvoreni u okviru udruženog zločinačkog poduhvata u kojem je, pored Republike Srpske Krajine, učestvovala su i Republika Srpska, Srbija i Hrvatska (Milošević, Odluka 98bis, 258-60.); nadalje, vidi predmet protiv Duška Tadića: presuda se bavila Miloševićem prvenstveno zbog njegove uloge ideološkog i političkog inspiratora događaja. U presudi se pominje „velikosrpska” politika koja se pripisuje Miloševiću i zaključuje da je „usvojena praksa etničkog čišćenja” kao dio politike „uspostavljanja Velike Srbije”. U presudi je također identificiran koncept „Velike Hrvatske”, koja bi uključila sve Hrvate koji žive na području bivše Jugoslavije (Tadić, Presuda, 84.); U presudi ICTY-a Prliću i dr. iz novembra 2017. gdje „Vijeće većinom konstatuje da je udruženi zločinački poduhvat postojao i da je imao za krajnji cilj uspostavu hrvatskog teritorijalnog entiteta s dijelom granica Hrvatske banovine iz 1939. kako bi se omogućilo ponovno ujedinjenje hrvatskog naroda. Ovaj hrvatski teritorijalni entitet u BiH trebao se ili ujediniti s Hrvatskom nakon mogućeg raspada BiH, ili postati nezavisna država unutar BiH s direktnim vezama s Hrvatskom.”

<sup>9</sup> Vidjeti Riada Akšimović Akyol, *On the Anniversary of Genocide in Bosnia, a Policy Reassessment is in order*, *New Lines Magazine*, July 15, 2022.

<sup>10</sup> Vidjeti John Newhouse, *No Exit, No Entrance*, *The New Yorker*, Juni 28 1993, str. 44-51.

Observing the present, we can find concrete examples that support this argument. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are regional neighbours without open questions, that enjoy excellent bilateral political, social and interpersonal relations. This reality indicates that the source of the problem in the Balkans is not the allegedly irreconcilable religious and national differences between people, but rather the “Greater-state” ambition of Serbia and Croatia towards BiH. A series of judgements by international courts and research by international organizations have clearly established the content and essence of these two “Greater-state” Serbian and Croatian projects – the claim to annex and rule the territory of BiH.<sup>8</sup> In achieving that, Belgrade and Zagreb have used both ethnic and religious factors to inflame interethnic hatred, mistrust and instability, which culminated in mass war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide in BiH.

BiH’s struggle to preserve its international subjectivity, sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of neighbours’ irredentist politics is still alive. In that struggle, Belgrade and Zagreb throughout history have enjoyed support from certain European centres of power, as well as the support of a number of influential European individuals who subscribed to the position that BiH was “impossible” for them, and therefore should be divided for the sake of “painful restoration of Christian Europe”.<sup>9</sup> Primarily, that support was reflected in aligning views on a common enemy in BiH: Islam, the Muslims. In that wave of the fight against Islam, during the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RBiH), European political elites were most afraid of the possibility of a birth of a vibrant Muslim state in the southeast of Europe – “one that might become rich, militant, and an inspiration for ethnic or communal strife elsewhere”.<sup>10</sup> The apocryphal condemnation of Serbs by “putting finger on this evil” rather served to mask and soften the position of European power centres – that aggression towards BiH was interpreted as a common way of defending Europe, its religion and its culture – in

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<sup>8</sup> If looking for historic orientation, the Cvetković-Maček Agreement of August 1939 divided Bosnia – parts of it annexed by Banovina Croatia, the rest appropriated within existing banovina Vrbaska and Drinska within the framework of Serbian Banovina; for newer political orientation see “Decision on the strategic goals of Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina” adopted by Assembly of Republika Srpska on May 16 1992 in which strategic goal 3 mandates “...the elimination of river Drina as a border that separates the Serbian states”; and SANU (Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art) Memorandum 2 from 2011 which has laid out a modernized state-building strategy for the continuation of the “Greater Serbia” project and its finalization in peace; for legal precedence see verdicts such as the summary of the decision of the ICTY Hearing Panel in the case against Slobodan Milošević which stated that projects of “Greater Serbia” and “Greater Croatia” was done within the framework of joint criminal enterprise in which, in addition to the Republika Srpska Krajina, the Republika Srpska, Serbia and Croatia also participated (Milošević, 98bis Decision, 258-60.); furthermore, see case against Duško Tadić: the judgement dealt with Milošević primarily because of his role as the ideological and political inspirer of the event. Verdict mentions the “Greater Serbia” policy attributed to Milošević and concludes that “the practice of ethnic cleansing was adopted” as part of the policy of “establishing Greater Serbia”. The judgement also identifies the concept of “Greater Croatia”, which would include all Croats living in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (Tadić, Judgement, 84.); definitive account of “Greater Croatia” has been established in ICTY verdict against Prlić et al. from November 2017 where “the Chamber finds by a majority that a joint criminal enterprise existed had as its ultimate goal the establishment of a Croatian territorial entity with part of the borders of the Croatian Banovina of 1939 to enable a reunification of the Croatian people. This Croatian territorial entity in BiH was either to be united with Croatia following the prospective dissolution of BiH, or become an independent state within BiH with direct ties to Croatia”.

<sup>9</sup> See Riada Akšimović Akyol, *On the Anniversary of Genocide in Bosnia, a Policy Reassessment is in order*, New Lines Magazine, July 15, 2022.

<sup>10</sup> See John Newhouse, *No Exit, No Entrance*, The New Yorker, June 28 1993, pp.44-51.



njene vjere i njene kulture – u očuvanju kršćanskog europskog svijeta.<sup>11</sup> Za Europu je neshvatljivost postojanja europskih bijelih muslimana, progresivnih po svom načinu života, prirodno integriranih u moderne trendove europskog demokratskog i kulturnog naslijeđa, bio sekundarni problem. Zapravo, primarni problem je jednostavniji: BiH bila je i ostala jedna od rijetkih zemalja u Europi u kojoj su muslimani dominantna državotvorna zajednica, politički faktor koji ima kapacitet da proizvede i konzumira sve dijelove društvenog ugovora u jednoj državi, od kulture, muzike i umjetnosti, do privrede, sigurnosti i odbrane.

Takvi stavovi su prisutni i danas, i ta podrška je i dalje vidljiva u krugovima europskih desničara, autokrata i radikala koji oličavaju politiku nacionalnih pokreta za etnički čiste, homogene teritorije.<sup>12</sup> To je prijetnja ne samo BiH kao međunarodno priznatoj državi, već i cijeloj europskoj sigurnosnoj strukturi koja počiva na principima nepovrjedivosti granica i državnog suvereniteta. Zbog toga ruska podrška Beogradu i Zagrebu ima ozbiljne posljedice. Ruska uloga u protekloj deceniji bila je usredsređena na podržavanje aktera da proizvede trajnu destabilizaciju u BiH.<sup>13</sup> Iskorištavanje vjerskih, etničkih i političkih podjela bilo je permanentno sredstvo susjednih država za podsticanje kriza u regionu. Drugim riječima, Ruska politika koristi Beograd i Zagreb u potkopavanju stabilnosti BiH s namjerom da spriječi Balkan da uhvati tempo euroatlantskih integracija i Sarajevo trajno drže u podređenom položaju.

## Podrivanje stabilnosti – regionalni pristup BiH

**S**a kontinuiranim oživljavanjem radikalne nacionalističke politike '90 godina, ideologija etnonacionalnog ekskluziviteta i nacionalne homogenizacije teritorija u multietničkim državama opasan je predznak za nestabilnost regiona. Ovo je prije svega vidljivo u BiH, gdje su takve politike posebno izražene. S tim ciljem, Rusija je podržavala različite aktere unutar srpske i hrvatske zajednice koji su aktivno radili na destabilizaciji političkog i teritorijalnog integriteta BiH. Historijski gledano, takve politike su uvijek ugrožavale mir i stabilnost Balkana i imaju ozbiljan potencijal da naruše delikatnu ravnotežu mira, u regionu i šire.

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<sup>11</sup> Vidjeti Jean Baudrillard, *The West's Serbianization, This Time We Knew*, NYU Press, 1995, str. 84-87.

<sup>12</sup> Politička ekonomija Europe svjedoči oživljavanju ekstremno desnih pokreta i nacionalističkih lidera širom Europe. Nedavno pismo predsjednika Mađarske Viktora Orbana Miloradu Dodiku poziva na rasnu čistoću: „obnovom Europe utemeljene na hrišćanskoj civilizaciji i suverenim nacijama“; njegove primjedbe odnosile su se na „miješanje“ europskih i neeuropskih rasa, dodajući da zemlje u kojima se miješaju Europljani i neeuropljani „više nisu nacije“. Ideologije sa donekle sličnim pozicijama prisutne su u pokretima krajnje desnice u nacionalnoj stranci „Okupljanje“ u Francuskoj, AfD u Njemačkoj, FPÖ u Austriji i drugima.

<sup>13</sup> Vidjeti Jasmin Mujanović, *Russia's Bosnia Gambit*, Foreign Affairs, September 6 2017.

preserving the Christian European world.<sup>11</sup> For Europe, the incomprehensibility of existence of European white Muslims, progressive in their nature, and naturally integrated into the modern trends of Europe's democratic and cultural legacy was a secondary issue. In fact, the primary one was simpler: that BiH was and still remains one of the only countries in Europe where Muslims are a dominant state-building team, a political factor that has the capacity to produce and consume all parts of a social contract in one state, from culture, music and art, to economy, security and defence.

Such attitudes are still present today, and this support is still visible in the circles of European right-wing, autocrats, radical leaders who embody the policy of national movements for ethnically pure, homogeneous territories.<sup>12</sup> It is a threat not only to BiH as internationally recognized, but to the entire European security structure which rests on the principles of inviolability of borders and national sovereignty. Which is why Russian support towards Belgrade and Zagreb has serious ramifications. Russian role in the past decade has been centred around propping actors to produce perpetual destabilization in BiH.<sup>13</sup> Exploiting religious, ethnic and political division has been a permanent tool of neighbouring countries to fuel crises in the region. In other words, Russian politics have exploited Belgrade and Zagreb in undermining the stability of BiH in an attempt to prevent the Balkans from catching up with the pace of Euro-Atlantic integration, while concurrently ensuring that Sarajevo remains, indefinitely, in a subordinate position.

## Undermining stability – a regional approach to BiH

**W**ith the continuous revival of radical nationalistic politics of the 1990s, the ideology of ethno-national exclusivity and national homogenization of territories in multi-ethnic states is a dangerous omen for the stability of the region. This is particularly evident in BiH, where such policies are on full display. Under that line of action, Russia has supported different actors within the Serb and Croat community who have actively worked to destabilize the political and territorial integrity of BiH. Historically, such policies have always threatened the peace and stability of the Balkans and have serious potential to disrupt the delicate peace equilibrium, in the region and beyond.

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<sup>11</sup> See Jean Baudrillard, *The West's Serbianization*, This Time We Knew, NYU Press, 1995, pp.84-87

<sup>12</sup> The political economy of Europe has witnessed the revival of far-right movements and nationalist leaders all across Europe. Hungary President Viktor Orbán's recent letter to Milorad Dodik calls for race purity by: "rebuilding Europe based on Christian civilization and sovereign nations"; his wider remarks attacked the "mixing" of European and non-European races, adding that countries where Europeans and non-Europeans mix "are no longer nations". Ideologies with similar positions are present in far-right movements in National Rally in France, AfD in Germany, and FPÖ in Austria, and others.

<sup>13</sup> See Jasmin Mujanović, *Russia's Bosnia Gambit*, Foreign Affairs, September 6 2017.

## „Velika Srbija“ i Srpski svet – rebrandiranje nacionalističkog diskursa

**b**osanski Bosanski Srbi su veći dio protekle dvije decenije provodili razornu verbalnu tiradu. Kao jedan od dva entiteta uspostavljena Dejtonskim mirovnim sporazumom (DMS), Republika Srpska je uložila sve napore za otcjepljenje od BiH. Tu kampanju je Rusija temeljito podržala s namjerom ostvarivanja većih strateških ciljeva.<sup>14</sup> Razbijanje BiH i uništenje njene državnosti spada u širi geopolitički kontekst ruskog podrivanja euro-atlanskih integracija zemalja zapadnog Balkana. To je strategija koja počiva na trajnoj proizvodnji BiH nestabilnosti koja opstruira njene euroatlanske integracije, iako su svi institucionalni preduslovi za članstvo već uspostavljeni.<sup>15</sup> Kada su ruski tenkovi počeli gaziti ukrajinske ravnice, to je izazvalo duboku zabrinutost za ono što bi se moglo dogoditi u BiH – korištenje sile za prekrajanje granica i stvaranje novih teritorijalnih realnosti.

Rukovodstvo Republike Srpske, na čelu sa Miloradom Dodikom, srpskim članom bosanskog tročlanog predsjedništva, ovaj plan provodi kroz ideološku formulu „Velike Srbije“ – danas poznatu kao *Srpski svet*. Uz podršku Srbije i Rusije, zalaže se za ujedinjenje svih etničkih Srba na Balkanu unutar jedne zemlje.<sup>16</sup> Ta ideologija teži etnički homogenim teritorijama što je u suprotnosti sa principom nepovrijedivosti granica i suverenitetom država. Brzom simulacijom potencijalnih scenarija lahko se mogu predvidjeti posljedice ovih aktivnosti po sigurnost Balkana. Gestrateški, otcjepljenje Republike Srpske, uz rusku podršku u nastojanju da se zaštiti slavensko-pravoslavno bratstvo, *de facto* bi stvorilo ekvivalent Transnitrije na Balkanu – idealnu polugu za vanjsko miješanje u regionalnu krizu. Nadalje, to bi Rusiji omogućilo bliži pristup lukama toplih mora na Jadranu, što je dugogodišnji cilj koji tradicionalno usmjerava ruske interese u jugoistočnoj Europi.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Vidjeti Vesna Pusić, *What Russia Really Wants in the Balkans*, Foreign Policy, November 23 2021.

<sup>15</sup> Srpski predstavnici u podjeli vlasti DMS tvrde da ne postoji konsenzus o članstvu u NATO-u između tri naroda u BiH. Međutim, predstavnici srpskog naroda u BiH su u više navrata glasali za članstvo u NATO-u. Dva slučaja su presudna. 2005. godine, glasovima srpskih predstavnika u Parlamentu BiH, usvojen je Zakon o odbrani BiH, čiji član 84. jasno kaže da „Parlamentarna skupština, Vijeće ministara Bosne i Hercegovine, Predsjedništvo, te svi subjekti odbrane, u okviru vlastite ustavne i zakonske nadležnosti, provest će potrebne aktivnosti za prijem Bosne i Hercegovine u članstvo NATO-a“. Godinu dana kasnije, 2006. godine, Predsjedništvo BiH, na čelu sa predsjedavajućim Predsjedništva BiH Nebojšom Radmanovićem (član Predsjedništva iz reda srpskog naroda), potpisalo je Sporazum o pristupanju BiH NATO programu „Partnerstvo za mir“ – korak koji je preduslov za članstvo u NATO. Od tada, potpomognuta ruskom i srpskom podrškom, Republika Srpska odbacuje ovaj stav pravdajući ga historijskim animozitetom prema Alijansi koja je bombardovala vojsku bosanskih Srba u BiH tokom rata, kao i bombardovanje Srbije tokom rata na Kosovu 1999. godine.

<sup>16</sup> Ranije u martu Aleksandar Vulin, ministar unutrašnjih poslova Srbije, javno je tokom konferencije u Bijeljini u BiH izjavio: „*Srpski svet* je nužnost ove generacije. Ako ne stvorimo *Srpski svet*, bojim se da nećemo imati šta ostaviti budućim generacijama.“

<sup>17</sup> Vidjeti Harun Karčić, *Russia's Influence in the Balkans: The Interplay of Religion, Politics, and History*, Berkley Center

## „Greater Serbia” and Srpski svet – rebranding nationalistic discourse

The Bosnian Serbs have been on a disruptive tirade for the better part of the past two decades. As one of the two entities set up under Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), Republika Srpska has invested all efforts in seceding from BiH – a campaign thoroughly supported by Russia in pursuit of broader strategic goals.<sup>14</sup> Breaking BiH apart and tearing up its statehood falls under the greater geopolitical objective of Russia’s undermining of the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkan countries. It is a strategy that rests on the permanent production of BiH instability that obstructs its Euro-Atlantic integration, although all institutional prerequisites for membership are already in place.<sup>15</sup> So when Russian tanks started trampling across Ukrainian plains, it raised a deep sense of concern for what could happen in BiH – i.e., the use of brute force to redraw borders and carve out new territories.

The leadership in Republika Srpska, at the helm with Milorad Dodik, the Serb member of Bosnian tripartite presidency, guards this possibility through the ideological weaponization of “Greater Serbia” – today known as *Srpski svet*. With support of Serbia and Russia, it advocates for the unification of all ethnic Serbs in the Balkans within one land.<sup>16</sup> The ideology pursues ethnically homogenous territories which contradicts the principle of the inviolability of borders the sovereignty of states. By simulating potential scenarios, one can easily forecast the consequences of these actions for the security of the Balkans. Geostrategically, the secessions of Republika Srpska, with Russian support under the bid to protect the Slavic-Orthodox brotherhood, would de facto create a Transnistrian equivalent in the Balkans – an ideal lever for outsourcing crises in the region. Furthermore, it would enable Russia closer access to the warm-water ports of the Adriatic, a long-standing goal that has traditionally guided Russian interests in South-eastern Europe.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> See Vesna Pusić, *What Russia Really Wants in the Balkans*, Foreign Policy, November 23 2021.

<sup>15</sup> The Serb component in power-sharing DPA claims that there is no consensus on NATO membership among the three nations in BiH. However, the representatives of the Serb people in BiH have voted on several occasions for NATO membership. Two instances are crucial. In 2005, with the votes of Serbian representatives in the Parliament of BiH, the Law on Defence of BiH was adopted, whose article 84 clearly states that “the Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the Presidency of BiH, and all subjects of defence, within their own constitutional and legal jurisdiction, will carry out the necessary activities for the admission of BiH to NATO membership”. A year later, in 2006, the Presidency of BiH, headed by the Chairman of the Presidency of BiH Nebojša Radmanović (Serb Member of the Presidency), signed the Agreement on Accession of BiH to the NATO program “Partnership for Peace” – a stepping stone for NATO membership. Since then, propped up by Russian and Serbian support, Republika Srpska has rejected this position justifying it with historical animosity towards the Alliance that bombed Bosnian Serb army in BiH during the war, as well as the bombing of Serbia during the Kosovo war in 1999.

<sup>16</sup> Earlier in March Aleksandar Vulin, Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs, went public during a conference in Bijeljina, BiH with “*Srpski svet* is the necessity of this generation. If we don’t create *Srpski svet*, I’m afraid we won’t have anything to leave to future generations.”

<sup>17</sup> See Harun Karčić, *Russia’s Influence in the Balkans: The Interplay of Religion, Politics, and History*, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, Georgetown University, July 25 2022.





ILUSTRACIJA – „Srpski svet” je tek eufemizam za stari koncept Velike Srbije, ili slično nazvanog „Ruskog svijeta”, ili Le Monde français, Die deutsche Welt, La mondo Italiano, Lumea Romaneasca ili The English World.

ILLUSTRATION – „Serbian world” is just a euphemism for the old concept of Greater Serbia, or the similarly named „Russian world”, or Le Monde français, Die deutsche Welt, La mondo Italiano, Lumea Romaneasca ili The English World.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Support of „Russian World” / „Greater Russia” and „Serbian World” / „Greater Serbia” in demonstrations across cities in Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Podrška „Ruskog svijeta” / „Velike Rusije” i „Srpskog sveta” / „Velike Srbije” na demonstracijama širom gradova u Srbiji i Republici Srpskoj u Bosni.



Na ideološkom nivou, kroz dajtonsku rekonstrukciju BiH „Velika Srbija“ je osigurala „velikodržavni“ projekat koji je historijski težio ponovnom ujedinjenju matične Srbije i entiteta u BiH. Nakon 27 godina taj projekat je nenadano dobio na težini jer sada uključuje podršku Rusije čija neoimperijalna kampanja koristi saveznike u ime obnove historijskog jedinstva Slavena.<sup>18</sup> Taj simbiotski odnos omogućava Beogradu da Sarajevu nametne trajno podređen položaj u kojem je sputano da se oslobodi sjene *Srpskog sveta* koji je osnažio kroz nacionalistički karakter Republike Srpske. To hendikepira BiH da ozbiljnije zakorači u euroatlanske integracije. S druge strane, to je omogućilo Rusiji da proširi svoju viziju izvan „bliskog inostranstva“. To novo inostranstvo ne dopušta geopolitičku ekspanziju atlantista, i omogućava Rusiji da povрати svoj autoritet i mjesto u svijetu.

*Srpski svet* je danas jednostavno rebrendiranje, evociranje naslijeđa „Velike Srbije“, koje počiva na istim principima, istoj ideologiji, ali prilagođeno drugačijem geopolitičkom kontekstu. *Srpski svet* je strukturiran dogmatski, iako je prožet lažima i nelogičnostima. Uvjerena da je *Srpski svet* nasljedno superiorniji od drugih koristi se kao dokaz urođene srpske inteligencije u kojoj laž predstavlja najveći stvaralački oblik srpskog patriotizma.<sup>19</sup> Takvo ponašanje je sveprisutno u srpskoj političkoj eliti u BiH.

Doktrina *Srpskog sveta* koju koriste srpski nacionalisti u BiH nije slučajno odabrana. Ona danas teži europskoj desnici, onim istim rehabilitiranim frakcijama koje su početnu agresiju na BiH opravdavale borbom protiv „islamskog fundamentalizma“. Paralela s „Velikom Srbijom“ je takođe prihvatljiva za Rusiju jer podržava restauraciju *Russkiy Mir* („Velika Rusija“) unutar historijskih imperijalnih granica. Na isti način na koji Vladimir Putin smatra Ukrajinu historijskom greškom koju treba ispraviti<sup>20</sup>, ideologija „Velike Srbije“ inherentno posmatra BiH i bosanske muslimane kao grešku u genetskom kodu koje treba istrijebiti.<sup>21</sup> Dakle, islamizacija bosanskih muslimana nije samo pitanje

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for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, Georgetown University, July 25 2022.

<sup>18</sup> Aleksander Dugin, ruski politički filozof, historijsko jedinstvo na Balkanu opisuje kao ponovno rođenje slavenske unije, uz napomenu da će “doći zaokret Srbije u ruskoj geopolitičkoj agendi slavenskog preporoda...trebamo završiti ono što smo započeli”. Centar njegove ideologije “Velike Rusije” uspostavljene silom uključuje države poput Ukrajine, Latvije, Litvanije i Estonije, ali i Finske, Rumunije, Sjeverne Makedonije, Srbije, “srpske Bosne” i Grčke.

<sup>19</sup> Dobrica Ćosić, koga mnogi nazivaju „ocem srpskog naroda“ u svojoj knjizi „Deobama“ iz 1961. godine, elokventno je rasvijetlio ideologiju laži. Ova paradigma „laž je srpski nacionalni interes“ je kasnije institucionalizovana kroz dva Memoranduma SANU.

<sup>20</sup> Pogledajte članak koji je napisao Vladimir Putin, *O historijskom jedinstvu Rusa i Ukrajinaca*, Kremlj, 12 juli 2021., koji se smatra Putinovim ideološkim stubom u percepciji rusko-ukrajinske historije.

<sup>21</sup> Za razumijevanje težine riječi „istrijebiti“ potrebno je podsjetiti se na zloglasni govor Radovana Karadžića „put u pakao“ u oktobru 1991. u Parlamentu u kojem je prijetio: „Ovo je isti ona autostrada pakla i stradanja bijede kojom su pošli Slovenija i Hrvatska. Nemojte da mislite da nećete odvesti Bosnu i Hercegovinu u pakao, a muslimanski narod u možda u nestanak (*extinct*). Gotovo 30 godina kasnije, odluka u predmetu MKSJ-a (IT-95-5/18) protiv Radovana Karadžića u Drugostepenoj presudi dala je pravni osnov koji je potvrdio da je genocid korišten kao sredstvo za istrebljenje, konkretno „potvrđene prvobitne osude na osnovu članova 7(1) i 7(3) Statuta MKSJ-a za genocid, progon, istrebljenje, ubistvo, deportaciju i druga nečovječna djela kao zločine protiv čovječnosti...u vezi sa njegovim učešćem u četiri udružena zločinačka poduhvata (UZP): (i) „Sveobuhvatni UZP“ sa zajedničkim planom da se bosanski Muslimani i bosanski Hrvati trajno uklone s područja u Bosni i Hercegovini na koja su bosanski Srbi polagali pravo putem počinjenja

On an ideological level, through the Dayton reconstruction of BiH, “Greater Serbia” has provided a “Greater-state” project that has historically aspired towards the reunification between motherland Serbia and the entity in BiH. After 27 years, the project has suddenly gained weight because it now includes the support of Russia whose neo-imperial campaign is using allies in the name of restoring Slavic historic unity.<sup>18</sup> That symbiotic relationship enables to impose a permanently subordinate position on Sarajevo, in which it is too constrained to free itself from the shadow of *Srpski svet* reinvigorated in the nationalist character of Republika Srpska. This handicaps BiH to take a more serious step towards Euro-Atlantic integration. On the other side, it has enabled Russia to disseminate its vision beyond the “near abroad”. The new “near abroad” therefore does not allow the geopolitical expansion of the Atlanticists, and enables Russia to regain its authority and place in the world.

Today, *Srpski svet* is rather a mere rebranding, an evocation of the legacies of “Greater Serbia”, which rest on the same principles, same ideology, but adapted to a different geopolitical context. *Srpski svet* is structured dogmatically, even though riddled with lies and illogicality. Beliefs that the *Srpski svet* is inherently superior to others is used as a proof of innate Serbian intelligence in which the lie represents the highest creative form of Serbian patriotism.<sup>19</sup> Such behaviour is ubiquitous in the Serbian political elite in BiH.

The *Srpski svet* doctrine used by Serbian nationalist in BiH is not accidental. Today it tends to the European right-wing, the same rehabilitated fractions that justified initial aggression in BiH as fighting “Islamic fundamentalism”. The parallel of “Greater Serbia” is also digestible to Russia because it supports the restoration of *Russkiy Mir* (Greater Russia) within historical imperial borders. In the same way that Vladimir Putin considers Ukraine as a historical mistake that needs to be corrected<sup>20</sup>, the ideology of “Greater Serbia” inherently views BiH and Bosnian Muslims as a mistake in the genetic code that needs extinct.<sup>21</sup> Hence, the Islamization of Bosnian Muslims is not only a matter of religion – reducing a nation to a religious dimension – but a deliberate attempt of dissecting one

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<sup>18</sup> Alexander Dugin, the Russian political philosopher, refers to the historic unity in the Balkans as the rebirth of the Slavic union, with remarks that “the turn of Serbia in Russian geopolitical agenda of Slavic revival will come...we should finish what we started”. Central to his ideology is the “Greater Russia” re-established by force to include countries such as Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, but also Finland, Romania, North Macedonia, Serbia, ‘Serbian Bosnia’ and Greece.

<sup>19</sup> Dobrica Ćosić, by many referred as “Father of Serbian nation” in his 1961 ‘Deobama’ has eloquently elucidated the ideology of lies. This paradigm “lie is Serbian national interest” was later institutionalized through two SANU Memorandums.

<sup>20</sup> See article written by Vladimir Putin, *On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians*, Kremlin, July 12 2021., which is held to be an ideological pillar of Putin in the perception of Russian-Ukrainian history.

<sup>21</sup> Understanding this weight of the word “extinction” needs recalling to the infamous Radovan Karadžić’s “road to hell” speech in October 1991 in Parliament in which he threatened: “This is the same highway to hell and misery taken by Slovenia and Croatia. Beware. Don’t think that you will not drive Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell, and the Muslim people into extinction (*nestanak*).” Almost 30 years later, the decision of ICTY case (IT-95-5/18) against Radovan Karadžić in Appeal Judgement has produced legal ground that confirmed that genocide was used as means of extinction, specifically “reaffirmed initial convictions pursuant to Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute for genocide, persecution, extermination, murder, deportation and other inhuman acts as crimes against humanity...in relation to his participation in four joint criminal enterprises (JCEs): (i) the “Overarching JCE” with a common plan to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory through the commission of crimes in municipalities throughout BiH; (ii) the “Sarajevo JCE” aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo through a campaign of sniping and shelling; (iii) the “Hostages JCE” with the common purpose of taking UN personnel hostage in order to compel NATO to abstain from conducting air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets; and (iv) the “Srebrenica JCE” to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica in July 1995.”



vjere – svođenje nacije na religijsku dimenziju – već namjerni pokušaj odvajanja jednog naroda od njegove geografije, historije i etničke pripadnosti. Dehumanizirati bosanske muslimane znači lišiti ih identiteta, predstaviti ih kao manje vrijedne među europskim narodima. Parlament EU nedavno je poslužio kao pozorište za ove ideje, gdje je Dodik plasirao ustaljene rasističke teorije po kojima su Bošnjaci, muslimani, neprirodni u Europi, u poređenju sa Srbima i Hrvatima koji su prastari narodi na Balkanu.<sup>22</sup> Drugim riječima, bosanski muslimani su aberacija, pa je i postojanje BiH kao države aberacija. To je ekvivalent kampanji „denacifikacije“ u Ukrajini i „historijskoj odgovornosti Vladimira Putina da ne prepusti rješavanje ukrajinskog pitanja budućim generacijama“.<sup>23</sup> Dakle, vraćanje Ukrajine Rusiji podrazumijeva potrebu da se njena državnost restrukturira, ponovo uspostavi i vrati u njeno prirodno stanje kao dio ruskog svijeta. To su dva istovremena koncepta kojima se poriče pravo – Bošnjacima u Bosni i Ukrajincima u Ukrajini – da imaju svijest o sebi koja je u suprotnosti sa historijskim shvatanjima njihovih susjeda o njima, a koju oni stalno ponavljaju.

U zaštiti slavensko-pravoslavnog bratstva, Vladimir Putin je direktno angažirao Rusku pravoslavnu crkvu (RPC) kao alat mehke moći koja je instrumentalizirana u unapređenju ruskih interesa, ne samo na bivšem sovjetskom prostoru, nego i na Balkanu i BiH, gdje pravoslavni kršćani žive.<sup>24</sup> Na individualnom nivou, Rusiji pomaže Dodik koji promovise zajedničke panslavenske i pravoslavne korijene. Zagovarajući duboke kulturne i duhovne veze, ovaj savez je olakšao prodor ruskih ekonomskih i vojnih interesa u Republici Srpskoj.<sup>25</sup> Institucionalno, glavni saveznik Rusije je Srpska pravoslavna crkva (SPC). Ova vjerska retorika između RPC-SPC koristi se u BiH kao oruđe za manipulaciju međureligijskim i međuetničkim narativima za postizanje geopolitičkih ciljeva protiv NATO-a.<sup>26</sup> Iskorištavajući važne društvene i političke faktore koje crkva i religija dijele, Moskva je uspjela u

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zločina u opštinama širom BiH; (ii) „UZP vezan za Sarajevu“ čiji je cilj bio širenje terora među civilnim stanovništvom Sarajeva kampanjom snajperskog djelovanja i granatiranja; (iii) „UZP vezan za taoce“ s ciljem uzimanja pripadnika UN-a za talaca kako bi se NATO primorao da se suzdrži od izvođenja zračnih napada po ciljevima bosanskih Srba; i (iv) „UZP vezan za Srebrenicu“ za eliminaciju bosanskih Muslimana iz Srebrenice u julu 1995.”

<sup>22</sup> Zanimljivo zapažanje tokom saslušanja bio je Dodikov komentar, odnosno pitanje „kako to da se Evropa bori protiv muslimanske države, a u Bosni i Hercegovini gura Srbe i Hrvate u takvu državu“, naizgled tražeći podršku među svojim desničarskim, islamofobnim partnerima u EU parlamentu. Za detalje svjedočenja vidjeti saslušanje Odbora za vanjske poslove Evropskog parlamenta o situaciji u Bosni i Hercegovini održano 14. i 15. marta 2022. godine.

<sup>23</sup> Ideja „ukrajinskog pitanja“ dio su pogrešno i/ili slučajno objavljenog ruskog članka u RIA Novostima koji daje uvid u neoimperijalističko razmišljanje iza Putinove odluke da napadne Ukrajinu. Članak je u međuvremenu obrisano, ali je dostupan na sljedećem linku: <https://web.archive.org/web/20220226051154/https://ria.ru/20220226/rossiya-1775162336.html>

<sup>24</sup> Vidjeti Robert C. Blitt, *Russia's Orthodox Foreign Policy: the Growing Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping Russia's Policies Abroad*, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Winter 2011, Vol.33, No.2, str. 364-456.

<sup>25</sup> Vidjeti Paul Stronski i Annie Himes, *Russia's Toolkit in the Balkans*, Russia's Game in the Balkans, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, JSTOR, 2019, str. 5-16.

<sup>26</sup> Vidjeti Leon Hartwell, Hikmet Karčić, Josephine Mintel, *Send NATO Troops to Help Stabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina*, War on the Rocks, August 12 2022.

nation from its geography, history, and ethnicity. To dehumanize Bosnian Muslims is to strip them of identity, paint them as lesser among European *populis*. The EU Parliament recently served as a scene for these ideas, where Dodik platformed well-established racist theories according to which Bosniaks, Muslims, are unnatural in Europe, compared to Serbs and Croats who are ancient people in the Balkans.<sup>22</sup> In other words, Bosnian Muslims are an aberration, so the existence of BiH as a state is also an aberration. It is the equivalent of the “denazification” campaign in Ukraine, the “historic responsibility of Vladimir Putin to not leave the resolution of the Ukrainian question to future generations.”<sup>23</sup> Thus, to return Ukraine to Russia underscores the need to have its statehood re-structured, re-established and returned to its natural condition as part of the Russian world. Such are the two concurrent concepts employed to deny – Bosniaks in Bosnia, and Ukrainians in Ukraine – a sense of self-awareness that contradicts the historical understanding of their neighbours about them, which they incessantly repeat.

In protecting the Slavic-Orthodox brotherhood, Vladimir Putin has directly recruited the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as a soft-power that is instrumental in advancing Russian interests, not only in post-Soviet space, but also in the Balkans and BiH, where Orthodox Christians live.<sup>24</sup> Individually, Russia is aided by Dodik who promotes common pan-Slavic and Orthodox roots. Advocating deep cultural and spiritual connections, this alliance has served to facilitate Russian economic and military interests in Republika Srpska.<sup>25</sup> Institutionally, Russia’s main interlocutor has been the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC). The religious rhetoric of ROC-SOC has been used in BiH as a tool for manipulation of interreligious and interethnic narratives to achieve geopolitical goals against NATO.<sup>26</sup> Exploiting important societal and political factors that the church and religion hold, Moscow has been successful in fortifying relationships with political leaders, churches and independent groups. Furthermore, the narrative of Slavic brotherhood and shared Orthodox Christianity possess a strong engaging factor, pulling Oligarchs close to the ROC and other different far-right groups in Russian society to actively interlink the church with various counterparts across the Balkans. One of prime examples is Konstantin Malofeev, an oligarch whose think tank Katehon has been a service for Russian influence operations and the spread of strong anti-Western

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<sup>22</sup> An interesting observation during the hearing was Dodik’s comment, or question “how is it that Europe is fighting against a Muslim state, but in Bosnia and Herzegovina is pushing Serbs and Croats into such a state”, seemingly looking for support among its right-wing, Islamophobic centres in the EU parliament; for detailed testimony see Committee on Foreign Affairs of EU Parliament hearing on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina held on 14 and 15 March 2022.

<sup>23</sup> The ideas of “Ukrainian question” are part of the mistakenly published Russian article in *RIA Novosti* that gives insight in the neo-imperialist thinking behind Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine. The article has since been deleted, but can be found on the following link: <https://web.archive.org/web/20220226051154/https://ria.ru/20220226/rossiya-1775162336.html>

<sup>24</sup> See Robert C. Blitt, *Russia’s Orthodox Foreign Policy: the Growing Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping Russia’s Policies Abroad*, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Winter 2011, Vol.33, No.2, pp.364-456.

<sup>25</sup> See Paul Stronski and Annie Himes, *Russia’s Toolkit in the Balkans*, Russia’s Game in the Balkans, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, JSTOR, 2019, pp.5-16.

<sup>26</sup> See Leon Hartwell, Hikmet Karčić, Josephine Mintel, *Send NATO Troops to Help Stabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina*, War on the Rocks, August 12 2022.

jačanju odnosa s političkim liderima, crkvama i nezavisnim grupama. Štaviše, narativ o slavenskom bratstvu i zajedničkom pravoslavnom kršćanstvu posjeduje snažan privlačni faktor, te okuplja oligarhe bliske RPC i drugim različitim ekstremno desničarskim grupama u ruskom društvu kako bi aktivno povezivali crkvu sa različitim organizacijama širom Balkana. Jedan od najboljih primjera je Konstantin Malofejev, oligarh čiji think-tank Katehon služi za ruske operacije utjecaja i širenja oštre antizapadne propagande.<sup>27</sup> Takođe je, navodno, koordinirao ulazak više od sto Kozaka u Republiku Srpsku kako bi podržali Dodika uoči izbora u oktobru 2014. godine.<sup>28</sup> Sve te aktivnosti, potpomognute lokalnim političkim i drugim akterima – od oligarha do crkve, bajkerske bande Noćnih vukova do paravojnih jedinica<sup>29</sup> – imaju za cilj olakšati dublju rusku infiltraciju u regionu i BiH.

Infiltracija Rusije kroz *Srpski svet* predstavlja prijetnju sigurnosti i stabilnosti BiH i Balkana. Prepravljanje međunarodno priznatih granica na Balkanu, a čemu otvoreno pozivaju zagovornici *Srpskog sveta*, siguran je put u nove ratove. Ako dozvolimo *Srpski svet* danas, pitanje je šta će nas spriječiti da sutra imamo i druge svetove, kao što su mađarski, albanski ili hrvatski.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Dio propagandnih materijala „Srpskog svijeta“ u Banjki Luci i „Srpskog sveta“ u Njemačkoj.  
 ILLUSTRATION ~ Part of the propaganda materials of "Serbian World" in Banjka Luka and "Serbian World" in Njemačkoj.

<sup>27</sup> Pored biznismena, Malofejev je predsjednik dobrotvorne fondacije Svetog Vasilija Velikog, najveće pravoslavne dobrotvorne organizacije u Rusiji sa budžetom od preko 40 miliona dolara. On je i predsjednik medijske grupe Cargrad posvećene ruskom pravoslavlju i osnivač međunarodnog investicionog fonda Marshal Capital Partners.

<sup>28</sup> Vidjeti Christo Grozev, *The Kremlin's Balkan Gambit: Part I*, Bellingcat, March 4 2017.

<sup>29</sup> Za detaljan prikaz uloge bajkerskih bandi u BiH, vidi Aleksandar Brezar, *Russian biker gang helping increase division in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Integrity Initiative, April 24 2019.

propaganda campaigns.<sup>27</sup> He has also, reportedly, coordinated the entry of more than a hundred Cossacks into Republika Srpska to support Dodik on the eve of October 2014 elections.<sup>28</sup> All these activities, aided by local political and other actors – from oligarchs to the church, Night Wolves biker gang to paramilitary militias<sup>29</sup> – are aimed to facilitate deeper Russian infiltration in the region and BiH.

The infiltration of Russia through *Srpski svet* represent a threat to the security and stability of BiH and the Balkans. Redrawing the internationally recognized borders in the Balkans, which is openly called by the advocates of *Srpski svet*, will ensure new wars. If we allow *Srpski svet* today, the question is what will prevent us tomorrow from having other worlds (*svetove*), such as Hungarian, Albanian, or Croatian.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Support of "Russian World" / "Greater Russia" and "Serbian World" / "Greater Serbia" in demonstrations across cities in Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Podrška „Ruskog svijeta” / „Velike Rusije“ i „Srpskog sveta” / „Velike Srbije“ na demonstracijama širom gradova u Srbiji i Republici Srpskoj u Bosni.

<sup>27</sup> Besides a businessman, Malofeev is the Chairman of St.Basil the Great Charitable Foundation, the largest Orthodox charity in Russia with a reported budget of over \$40 million. He is also the chairman of the media group Tsargrad that is dedicated to Russian Orthodox Christianity, and the founder of international investment fund Marshal Capital Partners.

<sup>28</sup> See Christo Grozev, *The Kremlin's Balkan Gambit: Part I*, Bellingcat, March 4 2017.

<sup>29</sup> For detailed account of the role of biker gangs in BiH, see Aleksandar Brezar, *Russian biker gang helping increase division in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Integrity Initiative, April 24 2019.



## Hrvatsko „legitimno predstavljanje“

**h**rvatsko pitanje u BiH nametnuto je kroz historijski sporazuma Cvetković-Maček iz 1939. godine. Nakon raspada Austro-Ugarske 1918. godine, pitanje BiH u okviru novonastale Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca dovelo je građane BiH, posebno Bošnjake, u podređeni položaj u odnosu na druge narode. Taj status je dodatno pogoršan sporazumom iz 1939. godine u kojem je BiH postala sredstvo za „potkusirivanje“ između srpskih i hrvatskih „velikodržavnih“ projekata. Prema tom sporazumu, novoformiranoj banovini Hrvatskoj, osim Savske i Primorske banovine, pripali su i gradovi Brčko, Gradačac, Derventa, Travnik i Fojnica – oko 1/3 državne teritorije. Ostatak je pripojen „Srpskoj zemlji“ – „Velika Srbija“.

Sporazum Cvetković-Maček iz 1939. godine postavio je temelje „Velike Hrvatske“ koja je propala zajedno sa porazom fašističke Njemačke na kraju drugog svjetskog rata. Politikom Franje Tuđmana, bivšeg hrvatskog predsjednika nakon raspada Jugoslavije 1992. godine, ideja „Velike Hrvatske“ ponovo je oživjela. Transkripti Tuđmanovih razgovora iz oktobra 1993. otkrivaju direktne upute njegovim oficirima da podrže Herceg-Bosnu. Tuđman je tada izjavio da su to „buduće granice hrvatske države“.<sup>30</sup> Tuđmanov cilj je bio vratiti Hrvatsku u granice Banovine Hrvatske od 1939.-1941. U projektu uspostavljanja Herceg-Bosne našao je saveznika u srpskom predsjedniku Slobodanu Miloševiću, s kojim je razgovarao o podjeli BiH. Prvo u Karađorđevu, a zatim u Tikvešu 1991. godine dogovoren je princip podjele: „gdje su Srbi većina, pripada Srbiji, a gdje su Hrvati većina, pripada Hrvatskoj; za muslimane, država enklava u sredini“.<sup>31</sup> Podjela BiH na dva „velikodržavna“ projekta zahtijevala je i raseljenje stanovništva, i njegovu nacionalnu homogenizaciju.<sup>32</sup> Kao što je priroda srpskih zločina u BiH s ciljem uspostavljanja „Velike Srbije“ dobila sudsku presudu, priroda ratnih dejstava hrvatske strane u BiH kojom je pokušala ustoličiti „Veliku Hrvatsku“ dobila je sličan sudski epilog. Tuđmanova Vlada je koristila „organizaciju, planiranje i koordiniranje vojnih operacija koje su se odvijale za vrijeme sukoba između HVO-a (snage bosanskih Hrvata) i Armije BiH što nedvosmisleno dokazuje da je Republika Hrvatska i Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosna imala jedan jedini cilj – inkorporirati

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<sup>30</sup> Vidjeti Sabrina P. Ramet i Ivo Goldstein, *Politics in Croatia since 1990* u Sabrina P. Ramet i Christine M. Hassenstab, *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2019, str. 273-308.

<sup>31</sup> Vidjeti Berina Beširović, *Sporazum Cvetković-Maček i njegove reperkusije na dogovor između Miloševića i Tuđmana u Karađorđevu*, Periodical for Social Issues, 2019, Vol.3, No.3, pp.73-85.

<sup>32</sup> Anto Valenta, jedan od tvoraca Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosna, u svojoj knjizi *Podjela Bosne i borba za cjelovitost* predložio je razmjenu stanovništva: 170.000 Hrvata bi se zamijenilo za 170.000 Muslimana; istovremeno, 194.000 Srba iz centralnih muslimanskih oblasti u Bosni biće zamenjeno sa 194.000 Muslimana koji bi napustili područja dodjeljena Srbiji.

## Croat „legitimate representation“

The Croat issues in BiH has been imposed through the historic Cvetković-Maček agreement from 1939. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, the question of BiH within the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes placed the citizens of BiH, especially Bosniaks, in a subordinate position compared to other peoples. That status was additionally worsened by the 1939 agreement where BiH became a ‘spare change’ between Serbian and Croatian “Greater-state” projects. According to the agreement, in addition to Savska and Primorska Banovina, the newly formed Banovina Croatia also included cities Brčko, Gradačac, Derventa, Travnik and Fojnica – about 1/3 of the state territory. The rest was annexed to “Serbian land” – “Greater Serbia”.

The Cvetković-Maček agreement from 1939 laid the foundation of “Greater Croatia”, which collapsed together with the defeat of fascist Germany at the end of World War II. With the politics of Franjo Tuđman, the former Croatian president after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1992, the idea of “Greater Croatia” was revived. Transcripts of Tuđman’s conversation dating October 1993 revealed direct instructions to his officers to shore up Herceg-Bosna. Tuđman would then proclaim that those were “the future borders of the Croatian state being resolved there”.<sup>30</sup> Tuđman’s goal was to restore Croatia to the boundaries of the Banovina Croatia from 1939-1941, either as part of the mainland or through the creation of Herceg-Bosna. In establishing Herceg-Bosna, Tuđman found an ally in the Serbian president Slobodan Milošević, with whom he discussed the division of BiH. First in Karađorđevo and then in Tikveš in 1991, the principle of vision was agreed upon: “where Serbs are majority, belongs to Serbia, where Croats are majority, belongs to Croatia; for Muslims, an enclave state in the middle”.<sup>31</sup> Partitioning BiH along two “Greater-state” projects required both resettlement of population and national homogenization.<sup>32</sup> Just as the nature of Serb atrocities in BiH with the aim of establishing “Greater Serbia” received a court verdict, the nature of war actions of the Croatian side in BiH with which it tried to enthrone “Greater Croatia” received similar judicial epilogue – Tuđman’s government used “the organization, planning and coordination of military operations which took place during conflict between the HVO (the Bosnian Croat forces) and the Army of BiH (the Bosnian army) and which the record conclusively proves how the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna

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<sup>30</sup> See Sabrina P. Ramet and Ivo Goldstein, *Politics in Croatia since 1990* in Sabrina P. Ramet and Christine M. Hassenstab, *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp.273-308.

<sup>31</sup> See Berina Beširović, *Sporazum Cvetković-Maček i njegove reperkusije na dogovor između Miloševića i Tuđmana u Karađorđevu*, Periodical for Social Issues, 2019, Vol.3, No.3, pp.73-85.

<sup>32</sup> In his book *Podjela Bosne i borba za cjelovitost*, Anto Valenta, one of the creators of Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna, proposed an exchange of populations: 170.000 Croats would be swapped for 170.000 Muslims; concurrently, 194.000 Serbs from central Muslim areas in Bosnia to be swapped with 194.000 Muslims that would leave areas assigned to Serbia.

‘hrvatske pokrajine’ u jedinstvenu hrvatsku državu.”<sup>33</sup> Muslimane, Bošnjake, u ovoj podjeli BiH, raseljavanjem, protjerivanjem i masovnim ubijanjem trebalo je svesti na demografsku mrlju koja ne može biti politički faktor koji će vjerodostojno doprinijeti procesima u državi.



ILUSTRACIJA - Historijsku „ispravu“ tzv. *Herceg-Bosna* dobila je u Hagu. Jadranko Prlić, Milivoj Petković, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Berislav Pušić i Valentin Čorić, nekadašnji njeni politički i vojni lideri, pravomoćno su proglašeni krivim 29. novembra 2017. godine za udruženi zločinački poduhvat protjerivanja i ubijanja Bošnjaka u Bosni i Hercegovini.

ILLUSTRATION - The so-called historical „document“. *Herceg-Bosna* won in The Hague. Jadranko Prlić, Milivoj Petković, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Berislav Pušić and Valentin Čorić, former political and military leaders, were found guilty on November 29, 2017, of the joint criminal enterprise of expelling and killing Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

<sup>33</sup> Op. cit., *Politics in Croatia since 1990*; više detalja otkriva presuda MKSJ Prliću i dr. od novembra 2017. (IT-04-74-A). Vijeće je utvrdilo da je „...već u decembru 1991. rukovodstvo Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosne (koje je uključivalo Mate Bobana, predsjednika Hrvatske zajednice (a kasnije Republike) Herceg-Bosne) i hrvatskih čelnika (uključujući Franju Tuđmana), predsjednik Hrvatske) smatralo da je za postizanje konačnog cilja, odnosno uspostave hrvatske teritorijalne cjeline, kako je prethodno opisano, potrebno izmijeniti etnički sastav teritorija za koje se tvrdi da su dio Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosna. Najranije od kraja oktobra 1992. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Milivoj Petković i Slobodan Praljak bili su svjesni da je postizanje ovog cilja suprotno mirovnim pregovorima koji su vođeni u Ženevi i da će podrazumijevati iseljavanje muslimanskog stanovništva sa teritorije Herceg-Bosne.”

had a single goal – to incorporate the ‘Croatian provinces’ into a unified Croatian state.”<sup>33</sup> Muslims, Bosniaks, in this redistribution of BiH were to be reduced, by displacement, expulsion and mass killing to a demographic stain which could not be a political factor that will credibly contribute to processes in the state.



ILLUSTRATION ~ The foundation of the so-called *Herceg-Bosna* was one of a series of decisions by the Croatian Democratic Union, then a political movement with the aim of preparing for defense against open aggression against our country, and then for its independence into a single Croatian state.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Utemeljenje tzv. *Herceg-Bosne* bila jedna u nizu odluka Hrvatske demokratske zajednice, tada političkog pokreta s ciljem priprema za odbranu od otvorene agresije na našu zemlju, a zatim za njezino osamostaljenje u jedinstvenu hrvatsku državu.

<sup>33</sup> Op. cit., *Politics in Croatia since 1990*; more details are revealed in the ICTY verdict against Prlić et al. from November 2017 (IT-04-74-A). The Chamber established that “...as early as December 1991, the leadership of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna (which included Mate Boban, President of the Croatian Community (and later Republic) of Herceg-Bosna) and Croatian leaders (including Franjo Tuđman, the President of Croatia) deemed that in order to achieve the ultimate goal, namely the establishment of a Croatian territorial entity as previously described, it was necessary to modify the ethnic composition of the territories claimed to be part of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. From at least the end of October 1992, Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Milivoj Petković, and Slobodan Praljak were aware that achieving this goal went against peace talks conducted in Geneva and would entail moving Muslim populations out of the territory of Herceg-Bosna.”



Ideja o potčinjavanju BiH Hrvatskoj u današnje vrijeme oličena je u inicijativama za izmjenu unutrašnjih zakona, prije svega izbornog zakona, kako bi se ostvarilo takozvano „legitimno predstavljanje“. Koristeći svoju poziciju članice EU i NATO-a, Hrvatska svoju politiku u BiH na međunarodnoj sceni plasira kroz inicijative koje su u interesu samo jedne političke stranke – HDZ BiH (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica) – čija sestrinska stranka čini vlast u Hrvatskoj. Predsjednik HDZ-a BiH Dragan Čović, bivši član Predsjedništva BiH iz reda hrvatskog naroda, takođe se zalaže za reformu izbornog zakona koja daje veću vrijednost glasovima Hrvata iz područja kojima isključivo upravlja HDZ BiH.<sup>34</sup>

Nedavno predložene izmjene koje je hrvatska vlada zastupala u Bruxellesu i Washingtonu, a koje su zatim izašle u javnost kao planirani nacrt koje bi nametnuo visoki predstavnik međunarodne zajednice Christian Schmidt proizvodi pogubnije posljedice. Hrvatski zahtjev Schmidtu je u apsolutnoj suprotnosti sa univerzalnim demokratskim normama i udaljio bi BiH od ideje standarda građanski uređenih društava.<sup>35</sup> To bi produbilo diskriminaciju uvođenjem etnički čistih političkih cjelina, proizvelo bi teritorijalnu segregaciju i eliminaciju prava manjina u BiH, stvorilo dalju polarizaciju duž etničkih linija i dovelo do radikalizacije društva.<sup>36</sup> Nadalje, predložene promjene su problematične jer u potpunosti ignorišu brojne odluke Europskog suda za ljudska prava koje se tiču već uspostavljene diskriminacije u Ustavu BiH.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Prvobitni prijedlozi, koje su podržale i Ambasada SAD i Delegacija EU u Sarajevu, bio je izborni model koji bi se primjenjivao samo na teritoriji Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine (FBiH), dok bi u Republici Srpskoj princip ostao „jedan čovjek-jedan glas“. Važno je napomenuti da prema posljednjem popisu stanovništva BiH iz 2013. godine, a na osnovu rezultata Centralne izborne komisije na općim izborima 2018. godine: od ukupnog broja od 497.883 Hrvata u FBiH, 305.930 Hrvata živi u kantonima sa bošnjačkom većinom zajedno sa jednim mješovitim kantonom (HNK). Oduzimanjem 305.930 od ukupnog broja Hrvata u FBiH (497.883) dobije se 191.903 Hrvata koji žive u kantonima sa hrvatskom većinom. HDZ BiH je na izborima 2018. osvojio 145.487 glasova u FBiH, što daje podatak da od ukupnog broja Hrvata po popisu, tek svaki treći (!) Hrvat je glasao za HDZ BiH, ako se ne računaju glasovi ostalih građana.

<sup>35</sup> Procurjele izmjene Izbornog zakona uvode cenzus od 3%. Naime, samo kantoni u kojima jedan konstitutivni narod čini više od 3% ukupnog stanovništva tog konstitutivnog naroda na teritoriji FBiH mogu birati i delegirati delegate iz tog konstitutivnog naroda u Dom naroda. Drugim riječima, ovakav prijedlog eliminira zastupljenost određenog broja nacionalnih manjina koje žive u etnički mješovitim područjima.

<sup>36</sup> Vidjeti Arminka Helić, *Electoral Reform Proposals in Bosnia and Herzegovina Will Cement Ethnic Divisions*, RUSI, August 1 2022.

<sup>37</sup> U pitanju su presude Evropskog suda za ljudska prava Sejdić-Finci, Zornić, Šlaku, Pilav i Pudarić protiv BiH. Presude obavezuju BiH da ukine diskriminatorne odredbe u Ustavu i Izbornom zakonu BiH, koje onemogućuju nacionalnim manjinama, ali i deklarisanim građanima, te pripadnicima konstitutivnih naroda, u zavisnosti od toga na kom dijelu teritorije BiH žive, da se kandiduju na izborima za članove Predsjedništva, Parlamenta i Doma naroda;

U centru ovog pitanja je odredba „konstitutivnog naroda“ – iako je to ustavna kategorija unutar DMS, proglašena je diskriminatornom od strane ESLJP-a; Naime, presuda Zornić protiv BiH u tački 43. jasno kaže da je „Sud u predmetu Sejdić i Finci je primjetio da je u vrijeme kada su donesene sporne ustavne odredbe na terenu došlo do vrlo krhkog primirja, te da je cilj tih odredbi bio da se zaustavi brutalni sukob obilježen genocidom i „etničkim čišćenjem“ (vidi *ibid.*, § 45). Priroda tog sukoba bila je takva da je bilo neophodno pristati na „konstitutivne narode“ kako bi se osigurao mir (*ibid.*). Međutim sada, više od osamnaest godina nakon završetka tragičnog sukoba, ne može postojati bilo kakav razlog za održavanje na snazi spornih ustavnih odredbi. Sud očekuje da će se bez daljeg odgađanja uspostaviti demokratsko uređenje. S obzirom na potrebu da se osigura stvarna politička demokratija, Sud smatra da je došlo vrijeme za politički

The idea of subduing BiH to Croatia in today's time is embodied in initiatives to amend internal laws, primarily the election law, in order to fulfil the so-called "legitimate representation". Using its position as a member of EU and NATO, Croatia platforms its policy on BiH on the international stage through initiatives that tender exclusively to the interest of one political party – HDZ BiH (Croatian Democratic Union) – whose sister party is ruling in Croatia. HDZ BiH's president Dragan Čović, also the former Croat member of the Bosnian presidency, has staunchly advocated for an election law reform that assigns more value to the votes of Croats from areas exclusively governed by HDZ BiH.<sup>34</sup>

Recent proposed changes pushed in Brussels and Washington by the Croatian government, and then leaked as planned draft to be imposed by the international community's High Representative Christian Schmidt produce more disastrous consequences. Croatia's request to Schmidt is in opposition to universal democratic norms and would distance BiH from the ideas and standards of a civic-oriented society.<sup>35</sup> It would deepen discrimination by gerrymandering ethically clean political units, produce territorial segregation and the elimination of minority rights within BiH, create further polarization along ethnic lines and lead to radicalization of society.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, the proposed changes are problematic because they completely ignore a number of European Court of Human Rights decisions which concern already established discrimination within BiH's constitution.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Initial propositions, supported both by US Embassy and EU Delegation in Sarajevo, was an electoral model that would be applied only on the territory of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), while in RS the principal would remain "one person-one vote". Of importance is to note that according to latest BiH census in 2013, and based on the results of the Central Election Commission of the 2018 general elections: out of the total number of 497.883 Croats in FBiH, 305.930 Croats live in cantons with a Bosniak majority together with one mixed canton (HNK). Subtracting 305.930 from the total number of Croats in FBiH (497.883) results in 191.903 Croats living in cantons with a Croat majority. In 2018 elections, HDZ BiH won 145.487 votes in FBiH, which conveys that out of the total number of Croats according to the census, only one in three (!) Croats voted for HDZ BiH, if no votes from other citizens are included.

<sup>35</sup> The leaked changes to the Election Law introduce a census of 3%. Specifically, only cantons where a constituent people have more than 3% of the total population of that constituent people in the entire FBiH shall elect delegates from that constituent people to the House of Peoples. In other words, this change eliminates representation of certain number of Bosnian minority communities that live in ethnically mixed regions.

<sup>36</sup> See Arminka Helić, *Electoral Reform Proposals in Bosnia and Herzegovina Will Cement Ethnic Divisions*, RUSI, August 1 2022.

<sup>37</sup> The ECHR verdicts in question are *Sejdić-Finci*, *Zornić*, *Šlaku*, *Pilav*, and *Pudarić* against BiH. The verdicts oblige BiH to abolish discriminatory provisions in the Constitution and Election Law of BiH, which prevents national minorities, but also declared citizens, and members of constituent peoples, depending on which part of the territory of BiH they live in, from running in elections for members of the Presidency, Parliament and House of Peoples;

Centre to the issue is the provision of "constituent people" – while it is a constitutional category within the Dayton, it has been declared discriminatory by the ECHR; namely verdict *Zornić vs BiH* states clearly in point 43 that "in *Sejdić and Finci* the Court observed that when the impugned constitutional provisions were put in place a very fragile ceasefire was in effect on the ground and that the provisions were designed to end a brutal conflict marked by genocide and "ethnic cleansing" (see *ibid.*, § 45). The nature of the conflict was such that the approval of the "constituent peoples" was necessary to ensure peace (*ibid.*). However, now, more than eighteen years after the end of the tragic conflict, there could no longer be any reason for the maintenance of the contested constitutional provisions. The Court expects that democratic arrangements will be made without further delay. In view of the need to ensure effective political democracy, the Court considers that the time has come for a political system which will provide every citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the right to stand for elections to the Presidency and the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina without discrimination based on ethnic affiliation and without granting special rights for constituent people to the exclusion of minorities or citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina." HDZ BiH's proposal all revolve around further entrenching the provision of "constituent people", therefore ignoring the verdicts by ECHR.

Izmjene izbornog zakona po mjeri predstavnika HDZ-a BiH i Zagreba ravne su uspostavljanju trećeg entiteta koji bio imao izvršni, zakonodavni i sudski kapacitet da stavi veto na svaku političku odluku većine u BiH. Takav status implicira oživljavanje „Velike Hrvatske“ zasnovane na principima kolonizacijske vladavine nad BiH od strane Hrvatske. Neuspjeli ratni ciljevi danas bi se ostvarili u miru, nametanjem tvorevine ekvivalentne *Srpskom svetu*. Ovakav ishod prepoznala je i Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti (HAZU). HAZU je nedavno objavio program pod nazivom „Prilozi za zaštitu hrvatskih nacionalnih interesa“ u kojem predlaže niz uvjeta za članstvo BiH u EU, među kojima je i „priznati pravu, oslobodilačku ulogu Hrvatskoj i Hrvatima u ratu...i osigurati ravnopravnost hrvatskog naroda, tj. treći entitet i sva prava koja iz toga proizlaze...“.<sup>38</sup> Odjek HAZU programa pojačan je glasovima ekstremnih desničara, poput aktualnog hrvatskog predsjednika Zorana Milanovića uz podršku umjerenije vlade premijera Andreja Plenkovića.<sup>39</sup> Svojim stavovima zajedno su Hrvatsku vratili Tuđmanovom naslijeđu obnovljene saradnje sa srpskom politikom u BiH, dijeleći isti cilj – podjelu države BiH. Za te ciljeve, Hrvati u BiH spremni su izvršiti teritorijalnu reorganizaciju, prijeteci nasiljem ako im rezultati predstojećih oktobarskih izbora ne budu išli u prilog.<sup>40</sup>

Prosto je nevjerojatno da međunarodna zajednica u svojoj tobožnjoj podršci euroatlantskom putu BiH kroz izmjenu izbornog zakonodavstva prenebregava ksenofobične zahtjeve Hrvatske da samo „čisti nacionalni Hrvati mogu birati svoje legitimne predstavnike“?! Još je teže Milanovićevu izjavu o novoj generaciji „bošnjačkih muslimanskih lobista“ koje smatra „toksičnim brendom“ dovesti u vezu sa vrijednostima suvremene europske demokratije.<sup>41</sup> Takvo ponašanje međunarodne zajednice sve više

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sistem koji će svakom građaninu Bosne i Hercegovine osigurati pravo da se kandidira na izborima za Predsjedništvo i Dom naroda Bosne i Hercegovine, bez diskriminacije po osnovu etničke pripadnosti i bez davanja posebnih prava konstitutivnim narodima uz isključivanje manjina ili građana Bosne i Hercegovine“. Prijedlog HDZ BiH se zasniva na daljnjem učvršćivanju odredbe „konstitutivnog naroda“, te se u potpunosti zanemaruju presude Evropskog suda za ljudska prava.

<sup>38</sup> Cjelokupnu listu kriterija prema svim susjednim državama u regiji vidi Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti (HAZU), *Prilozi za zaštitu hrvatskih nacionalnih interesa prilikom pregovora Republike Hrvatske s Bosnom i Hercegovinom, Crnom Gorom i Srbijom u pogledu njihova ulaska u Evropsku Uniju*, 20. maja 2022.

<sup>39</sup> Hrvatski predsjednik Zoran Milanović je na tiradi ksenofobičnih i šovinističkih komentara u vezi sa BiH. Govoreći o državi BiH, on je izjavio: „...građanska država [u BiH] je daleki, daleki san, i to je lijepa stvar, ali prvo sapun, onda parfem“. U jeku ruske invazije na Ukrajinu, Milanović je predložio da Hrvatska uloži veto na ulazak Finske i Švedske u NATO, osim ako međunarodna zajednica ne prisili Bošnjake da provedu promjenu izbornog zakona kako to zahtjeva HDZ BiH. Nedavno je izjavio da današnje Bosne ne bi bilo bez Hrvatske vojske i njene uloge u ratu u BiH, a građane Sarajeva koji su protestovali zbog promjena koje je OHR predložio nazvao je „unitarističkom ruljom“.

<sup>40</sup> Za više informacija o idejama teritorijalne reorganizacije pogledajte najnovije zaključke sa sjednice Hrvatskog narodnog sabora (HNS), glavne političke organizacije Hrvata u BiH, održane 29. jula 2022. godine; za razumijevanje prijetnje nasiljem i detaljan prikaz uloga, vidi Sead Turčalo i Edina Bećirević, *International Community Risks Fulfilling Russia's Agenda in Bosnia*, *Balkan Insight*, August 5 2022.; u danima nakon dospelog nacrtu moguće odluke OHR-a u javnosti, nekoliko diplomatskih izvora potvrdilo je da je hrvatski establišment, kako u BiH tako i u Zagrebu, prijetio nasiljem na jugu zemlje ako izborni zakon ostane nepromijenjen. Izvori su izvjestili da je Washington DC prijetnju shvatio ozbiljno i da je bio jedan od ključnih izvora pritiska na OHR da nametne promjene.

<sup>41</sup> Milanović je ovu izjavu dao nakon usvojene inicijative njemačkog Bundestaga o BiH. Za detalje vidjeti inicijativu

Changes to the election law tailored to HDZ BiH representatives and Zagreb is tantamount to the establishment of the third entity, one which would possess its own executive, legislative and judicial instrument to veto any decision of the majority in BiH. It would imply the revival of “Greater Croatia” resting on the principles of a colonization-like ruling of BiH under Croatia. What has failed as a war-time goal, today would be achieved in peace, through the imposition of a creation equivalent to *Srpski svet*. This end goal has been also recognized by the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts (HAZU), an equivalent to SANU. HAZU recently published a paper titled “Contributions to the Protection of Croatian Interests” in which it proposes number of conditions for EU membership for BiH, among which also is “recognizing true, liberating role of Croatia and Croats in the war... and ensuring the equality of Croatian people, i.e., the third entity and all rights arising therefrom...”.<sup>38</sup> The echo of HAZU is reinforced by the voices of extreme far-right figures, such as the current Croatian president Zoran Milanovic with the support of more moderate Prime Minister Andrej Plenković’s government.<sup>39</sup> Together they have turned Croatia back to Tuđman’s legacy of restored collaboration with Serbian politics in BiH, sharing the same goal – the division of the BiH state. For those goals, Croats in BiH are ready to carry out territorial reorganization, threatening violence if the results of the upcoming October election are not in their favour.<sup>40</sup>

It is simply unbelievable that the international community, in its supposed support for BiH’s Euro-Atlantic path through the amendment of the election law, ignores Croatia’s xenophobic demands that only “clean” national Croats can elect their “legitimate representatives”?! It is even more difficult to relate to Milanović’s statement about the new generation of “Bosniak Muslim lobbyist”, which he considers a “toxic brand”, to the values of contemporary European democracy.<sup>41</sup> Such behaviour of the international community increasingly resembles the failed policies of Western powers during the war in BiH. How else to explain, despite all sound principles of democracy and European libertarian values, an attempt to establish a system in which the political factor of the majority, Bosniaks and declared citizens, is permanently subdued to a minority that stands for national homogenization and ethno-national exclusivity in certain territories of BiH. Montenegrin write

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<sup>38</sup> For the entire list of criteria towards all neighbouring states in the region, see Croatian Academy of Science and Arts (HAZU), *Prilozi za zaštitu hrvatskih nacionalnih interesa prilikom pregovora Republike Hrvatske s Bosnom i Hercegovinom, Crnom Gorom i Srbijom u pogledu njihova ulaska u Europsku Uniju*, May 20 2022.

<sup>39</sup> Croatian President Zoran Milanovic has been on a tirade of xenophobic and chauvinist comments regarding BiH. When discussing the state of BiH, he proclaimed: “...the civil state [in BiH] is a distant, distant dream, and it is a beautiful thing, but first the soap, then the perfume”. In the midst of Russian invasion into Ukraine, Milanovic proposed that Croatia vetoes Finland and Sweden accession into NATO unless international community force Bosniaks to implement election law change as requested by HDZ BiH. He recently stated that today’s Bosnia would not exist without Croatian army and its role during the war in BiH, and called the citizens of Sarajevo who protested OHR’s proposed changes as “unitarist scoundrels”.

<sup>40</sup> For more information on the ideas of territorial reorganization see latest conclusions of the session of Croatian National Assembly (HNS), the main political organization of Croats in BiH, held on July 29, 2022; for understanding the threat of violence and a detailed account of the stakes at play, see Sead Turčalo and Edina Bećirević, *International Community Risks Fulfilling Russia’s Agenda in Bosnia*, Balkan Insight, August 5 2022.; in the days after the leaked draft of OHR’s possible decision, several diplomatic sources confirmed that the Croat establishment, both in BiH and Zagreb, threatened the use of violence in the south of the country if the election law remained unchanged. Sources reported Washington D.C took this seriously and was the key source of pressure on OHR to impose changes.

<sup>41</sup> Milanović made this statement after the adopted initiative by the German Parliament on BiH. For more details see Bundestag initiative “Supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina on the way to a better future”.



Podsjeća na pogubne politike zapadnih sila tokom rata u BiH. Kako drugačije objasniti, uprkos svim zdravim principima demokratije i europskim slobodarskim vrijednostima, pokušaj uspostavljanja sistema u kojem se politički faktor većine, Bošnjaka i deklariranih građana, trajno podređuje manjini koja se zalaže za nacionalnu homogenizaciju i etnonacionalni ekskluzivitet na određenim teritorijama BiH. Crnogorski pisac Andrej Nikolaidis nedavno je primjetio: „otvaranjem političkog procesa, zapadna intervencija dovodi u pitanje jednostavnu, demografsku, biološku činjenicu: da je u BiH najviše muslimana i da će ih sutra biti još više“. Zapadnom intervencijom ova činjenica se minimizira. Budući da politika „uradimo sve da muslimana u Bosni bude manje“ nije urodila plodom, pristupilo se politici „hajde da štelujemo sistem tako da politički efekat bude kao da je muslimana manje“.<sup>42</sup>



ILUSTRACIJA – „Prilozi za zaštitu hrvatskih nacionalnih interesa“ HAZU snažno su podržani od vlade premijera Andreja Plenkovića, koji su trebali osigurati ravnopravnost hrvatskog naroda, tj. treći entitet i sva prava koja iz toga proizlaze.

ILLUSTRATION – The „Contributions for the Protection of Croatian National Interests“ to HAZU were strongly supported by the government of Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, who were supposed to ensure the equality of the Croatian people, i.e. the third entity and all the rights that derive from it.

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Bundestaga „Podrška Bosni i Hercegovini na putu ka boljoj budućnosti“.

<sup>42</sup> Vidjeti Andrej Nikolaidis, *Što nije moglo genocidom, može Schimdtovom politikom*, *Slobodna Bosna*, 26. juli 2022.

Andrej Nikolaidis recently observed: “to open this political process, the Western intervention is questioning a simple, demographic, biological fact: that Muslims are a majority in BiH, and that there will be more of them tomorrow”. The Western intervention chooses to minimize this fact, since the policy “let’s do everything so that there are fewer Muslims in Bosnia” did not bear fruit, the policy “lets manipulate the system so that the political effect is as if there are fewer Muslims” is instead employed.”<sup>42</sup>



ILLUSTRATION ~ With his views, Zoran Milanović returned Tuđman's legacy of renewed cooperation with Serbian politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, sharing the same goal – the division of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Zoran Milanović se svojim stavovima vratio Tuđmanovom naslijeđu obnovljene saradnje sa srpskom politikom u BiH, dijeleći isti cilj – podjelu države BiH.

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<sup>42</sup> See Andrej Nikolaidis, *Što nije moglo genocidom, može Schimdtovom politikom*, Slobodna Bosna, July 26 2022.

Ova intervencija uživa podršku velikog broja europskih ekstremnih desničara, od srpskih predstavnika u BiH i Beogradu do Rusije i mađarskog predsjednika Viktora Orbana.<sup>43</sup> Treba napomenuti da je Rusija dobar dio posljednje decenije revnosno branila stav da je svako korištenje bonskih ovlasti antidemokratski, nelegitimno i da bi upotreba istih mogla dovesti u pitanje sve što je BiH postigla u posljednjih 25 godina. Obrazlažući da „narodi sami odlučuju o sudbini BiH, bez vanjskog posredovanja“, Rusija je upozoravala na stvaranje novih nestabilnosti i ugrožavanja sigurnosti u BiH.<sup>44</sup> Ipak, kada je OHR razmatrao nametanje najnovijih antidemokratskih, anticivilizacijskih mjera izbornog zakona koje bi udaljile BiH od ideje građanski uređenog društva, reakcija Rusije je izostala. Nije izražena zabrinutost za funkcionalnost BiH, niti su u javnosti izrečene prijetnje. Ovakav rasplet je razumljiv kada se ruska pozicija stavi u širi kontekst težnji „Velike Hrvatske“. Ovakvim djelovanjem OHR-a olahko prepušta BiH ruskoj interesnoj sferi, te je u tom procesu izdvaja iz NATO i EU puta. Između ostalog, ruski zvaničnici su u više navrata podržali zahtjeve HDZ-a BiH za izmjenom izbornog zakona, pa je u skladu s tim Čović izrazio „potrebu većeg ruskog utjecaja u BiH“.<sup>45</sup> Razlog je jasan za Rusiju. Usvajanje OHR-ovih izmjena izbornog zakona na zahtjev HDZ-a BiH znači prepuštanje odlučivanja u ruke dva „velikodržavna“ projekta koji uživaju podršku Moskve u jednostranoj reorganizaciji teritorije BiH, a u sprezi sa tekućim planovima za otcjepljenje od strane Republike Srpske. Time bi BiH ostala paralizirana u ostvarivanju bilo kakvog napretka jer bi bila onemogućena ispunjavati neophodne kriterije za daljne euroatlantske integracije. Na kraju, bilo bi zaustavljeno njeno članstvo u NATO-u, a što je za Rusiju krajnji cilj.



<sup>43</sup> Orban je u više navrata izrazio podršku srpskim i hrvatskim predstavnicima u BiH. U svom posljednjem govoru održanom 23. jula 2022. na 31. ljetnom kampu Balvanos izjavio je da se “Hrvati varaju u Bosni”, te da Mađarska podržava Hrvatsku “svim sredstvima koja su nam na raspolaganju”. U aprilu 2022. godine, mađarski ministar vanjskih poslova Peter Szijjarto je potvrdio ovu poziciju prema hrvatskom ministru vanjskih poslova Gordan Grlić Radman, izjavivši da “Mađarska podržava hrvatski stav da hrvatskog člana Predsjedništva BiH moraju birati Hrvati”, te da “Mađarska ne podržava političku progon ili sankcije protiv Milorada Dodika...”. Orbanova poruka na konferenciji za novinare održanoj u decembru 2021. također je bila jasna kada se radi o problemu s Bosnom u očima krajnje desnice kada je izjavio: „Izazov s Bosnom je kako integrirati zemlju sa 2 miliona muslimana [u EU].”

<sup>44</sup> Vidjeti komentare Marije Zaharove iz septembra 2021. o korištenju Bonških ovlaštenja; vidjeti izjave Ambasade Rusije u Sarajevu za komentare iz aprila 2022. o destabilizaciji BiH zbog korištenja Bonških ovlaštenja.

<sup>45</sup> Vidjeti Avdo Avdić, *Od Lavrova do Orbana, preko Ivancova i Kalabuhova: Od 2017. godine (pro)ruski zvaničnici insistiraju na “legitimnom predavljanju” Hrvata!*, Istraga, 4. august 2022.

This intervention enjoys the support of a large number of far-right European figures, from Serbian representatives in BiH and Belgrade to Russia and Hungarian president Viktor Orbán.<sup>43</sup> It should be noted that Russia, for a good part of the last decade, zealously defended the position that any use of Bonn Powers is anti-democratic, illegitimate, and that the use of such powers could call into question everything that has been achieved in BiH in the last 25 years. Arguing that “peoples decide the fate of BiH themselves, without external intervention”, Russia warned of the creation of new instability and threats to security in BiH.<sup>44</sup> Yet, when OHR considered imposing the latest anti-democratic, anti-civilizational Election Law measure that would distance BiH from the ideas of a civic-oriented society, Russia stood in silence. No concerns for the functionality of BiH were expressed, nor were any threats issued in the public sphere. This state of play is understandable when putting Russian position in a wider context of “Greater Croatia” aspirations. First, OHR’s action aid BiH’s surrender to the Russian sphere of interest and in that process separates it from NATO and EU path. Consequently, it was Russian officials that have repeatedly supported HDZ BiH requests to amend the Election Law, and accordingly, it was Čović who proclaimed “the need for more Russian influence in BiH”.<sup>45</sup> Second, the rationale is clear for Russia. Adopting OHR’s proposed changes to the election law at the request of HDZ BiH means handing over the decision-making in the hands to two “Greater-state” projects that enjoy Moscow’s support in unilaterally reorganizing the territory of BiH in conjunction with the ongoing secession plans by RS. By doing so, BiH would remain paralyzed in achieving any progress, because it would be unable to meet the necessary criteria for further Euro-Atlantic integration. Ultimately, its NATO membership would be stopped, which is Russia’s end goal.



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<sup>43</sup> Orbán has had a number of endorsements towards his Serbian and Croatian counterparts in BiH. His most recent speech held on July 23 2022 at 31<sup>st</sup> Balványos Summer Camp claimed that “the Croats are being cheated in Bosnia”, and that Hungary supports Croatia with “all means at our disposal.” Earlier this year, in April 2022, Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister Peter Szijjarto reaffirmed this point to the Croatian counterpart Gordan Grlić Radman stating that “Hungary supports Croatian position that Croatian member of the Presidency of BiH must be elected by Croats”, and that “Hungary does not support political pursuit or sanctions against Milorad Dodik...”. Orbán’s message at a press conference held in December 2021 was also clear about the challenge with Bosnia in the eyes of far-right when he stated: “the challenge with Bosnia is how to integrate a country with 2 million Muslims [in the EU].”

<sup>44</sup> See Marija Zaharova’s comments from September 2021 on the usage of Bonn Powers; see Russian Embassy in Sarajevo for comments from April 2022 about destabilization of BiH due to Bonn Powers usage.

<sup>45</sup> See Avdo Avdić, *Od Lavrova do Orbana, preko Ivancova i Kalabuhova: Od 2017. godine (pro)ruski zvaničnici insistiraju na “legitimnom predavljanju” Hrvata!*, Istraga, August 4 2022.



## Put naprijed za Bosnu i Hercegovinu

Posmatrajući historijski kontekst, srpsko-hrvatski dogovori o podjeli BiH, prvo kroz Cvetković-Maček sporazum, a zatim kroz Milošević-Tuđman dogovor, trebali su poslužiti kao jasnije upozorenje zapadnim silama u njihovoj orijentaciji prema Balkanu. Demokratska renesansa 1990-ih na Balkanu iznjedrila je modernu BiH iz želje bosanskih građana za slobodom, samoopredjeljenjem i međunarodnom afirmacijom. Ipak, zanemarivanjem historijskih činjenica, ova renesansa je zasjenjena strahovitom greškom: prihvatanjem političke platforme koja postulira bosansku državu kao dogovor naroda.<sup>46</sup> Možemo li zamisliti političko stanje drugih zemalja Balkana i istočne Europe ako se isti ovaj princip primjeni i na njih? BiH kao dogovor naroda, personificiran u DMS, anahron je koncept kojeg je prevazišlo vrijeme. Ovo je postalo očigledno kako je europski kontinent učvrstio svoju transformaciju u kontinent naprednih demokratija sa individualnim ljudskim pravima i jednakošću europskih građana bez obzira na sve njihove razlike. Štaviše, ovaj koncept je u BiH proizveo više nestabilnosti i neizvjesnosti nego što se moglo očekivati.<sup>47</sup> Alternativa nestabilnosti i neizvjesnosti koja će nastaviti proizvoditi stalne krize za euroatlantsku sigurnost je usvajanje potpuno nove političke paradigme za BiH, izvan okvira DMS. Nova politička paradigma za bosansku, regionalnu balkansku i europsku sigurnost zahtijeva potpunu eliminaciju nacionalizacije teritorija i teritorijalizaciju etničkog ekskluziviteta. Postizanje toga je stvaranje teorijske osnove za prevenciju sukoba. Tek kada ovu političko-teorijsku platformu usvoji većina građana BiH, BiH može prevladati prepreke tranzicijskog postkonfliktnog društva i zakoračiti u vjerodostojnu demokratiju.

Razmislite o logičnim implikacijama nastavka implementacije i održavanja slova i duha DMS. Pored činjenice da postojeći ustav uskraćuje osnovna građanska i demokratska prava velikom broju njenog stanovništva, njegova sektaška ukorijenjenost postepeno je olakšala nacionalistički separatizam te

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<sup>46</sup> Ideju „BiH kao dogovor naroda“ iznio je prvi predsjednik suverene Republike BiH Alija Izetbegović u uvodnoj riječi na osnivačkoj skupštini Stranke demokratske akcije (SDA) 26. maja 1990. godine. u Sarajevu... „predstoji novi dogovor naroda BiH i naroda Jugoslavije o tome kakvu Bosnu i kakvu Jugoslaviju želimo“. Ova paradigma je otežala razvoj koncepta moderne bosanske nacije u skladu sa europskim normama i demokratskim standardima.

<sup>47</sup> Arhitekta Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma Richard Holbrooke zamislio je DMS samo kao privremeno rješenje s primarnim ciljem okončanja rata i uspostavljanja početnih temelja bosanske države. Kasnija se očekivalo da se napravi tranzicija sa DMS ka prihvatljivijem, funkcionalnijem ustavnom sporazumu. U svom tekstu za The Atlantic „The End of the American Century“ George Packer blisko je uhvatio neka razmišljanja Holbrookea godinama nakon posredovanja u Dejtonu: „...ali u nadolazećim godinama on će dva puta žaliti zbog Bosne. Prvo što je Holbrooke požalio bio je pritisak na Muslimane da prihvate naziv Republika Srpska – Izetbegović je rekao da je to kao 'nacističko ime' – za srpski entitet. Republika Srpska je postala prokletstvo koju su pregovarači vješali Bosni oko vrata. Druga žal bilo je prisiljavanje hrvatske i bosanske vojske da se zaustave pred Banjalukom i prihvate prekid vatre početkom oktobra. ...Šta da je pustio da padne Banja Luka? Bio bi to kraj Republike Srpske. Bosna bi danas bila multietnička država, neuredna ali cjelovita. Rat bi imao pobjednika. I ne bi bilo Dejtona.“ Za detaljan prikaz Holbrookeove uloge u bosanskom ratu vidi George Packer, *Our Man: Richard Holbrooke and the End of the American Century*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2019.

## A way forward for BiH

Observing the historical context, the Serbian-Croatian agreements on division of BiH, first through Cvetković-Maček agreement and then through Milošević-Tuđman deal, should have served as a sounder alarm for the Western powers in their orientation towards the Balkans. The democratic renaissance of the 1990s in the Balkans bore modern BiH out of Bosnian citizens desire for freedom, self-determination and international affirmation. Yet, neglecting historical facts, this renaissance is shadowed by a lingering mistake: the acceptance of a political platform that postulates the Bosnian state as an agreement of the peoples.<sup>46</sup> Can we imagine the political state of affairs of other Balkan and Eastern Europe countries if this principle is applied to them? BiH as an agreement of the peoples, personified in the DPA, is an anachronistic concept stomped by time. This has become more obvious as the European continent solidified its transformation into a continent of advanced democracies with individual human rights and equality of European citizens regardless of all their differences. More so, this concept has produced more instability and uncertainty than was ever expected.<sup>47</sup> To offer an alternative to the instability and uncertainty that will continue to produce perpetual crises for Euro-Atlantic security is the adoption of a completely new political paradigm for BiH, beyond crevices of the DPA. The new political paradigm for Bosnian, regional Balkan and European security requires the complete elimination of nationalization of territories and territorialization of ethnic exclusivity. Achieving that is to create a theoretical background for conflict prevention. Only when this political-theoretical platform is adopted by majority of BiH's citizens can BiH overcome the obstacles of a transitional post-conflict society and step into a credible democracy.

Think about the logical implications of continuing to implement the letter and spirit of the DPA: in addition to the fact that the existing constitution denies basic civil and democratic rights to a large number of its populace, its sectarian entrenchment has gradually facilitated nationalist separatism and state-capture in the face of two "Greater-state" projects with the help of Belgrade and Zagreb. These weaknesses of DPA in

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<sup>46</sup> The idea of "BiH as an agreement of the peoples" has been introduced by the first president of the sovereign Republic of BiH, Alija Izetbegovic, in the introductory word at the founding assembly of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) on May 26 1990 in Sarajevo... "there is a new agreement between peoples of BiH and the peoples of Yugoslavia about what kind of Bosnia and what kind of Yugoslavia we want". This paradigm has obstructed the concept of development of the modern Bosnian nation in line with European norms and democratic standards.

<sup>47</sup> The architect of Dayton Peace Agreement Richard Holbrooke envisioned DPA only to serve as a temporary solution with the primary goal of ending war and establishing initial contours of the Bosnian state. Later expectations revolved around transitioning from Dayton towards a more acceptable, functional constitutional agreement. In his piece for The Atlantic "The End of the American Century" George Packer closely captured some reflections of Holbrooke years after brokering Dayton: "...but in the coming years he would have two regrets about Bosnia. Holbrooke's first regret was pressuring the Muslims to accept the name Republika Srpska – Izetbegovic said it was like a "Nazi name" – for the Serb entity. Republika Srpska became a curse that the negotiators hung around Bosnia's neck. The second regret was forcing the Croatian and Bosnian armies to stop short of Banja Luka and accept a cease-fire in early October. ...What if he had let Banja Luka fall? It would have been the end of the Republika Srpska. Bosnia today would be a multi-ethnic state, messy but whole. The war would have had a winner. And there would have been no Dayton." For detailed account of Holbrooke's role in Bosnian war see George Packer, *Our Man: Richard Holbrooke and the End of the American Century*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2019.

je državu zarobila u dva „velikodržavna” projekta uz pomoć Beograda i Zagreba. Ove slabosti DMS su zauzvrat olakšale Rusiji da se pozicionira u mehkom trbuhu Europe, omogućavajući joj da podrži proxy aktere i proizvodi stalne krize za euroatlantsku sigurnost na Balkanu. Pitanje je onda zašto postoji posvećenost ovom sistemu? Zapadne sile predvođene Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama su uložile značajnu količinu političkog i diplomatskog napora i finansijskog kapitala u državotvorni i sigurnosni sistem BiH. Ironično, DMS je počeo da ugrožava sve dosada uložene napore. Udaljiti BiH od DMS znači stati u kraj ovom problemu. Reformisati BiH u skladu sa liberalno-demokratskim standardima i normama znači osloboditi se lanaca nacionalističke politike. Bio bi to prirodan napredak ka funkcionalnoj ustavnoj demokratiji koja je sveprisutna na europskom kontinentu. U tom kontekstu postavlja se još jedno pitanje. Dok su bosanski muslimani, kao većinska državotvorna zajednica, optuženi za islamski radikalizam jer se usuđuju zahtijevati da uživaju ista demokratska prava, pravila i vrijednosti kao i ostatak europske demokratske tekovine, muslimanski svijet šuti. Zašto je BiH interesantna svima, od liberalno progresivne europske zelene partije do krajnje desnih krugova, osim muslimanskom svijetu? Ovu ironiju je teško izostaviti kada se BiH posmatra između Istoka i Zapada, kao i navodni prirodni odnosi između BiH i Turske, te ostatka islamskog svijeta.

Dok pokušavamo dati odgovore na ova pitanja, bosanska država se mora pozabaviti svojim egzistencijalnim prijetnjama po nacionalnu sigurnost i opstanak. U geopolitičkom kontekstu, nova politička paradigma podrazumijeva rekalkibraciju prioriteta. Bosanska politika ne smije upasti u zamku ni sa zapada ni sa istoka, u kojoj je BiH izgrađena kao tampon zona u odnosu na sfere uticaja koje je zapad olako ustupio Rusiji – i istoka koji je ostavio BiH podložnom nedorečenim stavovima islamskog svijeta. Nadalje, ta tampon zona nikako ne može biti pod kontrolom srpskih ili hrvatskih aktera u BiH, niti njihovih sponzora u njihovim matičnim zemljama. Takve politike izgubile su svaki kredibilitet u višestoljetnom ophođenju prema BiH. Samim tim, BiH će iz nužde pronaći svoj put upravo zbog nevjerodostojnih europskih elita i politike prema BiH da zaustave proboj secesionističkih aktera podržanih ruskim malignim utjecajem. U međuvremenu, taj put mora biti popločan razumijevanjem nadolazećih generacija u BiH da je kapacitiranje države protiv susjednih „velikodržavnih“ aspiracija jedini garant u očuvanju historijskih, suverenih granica BiH. To kapacitiranje podrazumijeva jasan strateški cilj i nacionalni diskurs koji je čvrsto utemeljen na integraciji u euroatlantski savez.

U prvom redu, jedna od osnovnih mjera na kojima treba graditi kapacitete BiH jeste sposobnost razotkrivanja iredentističke politike Srbije i Hrvatske i vojnih, obavještajnih, kulturnih, ekonomskih, političkih, vjerskih i diplomatskih veza između Rusije i dva „velikodržavna“ projekta. Da bi se to postiglo, potrebno je izgraditi bosansku državu kao intelektualnu fabriku antirasističke i antidiskriminacijske politike. Kroz stvaranje kredibilnih naučnih, akademskih, nevladinih i diplomatskih platformi neće se ostaviti prostor u bilo kojem obliku Beogradu i Zagrebu da se dalje miješaju u unutrašnja pitanja BiH. Ovo se posebno odnosi na NATO i EU forume koji se koriste kao platforma za ove politike. Ovo

turn made it easier for Russia to position itself in the 'soft underbelly' of Europe, enabling it to support proxy actors and produce perpetual crises for the Euro-Atlantic security in the Balkans. The question then is why is there commitment to this system? The Western powers led by United States have invested significant amount of effort and political, diplomatic and financial capital into the state-building and security apparatus of BiH. Ironically, DPA has begun to jeopardize all these efforts invested so far. To move BiH away from DPA is to put an end to this quagmire. To reform BiH along the lines of a liberal-democratic standards and norms is to set free of the chain of nationalistic politics. It would be a natural progression towards a functional constitutional democracy present all over the European continent. Another question arises in this context. While Bosnian Muslims, as majority state-building team, are accused of Islamic radicalism because they dare demand to enjoy same democratic rights, rules and values as the rest of the European democratic heritage, the Muslim world is silent. Why is BiH interesting to everyone, from liberal progressive European Greens to far-right circles, except to the Muslim world? This irony is hard to omit when observing BiH between Occident and Orient, as well as the supposed natural relations between BiH and Turkey, and the rest of the Islamic world.

As we try to provide answers to these questions, the Bosnian state must address its existential threats on national security and survival. In the geopolitical context, the new political paradigm implies recalibration of priorities. Bosnian polity must not fall into the trap neither from the West nor from the East, in which BiH is built as a buffer zone in relation to spheres of influence that the West has too lightly yielded to Russia – and from the East that has left BiH susceptible to the ambiguous attitudes of the Islamic world. Furthermore, that buffer zone cannot possibly be under the control of Serb or Croat actors in Bosnia, nor their sponsors in their home countries. Such actors have lost all credibility in the centuries-old treatment towards BiH. Therefore, BiH will carve its path out of necessity precisely because of the incredulity of the European elites and policy in stopping the breakthrough of secessionist actors supported by Russian malign influence. In the meantime, that path will be paved with understanding of the upcoming generations in BiH that the capacitation of the state against the neighbourly "Greater-state" aspirations is the only guarantor in preserving the historical, sovereign borders of BiH. That capacitation implies a clear strategic goal and a national discourse that is firmly grounded in integration in the Euro-Atlantic alliance.

In the first instance, one of the basic measures on which BiH's capacities should be built is the ability to expose the irredentist policies of Serbia and Croatia and the military, intelligence, cultural, economic, political, religious and diplomatic links between Russia and the two "Greater-state" projects. To do so requires building the Bosnian polity into an intellectual factory of antiracist and antidiscrimination policy. Through the creation of credible scientific, academic, non-governmental and diplomatic platforms no credence will be left in any shape or form to Belgrade and Zagreb to further interfere in internal matters of BiH. This particularly applies to NATO and EU forums which are used as a platform for these policies. This must be underpinned by the notion of a "friend in need is a friend indeed". Expanding the friendship circle of the Bosnian cause necessitates investing both capital and human resources in a large-scale foreign policy apparatus that will



mora biti potkrijepljeno idejom „prijatelj u nevolji je zaista prijatelj“. Širiti krug prijatelja bosanskih interesa zahtijeva ulaganje kapitala i ljudskih resursa u vanjskopolitički aparat koji će pokrenuti veliko ulaganje u infrastrukturu lobiranja u ključnim prijestolnicama širom svijeta. Takav poduhvat bi povezo dijaspору s afirmiranim ljudima bosanskih korijena, civilno društvo sa udruženjima građanskih aktivista, biznise sa sindikatima industrijalaca, kako bi promovirao zajednički ekonomski interes i stvorio međuzavisne veze između društava. Štaviše, politički odnosi zahtijevaju razvijanje veza i sa zakonodavnim predstavnicima s obje strane Atlantika, uspostavljajući zajedničku vezu utemeljenu u demokratskom i principijelnom dijalogu. Put promocije pro-bosanskih interesa u parlamentima može se realizirati kroz uspostavljanje različitih službenih radnih grupa i klubova u nacionalnim zakonodavnim tijelima koji će zajednički oblikovati novu paradigmu za BiH – eliminaciju etničkog ekskluziviteta i implementaciju ideje građanskog društva uz puno poštivanje individualnih i kolektivnih prava, a uz to istovremeno suprotstavljajući se ruskom prisustvu u BiH.

U ovom procesu identifikacije puta BiH, nastupajuća generacija građana će snositi najveći dio tereta. Da bi se iskoristio zadati momentum, BiH se ne može vratiti uobičajenom latergičnom ponašanju. Nova era BiH proljeća mora biti prepoznata preuređenom kadrovskom politikom koja pokreće kritičnu masu nove, mlađe generacije kompetentnih, vanjskopolitički pametnih, strateški jakih i zapadno usmjerenih pojedinaca koji su pozicionirani da grade mreže i mostove prema relevantnim partnerima, kreatorima politika i prijestolnicama širom svijeta, na zapadu i istoku. Takav kadar legitimira svoje uporište, u zemlji i inostranstvu, samo ako dosljedno i bezuslovno insistira na striktnom poštovanju normi ljudskih prava i standarda vladavine prava koji prevladavaju u Europi, a oličeni su kroz zapadne demokratije.

Sva bitna pitanja oko BiH treba normalizirati kroz mogućnost referendumskih pitanja pred svim građanima BiH, uz podršku i praćenje međunarodne zajednice. Takva paradigma podrazumijeva promjenu načina razmišljanja promovisanjem novog sistema vrijednosti koji bi razbio dinamiku do sada slijeđenog principa „dogovora naroda“. Konačno, politički fokus BiH treba ostati posvećen izgradnji odbrambenih i sigurnosnih kapaciteta na svom putu ka NATO članstvu. Kreativnim pristupom marketinga prednosti mogu se identificirati načini na koje BiH može doprinijeti kao pružatelj sigurnosti kolektivnoj odbrani europskog kontinenta. Ovo prvenstveno označava potrebu kontinuiranog premošćavanja jaza između vojne i sigurnosne interoperabilnosti sa standardima NATO-a. U zajedničkoj borbi za očuvanje BiH kao demokratske, zapadno orijentisane suverene države, BiH će tražiti partnere koji razumiju posljedice nevinog posmatranja neobuzdanih ruskih aktivnosti u regionu. Ali pored toga, takođe će tražiti i one koji se snažno zalažu za to da je BiH kao euroatlantska članica osnovni preduslov za trajni mir na Balkanu – a samim tim i eliminaciju nacionalističke politike „velikodržavnih“ projekata.

initiate a major investment in lobbying infrastructure in key capitals across the world. An apparatus would tie diaspora with affirmed people of Bosnian roots, civil society with citizen activists' associations, businesses with industrialist unions to promote common economic interest and create interdependence links between societies. More so, the political relations require expanding ties with legislative branches on both sides of the Atlantic, seeking a common theme rooted in democratic and principled dialogue. The avenue for promotion of pro-BiH cause in parliaments can be realized through the establishment of various official working groups and caucuses in national legislatures that will jointly shape a new paradigm for BiH – the elimination of ethnic exclusivity and implementation of the idea of a civic state with full respect for individual and collective rights, while also countering Russian actions in BiH.

In this process of identification of the path of BiH, the next generation of citizens will bear most of the weight. To use momentum accordingly, BiH cannot return to its latergic business as usual. The new era of the Bosnian spring must be identified by a revamped personnel policy that that puts into motion a critical mass of new, younger generation of competent, foreign policy savvy, strategically sound and western brought individuals that are positioned to build networks and bridges towards relevant stakeholders, policymakers and capitols around the world, in the West and the East. This personnel legitimizes its foothold, at home and abroad, only if it consistently and unconditionally insists on strict observance of acquis of human rights and rule of law standards that prevail in Europe and are embodied through Western democracies. All important issues surrounding BiH should be normalized through the possibility of referendum questions before all citizens of BiH, supported and monitored by the international community. Such paradigm connotes a change in the way of thinking by promoting a new system of values that would break the dynamics of the hitherto established principle of “agreement of the peoples”. Finally, the Bosnian polity focus should remain committed to defence and security capacity building on its path towards NATO membership. A creative approach of marketing of strengths can identify ways in which BiH can contribute as a security provider to the collective defence of the European continent. This primarily signifies the need to continuously bridge the gap between military and security interoperability with NATO standards. In the joint struggle to preserve BiH as a democratic, Western-oriented sovereign state, BiH will seek partners who understand the consequences of idly observing rampant Russian activities in the region. But will also seek those who fervently advocate that BiH as a Euro-Atlantic member is a basic prerequisite for permanent peace in the Balkans – and consequently the elimination of nationalist policies of “Greater-state” projects.

## Zaključak

U odbrani zemlje od „velikodržavnih“ aspiracija, BiH se nalazi na raskrsnici između usvajanja nove političke paradigme ili nastavka etnonacionalnog ekskluziviteta. Potonji je stekao saveznika u Rusiji i drugim ekstremno desničarskim pokretima širom Europe koji podržavaju kontinuirano podrivanje suvereniteta i teritorijalnog integriteta BiH na njenom euroatlantskom putu. *Sprski svet* kao evolucija „Velike Srbije“ koja dijeli istu ideologiju kao i *Русский мир* (*Ruski svijet*) u Ukrajini prijatna je BiH. To neminovno ugrožava i Balkan i europsku sigurnost koja počiva na principima nepovrijedivosti granica i državnog suvereniteta. Uz to, naponi da se uspostavi treći entitet kroz oživljavanje „Velike Hrvatske“ daju iste rezultate. Ali više od toga, ove politike šalju važnu poruku: nametanje rješenja koje će dodatno učvrstiti ideje etnonacionalne isključivosti legitimira ratne zločine, etničko čišćenje i genocid u BiH kao validnu metodu u postizanju političkih ciljeva. Takva poruka može samo ohrabriti ratne politike sa još većim apetitom u svojim akcijama razbijanja BiH. Taj kolaborativni pristup dehumanizacije demografske većine BiH, Bošnjaka i svih drugih građana koji odbijaju da se pridruže idejama čiste etničke homogenosti, zahtijeva od bih-politike da se angažira u ozbiljnoj izgradnji kapaciteta s jasnim strateškim prioritetima i nacionalnim diskursom.

Zato bosanski građani i Bošnjaci kao dominantna državotvorna zajednica, koja je kroz historiju stajala kao bedem odbrane BiH od onih koji su se usudili dovesti u pitanje njeno postojanje, treba da prepoznaju važnost trenutka u kojem se nalaze. Taj trenutak državotvorne politike stavlja ideju nove političke paradigme u sam fokus. Na pluralističkoj političkoj sceni nastoji vezati zajednički dogovor, stav i principe u pogledu zaštite i daljeg razvoja BiH kao građanske demokratske zemlje sposobne za samoodrživ razvoj i odbranu u okviru euroatlantskog svijeta. Ovaj izričit stav donesen dogovorom, a potom predstavljen domaćoj i međunarodnoj javnosti, može biti formalizovan i verifikovan samo voljom većine građana. Razumjeti i postepeno prihvatati političku paradigmu ovog tipa predstavljat će stav međunarodne zajednice prema ovoj zemlji i najbolji je test za podršku prijatelja BiH, kako na Zapadu tako i na Istoku.

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
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## Conclusion

In shielding the country from “Greater-state” aspirations, BiH is at crossroads between adopting a new political paradigm, or the continuation of ethno-national exclusivity. The latter has attained an ally in Russia and other far-right movements across Europe that support continuous undermining of BiH sovereignty and territorial integrity on its Euro-Atlantic road. *Sprski svet* as an evolution of “Greater Serbia” that shares the same ideology as *Ruskiy Mir (Russian world)* in Ukraine is a threat to BiH. Inevitably, this also threatens Balkans and European security which rests on the principles of inviolability of borders and national sovereignty. Additionally, efforts to establish the third entity through the revival of “Greater Croatia” produces same outcomes. But more than that, these policies send an important message: imposing a solution that will further entrench the ideas of ethno-national exclusivity legitimizes war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide in BiH as a valid method in achieving political goals. Such a message can only encourage war-time policies with an even greater appetite in their actions to break BiH. That collaborative approach of dehumanizing the demographic majority of BiH, Bosniaks and all other citizens who refuse to subscribe to ideas of pure ethnic homogeneity, requires the Bosnian polity to engage in serious capacity building with clear strategic priorities and a national discourse.

That is why Bosnian citizens and Bosniaks as a dominant state-building team, that throughout history stood as a bulwark of defense of BiH against those who dared to question its existence, should recognize the importance of the moment they are in. That moment of state-building politics puts the idea of a new political paradigm in the very focus. On the pluralistic political scene, it seeks to bind a common agreement, position and principles regarding the protection and further development of BiH as a citizen democratic country capable of self-sustainable development and defense within the Euro-Atlantic world. This explicit position brought through an agreement and then presented to the domestic and international public can only be formalized and verified by the will of majority of the citizens. To understand and gradually accept the political paradigm of this type will represent the position of the international community towards this country and is the best test for the support of BiH’s friends, both in the West and in the East.






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**PRIKAZ  
REVIEW**

Ahmed ALIBAŠIĆ

## **DO ČISTE VJERE PUTEVIMA SLOBODE I ZDRAVOG RAZUMA**

Prikaz knjige: Mustafa Cerić, Kritika čiste vjere,  
Sarajevo, Centar za dijalog – Vesatijja, 2021, 200 str.

## **TO PURE FAITH IN THE WAYS OF FREEDOM AND COMMON SENSE**

Book review: Mustafa Cerić, A Critique of Pure Faith,  
Sarajevo, Center for Dialogue – Wesatiyya, 2021, 200 pages.



## DO ČISTE VJERE PUTEVIMA SLOBODE I ZDRAVOG RAZUMA

Mustafa Cerić, *Kritika čiste vjere*,  
Centar za dijalog – Vesatijja, 2021, 200 str.

Teško je svakom vjerniku, posebnom nekom ko je dvije decenije bio vrhovni poglavar jedne vjerske zajednice, nijemo posmatrati kako se njegova vjera višestruko zloupotrebljava i kontaminira. Reisul-ulema Mustafa Cerić nije neko ko može/hoće utihnuti pred mnoštvom takvih napora. Vođen idejom da je riječ uvijek početak (119), dr. Cerić je neumorni govornik i pisac impresivne produkcije. Njegovo obrazovanje, leadersko iskustvo, spisateljski dar, upućenost u klasičnu i savremenu literaturu te globalni angažman od njega su načinili spisatelja autentične misli i posebne kategorije.

Knjiga pred nama je zbirka četrdeset eseja objavljenih u islamskim novinama Preporod i na internetskim stranicama Centra za dijalog – Vesatijja u periodu 2016–2018. Predgovor Ekrema Tucakovića vjerno je sumirao cijeli sadržaj pa ga nećemo ovdje ponavljati. Autor adresira mnoštvo tema uvijek se vraćajući svojoj centralnoj nakani: da razluči čistu vjeru od ljudskih interpretacija i praksi koje su iz različitih razloga (npr. vremenske zastarjelosti, geografske stranosti, ili jednostavno pogrešnosti) postale koprena ili balast čistoj vjeri i rezultirali skaradnom pojavom “religioznih (ne)vjernika” (93-95). Pritom se koristi metodom odstranjivanja od vjere svega onoga što joj striktno ne pripada.<sup>1</sup> Sam autor kaže da “na prvi pogled to izgleda i normalno i razumljivo, ali u povijesti to nije bilo ni normalno ni razumljivo” (138). Ovom prilikom ćemo akcentirati neke teze i dionice knjige ostavljajući čitaocu da ostale sam otkrije. Budući da nisam ni filozof ni teolog, neću se posebno zadržavati na čisto filozofskim

i stručno teološkim dijelovima (npr. 113-116) već na onim koja oslovljavaju svakog vjernika i muslimansku zajednicu (tj. društvenu islamsku misao).

U ovim esejima ima ponešto za svakoga; za obrazovane teologe i ljubitelje mudre riječi uopće ali i za vjernike neupućene u teološke debate na kojima je dr. Cerić nekad davno doktorirao pred r. Fazlurom Rahmanom na Univerzitetu u Čikagu. Mislim ovdje na autorova razmatranja o podršci h. Hatidže Poslaniku, a.s., po primitku prve objave (71-72), islamu i besmrtnosti (83, 97), konsekvencama vjere u Sudnji dan (180-181) i hedonizmu (“Hedonizam je bolesna strast koja troši ljudsku plodnost”, 88). To su ponajbolje eksplikacije tih tema na jasnom i pristupačnom bosanskom jeziku, koji autor snažno zagovara (126). Kao primjer navodimo i razmatranje o potrazi modernog čovjeka za srećom: “Taj moderni čovjek nije samo nesretan, već je i očajan što nije sretan. A nije sretan zato što ono što ga na prvi pogled čini sretnim ubrzo ga učini nesretnim. ... Sretan je što ugodno živi, ali je nesretan što mu je život kratak. Volio bi da živi i poslije smrti, ali negira život na drugom svijetu. ... Volio bi da ima više života, ali pjeva 'samo se jednom živi'. U tome je razlika između onih koji su svjesni dva života: jednog koji je prolazan i drugog koji je vječan i onih koji misle da postoji samo jedan prolazni život poslije kojeg je samo jedno veliko ništa. Prvi su sretni u nesretnom prolaznom životu dok misle na vječni spas, a potonji su nesretni u sretnom prolaznom životu dok strahuju od neminovnog, nesretnog i bespovratnog kraja” (93-94). Podjednako je osvješćujuća autorova zapitanost o paradoksima savremenog svijeta: “Zašto čovjek ima potrebu da brine o životinjama ako nije u stanju da brine o samome sebi? Zašto zabrana ubijanja životinja

<sup>1</sup> Pripovijeda se da je Mikelandelo na pitanje kako je uspio isklesati Davida odgovorio: samo sam odstranio ono što u kamenu nije bio on!

## TO PURE FAITH IN THE WAYS OF FREEDOM AND COMMON SENSE

Book review: Mustafa Cerić, *A Critique of Pure Faith*,  
Sarajevo, Center for Dialogue – Wasatiyya, 2021, 200 pages.

It is difficult for any believer, especially someone who was the supreme head of a religious community for two decades, to silently observe how his faith is repeatedly abused and contaminated. Grand Mufti Mustafa Cerić is not someone who can/will remain silent in the face of many such efforts. Guided by the idea that the word is always the beginning (119), dr. Cerić is a tireless speaker and writer of impressive production. His education, leadership experience, writing talent, familiarity with classic and contemporary literature, and global involvement have made him a writer of authentic thought and a special category.

The book before us is a collection of forty essays published in the Islamic newspaper *Preporod* and on the website of the Center for Dialogue – *Wasatiyya* in the period 2016-2018. The foreword by Ekrem Tucaković faithfully summarized the entire content, so we will not repeat it here. The author addresses a multitude of topics, always returning to his central intention: to distinguish pure faith from human interpretations and practices that, for various reasons (e.g., time obsolescence, geographical foreignness, or simply wrongness), have become a veil or ballast to pure faith and resulted in the dismal appearance of "religious (non)believers" (93-95). At the same time, it uses the method of removing from religion everything that does not strictly belong to it.<sup>1</sup> The author himself says that "at first glance it looks both normal and understandable, but in history it was neither normal nor understandable" (138). On this occasion, we will emphasize some theses and parts of the book, leaving the reader to discover the rest on their own. Since I am neither a philosopher nor a theologian, I will not particularly dwell on the purely philosophical and expertly theological parts (e.g. 113-116), but rather on those that address every believer and the Muslim community (i.e. social Islamic thought).

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<sup>1</sup> It is said that Michelangelo replied when asked how he managed to carve David: I only removed what was not him in stone!

There is something for everyone in these essays; for educated theologians and lovers of wise words in general, but also for believers ignorant of the theological debates for which dr. Cerić once upon a time received his doctorate before late Fazlur Rahman at the University of Chicago. I am referring here to the author's considerations on the support of honorable Khadija to the Prophet, peace be upon him, upon receiving the first revelation (71-72), Islam and immortality (83, 97), the consequences of belief in the Day of Judgment (180-181) and hedonism ("Hedonism is a sick passion that consumes human fertility", 88). These are the best explanations of those topics in a clear and accessible Bosnian language, which the author strongly advocates (126). As an example, we cite the consideration of modern man's search for happiness: "That modern man is not only unhappy, but also desperate for not being happy. And he is not happy because what makes him happy at first sight soon makes him unhappy. ... He is happy that he lives comfortably, but he is unhappy that his life is short. He would like to live after death, but he denies life in the other world. ... He would like to have more lives, but he sings 'you only live once'. This is the difference between those who are aware of two lives: one which is transitory and the other which is eternal, and those who think that there is only one fleeting life after which there is only one great nothingness. The former are happy in an unhappy transient life while thinking of eternal salvation, and the latter are unhappy in a happy transient life while fearing an inevitable, unhappy and irreversible end" (93-94). Equally enlightening is the author's questioning of the paradoxes of the modern world: "Why does man need to take care of animals if he is unable to take care of himself? Why ban the killing of animals if mass killing of humans is allowed? Why does man love animals if he does not know how to love man?" (88).

The author's unique profile gives these essays and



ako je dozvoljeno masovno ubijanje čovjeka? Zašto čovjek voli životinje ako ne umije da voli čovjeka?” (88).

Autorov unikatni profil ovim esejima i tezama u njemu daje posebnu dimenziju i značenje. Poziv ulemi da svjesno ili nesvjesno ne proizvodi poluistine i polulaži radi lične koristi (43) odjekuju jače kad ih napiše neko ko ulemu poznaje dugo i intimno. Slično je i sa tvrdnjom da problem nije u diktatu vjere već u “diktatorima vjere” (74), kakvih se autor očito nagledao; da je dogma ćorsokak i ropstvo uma (77); da je taklid u vjerovanju nedopustiv (78); da su muslimanski teolozi najveći krivci što je muslimanska vjera opterećena dogmatsko-taklidskim mišljenjem (78); da je personalna akida, makar bila i od najvećeg učenjaka, lični gutljaj čiste vode sa izvora šerijata, koji može utoliti žeđ tog učenjaka ali ne nužno i žeđ njegovih učenika (84).

Reisul-ulema Cerić se ne bavi samo globalnim izazovima za čistu vjeru već i onim lokalnim, bosanskim: “Sada vidimo da nam se dragulj čiste vjere prlja dogmom sujete, pakosti, ljubomore, zavisti, sebičnosti, licemjerja i isključivosti.” Upravo pred tim izazovima je skromniji nego pred onim globalnim: “Znam, ali ne umijem ništa da poduzmem da to spriječim. Znam, ali sam nemoćan da zaustavim mrak sujete. Znam, ali sam frustriran što ne smijem da govorim ono što stvarno mislim. Ne zbog ičije cenzure, već zbog samocenzure. ... Priznajem, teško mi je što Marks više nije kriv, već smo krivi svi mi” (118-119). Nije to jedino mjesto gdje autor adresira pitanje “kolektivne nemoći” koja nas sve frustrira i tjera da činimo poteze očajnika koji nas mogu odvesti samo u propast, bilo da je riječ o nasilnom ekstremizmu, nekritičkom pripadanju ili apatiji. Bilo bi korisno da se autor u nekoj narednoj prilici posveti više pitanju prevazilaženja ove nemoći. Siguran sam da o tome mnogo zna iz svojih uvida u literaturu i iz ličnog iskustva. Osnaživanje zajednice kao strukturalno rješenje za muslimanske frustracije mogla bi biti i jedna od tema autorovih memoara u nastajanju.

Bilo da se bavi globalnim ili lokalnim izazovima čiste vjere, reisul-ulema to čini kao mislilac i veliki zagovornik razumijevanja vjere kao etičke poruke u uvjetima slobode pomoću zdravog razuma.

Sloboda je drugo pravilo čiste vjere (109). Zapravo, vjera je sloboda (198). Bez slobode nema spoznaje Istine (159). Čovjek nema izbora već da bira, čovjek nema slobodu od slobode (199). Slobodu duha i slobodu uma o velikim vjerskim temama nemaju pravo ograničiti ni muslimanske vlasti, ni sam halifa: “politika, odnosno država, makar to bio i Hilafet, nema pravo diktirati spekulativnu dogmu, jer vjera mora ostati čista od dogme, koja je misaono promjenjiva”, i koje je, zapravo, diktat politike (102). Vlast, makar bila i muslimanska, nema pravo miješati se u vjerska i doktrinarna pitanja muslimana: “Sloboda savjesti i vjere jedna je od najviših vrijednosti islamskog moralno-etičkog učenja” (104).

Sloboda, međutim, nije dovoljna za pronalazak Istine i prepoznavanje smisla postojanja. U slobodi se čovjek ima osloniti na zdravi razum, “koji nije najsavršenija mjera stvari na ovome svijetu, ali jeste jedna od najboljih i najpouzdanijih mjera za mentalno i duhovno zdravlje čovjeka“ (144). Nakon iskustva sa marokanskim šarlatanom koji je u jesen 2010. godine sedmicama zamajavao bh. muslimansku javnost svojim nadriljekarstvom i teorija zavjere u jeku pandemije COVID-19 ohrabrujuće je čuti da Kur'an odiše “racionalnim i znanstvenim optimizmom” (164). Taj dar Božiji ugrožavaju zaneseni sufija koji misli da je svetac na Nebu i zaglupljeni bukvalista koji misli da je svetac na Zemlji (145). Među izazovima čiste vjere preko ataka na zdravi razum (pseudoselefizam ili čisti bukvalizam, sufijski elitizam i agnosticizam) autor izrijeком ne spominje rigidni tradicionalizam, mada se cijeli serijal zapravo tim izazovom bavi više nego ijednim drugim. Pretpostavljam da je autor htio izbjeći etiketiranje koje često pomaže u razumijevanju ali i stvara jake animozitete koji prekidaju dijalog.

A ovaj serijal je implicitna kritika okoštale tradicije jer, kad se spoje sloboda i um, nema mjesta naslijeđenim stavovima, ma koji mezheb da je u pitanju. Tako čitamo “da je Kur'an jedina sveta knjiga koja nagovještava mogućnost spasenja i onih koji se ne zovu 'muslimani' ako su po svom vjerovanju i djelovanju u duhu opće ideje tevhide i dobrobitnog djelovanja u svijetu”(152-3). Ništa manje neortodoksna nije ni autorova

theses a special dimension and meaning. The call to ulama not to consciously or unconsciously produce half-truths and half-lies for personal gain (43) resonates more strongly when written by someone who has known the ulama for a long time and intimately. It is similar to the claim that the problem is not in the dictation of faith but in the "dictators of faith" (74), which the author obviously saw a lot of them; that dogma is a dead end as well as slavery of the mind (77); that *taqlīd* in belief is impermissible (78); that Muslim theologians are the biggest culprits that the Muslim faith is burdened with dogmatic- *taqlīd* thinking (78); that personal *'aqīdah*, even if it was from the greatest scholar, is a personal sip of pure water from the source of *Shari'ah*, which can quench the thirst of that scholar but not necessarily the thirst of his students (84).

Grand Mufti Cerić deals not only with global challenges for pure faith, but also with local, Bosnian ones: "Now we see that the jewel of pure faith is being defiled by the dogma of vanity, wickedness, jealousy, envy, selfishness, hypocrisy and exclusivity" is more modest than before the global one: "I know, but I cannot do anything to prevent it. I know, but I am powerless to stop the darkness of vanity. I know, but I am frustrated that I cannot say what I really think. Not because of anyone's censorship, but because of self-censorship. ... I admit, it is hard for me that Marx is no longer guilty, it is all of us" (118-119). It is not the only place where the author addresses the issue of "collective impotence" that frustrates us all and forces us to make desperate moves that can only lead us to ruin, whether it is violent extremism, uncritical belonging or apathy. It would be useful for the author to devote himself more to the issue of overcoming this weakness on some future occasion. I am certain he knows much about it from his insights into literature and from personal experience. Community empowerment as a structural solution to Muslim frustrations could also be one of the themes of the author's upcoming memoir.

Whether he deals with global or local challenges of pure faith, the Grand Mufti does so as a thinker and a great advocate of understanding *faith as an ethical message under conditions of freedom* by means of *common sense*. Freedom is the second rule of pure faith (109). In fact, faith is freedom (198). Without freedom there is no knowledge of the Truth (159). Man has no choice but to choose, man has no freedom from freedom (199). Neither the Muslim authorities, nor the caliph himself, have the right to limit the freedom of the spirit and the freedom of the mind on major religious topics: "politics, that is, the state, even if

it was the Caliphate, has no right to dictate speculative dogma, because faith must remain pure from dogma, which is mentally changeable." , and which is, in fact, a policy dictate (102). The government, even if it is Muslim, has no right to interfere in the religious and doctrinal issues of Muslims: "Freedom of conscience and religion is one of the highest values of Islamic moral and ethical teaching" (104).

Freedom, however, is not enough to find the Truth and recognize the meaning of existence. In freedom, a person can rely on common sense, "which is not the most perfect measure of things in this world, but it is one of the best and most reliable measures for the mental and spiritual health of a person" (144). After the experience with the Moroccan charlatan who, in the fall of 2010, swayed Bosnia and Herzegovina for weeks, the Muslim public with its quackery and conspiracy theories in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is encouraging to hear that the Qur'an exudes "rational and scientific optimism" (164). That gift of God is threatened by the rapturous Sufi who thinks he is a saint in Heaven and the dumbed-down literalist who thinks he is a saint on Earth (145). Among the challenges of pure faith through attacks on common sense (pseudo-Selfism or pure literalism, Sufi elitism and agnosticism), the author does not expressly mention rigid traditionalism, although the entire series actually deals with that challenge more than any other. I assume that the author wanted to avoid labeling that often helps in understanding but also creates strong animosities that interrupt the dialogue.

And this series is an implicit criticism of the ossified tradition because, when freedom and reason come together, there is no place for inherited attitudes, no matter what *madhhab* it is about. Thus, we read "that the Qur'an is the only holy book that hints at the possibility of salvation even for those who are not called 'Muslims' if their beliefs and actions are in the spirit of the general idea of *tawhīd* and beneficial action in the world" (152-3). No less unorthodox is the author's positive valorization of Abu Bakr al-Rāzī, Abu 'Alā al-Ma'arrī and Abu Ḥayyān al-Tawhīdī (68, 156) or his assessment that the *fatwa* of Shaykh al-Islam Mustafa Sabrī, which provides a standard Sunni answer about the status of sinners, was given in the "spirit of the Murjīte doctrine" (178). Finally, for the traditionalists, Abu Ḥamid al-Ghazālī cannot be guilty of anything, not even the "self-imposed ban on practicing philosophy" after which Muslims became dependent on other people's philosophies (86).

The author locates the main culprit for the decadence of Islamic civilization in the loss of a free mind, in the state of spiritual and intellectual unfreedom that occurred after the

pozitivna valorizacija Ebu Bekra er-Razija, Ebu 'Ala'a el-Me'arrija i Ebu Hajjana et-Tevhidija (68, 156) ili njegova ocjena da je fetva šejhul-islama Mustafe Sabrija koja daje standardni sunijski odgovor na pitanje o statusu grešnika donesena u “duhu murdžijske doktrine” (178). Konačno, za tradicionaliste Ebu Hamid el-Gazali ne može biti krivac ni za što pa ni za “samonometnutu zabranu bavljenjem filozofijom” nakon koje su muslimani postali ovisni o tuđim filozofijama (86).

U gubitku slobodnog uma, u stanju duhovne i intelektualne neslobode koje je nastupilo nakon redukcije znanja na ono striktno teološko, odnosno isključivanja prirodnih nauka i primijenjenog znanja iz korpusa pohvalnih spoznaja autor locira glavnog krivca za dekadenciju islamske civilizacije (153-154, 159). Vrijeme je da muslimani shvate da nisu grijeh znanje i nauka, već neznanje i neukost (180) te da ljudski razum nije stvoren da dokazuje svoju nemoć, već svoju moć (163).

U vremenu kada se vjera sve češće doživljava kao magija ili platforma za dodatnu nacionalnu mobilizaciju i identifikaciju ništa manje važno nije ni apostrofiranje islama kao etičke poruke, koja “zahtijeva aktivan, a ne pasivan, odnos prema javnom moralu” (181-182). Čini se da je ta svijest o obavezi širenja svjetla čiste vjere oko sebe jedan od motiva za autorovo pisanje i govorenje (196). Da nije svakovrsnih zloupotreba čiste vjere, ovu elementarnu sponu između vjere i morala ne bi

trebalo ni naglašavati s obzirom na očiglednu vezu između vjere u Sudnji dan i ljudskog djelovanja (180-181). Jedan od izraza čiste vjere kao etike je vladavina prava, nomokratija koje nam danas nedostaje jer u postkomunističkom vremenu vlast obnašaju ili “neupućeni idealisti ili upućeni realisti koji znaju kako se uzurpira vlast po principu vladavine partijske volje jedne interesne grupe”. I dok muslimani nomokratiju imaju samo u svom sjećanju, ona se može naći u Evropi i Sjevernoj Americi (134, 139).

Na samom kraju, kako i priliči, i u skladu s pozivom autora da se kritički čita, evo i nekoliko primjedbi i sugestija. Nisam siguran da afirmacija bosanskog jezika mora (i smije) biti nauštrb sociologije u našem obrazovanju (126). Teško da se za selefije može reći da su “čuvari vjerskog i kulturnog pamćenja muslimanske zajednice” (83). Tu ambiciju imaju tradicionalisti. Konačno, mogu li se u istu ravan staviti religija kao vještačka vjera i kultura (54)?

Reisul-ulema Cerić podario nam je seriju smjelih filozofsko-teološko-društvenih eseja koji nas uprkos povremenim pesimističkim tonovima (88-89) ohrabruju da se oslobodimo dogmatskog straha i s pouzdanjem u posljednji zavjet s Gospodarom, oslonjeni na vlastiti zdravi razum, napravimo snažan iskorak na putu vlastitog osnaživanja na korist općeg ljudskog dobra. Tako nam Bog pomogao!

reduction of knowledge to strictly theological knowledge, that is, the exclusion of natural sciences and applied knowledge from the corpus of commendable knowledge (153-154, 159). It is time for Muslims to understand that knowledge and science are not sins, but ignorance and indolence (180) and that human reason was not created to prove its weakness, but its power (163).

At a time when faith is increasingly perceived as magic or a platform for additional national mobilization and identification, the apostrophizing of Islam as an ethical message, which "requires an active, not passive, attitude towards public morality" is no less important (181-182). This awareness of the obligation to spread the light of pure faith around oneself seems to be one of the motives for the author's writing and speaking (196). If it were not for all kinds of abuses of pure faith, this elementary bond between faith and morality should not even be emphasized considering the obvious connection between faith in the Day of Judgment and human action (180-181). One of the expressions of pure faith as ethics is the rule of law, a nomocracy that we lack today because in the post-communist era, power is held by either "ignorant idealists or knowledgeable realists who know how to usurp power based on the principle of the rule of the party will of an interest group". While Muslims have nomocracy only in their memory, it can be found though in Europe and North America (134, 139).

At the very end, as befits, and in accordance with the author's invitation to read critically, here are a few remarks and suggestions. I am not sure that the affirmation of the Bosnian language must be (and should) be at the expense

of sociology in our education (126). Salafis can hardly be said to be "guardians of the religious and cultural memory of the Muslim community" (83). Traditionalists have that ambition. Finally, can religion be put on the same level as artificial faith and culture (54)?

Grand Mufti Cerić gave us a series of bold philosophical-theological-social essays that, despite occasional pessimistic tones (88-89), encourage us to free ourselves from dogmatic fear and with confidence in the last vow with the Lord, relying on our own common sense, make a strong step towards the path of self-empowerment for the benefit of the general human good. So, God helped us!









ILUSTRACIJA - Nova džamija kraljice majke (*Yeni Valide Camii*), koja se obično naziva *Nova džamija (Yeni Cami)*, dominira trajektnim pristaništem u Eminönü na južnom kraju istanbulskog mosta Galata preko Zlatnog roga.

ILLUSTRATION - **The New Queen Mother Mosque (*Yeni Valide Camii*)**, commonly called the **New Mosque (*Yeni Cami*)**, dominates the ferry docks in Eminönü at the southern end of Istanbul's Galata Bridge over the Golden Horn.





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Čini se bitnim napomenuti da se u tekstu navode brojevi referenci u superskriptu; naslovi ispisuju velikim slovima (Times New Roman Bold 12pt); podnaslovi početnim velikim ostalo malim slovom (Times New Roman Bold 12pt); podpodnaslovi početnim velikim ostalo malim slovom ali u *italicu*/kurziv (Times New Roman Italic 12pt); numerički sistem citiranja koristi se uz bibliografske napomene (bilješke) na podnožju stranice – u fusnoti ili na kraju rada ili poglavlja – u endnoti; brojevi stranica se pišu u cijelosti; kod citiranja zadržavaju se sve pravopisne osobenosti (interpukcijski i pravopisni znaci) i eventualne greške; citirani tekst se obavezno označava navodnicima na početku i na kraju („“); navodnici i polunavodnici (‘ ’), kao i **boldirani** font mogu se koristiti za isticanje riječi, pojmova ili kratkih fraza unutar teksta; naslovi članaka iz časopisa i referentnih djela se tretiraju navedenim fontom **bold** u *italicu*/kurziv; kada je citirani tekst obiman, izostavljene dijelove treba označiti sa tri tačke u uglastim zagradama prije i poslije prekida [...]; također, sve eventualne izmjene u citiranom tekstu je potrebno označiti uglastim zagradama; citat u citatu se označava polunavodnicima („...“); izuzetno, kada primarni izvor nije dostupan, može da se navodi citat koji je već citiran od strane nekog drugog autora i u tom slučaju u popisu literature potrebno je navesti puni bibliografski zapis originalnog citatata, kao i publikacije iz koje je preuzet dati citat; kada se citira izvor informacija koji je već ranije naveden u radu koristi se kratica *op. cit.*; kratica *ibid.* se koristi kada se iz istog izvora navodi više citata na istoj stranici; veći dijelovi citiranog teksta pišu se u posebnom odjeljku, uvučenom slijeva, sa po jednim praznim redom iznad i ispod odjeljka, pisanim manjim fontom u *italicu* (kurziv 10pt). Ove veće odjeljke ne treba stavljati u navodnike.

Bibliografske jedinice trebaju biti poredane abecedom prema prezimenima autora. Radove istog autora složiti hronološkim redom, od ranijih prema novijim, a radove jednog autora objavljene u istoj godini dodatno obilježiti malim slovima (npr. 1988a, 1988b).

Ako se navodi više od jednog članka iz iste knjige, treba navesti tu knjigu kao posebnu jedinicu pod imenom urednika, pa u jedinicama za pojedine članke uputiti na cijelu knjigu. Imena autora dati u cijelosti, a ne zamjenjivati ih inicijalima, osim ako sam autor obično koristi samo inicijale. Naslove knjiga i časopisa treba pisati **bold italicom** (kurzivom). Naslove članaka iz časopisa ili zbornika treba pisati pod navodnim znacima u **boldu**.

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#### *Prikazi knjiga*

Prikaz knjige obično sadrži između 800 i 1.200 riječi. Podnaslove treba svesti na minimum, a fusnote treba što rjeđe koristiti. Prikaz knjige treba biti naslovljen bibliografskom informacijom u skladu sa sljedećim pravopisom: Ime i prezime autora, Naslov knjige, Mjesto izdavanja: Izdavač, godina izdanja. Broj strana, ISBN ..... Ime autora prikaza navesti na kraju rada.

U prikazu dati kratak pregled glavnih ciljeva djela za koje se piše prikaz, glavnih teza i tema kojima se bavi te koju vrstu izvora koristi. Za uredničku knjigu, sumirati glavne teme i naznačiti, samo ukoliko je to potrebno, pojedina poglavlja. Navesti koji je originalni doprinos tog djela kako konkretnom području istraživanja, tako i nauci općenito. Ako je svrshodno, označiti širi kontekst kojemu ovo djelo daje doprinos, te procijeniti koliko je to djelo ispunilo svoju svrhu, je li ono teorijski i metodološki pouzdano? Preporučiti ciljno čitateljstvo za knjigu.

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Prevedeni članci trebaju biti, uz prevedeni tekst, popraćeni prevodiočevom napomenom o relevantnosti i značaju članka. Poželjno je da se dadne kratka analiza prevedenog teksta u vidu uvodnog teksta i prevodiočevih bilješki.

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Nakon što je prihvaćen, rad se s ispravkama u PDF formatu e-mailom dostavlja autoru da provjeri ima li činjeničnih i štamparskih grešaka. Autori su odgovorni za provjeru korigiranog rada i preporučuje im se da koriste alatnu traku Comment & Markup da unesu svoje eventualne izmjene direktno na korigirani tekst. U ovoj fazi pripreme dozvoljene su samo manje izmjene.

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#### *Naknada za objavljivanje*

Radovi (članci) se ne honoriraju.

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Autori mogu izvršiti predaju radova putem OJS-a: <https://illuminatio.cdv.ba/index.php/casopis/about/submissions>.

It is well known that there are several accepted systems for citing literature. Our goal is to have a common citation of accurate data and uniformity, which, unfortunately, we were not able to explicitly provide at the outset. This is the only reason the Vancouver and partly the Harvard citation systems are present. From the next issue onwards, we will exclusively use the Vancouver Uniformity System. All papers should follow the Vancouver Parity Quotation System in the text.

It seems important to note that in the text: reference numbers in the superscript are listed; titles in capital letters (Times New Roman **Bold** 12pt); subtitle initial big remaining small letters (Times New Roman **Bold** 12pt); additional titles (subheading) initial large and remaining small letters, but in *italics* (Times New Roman *Italic* 12pt); the numerical citation system is used within the bibliographic notes (footnotes) at the foot of the page – in the footnote or at the end of the paper or chapter – in the endnote; page numbers are written in their entirety; citation retains all spelling peculiarities (punctuation and spelling) and possible errors; quoted text must be marked with quotation marks at the beginning and end („ ”); quotation marks and single quotation marks (‘ ’), as well as bold font, can be used to highlight words, concepts or short phrases within the text; the titles of journal articles and reference works are treated with the indicated **bold font in italics**; when the quoted text is extensive, the omitted parts should be marked with three dots in square brackets before and after the break [...]; also, any possible changes to the quoted text should be marked with square brackets; the quotation in the quotation is indicated by single quotation marks ('...'); exceptionally, when the primary source is not available, the citation already cited by another author may be cited, in which case the full bibliographic record of the original citation as well as the publications from which the citation was taken should be indicated; when quoting a source of information already cited earlier in the paper, abbreviation is used *op. cit.*; abbreviation *ibid.* is used when multiple citations on the same page are quoted from the same source; larger parts of a quoted text are rendered in a separate paragraph, left-indented, with a space above and below the paragraph, in a smaller font size in *italics* (10pt). These larger sections should not be quoted.

Bibliographic units should be alphabetized by the author's surname. Arrange the works of the same author in chronological order, from earlier to newer, and additionally mark the works of one author published in the same year in small letters (e.g. 1988a, 1988b).

If more than one article in the same book is cited, it should be cited as a separate unit under the name of the editor, and referenced throughout the book in individual article units. Give the author's names in their entirety, not replace them with initials, unless the author usually uses only the initials. Book and magazine titles should be written in **bold italics**. The titles of journal articles or proceedings should be written in quotation marks in **bold**.

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#### **Book reviews**

A book review typically consists of between 800 and 1200 words. Subheadings should be reduced to a minimum while footnotes should be used as little as possible. A book review should be titled by the bibliographic information in accordance with the following rule: Author's full name, Book title, Place of publication: Publisher, Year of publication, Number of pages, ISBN. Name of the author of the review should be provided in the end of the work.

The review should provide a short overview of the main aims of the work that is being reviewed, the main theses and topics it deals with and the kind of sources it uses. For an edited collection the review should sum up the main topics, and mention individual chapters only if necessary. It should describe the original contribution of the work both to the specific area of research and to science in general. If relevant, it should describe the broader context the work contributes to and assess to what extent the work has fulfilled its purpose and whether it is theoretically or methodologically reliable. Target readership for the book should also be recommended.

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#### **Translation**

Translated articles should be accompanied by the translator's comment on the relevance and significance of the article. It is desirable to provide a brief analysis of the translated text in the form of an introductory text and translator's notes.

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#### **Preparation of the paper**

Upon acceptance, the paper, with corrections, is sent in PDF format by email to the author to check for factual errors and misprints. Authors are responsible for checking the proofread paper and are advised to use the toolbar Comment & Markup for inserting their eventual changes directly into the proofread text. Only minor changes are allowed during this stage of preparation.

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#### **Publishing fee**

There are no publishing fee.

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**VODIČ ZA TRANSLITERACIJU NA BOSANSKOM JEZIKU**  
TRANSLITERATION GUIDE FOR BOSNIAN

Arapski / Arabic	Simbol / Symbol	Arapski / Arabic	Simbol / Symbol
ا	A	ط	T
ب	B	ظ	Z
ت	T	ع	°
ث	Th	غ	Gh
ج	Dž	ف	F
ح	H	ق	Q
خ	Kh	ك	K
د	D	ل	L
ذ	Dh	م	M
ر	R	ن	N
ز	Z	ه	H
س	S	و	W
ش	Š	ي	Y
ص	Ş	ء	'
ض	Ḍ	ة	A/T

**Kratki samoglasnici:**

**Short Vowels:**

أ	u
ا	a
ي	i

**Dugi samoglasnici:**

**Long Vowels:**

و	Ū
ا	Ā
ي	Ī

**Dvoglasinici:**

**Diphthongs:**

وا	Aw
يا	Ay

**Važna napomena:** Ovo je transliteracija arapskog na bosanski alfabet koja se koristi u ovom časopisu!



**TRANSLITERATION GUIDE FOR ENGLISH**  
**VODIČ ZA TRANSLITERACIJU NA ENGLISKOM JEZIKU**

Arapski / Arabic	Simbol / Symbol	Arapski / Arabic	Simbol / Symbol
ا	A	ط	Ṭ
ب	B	ظ	Ẓ
ت	T	ع	ʿ
ث	Th	غ	Gh
ج	J	ف	F
ح	Ḥ	ق	Q
خ	Kh	ك	K
د	D	ل	L
ذ	Dh	م	M
ر	R	ن	N
ز	Z	ه	H
س	S	و	W
ش	Sh	ي	Y
ص	Ṣ	ء	'
ض	Ḍ	ة	A/T

**Kratki samoglasnici:**

**Short Vowels:**

ó	u
ó	a
ó	i

**Dugi samoglasnici:**

**Long Vowels:**

و	Ū
ا	Ā
ي	Ī

**Dvoglasnici:**

**Diphthongs:**

وا	Aw
يا	Ay

**Important Note:** This is transliteration of Arabic into English alphabet that is used in this Magazine!





**CENTAR ZA DIJALOG – VESATIJJA**  
**AL-WASATIYYA CENTER FOR DIALOGUE**

Gazi Husrev-begova, 56a  
71000 Sarajevo  
Bosna i Hercegovina / Bosnia and Herzegovina



Telefon / Phone: +387 33 570 025  
Email: [info@cdv.ba](mailto:info@cdv.ba)  
Web: <https://www.cdv.ba>

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Predsjednik Upravnog odbora /  
Chairman of the Board: Dr. Mustafa CERIĆ  
Direktor / Director: Dr. Senad ĆEMAN  
Sekretar / Secretary: Mohamed-Suleyman TADEFI

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Misiju i ciljeve **Centar za dijalog – Vesatijja** realizira kroz sljedeće aktivnosti:

- multidisciplinarna istraživanja i studije o dijalogu i srednjem ili miroljubivom putu u islamu;
- objavljivanje zapaženih ostvarenja domaćih i stranih autora o dijalogu i srednjem ili miroljubivom putu u islamu;
- organiziranje naučnih skupova, okruglih stolova, seminara, foruma i sličnih skupova na kojima će se razmatrati problemi i pitanja iz domena dijaloga i islamskog djelovanja u savremenim uslovima globaliziranog svijeta i diskutirati o njima;
- različite vrste edukacije i obuke u cilju osposobljavanja mladih ljudi da se aktivno uključe u procese dijaloga na lokalnom, regionalnom i međunarodnom nivou;
- identifikiranje i predlaganje mjera za otklanjanje različitih oblika devijantnog, ekstremnog ponašanja i shvatanja;
- održavanje internetskog portala posvećenog misiji i aktivnostima Centra;
- prikladne medijske aktivnosti.


Na planu realizacije svoje misije i ciljeva Centar putem naučno-istraživačkih radova i projekata posebno radi na uspostavljanju obostrano korisnih i prihvatljivih oblika saradnje sa srodnim centrom u Državi Kuvajt kao i s drugim sličnim centrima i ustanovama u regiji i svijetu. Centar će u perspektivi, shodno potrebama i mogućnostima, a u dogovoru s islamskim zajednicama u regionu, posebnu pažnju posvetiti uspostavi raznovrsnih oblika institucionalne saradnje na planu realizacije osnovne ideje i cilja Centra, a to je promoviranje kulture dijaloga, tolerancije i suživota te promicanje interpretativne tradicije srednjeg ili miroljubivog puta u islamu (**vesatijja**).

**Al-Wasatiyya Center for dialogue** achieves its mission and vision through the following activities:

- multidisciplinary research and studies on dialogue and issues of the middle way of Islam;
- publishing prominent works by local and international authors on dialogue and issues of the middle way of Islam;
- organizing scientific meetings, round tables, seminars, forums and similar gatherings which will consider problems and issues in the domain of dialogue Islamic activity in the contemporary conditions of the globalized world and discuss them;
- various kinds of education and training aimed at enabling young people to become actively involved in the dialogue processes at the local, regional and international level;
- identifying and proposing measures for the elimination of various kinds of deviant or extreme behavior and understanding;
- maintaining the Internet portal devoted to Center's mission and activities;
- appropriate media activities.

In achieving its mission and goals, Center is particularly involved in establishing the mutually useful and acceptable forms of cooperation with the related center in the State of Kuwait, as well as with other similar centers and institutions in the region and the world through research papers and projects. In the future, depending on needs and possibilities and in the agreement with Islamic communities in the region, Center will pay a particular attention to the establishment of diverse forms of institutional cooperation in the area of achieving Center's basic idea and goal, i.e. the promotion of the culture of dialogue, tolerance and coexistence and nourishing the interpretative tradition of the middle way of Islam (**Al-Wasatiyya**).









**CENTAR ZA DIJALOG - VESATIYYA**  
AL-WASATIYYA CENTER FOR DIALOGUE

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**Misija Centra** je širenje i promoviranje kulture dijaloga kako među muslimanima tako i među pripadnicima različitih religija i svjetonazora, a u skladu s ciljevima i misijom Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini definiranim izvorima islama i normativnim aktima.

**Osnovna djelatnost Centra** je usmjerena na realizaciju naučno-istraživačkih i edukativnih projekata u oblasti kulture dijaloga i promocije srednjeg puta u islamu.

The **mission of the Center** is to spread and promote a culture of dialogue among Muslims as well as members of different religions and worldviews, in accordance with the goals and mission of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina defined by the sources of Islam and its normative acts.

The main **activity of the Center** is focused on the realization of scientific-research and educational projects in the field of cultural dialogue and the promotion of the cultural dialogue.



**illuminatio/svjetionik/almanar**  
časopis za nove ideje / a journal for new ideas  
<https://svjetionik.cdv.ba>