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
- Mehmed A. AKŠAMIJA
- Mustafa CERIĆ
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
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časopis za nove ideje, koje osvjetljavaju spoznaju
ljudskog duha i uma o uvjetima ljudskog života u
prošlosti, sadašnjosti i budućnosti.

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a journal for new ideas that enlighten the human
spirit and mind about the conditions of human past,
present and future.



vol. IV - № 1 - 2023





God is the Light of the heavens and the earth
• *Bog je svjetlo nebesa i zemlje* •

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ČASOPIS ZA NOVU MISAO / THE JOURNAL FOR NEW IDEAS

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ČASOPIS O VJERI, MORALU, UMJETNOSTI, NACIJI, DRUŠTVU I DRŽAVI /
NEW IDEAS ON FAITH, MORALITY, ART, NATION, SOCIETY AND STATE

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Uvodnik

Poštovani čitatelji,

Ovo je sedmi broj (Svezak 4, br. 1, proljeće 2023) našeg i vašeg časopisa *illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar*.

U ovom broju imate privilegiju da se u kontinuitetu upoznate dublje i šire s pojmovima *ars – tehne – zanat – fann – qadar/šīnā'at* u „umjetnosti“, pojmove koje akademik **Mehmed Akšamija** približava našem razumijevanju, a sve s ciljem da se na adekvatan način prepozna bitna razlika između unaprijed projektirane vesternizirane umjetničke „zbilje“ i konstantno-kreativne islamske „umjetničke“ *qadar/šīnā'atske* genijalnosti, originalnosti i osebnosti u liku i djelu *homo islamikusa*.

Akšamijin rad nije primarno teološki, već „umjetničko“ dijaloški, ali je bit njegova sadržaja i poruka u afirmaciji islamskog *tawhīda*, monoteizma, kao primarnog motiva „umjetničkog“ djelanja/*šīnā'ata* kod *homo islamikusa*. Otuda, Akšamija nas podsjeća „da se modaliteti diskursā *qadar/šīnā'ata* u potpunosti razlikuju od drugih „umjetničkih formi“ po nizu međusobno povezanih, komplementarnih principa, uvjeta i obilježja... Modaliteti diskursā *qadar/šīnā'ata* omogućuju *homo islamicusovo* iskustvo Božanskog kao formu simboličkog prisustva (ar. *al-ḥudūr al-ramzī*), manifestiranog posredstvom mnoštva estetiziranih formi djelanja/*šīnā'ata*. U okviru slikovnog predstavljanja korištenjem odgovarajućih modalitetā diskursā *qadar/šīnā'ata* prisutna je mudrost (ar. *al-ḥikmah*) personificirana u uređenim postavkama, koloritom, veličinama i proporcijama kako geometrijskih figura, tako i likova i objekata. Analizom vizionarskog pregalaštva kojim su djela realizirana, moguće je zaključiti kako je riječ o *homo islamicusovom* dobročinstvu i milosrđu (ar. *al-iḥsān*) ...“

Dakle, Akšamijina sposobnost da nas uputi i otvori nam jedan novi vidik za islamski *tawhīd*, monoteizam, kao bit islamske vjere i kulture, kroz svojstvenu originalnu islamsku „umjetnost“ čini ne samo ovaj rad izuzetnim, već i cijel projekat našeg časopisa, koji unatoč svemu evo doživljava svoj sedmi broj.

Editorial

Dear readers,

This is the seventh issue (Volume 4, No. 1, Spring 2023) of our and your magazine *illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar*.

In this issue, you have the privilege of continuously getting to know more deeply and broadly the terms *ars* - *techne* - *craft* - *fann* - *qadar/ṣinā'at* in "art", terms that academician **Mehmed Akšamija** brings closer to our understanding, all with the aim of adequately recognizing the important difference between the pre-projected westernized artistic "reality" and the constantly creative Islamic artistic *qadar/ṣinā'at* genius, originality and distinctiveness in the image and work of the *homo islamicus*.

Akšamija's work is not primarily theological, but "artistically" dialogic, whereby the essence of its content and message is the affirmation of Islamic *tawḥīd*, monotheism, as the primary motive of artistic creation/*ṣinā'at* of *homo islamicus*. Hence, Akšamija reminds us „that modalities of the *qadar/ṣinā'at* discourse are completely different from other "art forms" by a series of mutually related, complementary principles, conditions and features... Modalities of *qadar/ṣinā'at* discourse allow *homo islamicus*'s experience of the Divine as a form of symbolic presence (ar. *al-ḥuḍūr al-ramzī*), manifested by means of a multitude of aesthetized forms of activity/*ṣinā'at*. In pictorial representation which uses appropriate modalities of the *qadar/ṣinā'at* discourse, there is wisdom (ar. *al-ḥikmah*) personified in organized actions, colours, sizes and proportions of both geometric figures and human figures and objects. By analyzing the visionary zeal with which works have been created, it can be concluded that it is *homo islamicus*'s beneficence and mercy (ar. *al-iḥsān*) ...“

Thus, Akšamija's ability to guide us and open a new perspective for Islamic *tawḥīd*, monotheism, as the essence of Islamic religion and culture, through original "Islamic art", makes not only this work exceptional, but also the entire project of our magazine, which despite everything is experiencing its seventh issue.

U islamskom *tawhīdidskom* duhu je i naredni članak, koji ukazuje na nedorečenost kvaziselefizma, koji zaobilazi ili potiskuje racionalnu moć kod čovjeka da u diskursu sa kvazimonoteizmom afirmira istinski islamski monoteizam kroz vjeru i misao Imāma al-Māturīdije (um. 333/944) iz Samarkanda. Naime, autentični selefizam, koji se bazira na kontinuitetu pamćenja, tj. islamskom identitetu, nije nikad bio sporan, već je sporan kvaziselefizam, koji zagovara svojevrsnu utopijsku, *ṭūbāwiyyu*, misao koja je strana islamskoj misli i praksi.

Profesor **Beshir Lassioued** iz Tunisa počastio nas je svojim prilogom o gnostičkoj misli i njenom utjecaju na razvoj čovječanstva. I ovaj rad je na tragu koncepta našeg časopisa da osvjetljava spoznaju ljudskog duha i uma. A *gnosis*, *ma'rafah*, tj. spoznaja samog sebe i svijeta je put za moralno i etičko ozdravljenje svijeta, koji je opterećen mnogim psihičkim i fizičkim bolestima zbog nedostataka gnoze o smislu života. Zato nam prof. Lassioued sugerira obnovu gnoze u smislu vraćanja duhovnim vrijednosti u misli i praksi, odnosno vježbi kakvu nalazimo kod sufijske ili derviše.

Ajla Čustović nas iz metafizičkog vraća ili spušta u fizički svijet, gdje nas suočava sa realnim izazovima oko ljudskih prava na primjeru Salmana Rushdiea. Ovdje nije riječ o slobodi mišljenja i govora, već je ovdje riječ o jednom odnosu prema islamu ne samo izvana, već i iznutra samoga islama, gdje ideja o ljudskim pravima gubi smisao jer se svodi na puku percepciju o sukobu civilizacija. Pronicljiva istražiteljica Čustović nam pokazuje kako se brani pozicija prava i pravde, kako se brane ljudska prava, u kontekstu „isprepletenih područja teologije, političke teorije, filozofije, lingvistike, hermeneutike i intelektualne povijesti“. Kad pročitate ovaj članak, sigurno ćete se osjećati sigurniji i pouzdaniji jednom velikom spoznajom u ovom svijetu velikih nepoznanica i neizvjesnosti.

U kontekstu svjetskih izazova kao što su strateško natjecanje velikih sila, gdje, kad jedna pada nije ništa manje opasna od one koja je u usponu, te problemi bez putovanja, kao što su pandemija i klimatska kriza i revolucija u tehnologiji, koja neumitno mijenja način ljudskog života, dr. **Enes Karić** donosi esej, kojim ukazuje na opasnost za planetu Zemlju ili kraj svijeta u smislu da čovjek danas posjeduje sredstva za samouništenje, koje dosada nije posjedovao. Bez apokaliptične opsesije, dr. Karić nas vodi kroz priču upočetku i kraju svijeta kako nas uče vjerske knjige. Naravno, niko osim Boga Stvoritelja, ne zna ni kako je svijet nastao ni kako će i kada nestati, ali je korisno da o tome čitamo i razmišljamo jer smo svi Allahovi i Allahu se svi vraćamo.

U svom članku o „Đozi i socijalizmu“, **Šaćir Filandra** je, kao niko dosada, objasnio odnos socijalističke Jugoslavije prema Đozi, ali i Đozin odnos prema Jugoslaviji. Možda nije na rangu Platonove odbrane Sokrata, ali je sigurno na tragu odbrane Đozinog lika i djela, koji to zaslužuje jer je to istodobno i odbrana bošnjačkog/bosanskog prava na nacionalni i državni identitet. Ne nasjedajući na površne i paušalne ocjene o ulozi Huseina ef. Đoze u različitim povijesnim okolnostima, Filandra je uspio da ukaže na važne detalje iz Đozinog vjerskog i društvenog aktivizma što ga oslobađa od pejorativnih predrasuda. Čitajući, Filandrin rad o Đozi, upoznajemo se bliže i bolje s jednim periodom naše bošnjačke/bosanske povijesti, koja je još uvijek u našem sjećanju.

The following article is also in the spirit of Islamic *tawhīd*, which points to the vagueness of quasi-Selfism, which bypasses or suppresses the rational power in man to affirm true Islamic monotheism in a discourse with quasi-monotheism through the faith and thought of **Imam al-Māturīdī** (d. 333/944) from Samarkand. Namely, authentic Salafism, which is based on continuity of memory, i.e., Islamic identity, has never been disputed, but quasi-Salafism, which advocates a kind of utopian, *ṭūbāwiyya*, thought that is foreign to Islamic thought and practice, is disputed.

Professor **Beshir Lassioued** from Tunisia honored us with his contribution on Gnostic thought and its influence on the development of humanity. This work follows the concept of our magazine to illuminate the human spirit and mind. *Gnosis, ma'rafah*, i.e., the knowledge of oneself and the world, is the way for moral and ethical healing of the world, which is burdened with many psychological and physical diseases due to the lack of gnosis about the meaning of life. For this reason, professor Lassioued suggests the restoration of gnosis in the sense of returning to spiritual values in thought and practice, i.e., an exercise such as one finds in *Sufis* or *dervishes*.

Ajla Čustović brings us back or bring us down from the metaphysical to the physical world, where she confronts us with real challenges regarding human rights on the example of Salman Rushdie. This is not about freedom of thought and speech, but here we are talking about a relationship towards Islam not only from the outside, but also from within Islam itself, where the idea of human rights loses its meaning because it is reduced to a mere perception of a clash of civilizations. Insightful researcher Čustović shows us how to defend the position of law and justice, how to defend human rights, in the context of "intertwined areas of theology, political theory, philosophy, linguistics, hermeneutics and intellectual history". When you read this article, you will surely feel more confident with a great knowledge in this world abundant with unknowns and uncertainties.

In the context of world challenges such as the strategic competition of great powers, where when one falls is no less dangerous than the one that is rising, and problems without passports, such as the pandemic and the climate crisis and the revolution in technology, which inexorably changes the way of human life, dr. **Enes Karić** presents an essay in which he points out the danger for the planet Earth or the end of the world in the sense that man today possesses the means of self-destruction, which he did not possess before. Without apocalyptic obsession, dr. Karić takes us through the story of the beginning and end of the world as taught by religious books. Of course, no one, except God the Creator, knows how the world was created or how and when it will end, but it is useful to read and think about, because we all belong to Allah and to Allah, we all will return.

In his article on "Đozo and Socialism", **Šaćir Filandra**, like no one before, portrayed the relationship of socialist Yugoslavia to Đozo, but also Đozo's relationship to Yugoslavia. It may not be on the level of Plato's apology of Socrates, but it is certainly on the path of defending Đozo's character and work, well deserved as it is also a defense of the Bosniak/Bosnian right to a national and state identity. Not falling for superficial and flat assessments about the role of Husein ef. Đozo in different historical circumstances, Filandra managed to point out important details from Đozo religious and social activism that frees him from pejorative prejudices. By reading Filandra's work on Đozo, we get to know a period of our Bosniak/Bosnian history, which is still in our memory, closer and better.

U iscrpnom prikazu knjige *Pristranost u popularnoj kulturi. Moć vizuelnih i jezičkih narativa* autora Anasa Al-Shaikh-Alija, **Linda Hyökki** nas upoznaje sa pojavom stereotipa u vizualnom i jezičkom narativu, na koje Anas Al-Shaikh-Ali uvjerljivo i ilustrativno ukazuje posebno kada je riječ o islamu, muslimanima, Arapima i drugima koji, prema onima koji šire te stereotipe, njima ne pripadaju.

Poštovani čitatelji,

U nadi da će vas i ovaj sedmi broj obogatiti novim spoznajama i prosvijetliti vaš duh i um, primite izraze našeg osobitog poštovanja.

Dr. Mustafa CERIĆ, glavni urednik

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ČASOPIS O VJERI, MORALU, UMJETNOSTI, NACIJI, DRUŠTVU I DRŽAVI

In a comprehensive review of the book *Bias in Popular Culture: The Power of Visual and Linguistic Narratives* by Anas Al-Shaikh-Ali, **Linda Hyökki** introduces us to the fact of stereotypes in visual and linguistic narratives, which Anas Al-Shaikh-Ali convincingly and illustratively points out especially when it comes to Islam, Muslims, Arabs and others who, according to those who spread these stereotypes, do not belong to them.


Dear readers,

In the hope that this seventh issue of our Magazine will also enrich you with new knowledge and enlighten your spirit and mind, please accept these expressions of our special respect.

Dr. Mustafa CERİĆ, Editor-in-chief

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NEW IDEAS ON FAITH, MORALITY, ART, NATION, SOCIETY AND STATE



ILUSTRACIJA - Kaligrafski ispisan Kur'an na slobodnim neuvezanim listovima (Subsaharska Afrika, Nigerija ili Čad).



ILLUSTRATION – The Qur'an written in Kaligraf script on free unbound leaves (Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria or Chad).



ILUSTRACIJA - Portret sufije homo islamicusa od nepoznatog autora, sredina 15. stoljeća.
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
Linda HYÖKKI

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Mehmed A. AKŠAMIJA

ARS – TEHNE – ZANAT – FANN – QADAR/ŠINĀ'AT – „UMJETNOST“

ARS - TECHNĒ - CRAFT - FANN - QADAR/ŠINĀ'AT - „ART“

Sažetak

Cilj ovog eseja je raspraviti posebno pitanje mogućeg teorijskog odnosa između modaliteta diskursa *qadar/šinā'ata* i drugih "formi umjetnosti", proširujući prethodne rasprave o onome što je deklarirano ili nazvano "islamska umjetnost" unutar okcidentalno-vesterniziranih teorijskih stajališta, nasuprot onome što takvi pojmovi mogu sadržavati unutar islamskog civilizacijskog kruga, ili implicirati unutar stručno-akademske kvalifikacije.^{▼1} Tačnije, želimo prezentirati iskustvo *homo islamicusa* koje karakterizira simbolična Božja prisutnost, a gdje se dobročinstvo i milosrđe manifestiraju posredstvom mnoštva estetiziranih formi djelanja/*šinā'ata*, temeljem mudrosti prisutne u personificiranim uređenim postavkama, koloritu, veličinama i proporcijama kako geometrijskih figura, tako i likova i objekata.

Osim toga, u cilju preciznijeg razumijevanja primordijalnog i suvremenog značenja riječi „umjetnost“, prijeko je potrebno razlikovati suvremenu upotrebu i značenje ovog pojma od njegovog ključnog značenja i smisla koji je tradicionalno nazivan zanatom, vještinom ili umijećem. Za razliku od generirane vesternizacije termina *umjetnost* na ono što je ars na starolatinskom ili na ono što je na starogrčkom τέχνη ([tehne], 'umijeće vještine', 'zanat' ali u značenju moć 'stvaranja' unaprijed postignutog rezultata svjesno kontroliranim i usmjerenim aktivnostima), arapsko nazivlje zadržava prvobitno tradicionalno značenje u terminu *fann* s njegovom mogućom aktivacijom u značenju umijeće *qadar/šinā'ata*. *Fann* je upravo umijeće tehne (τέχνη), usredotočeno na vještinu *homo islamicusa* i općenito na formalno-metodološku stranu polja *qadar/šinā'ata* pozicioniranog u temelj produktivno-refleksivnog diskursa, kao integralnog dijela islamskog civilizacijskog kruga.

Ključne riječi: *qadar/šinā'at*, *fann*, umijeće tehne (τέχνη), *homo islamicus*, mimezis, *umjetnost*, likovna forma, analogija, Deleuze, Derrida

^{▼1} Akšamija, A. Mehmed. *Analiza korištenja terminoloških odrednica 'umjetnost islama' i 'islamska umjetnost'*. *Illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar*, 2020. proljeće; 1(1):42–98; Akšamija, A. Mehmed. *QADAR/ŠINĀ' AT – doktrina nazivlja u skladu s islamskim principima o 'umjetnosti'*. *Illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar*. 2021. proljeće; 2(1):54–86; Akšamija, A. Mehmed. *QADAR/ŠINĀ' AT – karakterizacija nekih suštinskih okcidentalnovesterniziranih pogleda na tradicionalni islamski kreativni izraz*. *Illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar*. 2022. proljeće; 3(1):18–76.

Abstract

The aim of this essay is to discuss the particular issue of a possible theoretical relationship between the modality of *qadar/šīnāʿat* discourse and other “forms of art”, expanding the previous discussions of what is declared as or named “Islamic art” within Occidental-westernized theoretical views, as opposed to what such terms can entail within Islamic civilizational circle, or imply within professional-academic qualification.^{▼1} More precisely, we would like to present the experience of *homo islamicus* which is characterized by a symbolic presence of God, by beneficence and mercy, and manifested by means of many aestheticized forms of activity/*šīnāʿat*, of wisdom present in personified organized actions, colours, sizes and proportions of both geometric figures and human figures and objects.

Besides, to more accurately understand the primordial and contemporary meaning of the word ‘*art*’, it is necessary to distinguish the contemporary use and meaning of this term from its crucial meaning and sense, which has traditionally been named craft, skill or artistry. Unlike the generated westernization of term *art* to what is *ars* in old Latin or to what is in old Greek called τέχνη ([*technê*]; ‘*artistry of skill*’, ‘*craft*’, though meaning: the power of ‘*creating*’ a result achieved beforehand by consciously controlled and directed activities), Arabic terms preserve the original traditional meaning in the term *fann* with its possible activation which means artistry of *qadar/šīnāʿat*. *Fann* is exactly the artistry of *technê* (τέχνη), focused on the skill of *homo islamicus* and generally on the formal-methodological side of the field of *qadar/šīnāʿat* positioned in the foundation of productive-reflective discourse as an integral part of the Islamic civilizational circle.

Key words: *qadar/šīnāʿat*, *fann*, artistry of *technê* (τέχνη), *homo islamicus*, *mimesis*, *art*, art form, analogy, Deleuze, Derrida

^{▼1} Akšamija, A. Mehmed. *An analysis of the use of terminological determinants 'Art of Islam' and 'Islamic Art'*. Journal *Illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar*, Al-Wasatiyya Center for Dialogue, Sarajevo, Spring 2020, Volume 1, No. 1, pp. 43-99; Akšamija, A. Mehmed. *QADAR/ŠINĀʿAT – Doctrine of terms in line with Islamic principles about 'Art'*; in: *QADAR/ŠINĀʿAT – 'Islamic art'*, first part. Journal *Illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar*, Al-Wasatiyya Center for Dialogue, Sarajevo, Spring 2021., Volume 2, No. 1, pp. 55-87; Akšamija, A. Mehmed. *QADAR/ŠINĀʿAT – characterization of some essential Occidentalwesternized views on traditional Islamic creative expression*. Journal *Illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar*, Al-Wasatiyya Center for Dialogue, Sarajevo, Spring 2022, Volume 3, No. 1, pp. 19-77.

ARS – TEHNE – ZANAT – FANN – QADAR/ŠINĀ’AT – „UMJETNOST“

Već duži period, nažalost, prisutna je akademska atmosfera u kojoj se nastoje očuvati razlozi određenih fenomena ili okolnosti između onoga što je generirano vesternizacijom pod supstancijalnom bîti (ar. *al-dhāt*) – **sadržajem** (ar. *al-muḥṭawā*) i modelotvornom strategijom – **formom** (ar. *šaklan*) i što se smatra „islamskom umjetnošću“ nasuprot onome što se unutar islamskog civilizacijskog kruga može podrazumijevati pod takvim nazivljem, odnosno stručno-akademsom kvalifikacijom. Hoćemo kazati da je nemoguće doći do precinzihi i pouzdanih, kao i validnih tumačenja bez uvažavanja **metoda povoda** u području islamske jurisprudencije.^{▼2} To stajalište vidi karakteristična obilježja kao odraz šireg sveobuhvatnog obrasca ili fenomena koji estatizaciju djelanja/š*inā’ata* čini onim što *qadar/šinā’at* jeste.

Potrebno je podsjetiti da se modaliteti diskursā *qadar/šinā’ata* u potpunosti razlikuju od drugih „umjetničkih formi“ po nizu međusobno povezanih, komplementarnih principa, uvjeta i obilježja. Moguće je, naprimjer, izdvojiti svjesno deaktiviranje kod začetnika/dizajnera bilo kakvog vida konkretnog shvaćanja o Bogu posredstvom antropomorfnih elemenata (ar. *al-tanzih*). Također, pripisivanje ljudskih osobina Bogu, bile one fizičke ili duhovne, nije prisutno u bilo kojem obliku u sklopu apstraktnog karaktera slikovnog predstavljanja (ar. *al-tadžsīd*). Modaliteti diskursā *qadar/šinā’ata* omogućuju *homo islamicusovo* iskustvo Božanskog kao formu simboličkog prisustva (ar. *al-ḥuḍūr al-ramzī*), manifestiranog posredstvom mnoštva estetiziranih formi djelanja/š*inā’ata*. U okviru slikovnog predstavljanja korištenjem odgovarajućih modalitetā diskursā *qadar/šinā’ata* prisutna je mudrost (ar. *al-hikmah*) personificirana u uređenim postavkama, koloritom, veličinama i proporcijama kako geometrijskih figura, tako i likova i objekata. Analizom vizionarskog pregalaštva kojim su djela realizirana, moguće je zaključiti kako je riječ o *homo islamicusovom* dobročinstvu i milosrđu (ar. *al-iḥsān*) ...


^{▼2} Pod pojmom *islāmske jurisprudencije* (filozofije pravne nauke) podrazumijevamo pravnu identifikaciju okolnosti koje su dovele do pojave određene estetizirane forme unutar diskursā *qadar/šinā’ata*.

ARS - TECHNĒ - CRAFT - FANN - QADAR/ŞINĀ'AT - „ART“

For a long time, unfortunately, we have been witnessing an academic atmosphere which tries to preserve reasons why westernization considers the substantial essence (Ar. *al-dhāt*) – **content** (Ar. *al-muḥtawā*) and model-forming strategy – **form** (Ar. *shaklan*) as “Islamic art” as opposed to what Islamic civilizational circle sometimes implies by such terms, i.e. professional-academic qualification. We want to say that without taking into account the **method of reason** in the area of Islamic jurisprudence.^{▼2} These are rhetorical methods that include the analysis of the structure of the Qur'anic text and the study of unity and diversity within the modality of *qadar/şinā'at* from a holistic point of view. This paradigm sees characteristic features as a reflection of a wider, more comprehensive pattern or phenomenon that makes anesthetization of activity/*şinā'at* what *qadar/şinā'at* is.

We should be reminded that modalities of *qadar/şinā'at* discourse are totally different from other “art forms” by a series of mutually related, complementary principles, conditions and features. For instance, it is possible to single out conscious deactivation, by the author/designer, of any form of actual understanding of God by means of anthropomorphous elements (Ar. *al-tanzīh*). Besides, attributing human characteristics to God, whether they are physical or spiritual, are by no means present within the abstract character of pictorial representation (Ar. *al-tajāsīd*). Modalities of *qadar/şinā'at* discourse allow homo islamicus's experience of the Divine as a form of symbolic presence (Ar. *al-ḥuḍūr al-ramzī*), manifested by means of a multitude of aesthetized forms of activity/*şinā'at*. In pictorial representation which uses appropriate modalities of the *qadar/şinā'at* discourse, there is wisdom (Ar. *al-ḥikmah*) personified in organized actions, colours, sizes and proportions of both geometric figures and human figures and objects. By analyzing visionary zeal with which works have been created, it can be concluded that it is *homo islamicus*'s beneficence and mercy (Ar. *al-iḥsān*) ...

^{▼2} With the term *Islāmic jurisprudence* (philosophy of legal science) we refer to legal identification of circumstances that led to the emergence of a given aesthetized form within the *qadar/şinā'at* discourse.



ILUSTRACIJA – *Homo islamicus*: Shvaćanje Božanskog neizrecivog jedinstva posredstvom stiliziranih/apstraktnih ornamentalnih elemenata.
 ILLUSTRATION – *Homo islamicus*: Understanding the inexpressible Divine Oneness through stylized/abstract ornamental elements.

Prethodno smo se već dotaknuli nekih situacija. Međutim, bavljenje širom problematikom teorije *umjetnosti* upućuje nas na to da su sveukupna okcidentalno-vesternizirana svijest i razmišljanja o *umjetnosti* ostali u granicama što ih je postavila još grčka teorija širokog spektra značenja u funkciji retoričkog pojma *mimesis* (ar. *al-muḥākāt*)^{▼3} ili teorija o predstavljanju izraza *umjetničkog djela*.

Pojam *mimesis*^{▼4} imao je posebnu važnost u antičkoj estetici, koja je prvotno shvaćana kao *imitacija*. Demokrit je shvaćao *mimesis* kao *imitaciju načina djelovanja u prirodi*. Pojam je dobio posebnu važnost u Platonovoj i Aristotelovoj filozofiji, gdje je išao *ruku pod ruku* s pretpostavkom da je *imitacija* uvijek *figuralnog karaktera*.

Prema Platonu (ar. *Aflātūn*) *mimesis* ima tri značenja: ontološko – o odnosu ideja i osjetilnih stvari koje su njihove kopije; etičko – u smislu sličnosti s Bogom i estetsko – kao bit kreativnosti. Iako je pojavni svijet nešto što sliči idealnom bitku, ali ne samo on, kako tvrdi Platon, on je *imitacija aproksimativnog postajanja sličnog idealnoj paradigmi, koja je u svojoj konačnici figuralnog karaktera*.^{▼5}

▼3 Usporedi, Halliwell, Stephen. *The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems*. Princeton: University Press; 2002. str. 1-34.

Po Al-Farabiju ta se aktivnost naziva *reproduktivna imitacija* (ar. *al-muḥākāt*). *Muḥākāt* je sposobnost čovjeka da oponaša osjetilno i razumljivo, a ponekad čak i oponašanje određenih sklonosti. Također postoji sposobnost oponašanja temperamenta ukoliko se iskazuje kao reaktivnost na okolinu i sposobnosti samoregulacije ponašanja.

Al-Farabi on the Perfect State: Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī's Mabādi' Ārā Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila (revidirani tekst s uvodom, prijevodom i komentarom Richarda Walzera). Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1985. str. 210, 220.

▼4 *Mimesis*, grč. μίμησις, od μιμεῖσθαι, ar. *muḥākāt* = oponašati.
 Vidi i, Dukat, Zdeslav. *Aristotel: O pjesničkom umijeću*. Zagreb: Školska knjiga; 2005. str. 11.

▼5 Usporedi, Platon. *Država*. Zagreb: Naklada Jurčić; 1997. str. 597a.



ILLUSTRATION ~ A concrete understanding of God through anthropomorphic elements - *Blessing of the father God*.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Konkretno shvaćanje o Bogu posredstvom antropomorfnih elemenata - *Blagoslov boga oca*.

We have already touched upon some situations. However, dealing with broader issues of the theory of **art** indicates that the overall Occidental-westernized awareness of and thinking about “art” have remained within the limits defined as early as in the classical Greek theory of **art** as *mimesis* (Ar. *al-muḥakāt*)^{▼3} or theory about the representation of the expression of a **work of art**.

The term *mimesis*^{▼4} had a particular importance in ancient aesthetics, which was originally understood as **imitation**. Democritus understood *mimesis* as the *imitation of the way of activity in nature*. The concept assumed a particular importance in Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy, where it went *hand in hand* with the assumption that imitation is always of **figural character**.

According to Plato (Ar. *Aflātūn*) *mimesis* has three meanings: ontological – as a relationship between ideas and sensory things which are their copies; ethical – in the sense of similarity to God; and aesthetic – as the essence of creativity. Although the world of appearances is something that resembles the ideal being though it is not itself, as Plato claims, it is an *imitation of approximative becoming similar to the ideal paradigm, which is ultimately of figural character*.^{▼5}

^{▼3} Cf., Halliwell, Stephen. *The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems*. Princeton: University Press, 2002.

According to Al-Farabi, this activity is called reproductive imitation (Ar. *al-muḥakāt*). *Muḥakāt* is the ability to imitate sensory and understandable, and sometimes even to imitate the ability of inclination. It also has the ability to imitate temperament, if it happens to find a body.

Al-Farabi on the Perfect State : Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī’s Mabādi’ Ārā Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila (revised text with introduction, translation and commentary of Richard Walzer). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985., pp. 210, 220.

^{▼4} *Mimesis*, Gr. μίμησις, form μιμεῖσθαι, Ar. *muḥakāt* = imitate.

^{▼5} Cf., Platon. *Država*. Zagreb: Naklada Jurčić, 1997, p. 597a.

Kod Aristotela *mimesis* znači *imitaciju* ili figuralno predstavljanje s posebnom važnosti u slikovno-estetiziranom djelovanju. Odbacivanjem Platonove ideje kao stvarnosti u kojoj participiraju *sve stvari*, prema Aristotelu i figuralna slika te stvarnosti zadobiva sasvim drukčiju vrijednost, čime sasvim kompleksniju efikasnost poprima i aktivnost koja je proizvodi, tj. **oponaša** (lat. *imitator*). Na poseban način ruši se Platonovo stajalište po kojem je oponašanje unutar kreativnog čina bilo *imitacija* imitacije, koja proizvodi čiste figuralne fantazme (gr. *φαντασματα*, proizvod fantazije [imaginacije]) lišene istine.

Bitno je primijetiti kako se ideja o *imitaciji* kao mogućoj formi kreativne aktivnosti, koja će mnogo kasnije biti imenovana kao **umjetnost**, u okviru zapadnog civilizacijskog kruga zadržala sve do suprotnog romantičarskog shvaćanja **umjetnosti kao stvaranja**. Ipak, zagovaratelji *mimetičke teorije* ne bi trebali zatvarati oči pred onim što je pogledu neizbježno – makar to bila i ornamentalna, geometricizirana, apstraktna^{▼6} i *ina ostvarenja*. Čini se bitnim naglasiti kako je demagogija da je to nužno „realizam“ (termin potječe iz latinskog jezika *res* – stvar, *realis* – stvaran, predmetan) koji se može modificirati ili odbaciti, a pritom ne iskoračiti iz problema ograničenih *mimetičkom teorijom*.^{▼7}

Na osnovu navedene teorije, **umjetnost** kao takva – neovisno o konkretnim umjetničkim djelima – postaje problematičnom i potrebno joj je prisustvo apologije. A apologija **umjetnosti** rađa čudnu viziju prema kojoj je ono što smo naučili zvati „formom“ odvojeno od onoga što smo zvali „sadržajem“, dovodi do pomaka mišljenja koje sadržaj čini bitnim, a formu tek prilogom. Bilo da **umjetničko djelo** zamišljamo prema modelu slike (kreativnost kao slika realnosti) ili prema modelu poruke (kreativnost kao poruka), sadržaj (ar. *al-muḥtawā*) i dalje zavređuje poziciju na prvom mjestu.

Likovni tekst (likovna forma) je estetizirani govor linije, boje, plošnosti i eventualnog korištenja tipografskih elemenata. U likovnom smislu gledati određeno kreativno ostvarenje znači *čitati likovni tekst*. Likovni tekst je početak i kraj, jedini kreativni smisao likovnog djela. Sve što je u kreativnom ostvarenju izvan likovnog teksta, a to znači: svaki estetizirani sadržaj koji se ne nalazi u liniji, boji, plošnosti, tipografskim elementima – likovno ne postoji. Slikovni prikaz se ne slika [...], nego isključivo događa radi *likovnog teksta* (likovne forme). Stoga je likovno djelo samo onda kvalitetno kada u njemu *likovna forma* (*likovni tekst*) nadvlada likovni motiv.

Likovno djelo sastoji se od materijalnih ili fizičkih^{▼8} i od psihičkih vizualnih elemenata utemeljenih na duhovnoj spoznaji (ar. *al-ma'rifah*), a izražava se preko likovnog motiva [teme

▼6 Za ornamentalna, geometricizirana, odnosno *apstraktna ostvarenja* nastala u okviru modalitetā diskursā *qadar/šinā'ata*, koristi se arapska (jezička) kovanica *al-fann al-taškīlī*. Ona podrazumijeva proces odvajanja forme od sadržaja, čime se definira jedna estetizirana forma koja simbolički upućuje na značenje „iza“ samog djela, odnosno upućuje na dublje značenje.

▼7 Sontag, Susan. *Against Interpretation*. London: Vintage; 1994. = *Protiv interpretacije* (prev. Mario Kopic). Nije paginirano (str. 2). Dostupno na: <https://strane.ba/susan-sontag-protiv-interpretacije/>, pristupljeno 24.1.2019.

▼8 *Likovni elementi* (lat. *elementum*, 'temeljni sastojak'), osnovni pojam, sastavni dio cjeline, odnosno kompozicije likovnoga djela – tačka i linija, ploha, boja, površina, masa i prostor.

For Aristotle, *mimesis* means *imitation* or figural representation of particular importance in pictorial-aestheticized activity. Aristotle rejects Plato's ideas as a reality where all things participate and claims that even a figural picture of the reality assumes a completely different value, and thus the activity which produces, i.e. *imitates* (Lat. *imitor*) also assumes far more complex efficiency. In a distinctive way, it refutes Plato's standpoint according to which imitation within a creative act was *imitation* of imitation, which produces pure figural phantasms (Gr. *φαντασματα*, a product of fantasy [imagination]) deprived of truth.

It should be noted that the idea of *imitation* as a possible form of creative activity which would far later be named **art** would remain in the Western civilizational circle until the opposite Romanticist understanding of **art as creation**. Still, advocates of *mimetic theory* need not close their eyes to what cannot escape the eye – even to decorative, geometricized, abstract^{▼6} and *other creations*. It seems essential to note that the fallacy that 'art' is necessarily "realism" (the term originates from Latin *res* – thing, *realis* – real, substantive) can be modified or scrapped without ever moving outside the problems delimited by the *mimetic theory*.^{▼7}

Based on this theory, **art** as such – above and beyond given "works of art" – becomes problematic and needs defence. Further, it is the defence of **art** that gives birth to the odd vision by which something we have learned to call "form" is separated off from something we have learned to call "content", and to the well-intentioned move which makes content essential and form accessory. Whether we conceive of the **work of art** on the model of a picture (*art* as a picture of reality) or on the model of a statement (*art* as the statement of the *artist*), content (Ar. *al-muḥṭawā*) still comes first.

Art text (*art form*) is aestheticized speech of line, colour, flatness and possible use of typography elements. In the sense of visual art, watching a given creation means reading an *art text*. *Art text* is the beginning and the end, the only creative sense of a work of art. Everything in a creation which is beyond the art text, which means: any aestheticized content which is not found in line, colour, flatness, typography elements – does not artistically exist. A pictorial representation is not painted but is rather happening for the sake of an *art text* (*art form*). Therefore, a **work of art** has a high quality only when the **art form** (*art text*) overrides the motif.

A **work of art** consists of substantive or physical^{▼8} and psychical visual elements based on spiritual insight (Ar. *al-ma'rifah*), and is expressed through the art motif [topic (Ar. *mawḍū*) or content (Ar. *al-muḥṭawā*), i.e. expression (Ar. *ta'bīr*)] and *form of art* (the way of expressing art motif).

▼6 Ornamental, geometricized, i.e. *abstract creations* made within modalities of *qadar/ṣinā'at* discourse are referred to by the Arabic (language) coinage *al-fann al-tashkīlī*. It refers to the process of separating **form** from **content**, which in turn defines an aestheticized form which symbolically indicates the meaning "behind" the work itself, i.e. a deeper meaning.

▼7 Sontag, Susan. *Against Interpretation*. London: Vintage, 1994, p.2.

▼8 *Elements of visual art* (Lat. *elementum* = fundamental component), the basic concept, constituent part of a whole, i.e. of the composition of a work of art – a dot and a line, plane, colour, surface, mass and space.

(ar. *mawḍū'*) ili sadržaja (ar. *al-muḥtawā*), odnosno izraza (ar. *ta'bir*) i likovne forme (načina izražavanja likovnog motiva).

Likovni motiv (tema ili sadržaj, odnosno izraz) jest ono što je *homo islamicus* prikazao na likovnom djelu, pa, prema motivu, likovno djelo može biti prikazano ili figurativno (ar. *al-taškīl*), odnosno stilizirano i denaturalizirano, ili apstraktno (ar. *tadžrīd*).^{▼9}



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Farrukh ibn `Abd al-Latif: Likovno djelo prema motivu prikazano figurativno - *Sat slona*, Sirija 1315.

ILLUSTRATION ~ Farrukh ibn `Abd al-Latif: A work of art according to the motif shown figuratively - *The Elephant Clock*, Syria 1315.

Ima li išta pouzdanije nego slijediti put koji naznačuju potezi *kālēmā* (ar. *al-qalam*, 'olovka ili pero') ili *ferše* (ar. *faršah*, 'kist') ili ...; postojani trag koji svjedoči o nadopunjavanju i nadovezivanju na prvotni *tractus*. Ustvari, može li se uopće i misliti o uspješnoj vizualizaciji bez djelića metamorfne stijene koja sadrži dovoljno minerala lazurita kako bi se ostavio trag *lapisa* (olovka, pisaljka ...), odnosno bez odgovarajućeg pigmenta kako bi se podario vidljivi trag poteza kista – *nulla dies sine linea*, bez ukupnosti poteza koji naznačuje pravac? Poredak analiziranja slikovnih prikaza po nastanku garantira, dakle, mogućnost uspješnog tumačenja. Željeni ishod bila bi potpuna likovna čitljivost djela, tj. uklanjanje i brisanje likovnih formi kao tekstualne matrice pred onim što je u njoj pohranjeno, što je začetnik/dizajner estetizirane reprezentacije htio ili uspio izraziti sadržajem (ar. *al-muḥtawā*).

Nažalost, niko više ne može povratiti onu nevinost prisutnu prije nastanka svih aktualiziranih teorija o ostavljanju traga *lapisa*, kada ono što se danas deklarira kao *umjetnost* nije poznavalo potrebu samoopravdanja, kada se čovjek nije pitao šta neki trag *lapisa ili ferše* „govori“, najvjerovatnije zato što je znao (ili mislio da zna) što oni čine. U cilju preciznijeg razumijevanja primordijalnog i suvremenog značenja riječi *umjetnost*, prijeko je potrebno razlikovati suvremenu upotrebu i značenje ovog pojma od njegovog ključnog značenja i smisla koji se tradicionalno nazivao zanatom, vještinom ili umijećem.

▼9 Sontag, Susan. Op. cit. Nije paginirano.

Art motif (topic or content, i.e. expression) is what *homo islamicus* presented in a work of art, and according to the motif, a work of art can be presented either figuratively (Ar. *al-tashkīl*), i.e. as stylized or denaturalized or abstractly (Ar. *tajrīd*).^{▼9}




ILLUSTRATION ~ Amir Khusrau: *Medallion (shamsa) from the Five Poems (Khamsa)*, Herat 1485 (Afghanistan).

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Amir Khusrau: *Medaljon (šamsa) iz pet pjesama (Khamsa)*, Herat 1485. (Afghanistan).

Is there anything more reliable than following the road indicated by strokes of the *kālēm* (Ar. *al-qalam*, pencil or quill) or *ferša* (Ar. *farshah*, brush) or something else; a fast trace which testifies to supplementing and building on the original *tractus*. Indeed, can one think about a successful visualization without a bit of metamorphous rock which contains enough mineral lazurite to leave a trace from *lapis* (pencil, stylus ...), or without a suitable pigment which would allow a visible trace of a brush stroke – *nulla dies sine linea*, without the entirety of strokes which indicate the direction? Thus, the order of analysing pictorial representations by the time of their creation guarantees a possibility of successful interpretation. The desired outcome would be a full artistic legibility of the work, i.e. removal and erasing of art forms as a form of text in front of what has been stored in it, of what the author/designer of the aestheticized representation wanted or managed to express with the content (Ar. *al-muḥṭawā*).

Unfortunately, nobody can any longer support or revive the innocence that existed before the emergence of all modern theories associated with leaving a trace from the *lapis*, when what is today declared as **art** did not know of a need for self-justification, or when mankind did not wonder what a trace from *lapis* or *fershah* would “say”. This was most likely because he knew (or thought he knew) what they *do*. To more accurately understand the primordial and the contemporary meaning of the word **art**, it is necessary to distinguish the contemporary use and meaning of this term from its crucial sense and meaning, which was traditionally called craft, skill or *artistry*.

^{▼9} Sontag, Susan. *Against Interpretation...* p.2.



ILUSTRACIJA - *Homo islamicusovo kreativno djelanje/šīnā'at* prema modelu poruke (kreativnost kao poruka) u okviru odgovarajućeg modalitetā diskursā *qadar/šīnā'ata* - *Simetrični strop džamije Lotfollah u Isfahanu.*




ILLUSTRATION - *Homo Islamicus'* creative action/*ṣināʿat* according to the message model (creativity as a message) within the appropriate modality of discourse *qadar/ṣināʿat* - Isfahan Lotfollah Mosque Ceiling Symmetric.

Aristotel (ar. *Arisṭūṭālīs* ili *Arisṭū*)^{▼10} nije imao nakanu izravno argumentirati da ono što je on nazivao *tehne* (τέχνη), a što je danas prisutno, uz učešće latinskog jezika terminološki transformirano u naziv za *umjetnost* (*ars, artis*), niti se Aristotel zadržavao na odbrani tako shvaćene aktivnosti od njenog degradiranja na *imitaciju* koja je daleko od istinske stvarnosti, one idealne, kako to podrazumijeva Platon u desetoj knjizi *Države*.^{▼11} Aristotel takve tačke tek implicitno dotiče i poništava tokom svojeg cjelokupnog izlaganja, koje je usmjereno prema pozitivnom proučavanju i razjašnjavanju naravi, objekata i uloge odgovarajuće kreativne aktivnosti – što se u akademskom okcidentalno-vesterniziranom vokabularu imenuje kao ‘*stvaralaštvo*’ (lat. *creativiti*).

Ipak, on je svoju odbranu utemeljio u izjednačavanju *kreativne djelatnosti* s jednom formom vještine ili zanata (τέχνη).^{▼12} Platon je na više mjesta izričito negirao takav pojam ili je umanjivao njegovu važnost. Postavljajući takav karakter pojavnosti među vještine ili zanate, odnosno *umijeća tehne* (τέχνη) kao nešto općepoznato i utemeljeno, Aristotel zapravo povezuje ljudsku aktivnost s razumskim ljudskim očitovanjima, to jest veže je uz djelatnosti koje su kontrolirane i vođene određenim normama, koje se individualiziraju u proizvodnji dovršenog djela. Vještina, zanat, umijeće tehne (τέχνη), općenito gledano, ne razlikuje se od drugih razumskih proizvodnih djelatnosti, osim po naravi djela koje se proizvodi i po svom specifičnom cilju. Teorijski gledano, smatra se da je takva vještina, zanat, umijeće tehne (τέχνη) na istom nivou s arhitekturom.^{▼13}

Suvremeno okcidentalno-vesternizirano akademsko nazivlje izvršilo je transformaciju termina *umjetnost* na ono što je *ars* na starolatinskom ili na ono što je na starogrčkom τέχνη ([*tehne*]; „umijeće vještine“, „zanat“ ali u značenju: *moć 'stvaranja' unaprijed postignutog rezultata svjesno kontroliranim i usmjerenim aktivnostima*). Za razliku od ovakve generirane vesternizacije arapsko nazivlje zadržava prvobitno tradicionalno značenje u terminu *fann* s njegovom mogućom aktivacijom u značenju *umijeće*

▼10 Aristotel je među muslimanima upamćen kao „prvi učitelj“ (ar. *al-mu' allim al-awwal*) i kao naprosto „mudrac“ (ar. *al-ḥakīm*). Usklađivanje Platonovog i Aristotelovog mišljenja među islamskim filozofima podržano je time što su i djela sa izrazito novoplatonskom tendencijom ušla u arapsku filozofsku literaturu pod Aristotelovim imenom, posebno takozvana *Aristotelovska teologija* i *Knjiga o čistom dobru*, koje su se, u islamskoj tradiciji, cijenile kao vrhunac aristotelovske metafizike i nadaleko su zračile pravu teologiju. Tako je Aristotelovo djelo moglo u islamu biti protumačeno kao zatvoreni teološko-filozofski sistem, koji je za sve daljnje istraživanje priskrbio stabilne konstrukte.

▼11 *Usporedi*, Platon. *Država*. Zagreb: Naklada Jurčić; 1997. str. 367.

Unatoč činjenici da su Arapi srednjeg vijeka Platona (ar. *Aflātūn*) smatrali „božanskim filozofom“ i „jednim od najvećih mudraca“ (Platonov i novoplatonski utjecaji u islamskoj filozofiji i teologiji), prijevod njegovih djela u arapski jezik bio je, ipak, sporadičan i fragmentaran.

▼12 *Usporedi*, Platon. *Ion* (Ἴων) : *The Nature of Poetic Inspiration*. Whitefish, Montana, SAD: Kessinger Publishing; 2004. str. 533e–534; slično se može pronaći u *Fedr ili o lepoti* (prev. Miloš Đurić); Beograd: Narodna knjiga Alfa; 1996. str. 245a; također u *Zakoni* (prev. Dr. Albin Vihlar). Beograd: BIGZ; 1971. str. 719c.

▼13 Proučavanjem pojma τέχνη („umijeće tehne“) u grčkoj misli, kao i kod samog Aristotela, između ostalih, bavili su se: Wieland, Wolfgang. *La fisica di Aristotele : Studi sulla fondazione della scienza della natura e sui fondamenti linguistici della ricerca dei principi in Aristotele* (prev. C. Gentili). Bologna: Il Mulino; 1993; Parente Isnardi, Margherita. *Techne : Momenti del pensiero greco da Platone ad Epicuro*. Firenze: La nuova Italia; 1966; Donini, Pier Luigi. *La tragedia e la vita : Saggi sulla Poetica di Aristotele*. Alessandria: Edizioni dell’Orso; 2004.

Aristotle (Ar. *Ariṣṭūṭālīs* or *Ariṣṭū*)¹⁰ did not intend to directly argue about what he called *technê* (τέχνη), and what is present today and what has been, with the participation of Latin, transformed into the term for **art** (*ars, artis*), nor did Aristotle dwell upon the defence of the activity understood in this way from its degradation to *imitation*, which is far from the true reality, the ideal one, as Plato implied in the tenth book of *The Republic*.¹¹ Aristotle only implicitly touched upon these points and annulled them during his entire reasoning, which is focused on positive study and clarification of the nature, objects and role of a corresponding creative activity – which academic Occidental-westernized vocabulary names as **creativity** od *creation* (Lat. *creativiti*; Bos. *stvaralaštvo*).

Still, he based his defence on equalizing *creative activity* with a form of skill or craft (τέχνη).¹² Plato explicitly negated such a concept or diminished its importance at several points. By positioning such a character of manifestation among skills or crafts, i.e. the *skills of technê* (τέχνη) as something generally known and well-established, Aristotle actually linked human activity to human rational observation, i.e. he linked it to activities which are controlled and led by given norms, and which are individualized in the production of a finished work. In general, skill, craft, skills of *technê* (τέχνη) does not differ from other rational productive activities, except by the nature of the work which is produced and by its distinctive goal. Theoretically, such a skill, craft, skills of *technê* (τέχνη) is considered to be at the same level as architecture.¹³

Contemporary Occidental-westernized academic terminology has made a transformation of the term **art** to what is referred to as *ars* in old Latin or as τέχνη ([*technê*] in Greek; “artistry of skill”, “craft” though in the sense of: *the power of ‘creating’ a previously achieved result by consciously controlled and directed activities*). Unlike westernized terminology generated in such a way, Arabic terms keep the original traditional meaning in the term *fann* with its possible activation which means

¹⁰ Among Muslims, Aristotle has been remembered as the “first teacher” (Ar. *al-mu’allim al-awwal*) and simply as the “sage” (Ar. *al-ḥakīm*). An alignment of the thought and axiomatic presuppositions of Plato and Aristotle among Islamic philosophers was supported by the fact that works with marked neo-Platonian tendency entered Arabic philosophical literature under the name of Aristotle, particularly the so-called “Aristotle’s Theology” and “A Book on Pure Good”, which have been appreciated as the peak of Aristotle’s metaphysics in the Islamic tradition, and widely radiated the true theology. Aristotle’s work could thus in Islam be interpreted as a closed theological-philosophical system, which provided stable constructs for any further research.


¹¹ Cf., Platon. *Država* ..., p. 367.

Despite the fact that medieval Arabs considered Plato (Ar. *Aflālūna*) a “divine philosopher” and “one of the greatest sages” (Plato’s and neo-Platonian influences in Islamic philosophy and theology), translation of his works into Arabic has been sporadic and fragmentary.

¹² Cf., Plato. *Ion* (Ἴων): *The Nature of Poetic Inspiration*. Montana, SAD: Kessinger Publishing, Whitefish, 2004, pp. 533e–534; similar can be found in *Fedr ili o lepoti* (trans., Miloš Đurić.). Beograd: Narodna knjiga Alfa, 1996, p. 245a; also in *Zakoni* (trans., Dr. Albin Vihlar). Beograd: BIGZ, 1971, p. 719c.

¹³ Among others, the term τέχνη (“skills of *technê*”) in Greek thought and Aristotle himself was studied by: Wieland, Wolfgang. *La fisica di Aristotele : Studi sulla fondazione della scienza della natura e sui fondamenti linguistici della ricerca dei principi in Aristotele* (trans. C. Gentili). Il Mulino, Bologna, 1993; Parente Isnardi, Margherita: *Techne: Momenti del pensiero greco da Platone ad Epicuro*. Firenze: La nuova Italia, 1966; Donini, Pier Luigi. *La tragedia e la vita: Saggi sulla Poetica di Aristotele*. Alessandria, Edizioni dell’Orso, 2004.

qadar/šīnā'ata.^{▼14} Riječ *fann* izvorno nema značenje *umjetnost* u onom smislu u kome se ona determinira u aktualnom zapadnom civilizacijskom krugu: *fann* je upravo *umijeće tehne* (τέχνη), usredotočeno na vještinu (ar. *mahārah*) i općenito na formalno-metodološku stranu polja *qadar/šīnā'ata* pozicioniranog u temelj produktivno-refleksivnog diskursa, kao integralnog dijela islamskog civilizacijskog kruga.



ILUSTRACIJA – Natjecanje dvojice kreativaca, jednog čija je integracija zasnovana na imanenciji (lijevo) i drugog (*homo islamicusa*) koji je integriran s transcencijom (desno).

▼14 Kada je riječ o našem specifičnom, ali konkretnom korištenju termina *uređenje* ili *dizajn* (ar. *qadar*) uz *djelanje* (ar. *šīnā'at*), iz čega je izvedena riječ 'zanat' u bosanskom jeziku, situacija je atipična, ali ona ipak proizlazi iz mogućnosti koju nudi tradicionalna islamska teologija (ar. '*ilm al-kalām*') i filozofija. Naime, u islamskoj teologiji i filozofiji termin *qaḍā* ('odluka' ili 'određenje' ili 'sud', što asocira na pojam *kādīja*, tj. *sudija* [iz ar. *al-qāḍī*, odnosno osm.tur. *kadı*]) i termin *qadar* ('poredak' ili 'harmonija' ili 'uređenje', odnosno dizajn) predstavlja jedno od šest temeljnih islamskih vjerovanja. *Qaḍā* je Božija odredba kao *Božija apsolutna volja*, a *qadar* je *Božija svemoć* da sve stvari u prirodi postavi po određenoj mjeri, te da u njoj vlada red i poredak, tj. harmonija, koja kod filozofa pobuđuje radoznalost, a kod *homo fannāna/islamicusa* (ar. *fannān*) izaziva osjećaj volje i želje za redom i uređenjem ili dizajnom, kao oblikom kreativnog postignuća na principu *qadara*, *precizne mjere*. *Sve što je Bog stvorio, stvorio je s [dizajnom, op. aut.] preciznom mjerom [ar. bi-qadar]*¹⁴ (Kur'an, 54:49). Ovdje se ne radi o čovjekovoj imitaciji *Božijeg umijeća stvaranja*, već o čovjekovoj želji da svoje estetizirano djelanje (ar. *šīnā'at*) uradi preciznom mjerom, koju na sebi svojstven način zapaža.

skills of *qadar/ṣināʿat*.^{▼14} The word *fann* does not originally mean *art* in the sense in which it is defined in the current Western civilizational circle: *fann* is exactly the *skills of technê* (τέχνη), focused on skill (Ar. *mahārah*) and generally on formal-methodological side of the area of *qadar/ṣināʿat* positioned in the foundation of productive-reflective discourse as an integral part of Islamic civilizational circle.




ILLUSTRATION ~ A contest between two creatives, one whose integration is based on immanence (left) and the other (*homo islamicus*) who is integrated with transcendence (right).

▼14 With respect to our specific actual use of the term *arrangement or design* (Ar. *qadar*) together with activity (Ar. *ṣināʿat*) from which the word “craft” was derived in Bosnian, the situation is atypical, though it results from the possibility offered by the traditional Islamic theology (Ar. *ʿilm al-kalām*) and philosophy. Indeed, in Islamic theology and philosophy, the term *qaḍā* (“decision” or “definition” or “judgment”, which associates to the term *qadi*, i.e. judge [from Ar. *al-qāḍī*, or Ottom.Turk. *kadı*]) and the term *qadar* (“order” or “harmony” or “arrangement”, i.e. design) is one of the six fundamental Islamic beliefs. *Qaḍā* is God’s provision as God’s absolute will, while *qadar* is God’s omnipotence to arrange all things in nature according to a given measure which makes up nature, and that order rules in it, i.e. harmony, which arouses curiosity in philosophers and in *homo fannān/islamicus* (Ar. *fannān*) it arouses a feeling of willingness and desire for order and arrangement or design, as a form of creative achievement on the principle of *qadara a determined measure*. „We have created everything in [design, author’s note] a determined measure [Ar. *bi-qadar*]” (*Qur’an*, 54:49). It is not a matter of man’s imitation of God’s artistry of creation, , but rather of the man’s desire to make his aestheticized activity (Ar. *ṣināʿat*) in a determined measure, which he perceives in a distinctive way.

Naime, riječ je o tome da se razgraniči, naprimjer, istinit stav i njegov simulakrum u okrilju nekog pseudoroda ili konkretno žanra. Simulakrum je instanca koja sadrži razliku po sebi kao dva divergentna niza, potpuno poništene sličnosti, na kojima prema Gillesu Deleuzu (um. 1995) *simulakrum pleše*, a da se pri tome ne može pokazati postojanje nekog originala u dubini promatrano s površine.^{▼15} Čini se da bi, na samom početku ovog prikaza, bilo potrebno dovesti u pitanje tu poziciju *razgraničenja*. To znači da bi izokrenuto Aristotelovo *tehne* (τέχνη) zajedno s transformiranim starolatinskim *ars* trebalo djelovati pomoću „dijalektike neposrednog“.^{▼16} Riječ je o tome da se odstrane svi osim pravog pretendenta. Lažni pretendenti, kao što znamo u antičkim mitovima, moraju umrijeti ili im se danas treba priznati autohtonost, distanciranost ili odijeljenost. Analogija pojmovu u takvoj situaciji jedan je takav *lažni pretendent*. Naime, u konkretnom slučaju nameće se otvoreno pitanje kako je moguće unutar analogija atribucije integrirati biće koje je integrirano s transcendencijom (ar. *al-ta'ālī*) i (ar. *al-ḥaqīqah*) bića čija je integracija zasnovana na imanenciji (ar. *al-džawhariyyah*). Znači, želja za ujedinjenjem duhovnog i sekularnog dovodi do projekta razlike i ponavljanja, odnosno do odbacivanja analogije (ar. *al-qiyās*). Očito je da se mora posvetiti pažnja ulozi razlike, sličnosti i identiteta spram onog pokretača koji omogućuje *razliku* razlike (ar. *farq*).

Pokretač je prije svega sila koja osigurava komunikaciju (ar. *al-tawāṣul*), ali pošto svaki intenzivni sistem posjeduje vlastiti *nagovještaj različito različitog*, što je drugostepena razlika, razlika prema samoj sebi jeste ona koja ono različito dovodi u odnos s različitim. Trasirani put prekriven je i prožet fenomenima koji su već uvedeni ili se uvode u sistem. Nagovještaj *različito različitog* nema drugog mjesta osim onoga na kojem nije, on je objekt koji nema mjesto te posjeduje identitet (ar. *huwayyah*) koji nema. Njegova eventualna uloga sadržana je u omogućavanju komunikacije između rubnih dijelova u takvom *intenzivnom sistemu*; nagovještaj djeluje kao ono što razlikuje *razlike*, kao diferencirajuća *diferencija*.

Ukoliko smo suglasni s time da su analogijom uglavnom razvijani fiktivni pretendenti, pa samim tim i hijerarhije (ar. *tasalsul*), onda je neminovno pokušati potražiti odgovor na to kako je moguće ukloniti anatemu s *razlike*? Odgovor se čini previše jednostavnim i glasi: odstraniti anatemu s *razlike* jedino je moguće ako se preokrene procjena rivala i odabir među pretendentima na „istinu“ (ar. *al-ḥaqīqah*). Ne radi se o tome da bi se stvari trebale napraviti „različito“ od onog kako su napravljene, nego je riječ o tome da se odgovori na pitanje pod kojim su se uvjetima dogodile stvari i u kojem će se pravcu one kretati unutar poredka stvari? Drugim riječima, zainteresirani smo dobiti odgovor na pitanje kako misliti „čistu“ *razliku*, a da je pri tome tumačimo kao pozitivitet (ar. *idžābiyyah*). Čini se potrebnim iznaći način razlikovanja one *razlike* na koju je prvi u odnosu na Platona ukazao Aristotel.

▼15 *Usporedi*, Deleuze, Gilles. *Razlika i ponavljanje* (prev. Ivan Milenković). Beograd: Fedon, 2009. str. 121.

▼16 Prema Gillesu Deleuzeu, Platon dijalektiku (činjenje razlike) određuje kao ono što proistječe iz problema, putem kojih se izdiže do čistog počela života; utemeljujući, ocjenjujući i raspodjeljujući probleme nudeći odgovarajuća rješenja. *Usporedi*, *Ibid.* str. 113.

Indeed, it is important to distinguish, for instance, a true view from its simulacrum under the wing of a pseudo-genus or specifically a genre. The simulacrum is the instance which includes a difference within itself such as two divergent series, with all resemblance abolished, on which, according to Gilles Deleuze (died in 1995) '*the simulacrum plays*', so that one can no longer point to the existence of an original in the deep when observed from the surface.^{▼15} It seems that the position of *partition* should be challenged at the very beginning of this review. It means that the reversed Aristotle's *technê* (τέχνη), together with transformed old Latin *ars* should work by means of "dialectics of the immediate".^{▼16} It means that all but the true claimant should be removed. As we know from ancient myths, false claimants must die or their authenticity, remoteness or separateness should be recognized. In such a situation, analogy of terms is an example of a *false claimant*. Indeed, in the actual case, an open question arises as to how it is possible, within analogies of attribution, to integrate a being which is integrated with transcendence (Ar. *al-ta'ālī*) and (Ar. *al-ḥaqīqah*) beings whose integration is predicated on immanence (Ar. *al-jawhariyyah*). This means that a desire for uniting the spiritual and the secular leads to projects of difference and repetition, i.e. rejecting analogy (Ar. *al-qiyās*). Attention obviously has to be paid to the role of difference, resemblance and identity against the driver which allows the *difference* of difference (Ar. *farq*).

The driver is, above all, a power which ensures communication (Ar. *al-tawāṣul*), but as every intensive system has its own *intimation of differently different*, which is a secondary difference, the difference from itself is what relates the different to the different. The paved road is covered and permeated with phenomena which have already been introduced or are being introduced into the system. The intimation of *differently different* has no other place than where it is not, it is an object which does not have a place and has an identity (Ar. *huwayyah*) which it does not possess. Its possible role is contained in allowing communication between bordering parts in such an *intensive system*; the intimation works as something that distinguishes between *differences*, as a differentiating *difference*.

If we agree that analogy has mostly developed false claims, and therefore hierarchies (Ar. *tasalsul*) as well, it is critical to try to find an answer to the question as to how it is possible to remove anathema from the *difference*? The answer seems to be too simple: it is possible to remove anathema from the difference only if one reverse the estimate of rivals and selection among claimants to "truth" (Ar. *al-ḥaqīqah*). It does not mean that things should be made "differently" from how they were made, but that one should answer the question as to under what conditions things happened and to what direction they will reverse, having in mind the current order of things. In other words, we are interested in finding the answer to the question as to how to contemplate the "pure" *difference*, while interpreting it as positivity (Ar. *ijābiyyah*). It seems necessary to find a way to differentiate the *difference* which was first indicated by Aristotle with respect to Plato. Indeed, Aristotle speaks only about a "relative" *difference*

▼15 Cf., Deleuze, Gilles. *Razlika i ponavljanje* (trans. Ivan Milenković). Belgrade: Fedon, 2009, p. 121.

▼16 According to G. Deleuze, Plato defines dialectics (making a difference) as the process which results from problems, by means of which it rises to the pure principle which founds, assesses and distributes problems offering appropriate solutions.

Cf., *ibid.*, p. 113.

Naime, kod Aristotela je riječ samo o „relativnoj“ *razlici* (*'action' differentia*) jer on odgovara na pitanje kojoj skupini pripadaju stvari. Takva skupina ne odgovara na *razlike* između rodova (žanrova) gdje *razlike* nisu stvar oponirajućih predikacija.^{▼17} *Razlike* u našem slučaju ovise o definiciji općenitosti žanrova koji indiciraju serije predikata unutar kojih se događaju specifične opreke. U tom slučaju definicija ovisi o definiciji pojma koji je i sâm ovisan o definiciji pripadajućeg žanra. Da bismo pronašli odgovor na pitanje kako stvari postaju *različite*, kako se razvijaju i nastavljaju razvijati na samoj granici žanrova u koje su bile raspoređene, potrebno je posegnuti za „stvarnom“ i „čistom“ *razlikom*. Ponavljanje je ponavljanje *razlike* koja mora biti takva da ju je moguće ponavljati (ar. *tikrār*) a da ne bude identična. Samo ponavljanje u kojem se odigrava kretanje *razlike* omogućuje da se razlika reproducira izvan domene istog. U tom kontekstu, potrebno je naglasiti kako povijest ne napreduje pomoću negacije, niti pomoću negacije *negacije*, nego pomoću odlučivanja u problemima i afirmiranja *razlike*. Prihvatanje *razlike* naspram identiteta (ar. *al-huwiyya*) u iluziji je svijesti, gdje se razlika vidi u srcu bića kao važniji dio uvida.

Ukoliko G. Deleuzeovo razmišljanje o formi interpoliramo na *umjetnost*, moguće bi bilo zaključiti kako se forma može razlučiti od materije, to jest može se razlučiti od temelja i dna, ali ne i obratno, zato što je samo razlučivanje *forma umjetnosti*. Forma se razgrađuje kada se ogleda u dnu koje se uzdiže. Uzdizanje dna njegova je samostalna egzistencija (ar. *al-wudžūd*) pa stoga forma koja prosijava i koja se ogleda kroz dno nije *forma* (ar. *šakl*). Uzdizanje dna na površinu rastače ljudsko lice, koje je slika površine (ar. *sath*). U tom se uzdizanju sjedinjuje ono što je neodređeno kao i ono što čini druga određenja. Sjedinjavanje u jedno određenje jest ono što čini *razliku*. Ako je podizanje dna i razlučivanje forme *razlika*, kako to Deleuze tvrdi, onda je razlika po njemu prokleta *čudovište*, *greška*, *grieh* i, što je najjasnije rečeno, razlika je „oblik zla“.^{▼18} Teološki kazano, način na koji je Deleuze opisao razliku jest opis grijeha, a u filozofskom smislu to znači da je razlika *zlo* (lat. *malum*). U tom slučaju mora se inzistirati na negativitetu, unatoč tome što negativitet ne može producirati nikakav pozitivni element otpora, ali će se onda morati pripojiti svakom diferencirajućem procesu i žanrovima koji se međusobno preklapaju. Iz toga neće biti teško zaključiti kako takav proces samodiferenciranja mora biti izražen u kategoriji „intenziteta“. To znači kako se istina o *umjetnosti* izražava intenzitetom (ar. *al-šiddah*) jer za nju nema „egzistencije“ (ar. *al-wudžūd*), nego postoji samo „intencija“ (ar. *al-qaṣd*). Takva *umjetnost* nije izbor čovjekova srca u znaku počinjanja (ar. *al-istihdāf*), koje mora biti čisto od bilo kakvih drugih veza osim sa Stvoriteljem (ar. *al-khāliq*), da bi moglo potpuno predano usvojiti potrebna saznanja djelanja/*sinā' ata*.

▼17 Deleuze, Gilles. *Op. cit.* str. 60.

▼18 Deleuze, Gilles. *Op. cit.* str. 59.

('action' *differentia*) since he answers the question as to which group things belong to. Such a group does not answer to *differences* between genera (genres), where differences are not a matter of opposing predications.▼¹⁷ In our case, *differences* depend on the definition of the generality of genres which indicate series of predicates within which particular contrarities happen. In this case the definition depends on the definition of the concept, which itself depends on the definition of the related genre. To find the answer to the conundrum as to how things become *different*, how they develop and continue to develop on the very border of genres into which they were classified, it is necessary to reach for the "true" and "pure" *difference*. Repetition is repeating a *difference* which has to be one that can be repeated (Ar. *tikrār*) without being identical. Only the repetition where there is movement of *difference* allows the *difference* to be reproduced beyond the domain of the same. In this context, it should be noted that history does not advance by means of negation or by means of negation of *negation*, but rather by means of making decisions in problems and promoting *difference*. Accepting *difference* against *identity* (Ar. *al-huwiyya*) is in illusion of the mind, where *difference* is seen in the heart of a being as an important part of insight.

If we interpolate thinking of G. Deleuze to **art**, it could be concluded that *form* can be distinguished from *matter*, i.e. it can be distinguished from foundation and bottom, but not the other way round, since distinguishing itself is a **form of art**. Form is disintegrated when it reflects in the ground from which it rises. Rising of the ground is its independent existence (Ar. *al-wujūd*) and therefore the form which glints and which is reflected through the ground is not form (Ar. *shakl*). Rising of the ground to the surface decomposes human face, which is the image of surface (Ar. *saṭḥ*). In this rise, what is indeterminate and what makes up other determinations unite. Combining into a single determination is what makes the *difference*. If raising the ground and dissolving the form is *difference*, as Deleuze claims, then, according to him, it should be accused *monster, error, sin* and, most clearly, difference is the "figure of evil".▼¹⁸ In the theological sense, the way in which Deleuze described difference is the description of sin, and in the philosophical sense it means that difference is *evil* (Lat. *malum*). In this existential case one must insist on negativity, despite the fact that negativity cannot produce any positive element of resistance, though it will then have to be adjoined to every differentiating process and genres which overlap. It will not be difficult to conclude that such a process of self-differentiation must be expressed in the category of "intensity". It means that **truth** about **art** is expressed by means of intensity (Ar. *al-shiddah*) since it is not related to "existence" (Ar. *al-wudūd*) but rather to "intention" (Ar. *al-qaṣd*). Such **art** is not a choice of the man's heart in the sign of beginning (Ar. *al-istihdāf*), which must be pure from any other ties except for those with the Creator (Ar. *al-khāliq*), to be able to adopt the necessary knowledge of activity/*ṣinā'at* with total dedication.

▼¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

▼¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

Pod uvjetom da s površine sagledamo dubinu, već spomenutih procesa analogije (ar. *al-qiyaṣ*) i univočnog (ar. *mutavat*), moguće je doći do zaključka da je analoški proces u neprekidnom diskriminiranju preferencija kojim se podižu i grade hijerarhije, za razliku od univočnog procesa što ostaje indiferentan prema svakoj partikularnoj razlici pod kulisom *jednakosti*, ali i vlastitom *primarnošću* ili *procesualnošću*. Dilema odakle početi analizu nastaje stoga što svi slikovni prikazi stoje u istoj ravni, navodno međusobno izjednačeni, bez ikakve prednosti po svom položaju. Međutim, obnavljanje ustaljene procesualnosti vrednovanja izgleda da ni na ovaj način ne uspijeva prikriti njenu netaknutu labilnost: imamo izjednačavanje slikovnih prikaza po položaju (ar. *wad'*) u isti mah dok se jednom od njih daje prednost, ne samo u navođenju. Složenost takvih hijerarhija i karakterističnu modeliranost njihovih preferencija moguće je pripisati samom analogizirajućem procesu, što nije ništa drugo nego praktično priklanjanje modalitetâ diskursâ *qadar/ṣinā'ata* partikularnoj tradiciji. Navedeno priklanjanje tradiciji dopušta metakritiku koju istovremeno ustrajavanje na univočnom i ekvivočnom kôdu negira. Ustrajavanje na univočnom i ekvivočnom kôdu odbacuje svaki oblik prihvatanja tradicije (ar. *al-sunnah*), što znači da je na djelu kreiranje vlastite tradicije (lat. *traditio*) i vlastite metakritičke pozicije bez uvažavanja onog „drugog“.



ILUSTRACIJA - Primjeri pokušaja izjednačavanja slikovnih prikaza po položaju - stropni enterijer džamije i pravoslavne crkve.

Praktično priklanjanje *homo islamicusa* modalitetu diskursâ *qadar/ṣinā'ata* partikularnoj tradiciji *al-sunnah*.

ILLUSTRATION - Examples of attempts to equalize pictorial representations by position - the ceiling interior of a mosque and an Orthodox church

Practical submission of *homo islamicus* to the discourse modality of *qadar/ṣinā'at* to a particular tradition *al-sunnah*.

Razlog zašto, između ostalog, prednost treba dati analoškom umjesto univočnom procesu, to jest kôdu (ar. *ramz*), sadržan je i u tome što je analoški proces participacija u božanskom biću, koja se može

Under the condition that we perceive the depth from the surface of the already described processes of analogy (Ar. *al-qiyās*) and the univocal (Ar. *mutavat*), it can be concluded that the analogical process implies continuous discrimination of preferences which raise and build hierarchies, unlike a univocal process, which remains indifferent to any particular difference under the guise of *equality*, as well as by its own *primacy* or *processuality*. The dilemma over where to begin the analysis is due to the fact that all pictorial representations lie on the same plane, allegedly mutually levelled, without any advantage provided by their respective position. However, it seems that renewing the established processuality of valuation does not manage to conceal its intact instability in this way either: we see levelling of pictorial representations by position (Ar. *waḍ'*) and at the same time advantage is given to one of them, not only allegedly. Complexity of such hierarchies and the characteristic modelling of their preferences can be attributed to the analogizing process itself, which is nothing else but practical deference of the modalities of *qadar/ṣinā'at* discourse to a particular tradition. This deference to tradition allows a meta-critique which is negated by persistence of univocal and equivocal code. Persistence on univocal and equivocal code rejects any sort of adopting tradition (Ar. *al-sunnah*), which means that it creates its own tradition (Lat. *traditio*) and its own meta-critical position without regard for the “other”.



ILLUSTRATION – Examples of attempts to equalize pictorial representations by position - the ceiling interior of a mosque and an Orthodox church
Creation of own tradition and own metacritical position based on the influence of post-iconoclastic Byzantine painting.

ILUSTRACIJA – Primjeri pokušaja izjednačavanja slikovnih prikaza po položaju - stropni enterijer džamije i pravoslavne crkve
Kreiranje vlastite tradicije i vlastite metakritičke pozicije na osnovu utjecaja postikonoklastičkog bizantskog slikarstva.

The reason why, among other things, preference should be given to analogical rather than to univocal process, i.e. code (Ar. *ramz*) is that analogical process is participation in the divine being, which can be

tumačiti kao participacija *homo islamicusa* u oponašanje svih pozitivnih Božijih atributa (ar. pl. *ṣifāt* od *al-ṣifa*) kao vlastitih, zahvaljujući sadejstvu božanske kreativnosti (ar. *al-khalq al-ilāhiyy*). Tako se osnovna kreativna izražajnost začetnika/dizajnera estetizirane reprezentacije objavljuje kao ona koja je vječno nova u vremenu. Iz toga proizlazi činjenica da se analoški kôd može pokazati kao temporalna beskonačnost, koja nije indiferentna spram razlike u kojoj je hijerarhija diferencijacije sâm taj beskonačni proces. Stoga ono što vidimo (što smatramo poželjnim za izbor ostvarenja unutar diskursâ *qadar/ṣinā'ata*) mora pripadati beskonačnosti (ar. *lānihāyyi*) na način neidentičnog ponavljanja.

Poznata je činjenica da na polju *umjetnosti* temporalna beskonačnost (lat. *temporales infinitum*)^{▼19} predstavlja nesavladivu slijepu ulicu (ar. *al-nihāyah*, bos. 'ćorsokak'), nerješivu teškoću, problem ... ili *aporiju* (grč. ἀπορία), dok *homo islamicus* u okviru *qadar/ṣinā'ata* favorizira stanovište kako se nešto mora *ponavljati* da bi se uopće moglo identificirati, ali kao *ponovljeno* (ar. *tikrār*) ono je različito (ar. *mukhtalif*). Dakle neidentično ponavljanje horizontalnog je karaktera i izraz fundamenta analogije začetnika/dizajnera, jer na vertikalnom nivou postoji ono što povezuje stvari s drugim pojavnim vrijednostima. Zato je moguće kazati kako je *qadar/ṣinā'at* vrsta *uprizorene analogije* (ar. *al-qiyās*). Modaliteti diskursâ *qadar/ṣinā'ata* ponavljaju se, ali uvijek različito, čak i ako su modaliteti slični (ar. *muṣābih*) ili približno isti (ar. *nafs al-ṣay'*), pozicije su različite i vode do različitih efekata (ar. *al-maf'ūl*, pl. *mafā'il*). Također uputno je argumentirati kako je stvarno ne-identično ponavljanje analoško, premda navedeno ne-identično ponavljanje samo sebe ne može dokazati (ar. *ithbāt*). Njega pokazuje i potvrđuje diskurs *qadar/ṣinā'ata*, koji unutar transformativnih mogućnosti i izražajnih sredstava, dodataka i varijacija obnavlja neidentično ponavljanje – originalni početak u kojem je moguće otkrivati sadržaj beskonačnog preko estetiziranog *ṣinā'ata*/djelanja koje *homo islamicusu* omogućuje istinski nove inovacije s različitim stepenom intenziteta. To bi značilo da su razlike formalne distinkcije latentne u jedinstvu ili intenzivni nivoi modelne razlike.

Svako daljnje povezivanje *islamske umjetnosti* s okcidentalno-vesterniziranim poimanjem *umjetnosti* kao takve sastavljalo bi jedinstvo s drugim diferencirajućim procesom, pa se čini kako takva očigledna moguća solidarnost povezivanja vrlo lahko pokazuje vlastitu ograničenost. Radi se o razdvajanju u kojem suodnosna djelovanja i djelanja/*ṣinā'ati* ovisе o pojavljujućem potiskivanju čisto virtualne samodiferencijacije.^{▼20}

▼19 Za razliku od okcidentalno-vesterniziranog poimanja vremena, vrijeme, u islamskom socijalno-historijskom smislu, nije šansa za čovjeka kao socijalno-historijskog bića, nego je ono njegova šansa u izvanhistorijskoj sferi, što je, dakle, njegova eshatološka šansa. Vrijeme je jedan otvoren obrazac; ono se ne promatra kao obična mjera izražena satima i minutama, koja se može kupiti, prodati ili trošiti. Vrijeme, također, nema dinamički i karakter kretanja prema gore (*ascensus*), nego statički, ne kreće se po vertikali, kao što nema ni svoje socijalno-historijske sadržaje, nego podsjeća na beskrajnu traku koja se horizontalno kreće, bez početka i kraja, bez svoje unutarnje snage, bez historijske motorike sa čovjekom u centru, vrti u mističnom krugu vječitog ponavljanja, pokretano i ispunjavano izvanhistorijskim silama o kojima čovjek niti treba niti može da se pita, na koje ne može, pa onda i neće da ima upliva.

Usporedi, Blake, Stephen P. *Time in Early Modern Islam: Calendar, Ceremony, and Chronology in the Safavid, Mughal and Ottoman Empires*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

▼20 Deleuze, Gilles. *Op. cit.* str. 72.

interpreted as participation of *homo islamicus* in imitating all the positive God's attributes (Ar. pl. *ṣifāt* of *al-ṣifa*) as his own, thanks to the interplay of divine creativity (Ar. *al-khalq al-ilāhiyy*). Thus, the basic creative expression of the author/designer of aestheticized representation is revealed as one which is ever new in time. It leads to the fact that analogical code can be shown as temporal infinity, which is not indifferent to the difference where the hierarchy of differentiation is this infinite process itself. Therefore, what we see (what we consider desirable for the choice of creations within the *qadar/ṣinā'at* discourse) must belong to infinity (Ar. *lānihāyyi*) in the way of non-identical repetition.

It is a well-known fact that in the area of **art**, temporal infinity (Lat. *temporales infinitum*)^{▼19} is an unsurmountable blind alley (Ar. *al-nihāyah*, Bos. *ćorsokak*), an unresolvable difficulty, a problem ... or an *aporia* (Gr. *ἀπορία*), while *homo islamicus* within *qadar/ṣinā'at* favours the viewpoint that something must be *repeated* in order to be identifiable, though as *repeated* (Ar. *tikrār*) it is different (Ar. *mukhtalif*). Thus, *non-identical repetition* is of horizontal character and is an expression of the foundation of the analogy of the author/designer, since at the vertical level there is something that links things with other manifest values. Therefore, it can be claimed that *qadar/ṣinā'at* is a kind of *staged analogy* (Ar. *al-qiyās*). Modalities of *qadar/ṣinā'at* discourse are repeated, but ever differently, even if the modalities are similar (Ar. *mushābih*) or approximately same (Ar. *nafs al-shay'*), positions are different and lead to different effects (Ar. *al-mafūl*, pl. *mafā'il*). Besides, it is advisable to argue that true non-identical repetition is analogical, although the non-identical repetition cannot prove itself (Ar. *ithbāt*). It is shown and confirmed by the *qadar/ṣinā'at* discourse which, within transformative possibilities and means of expression, additions and variations restores a non-identical repetition – the original beginning where it is possible to discover content of the infinite through aestheticized *ṣinā'at*/activity which allows *homo islamicus* true innovations with different degrees of intensity. It would mean that differences of formal distinction are latent in their unity or are intensive levels of the model difference.

Any further relating of “Islamic art” with Occidental-westernized understanding of **art** as such would combine unity with another differentiating process, and it seems that such an obvious possible solidarity very easily shows its own limitation. It is a separation where correlated actions and activities/*ṣinā'ats* depend on manifested suppression of purely virtual self-differentiation.^{▼20}

▼19 Unlike the Occidental-westernized understanding of time, in Islamic social-historical sense time is not a chance for the man as a social-historical being but rather his chance in a sphere beyond history, i.e. his eschatological chance. Time is an open pattern; it is not viewed as a simple measure expressed in hours and minutes, which can be bought, sold or spent. Besides, time does not have a dynamic or upward character (*ascensus*), but is static; it does not move along a vertical, and has no social-historical contents of its own but rather reminds of an endless belt which moves horizontally, without the beginning and the end, without its inner force, without historical motor ability with the man in the centre, rotates in a mystic circle of eternal repetition, driven and filled from outside by historical forces which the man should not and cannot wonder about, which he cannot and does not want to influence.

See, Blake, Stephen P. *Time in Early Modern Islam: Calendar, Ceremony, and Chronology in the Safavid, Mughal and Ottoman Empires*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

▼20 Deleuze, Gilles. *Razlika i ponavljanje...*, p. 72.



ILUSTRACIJA - Estetizirano djelanje/*šinā'at homo islamicusa* - materijalizacija formi prepoznatljivih ornamentalno estetiziranih izraza beskonačnog uzorka: islamska arhitektura, pločice i mozaici - Džamija "72 mučenika" u Mašhadu, Iran, 15. stoljeće.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Aestheticized action/*ṣināʿat* homo islamicus - the materialization of the forms of recognizable ornamentally aestheticized expressions of infinite pattern: islamic architecture, tiles and mosaics - Mosque of "72 Martyrs" in Mashhad, Iran, 15th century.

To znači kako virtualno pojavljujuća samodiferencijacija nikad u potpunosti ne može „biti“. Za razliku od Derridinog *koncepta traga* (fr. *trace*, jedan je od najvažnijih pojmova u njegovoj dekonstrukciji), virtualno pojavljujuća samodiferencijacija operira u kategoriji intenziteta i odnosi se prije svega samo na tijelo, ne na razlučivanje od temelja i dna budući da su tijela jedino što „postoji“ kod Deleuzea. Ipak, moguće je kazati da je dubinu moguće razotkriti jedino preko ekscesa na površini. Dubina je uvijek manjkava i kao takva uvijek virtualna. U ovom slučaju, a kada je o Derridinom mišljenju riječ, onda se nedostatak originala (dubine) uvijek i iznova neuspješno nadopunjuje suplementom (beskonačnim organiziranjem na površini), a čini se opravdanim dodatno unijeti i konstataciju bez uvažavanja metafizičkog, odnosno ontološke utemeljenosti, koja, istina, biva odsutna i skrivena onome kome nije jasna ili ko ne želi da prihvati radni kôd i praksu unutar formalno-metodološke strane polja *qadar/šīnā'ata*.

Pojedine erudite suočavajući se s ovom problematikom pravdawali su se kako je riječ o njima kao osobama koje moraju biti u stanju skloniti svaki zastor bez obzira na posljedice vlastite povijesti kao smislenog trajanja, koje, samo po sebi, nikada ne smije i ne može biti nejasno, iracionalno ili 'mistično'.^{▼21} Naime, prema onome nepoznatom, tj. sjeni naprosto odnosili su se kao prema poznatom (zastoru), bez ulaženja u proces spoznavanja istog.^{▼22} Pitamo se, kako da takvi intelektualci okarakteriziraju ono što ne ispunjava njihove standarde intelektualnosti, već samo kao njihove neuspjele intelektualne pokušaje? U tom slučaju se ono što je iza zastora (ar. *al-hidžāb*) obično naziva *sjenom* (ar. *zīll*) – bez otkrivanja samog zastora, bez spoznaje o sjeni, kao takvoj. Tako se u slučaju okcidentalnog povijesnog priznavanja apstarkcije misticizma, simbol nepoznatog – kojim je filozofska svijest sama označila mističnu spoznajnu tradiciju – prešutno izjednačava s onim što je nedostatno, neuspjelo, pogrešno. A ono što *homo islamicus* iskazuje o sebi jeste, dakle, jedno specifično obavezivanje na prenošenje, tj. na pomno čuvanje spoznaje iz prošlosti i spremnost da to nesebično nastavi u budućnost. Naime, fenomenu misticizma kao putu ljubavi (ar. *al-maḥabbah*) i putu spoznaje (ar. *al-ma'rifah*) nemoguće je pristupiti neovisno od njegovih konkretnih ozbiljenja u pojedincima i društvima određenog vremena. Međutim, ipak, to ne znači da je time narušen vječni kontinuitet njegovanja mistične spoznaje koja suštinski neizmijenjeno traje od pojave prvog začetnika/dizajnera, pa sve do današnjih dana.

▼21 Poznata je činjenica kako su pojedini mislioci iskonstruirali vezu između vlastitog nerazumijevanja određenog fenomena i etimologije koja se za taj fenomen veže, pa je ono što se primarno priziva samim izgovaranjem riječi *mystikos* (gr. μυστικός) postalo općepoznato kao svojevrsna misterioznost, tajanstvenost (eng. *mist* – magla, izmaglica). Međutim, kako je moguće uopće osloviti nešto o čemu nemamo pouzdanu spoznaju, to jest nešto što nam se doima kao suštinski nepoznato?

▼22 Globalni okcidentalno-vesternizirani akademizam, kada je riječ o misticizmu (ar. *al-taṣawwuf*) i *qadar/šīnā'atu* ne shvata da je fenomen ono što se pokazuje, ono što je očito i što u svojoj očitosti nadalje pokazuje nešto što se može otkriti tamo jedino pomoću onog što ostaje iza zastora... Takav pristup fenomenologiji sastoji se u spašavanju fenomena, dok oslobađa ili raskriva sjenu koja se pojavljuje ispod vanjštine zastora. Princip razumijevanja fenomena, fenomenologije, otuda jeste pojasniti ono sakriveno, tačnije sjenu, nevidljivo a prisutno ispod vidljivog, odnosno zastora.

It means that virtually exhibited self-differentiation can never completely “be”. Unlike Derrida's *concept of trace* (Fr. *trace*, one of the most important concepts in his deconstruction), the virtually manifested self-differentiation operates in the category of intensity and primarily pertains only to body, rather than to distinguishing from the foundation and the ground, since bodies are the only things that “exist” in Deleuze's work. Still, it may be claimed that depth can only be uncovered through excesses on the surface. Depth is always deficient and as such always virtual. In this case, as in Derrida's opinion, the lack of the original (depth) is again and again unsuccessfully complemented by a supplement (infinite organizing on the surface), and it seems to make sense to additionally introduce the statement without taking account of the metaphysical, or ontological grounding which is, in all honesty, absent and concealed to those who do not understand it or who do not want to accept working code and practice within formal-methodological side of the field of *qadar/ṣināʿat*.

The way of dealing with these issues includes attempts of some scholars to use justification that they are persons who must be able to remove any curtain regardless of the consequences of their own history as a meaningful lasting which, by itself, must never and can never be unclear, irrational or ‘mystic’.^{▼21} In other words, by treating what is unknown, i.e. a shadow, same as the known (curtain), without entering the process of getting to know it.^{▼22} One may ask how can such intellectuals characterize something that does not meet their standards of intellectuality but as unsuccessful intellectual efforts? In this case, they typically call what is behind the curtain (Ar. *al-hijāb*) a shadow (Ar. *ẓill*) – without revealing the curtain itself, without knowledge of the shadow as such. Thus, in the case of Occidental historical recognition of the abstraction of mysticism, the symbol of the unknown – which the philosophical mind itself used to label the mystic cognitive tradition – is tacitly equalled to what is inadequate, unsuccessful, wrong. However, what *homo islamicus* expresses about himself is, thus, a distinctive commitment to transmission, i.e. to the careful preservation of knowledge from the past and willingness to selflessly continue it in the future. Indeed, it is impossible to approach the phenomenon of mysticism as a road of love (Ar. *al-maḥabbah*) and a road of cognition (Ar. *al-maʿrifah*) independently of its actual realization in individuals and societies of a given time. However, it does not mean that it undermined the eternal continuity of his mystical cognition which essentially lasts in an unchanged form since the appearance of the first author/designer up to this day.

²¹ It is well-known that some thinkers construed a relationship between their lack of understanding a given phenomenon and etymology related to this phenomenon, and thus what is primarily evoked by mere uttering of the work *mystikos* (Gr. *μυστικός*) has become generally known as a distinctive mysteriousness, mystery (Eng. *mist*). However, how is it at all possible to address something which we do not reliably know about, something that seems essentially unknown?

²² With respect to *mysticism* (Ar. *al-taṣawwuf*) and *qadar/ṣināʿat*, global Occidental-westernized academism does not understand that a phenomenon is what is manifested, what is obvious and what, in its purity, further shows something that can be discovered only by means of what remains behind the curtain. Such an approach to phenomenology consists of saving the phenomenon while releasing or revealing the shadow which emerges under exterior of the curtain. The principle of understanding phenomena, phenomenology, is therefore clarification of what is concealed, more accurately the shadow, invisible though present under the visible, i.e. the curtain.

Nepoznanice, enigme, pa i misterije oko konstruktivnih formi i načina njihovog kreativno-konstruktivnog korištenja unutar geometriciziranih kompozicionih rješenja koje se pojavljuju u formi ornamenta i estetiziranih izraza beskonačnog uzorka bile su dugo vremena prisutne u okviru okcidentalno-vesterniziranih teorijskih pogleda. Potrebno je kazati kako se kaligrafija (ar. *al-khatt*)^{▼23} često pojavljuje u interakciji s preostala dva ornamentalno-geometricizirana kanona. Međutim, za razliku od estetiziranih i ornamentalnih formi kompoziciona kaligrafska rješenja su uvjetovana vrstom i formom arapskog pisma, ali i namjenom pisanog teksta; odnosi slovnih znakova i njihov međusobni položaj su od krucijalne važnosti. Kada je riječ o formama ornamenta i estetiziranih izraza beskonačnih uzoraka tu je dio tradicionalnih geometrijskih oblika konstruiran korištenjem šestara i ravnala, što je okcidentalno-vesternizirana javnost spoznala.^{▼24} Po pravilu, *homo islamicus* je započinjao crtanjem kruga unutar kojeg je ponajprije konstruirao pravilne poligonalne forme – kvadrata, pentagona ili heksagona. Zatim je među dodatnim linijama odabirao dijelove za iscrtavanje uzoraka te slijedio njihovo popunjavanje bojom i dodatno oblikovanje karakterističnih konturnih linija. Svi geometrijski uzorci razvijali su se iz jedne od spomenutih poligonalnih formi, te su se u beskraj ponavljali i tvorili odgovarajuću kompoziciju.

Međutim, korištenje samo šestara i ravnala bilo je izlišno kod konstruiranja strukture uzoraka kompliciranijih kompozicija peterostrukih ornamentalno-geometriciziranih formi. Tim povodom je *homo islamicus* izrađivao karakteristične, precizno određene oblike jednakostraničnih poligonalnih formi s uzorkom, pomoću kojih je oblikovao i popločavao površinu za peterostruke geometrijske forme, a jedan takav set pločica naziva se *gereh pločice* (perz. *gereh-sazi*, engl. *giri tiles*). Riječ je o pet pločica jednakih stranica i utvrđenih unutarnjih uglova (mjera svakoga od njih je sadržalac broja 36): pravilan dekadon s unutarnjim uglovima od 144°, pravilan pentagon s unutarnjim uglovima od 108°, izdužen, nepravilan heksagon s unutarnjim oštrim uglovima od 72° i ostalim tupim uglovima od 144°, romb s unutarnjim oštrim uglovima od 72° i tupim od 108°, te heksagon ili *mašna* (engl. *bowtie*) s unutarnjim oštrim uglovima od 72° i izbočenim od 216°.

Tek 2005. godine je okcidentalno-vesternizirana javnost dobila određene informacije o korištenim vrstama gereh pločica i njihovih unutarnjih i vanjskih uglova, kao i data naznaka o mogućem konstruktivnom oblikovanju kompozicija peterostrukih formi bez deseterokrake zvijezde. Ovo je samo još jedna od potvrda pomnog čuvanja spoznaje o estetiziranom djelanju/*šinā'atu* produktivno-refleksivne orijentacije iz prošlosti, kojoj je nemoguće bilo pristupiti neovisno od *homo islamicusovih* konkretnih ozbiljenja u određenom vremenu.

▼23 *Islamska kaligrafija* je termin koji se primjenjuje za kaligrafiju na arapskom jeziku i drugim jezicima što koriste arapsko pismo. Halifa (ar. *al-khalīfah*) 'Alī ('*Alī ibn Ebi Tālib*, 599.-661.) je bio prvi koji je insistirao da se lijepo i uredno pišu kur'anska ajeti (ar. '*āyatun* - jedan od 6219 izričaja od kojih se sastoji Kur'an).

▼24 Implementacija materijaliziranih formi prepoznatljivih ornamentalno estetiziranih izraza beskonačnog uzorka u okviru islamskog kulturno-civilizacijskog kruga bilježi se s arapskom dinastijom Omejida (661.-750.), a autorizacija tzv. „odgovarajućeg izraza arabeska“ u Evropi se tek datira u kasno 15. stoljeće, kada su renesansni majstori/umjetnici koristili/kopirali islamske ornamentalno-konstruktivne estetizirane izraze za ukrašavanje i posebno ukrasne uveze knjiga, nažalost bez ikakvih saznanja o njihovoj primordijalnoj duhovnoj inicijaciji/samospoznaji. Tokom stoljeća, izraz „arabeska“ se primjenjivao za široki raspon ornamentalno estetiziranih izraza beskonačnog uzorka u evropskoj i svjetskoj umjetnosti, pa su ga i muslimani, unutar i izvan islamskog kulturno-civilizacijskog kruga prihvatili/usvojili kao takvog.

The unknown, enigmas, and even mysteries surrounding constructive forms and ways of their creative-constructive use within geometricized compositional solutions that appear in the form of ornaments and aestheticized expressions of an infinite pattern have been present for a long time within the framework of occidental-westernized theoretical views. It is necessary to indicate how calligraphy is done (ar. *al-khatt*)^{▼23} often appears in interaction with the remaining two ornamental-geometricized canons. However, unlike aestheticized and ornamental forms, compositional calligraphic solutions are conditioned by the type and form of the Arabic script, as well as by the purpose of the written text; the relationships of letter characters and their mutual position are of crucial importance. When it comes to forms of ornament and aestheticized expressions of infinite patterns, there is a part of traditional geometric shapes constructed using compasses and rulers, which the Westernized public has come to know.^{▼24} As a rule, *homo islamicus* began by drawing a circle within which he first constructed regular polygonal forms - squares, pentagons or hexagons. Then, among the additional lines, he selected parts for drawing patterns, followed by filling them with color and additional shaping of characteristic contour lines. All geometric patterns were developed from one of the mentioned polygonal forms, and were endlessly repeated and formed a suitable composition.

However, the use of only compasses and rulers was superfluous when constructing the structure of samples of more complicated compositions of quintuple ornamental-geometric forms. On this occasion, *homo islamicus* made characteristic, precisely defined forms of equilateral polygonal forms with a pattern, with which he shaped and paved the surface for five-fold geometric forms, and one such set of tiles is called *giriĥ tiles* (perz. *gereĥ-sazi*). It is about five tiles with equal sides and fixed internal angles (the measure of each of them is the number containing the number 36): a regular decadon with internal angles of 144°, a regular pentagon with internal angles of 108°, an elongated, irregular hexagon with internal acute angles of 72° and other obtuse angles of 144°, a rhombus with internal acute angles of 72° and obtuse of 108° and a hexagon or bowtie with internal acute angles of 72° and protrudings of 216°.

It was only in 2005 that the occidental-westernized public received certain information about the types of gereĥ tiles used and their internal and external angles, as well as an indication of the possible constructive design of compositions of five-fold forms without a ten-pointed star. This is just one more confirmation of the careful preservation of knowledge about aestheticized work/*šinā'at* of a productive-reflexive orientation from the past, which was impossible to approach independently of *homo islamicus'* concrete realizations in a certain time.

▼23 *Islamic calligraphy* is the term applied to calligraphy in Arabic and other languages that use the Arabic script. Khalīfa (ar. *al-khalīfah*) 'Alī ('Alī ibn Ebī Tālib, 599.-661.) was the first to insist that Qur'anic verses be written beautifully and neatly (ar. *'āyātun* - one of the 6219 sayings that make up the Qur'an).

▼24 The implementation of materialized forms of recognizable ornamentally aestheticized expressions of an infinite pattern within the framework of the Islamic cultural-civilization circle is recorded with the Arab Umayyad dynasty (661-750), and the authorization of the so-called "proper expression of arabesque" in Europe only dates back to the late 15th century, when Renaissance masters/artists used/copied Islamic ornamental-constructive aestheticized expressions for decorating and especially decorative book bindings, unfortunately without any knowledge of their primordial spiritual initiation/self-realization. Over the centuries, the term "arabesque" was applied to a wide range of ornamentally aestheticized expressions of an endless pattern in European and world art, so it was accepted/adopted as such by Muslims, both inside and outside the Islamic cultural-civilizational circle.



ILUSTRACIJA - Primjer gereh pločica (deseterokraka zvijezda) s cvjetnim motivima i kaligrafijom
 Detalj s groblja Shah-i Zinda, Samarkand, Uzbekistan, 11. stoljeće.

ILLUSTRATION - An example of a gereh tile (ten-pointed star) with floral motifs and calligraphy
 Detail from Shah-i Zinda cemetery, Samarkand, Uzbekistan, 11th century.

Prethodno izlaganje bilo je u službi naznake postojanja i karakterizacije fenomena misticizma uopće, ali i unutar diskursa *qadar/šīnā'ata*, a sada ćemo, nažalost, u najglobalnijim crtama pokušati objasniti kompleks historijske i vjerske istine (ar. *al-ḥaqīqah*) iz koje je poniknuo *tesavvuf* (ar. *al-taṣawwuf*) i zašto je, kao takav svoje mjesto pronašao i u djelanju *homo islamicusa* i njegovih modaliteta *qadar/šīnā'ata*. Naime, u vezi s prirodom i pozicijom *qadar/šīnā'ata* zanimljivo je da je bilo nastojanja da se u okviru tadašnjih mogućih pristupa rješavanju problema eventualno razjasni problematika odnosa *homo islamicus* – historija (ar. *tārikh*). S obzirom na to da aktualni okcidentalno-vesternizirani filozofski nazor s provejavanjem zajedničke judeokršćansko-grčko-rimske baštine nije mogao pronaći put ka apliciranju unutar strukture *qadar/šīnā'ata*, inzistiralo se na jednom drugom rješenju, što je bilo bliže i prihvatljivije. To je bio sufizam (od ar. *ṣūfi*) ili *dervišizam* (od osm.tur. *derviş* ← perz. *derwīš*) koji pripada metafizičkom učenju o islamu (ar. *al-taṣawwuf*), o kojem se ne može govoriti, kako je već kazano u izrazima i mjerilima okcidentalno-vesterniziranih pogleda na svijet. Neophodno je naglasiti da kad bi islam u historijskoj praksi predstavljao vjeru objelodanjenog Božijeg zakona koji se historizira, onda



ILLUSTRATION – A sample from the family of five-fold fotme gereh tiles
 Mihrab, Al-Nasir Mohammad Mosque, Cairo, Egypt (1318-1334)
 ILUSTRACIJA – Uzorak iz obitelji peterostruke fotme gereh pločica
 Mihrab, džamija Al-Nasir Mohammad, Kairo, Egipat (1318.-1334.)

The text above served to indicate the existence and characterization of the phenomenon of mysticism in general, as well as within the *qadar/šīnā'at* discourse; now, unfortunately, we will attempt, in the broadest terms, to explain the complex of historical and religious truth (Ar. *al-ḥaqīqah*) which engendered *tasawwuf* (Ar. *al-taṣawwuf*) and why, as such, it also found its place in activity of *homo islamicus* and his modalities of *qadar/šīnā'at*. Actually, with respect to the nature and position of *qadar/šīnā'at* it is interesting to note that there have been attempts to clarify the issue of relationship *homo islamicus* – history (Ar. *tārīkh*) within the possible approaches to problem-solving at the time. Since in ancient history the philosophical view, permeated with joint Judeo-Christian-Greek-Roman heritage could not be applied within the structure of *qadar/šīnā'at*, it insisted upon another solution, which was more familiar and more acceptable. It was Sufism (from Ar. *ṣūfi*) or *dervishism* (from Ottom. Tur. *derviş* ← Pers. *derwīš*), which belongs to mystical teaching about Islam (Ar. *al-taṣawwuf*), and which cannot be dealt with by means of terms and criteria of Occidental-westernized worldviews. It seems necessary to underscore that if Islam, in the historical practice, were a religion of a revealed God's law which is historicized, it would be difficult to answer the

bi se teško moglo odgovoriti na pitanje zašto u toj vjeri nema i formi sekularizirane crkvene zajednice, njezine hijerarhije, moralnih autoriteta i njezinih organa ... Naime, ovaj proces svjedoči o tome da je u islamu došlo do konfrontacije dvaju osnovnih faktora, ezoteričkog (ar. *bāṭin*) i egzoteričkog (ar. *zāhir*) faktora. Pokušaja traženja rješenja u oba pravca bilo je, ali je, sasvim razumljivo, prihvaćeno transcendentno iskustvo kao specifični oblik duhovno-misaone forme i spiritualne iskustvene spoznaje Stvoritelja. Bilo je to nastojanje da se forma ljubavi (ar. *al-ḥubb*) između stvorenja u liku *homo islamicusa* i samog Stvoritelja obuhvati transcendentno (ar. *al-ta'ālī*). Ovako trasiran put povratka ka početnom izvoru (ar. *al-ta'wīl*) nije put racionalnog mišljenja, nego poseban intuitivno-spiritualistički postupak, koji predstavlja nutarnji odnos vraćanja čovjeka svome izvoru van vremena i prostora, u metahistoriju. Uporište za ovako postupanje temeljeno je na činjenici da Kur'an i korpus tradicije imaju svoju izvornu stranu danu van ovog svijeta (ar. *al-tanzīl*), u svom metafizičkom izvoru, u transhistoriji. I *qadar/ṣinā'at* kao i *tesavvuf* ili *tasavvuf* (ar. *al-taṣawwuf*) polazi od ezoteričke egzegeze Kur'ana i korpusa tradicije i razvija sličnu hermeneutiku. Već samo naveli da legalističko tumačenje Kur'ana i zakonskih obaveza čije je izvršenje dužnost za muslimane, bez pitanja kako i zašto, s punim podvrgavanjem Bogu i svjedočenjem o Njegovoj jedinosti, implicira ezoteriku i gnozu. Ali, i *homo islamicus*, kao i sūfija (ar. *al-ṣūfi*), a uobičajna praksa bila je da su oba sadržana u jednoj osobi, polaze od nekih bitnih mjesta u Kur'anu koja direktno upućuju na ezoteričko tumačenje kur'anskog teksta i koja sadrže duboke metafizičke i antropološko-saznajne probleme o Bogu, veličanstvenom kozmosu – svijetu, svemiru, univerzumu i čovjeku. Tako, *homo islamicus*, pored mnogih mjesta u Kur'anu od kojih polaze sufijske u tumačenju Kur'ana i strukturiranju svoje profetologije,^{▼25} respektira određena mjesta u Kur'anu. To se u prvom redu odnosi na mjesto u kome se govori o uzdignuću Poslanika Muhammeda (ar. *Muḥammad*) i njegovom viđenju Boga (ar. *al-mi'rādž*). To mjesto služi sufijski *homo islamicusu* kao izvanredan izvor inspiracije o doživljavanju neposredne božanske prisutnosti, što koristi za svoju tezu o čovjekovu lišavanju vlastitoga “ja” i nestajanja u Bogu (ar. *al-fanā'*).

Homines islamici mističnim slavljenjem jedinstvenih i vječnih Božijih atributa i svojstava (ar. *al-ṣifāt*), koji nisu identični s Božijom esencijom (ar. *al-dhāt*), niti su odvojeni od nje, proslavljaju i Poslanika u mogućoj vizualizaciji istraživanja njegovog života na osnovu postojećeg utemeljenog tekstualnog sadržaja.

▼25 Profetologija (ar. *al-nubuwwah*) i teološka antropologija predstavljaju islamsko učenje o Božijim poslanicima. Znak koji se vidi jeste svijet, a svijet sa svojim znakovima jeste moguća a i izvršena profetologija. To je metafizika kreiranja koja fizičku datost kodificira, pa ona otpočinje kao događanje estetike i ljepote i jeste istina i prostor na kojem se mogu postaviti mogući znakovi koji znače.

Metafizika, u našem slučaju, jeste prije svega događanje estetike iznimnog slikovnog znakovlja, i ona je vizualni kraj i početak poslanstva. Poslanikova misao eterična je, prije nego što krene u svijet, u kreiranje, i njegova je osobnost fascinantna i estetična. Njegov dobitak je bitan odgovor na sva pitanja koja se u tom svijetu mogu postaviti. On je dominantna i njegov ovozemaljski život, kao i samo poslanstvo jesu *homo islamicusova* datost nadahnuća (ar. *al-ilhām*) za odgovarajući modalitet diskursa *qadar/ṣinā'ata*. On je projektant prisustva, jer je Poslanikov *al-wahy* (Objava – božansko nadahnuće ili otkrivenje) za začetnika/dizajnera estetizirane reprezentacije nadahnuće (ar. *al-ilhām*).

question as to why in this religion there are no forms of secularized church, its moral authorities and its bodies. Indeed, this process also bears witness that two basic factors have confronted in Islam, the esoteric (Ar. *bāṭin*) and the exoteric (Ar. *zāhir*) factor. There have been attempts to search for for a solution in both directions; however, quite understandably, the mystical experience has been accepted as a distinctive form of spiritual-speculative form and spiritually experiential cognition of the Creator. There have been attempts to comprehend the form of love (Ar. *al-ḥubb*) between a being in the figure of *homo islamicus* and Creator Himself transcendently (Ar. *al-ta'ālī*). Such a road of return to the initial source (Ar. *al-ta'wīl*) is not a road of rational thinking but a special intuitive-spiritualist procedure, which represents an inner relationship within the man's return to his source beyond time and space to meta-history. The foothold for such a procedure is based on the fact that the Qur'an and the body of tradition have their original side provided beyond this world (Ar. *al-tanzīl*), in their metaphysical source, in trans-history. Both *qadar/ṣinā'at* and the *tassawwuf* (Ar. *al-taṣawwuf*) start from the esoteric exegesis of the Qur'an and the associated body of tradition and develop a similar hermeneutics. We have already noted that the legalist interpretation of the Qur'an and legal obligations the fulfilment of which is a duty for Muslims, without asking how and why, with full subjection to God and testifying of His oneness, implies esoterica and gnosis. However, both the *homo islamicus* and the Sufi (Ar. *al-ṣūfi*), and it was a typical practice that the two were contained in a single person, start from some crucial parts of the Qur'an which directly point to esoteric interpretation of the sacred text and which include profound metaphysical and anthropologically-cognitive problems about God, the magnificent cosmos – the world, the universe and the man. Thus, besides many parts of the Qur'an which Sufis use as starting points in interpreting the Scripture and structuring their prophethood,▼²⁵ *homo islamicus* respects certain parts of the Qur'an. It is primarily true of parts which describe the ascent of Muhammed (Ar. *Muḥammad*) and his seeing of God (Ar. *al-mi'rāj*). This part serves to a Sufi *homo islamicus* as an extraordinary source of inspiration for experiencing the immediate divine presence, which he uses for his thesis on the man's denial of his self and disappearance in God (Ar. *al-fanā*).

By glorifying unique and eternal God's attributes and features (Ar. *al-ṣifāt*), which are not identical to God's essence (Ar. *al-dhāt*) nor are separated from it, homines islamici also celebrated the Prophet in a possible visualization of researching his life predicated on the existing established textual content.

▼²⁵ *Prophethood* (Ar. *al-nubuwwah*) and theological anthropology represent Islāmic teaching about God's prophets. A sign which can be seen is the world, and the world with its signs are possible as well as implemented prophethood. It is the metaphysics of creating, which codifies the physically given, and it begins as happening of aesthetics and beauty and is the truth and the space where possible signs which mean something can be set up.

In our case, *metaphysics* is primarily an occurrence of aesthetics of exceptional pictorial symbols, and it is the visual end and the beginning of prophethood. The Prophet's thought is ethereal, before he heads to the world, to creation, and his personality is fascinating and aesthetic. His gain is a crucial answer to all questions which can be asked in this world. He is a dominant, and his earthly life, as well as prophethood, are the given of *homo islamicus*'s inspiration (Ar. *al-ilhām*) for a suitable modality of *qadar/ṣinā'at* discourse. He is the designer of presence, since Prophet's *al-wahy* (Revelation – divine inspiration or revelation) is an inspiration for the author/designer of aestheticized representation (Ar. *al-ilhām*).

To čine iz shvaćanja vlastite obaveze da pokažu muslimanima da oni, baš kao i njihova zajednica *ummet* (ar. *al-'ummāh*) u najranijim vremenima, trebaju živjeti u cjelovitoj harmoniji s načinom života, ponašanjem i idealom koji je Poslanik postavio pred muslimane. Moguće je pretpostaviti da je ovakvom tumačenju stajališta ili uvjerenja doprinio sâm filozof Muhammed Ikbāl (*Muḥammad Iqbāl*), koje odjekuje kao *basso ostinato* (“stalno ponavljanje jedne teme”) kroz njegovo djelo. ▼²⁶



ILUSTRACIJA - Portret sufije *homo islamicusa* pripadnika derviškog reda mevlevija (sufijski red osnovan 1273.).

ILLUSTRATION - Portrait of Sufi *Homo Islamicus*, a member of the Mevlevi dervish order (Sufi order founded in 1273).

Stoga mistični oblici vizualiziranih interpretacija u pogledu *homo islamicusa*, za razliku od doslovnog pristupa fenomenu figurativnosti (ar. *al-taškīl*), predstavljaju balansiranost onog unutarnjeg (ezoterijskog) naspram vanjskog (egzoterijskog). Samim tim razdvajanje *qadar/šīnā' ata* i transcendentnog iskustva

▼²⁶ Kao i svi muslimani, Ikbāl smatra da je vjerovanje u poslanstvo poslanika Muhammeda obaveza svakog muslimana. On je mišljenja da je islam kao vjeru objavio Stvoritelj, ali da egzistencija islama kao društva i nacije zavisi u cijelosti od ličnosti Poslanika. U tom smislu on naglašava da zadaća poslanstva nije samo da uspostavi odnos između Stvoritelja i Njegovih stvorenja, nego i da kreira uputu za individualni i društveni život čovječanstva.

Usporedi, Schimmel, Annemarie. *Džibrilovo krilo* (s engleskog prev. Enes Karić). Sarajevo: El-Kalem i Fakultet islamskih nauka u Sarajevu; 2013. str. 215.

They do so because they understand their own obligation to show Muslims that they, like their community *ummā* (Ar. *al-'ummāh*) in the earliest times, should live in integral harmony with the way of life, behaviour and ideal which the Prophet set before Muslims. It can be assumed that such an interpretation of the viewpoint or belief was contributed by the Pakistani philosopher Muḥammad Iqbāl, since it resounds like the *basso ostinato* ("continuous repetition of a single theme") throughout his work. ▼²⁶



ILLUSTRATION ~ *Mevlevi Sema*, i.e. "Mevlevi listening", is the Turkish name for the Sufi rite of *zikr* (Ar. *dikr*, "remembering", "mentioning" - a religious physical act of prayer) which, among other things, includes pronouncing God's names and thinking about Him, invoking Allah, glorifying God's name... *Zikr* can be collective or individual. The most famous part of the worship is the whirling *dervishes* dance, which is extremely spiritual and intimate, which is why this ceremony was entered on the UNESCO list of intangible world heritage in Europe in 2008.


ILUSTRACIJA ~ *Mevlevi Sema*, tj. „Mevlevijsko osluškivanje“, je turski naziv za sufijski obred *zikira* (ar. *dikr*, „podsjećanje“, „pominjanje“ - vjerski fizički čin molitve) koji, između ostalog sadrži izgovaranje Božijih imena i razmišljanje o Njemu, prizivanje Allaha, slavljenje Božijeg imena... *Zikr* može biti zajednički i pojedinačni. Najpoznatiji dio štovanja je plesna vrtnja derviša ukrug, koja je iznimno duhovna i intimna, zbog čega je ovaj obred upisan na UNESCO-ov popis nematerijalne svjetske baštine u Evropi 2008. godine.

In conclusion, mystical forms of visualized interpretations, unlike the literal approach to the phenomenon of figurativeness (Ar. *al-tashkīl*) represent a balance between the inner (esoteric) and the external (exoteric) of the *homo islamicus*. For this reason, splitting of *qadar/šīnā'at* and mysticism to acceptable and

▼²⁶ Like all Muslims, Iqbāl thinks that belief in prophetism of Prophet Muhammed is an obligation for all Muslims. He believes that Islam as a religion has been revealed by the Creator, but that existence of Islam as a society and a nation fully depends on the personality of Prophet. In this sense, he underscored that the task of prophetism is both to establish a relationship between the Creator and His beings, and to create the instruction for individual and social life of mankind.

Cf., Schimmel, Annemarie. *Džibrilovo krilo* (translated into Bosnian by Enes Karić). Sarajevo: El-Kalem and Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, 2013, p. 215.

na prihvatljivo i neprihvatljivo, duhovno i profano s prisustvom spiritualnog iskustva ezoterijske interpretacije nije opravdano; vjeru ne karakterizira samo Zakon objavljen ljudima u vidu Knjige i prisutnost pratećeg korpusa tradicije. Vjeru karakterizira i čovjek – *homo islamicus*, kojeg je Bog stvorio, a objavljenu mudrost (ar. *al-ḥikmah*) u formi vizualizirane poruke uobličava u okviru islamskog autorefleksivnog diskursa (ar. *al-thawābit al-islāmiyyah*) ili je pak onaj koji takvu mudrost nastoji ostvariti u svom životu. Takav pristup ne gaji nikakve težnje da asocira na srednjovjekovne rasprave o *benefitima vjere nad razumom* ili *razuma nad vjerom*, već se želi u što je moguće širem i detaljnijem obzorju ispitati narav onog teorijskog (filozofskog) te način na koji se navedeno odnosi prema shvaćenoj vjerskoj spoznaji (ar. *al-ma'rifah*), naime, kroz prizmu mistične vizualne interpretacije Božijih atributa i svojstava. Evidentno je kako je pojam vjere (ar. *al-dīn*) uopće po svom opsegu širi, te kako u svom hermeneutičkom potencijalitetu može da sadrži i pojam *qadar/ṣinā'ata* usko povezan s misticizmom, jer vjera u sebi sadrži mogućnost ezoterijske interpretacije. Čini se da svaka alternativa nije ništa drugo doli zatvorenost u onom prošlom, nepomična nostalgija ljudskog bitka bez teorijskog utemeljenja u beskonačnom trajanju. Ovakav pogled na naznačene fenomene (ar. pl. *mu'dżizāt*), možda čak i opravdano nailazi na određene poteškoće, no treba nastojati predvidjeti sve moguće pogreške i unaprijed ih prevladati u svjetlu jedne argumentacije koja nikad ne zaboravlja niti teži ka tome da napusti logičke zakone mišljenja (ar. *ra'y*).



ILUSTRACIJA – Različite forme timuridskih keramičkih poligonalnih gereh pločica (*cuerta seca* - oslikano obojenim glazurama).
Vjerovatno Khargird, sjeveroistočni Iran, 1442-3 godine.

ILLUSTRATION – Various forms of Timurid ceramic polygonal gereh tiles (*cuerta seca* - painted with coloured glazes).
Probably Khargird, northeastern Iran, 1442-3.

unacceptable, to spiritual and profane with the presence of spiritual experience of esoteric interpretation is not justified; a religion is not characterized only by Law revealed to people in the form of the Book and existence of the accompanying body of tradition. A religion is also characterized by the man – *homo islamicus*, who was created by God, and who moulds the revealed wisdom (Ar. *al-ḥikmah*) in the form of visualized message within Islamic self-reflective discourse (Ar. *al-thawābit al-islāmiyyah*), or else who strives to embody such wisdom in his life. Such an approach does not strive to associate medieval discussions of *benefits of religion over reason or reason over religion*, but wants to examine the nature of the theoretical (philosophical) on the broadest and the most detailed horizon possible, and how it is related to religious cognition (Ar. *al-maʿrifah*) understood through the prism of mystical visual interpretation of God's attributes and features. It is evident that the concept of religion (Ar. *al-dīn*) in general is of a broader scope, and that in its hermeneutical potential it can also include the concept of *qadar/ṣināʿat* closely tied to mysticism, since religion in itself includes a possibility of esoteric interpretation. It seems that any alternative is nothing else but closing in the past, a motionless nostalgia of the human being without a theoretical ground in infinite lasting. Such a view of the described phenomena (Ar. pl. *muʿjizāt*), perhaps even justly faces some difficulties; however, it is necessary to attempt to anticipate all possible mistakes and overcome them in advance in the light of arguments which are never forgotten or strive to abandon logical laws of thinking (Ar. *raʿy*).



ILLUSTRATION ~ Form of a twelve-pointed Timurid ceramic polygonal gereh tile.
Probably Khargird, northeastern Iran, 1442-3.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Forma dvanaestokrake timurijske keramičke poligonalne gereh pločice.
Vjerojatno Khargird, sjeveroistočni Iran, 1442-3 godine.

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**U SJENI KVAZI-SALAFĪ IDEOLOGIJE:
POVRATAK PROSVJETITELJSKO – SUNNITSKO-SINTETIČKOJ
TEOLOGIJI IMĀMA AL-MĀTURĪDJE**

**IN THE SHADOW OF QUASI-SALAFĪ IDEOLOGY:
A RETURN TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT OF IMĀM AL-MĀTURIDĪ'S
SUNNI SYNTHETIC THEOLOGY**

Sažetak

Postoji konsenzus danas među muslimanskim učenjacima: muslimanska globalna nacija (*ummet*) je u velikoj krizi. Ova kriza je slična dvjema najvećim krizama u muslimanskoj povijesti: krizi pada Abbasidskog *khilāfeta* u 13. stoljeću i kriza ukidanja Osmanskog *khilāfeta* u 20. stoljeću. Trenutna kriza pak ima različite vanjske i unutrašnje uzroke. Izazov za nacije, kao i pojedince u krizi, je da otkriju koji dijelovi njihovih identiteta dobro funkcioniraju i ne treba ih mijenjati, a koji dijelovi više ne funkcioniraju pa ih treba mijenjati. Danas je muslimanskom *ummetu*, pojedinačno i kolektivno, potrebna mudrost i hrabrost da prepozna šta se mora mijenjati kako bi se nosio sa novonastalom situacijom. Ali, u isto vrijeme mora se povući crtu i naglasiti elementi, koji su fundamentalni za naše vjerske, kulturne i civilizacijske identitete, koji se ne mogu mijenjati. *Ummet* muslimanski ne treba usmjeravati prema utopijskoj ideji *tūbāwīyyah*, tj., mjestu koje ne postoji (no-where), već ga treba usmjeravati prema ideji istinske vjere i zdravog razuma, na način na koji ga je usmjeravao Imām al-Māturīdī u 10. stoljeću u Samarkandu. Naime, Imām al-Māturīdī ustanovio je sintezu između *Naql-a* (Tradicije) i *'Aql-a* (Razuma) u stvarnom svijetu vjere i razuma, gdje se ne sudaraju, već se susreću na temelju uspjeha na Ovom (*al-dunyā*) i spasu na Drugome svijetu (*al-ākhirah*). U ovom radu autor osvjetljava ideju sintetičke islamske teologije Imām al-Māturīdija u duhu sunnitsko-hanefitskog učenja, ideju koju je obradio u svojoj doktorskoj disertaciji 1986. na Čikaškom univerzitetu pod mentorstvom pakistanskog profesora Fazlura Rahmana (1919-1988). Ova ideja može odražavati značenje riječi kriza: “razdvojiti”, “odlučiti”, “povući razliku”, a moglo bi značiti i “prekretnicu” od utopije ka stvarnosti suvremene povijesti muslimanskog *ummata*. Dakle, započnimo iznova ovo povijesno putovanje iz Samarkanda sa duhom i umom Velikog Imām: Abū Mansūra Muḥammada ibn Muḥammada ibn Maḥmūda al-Ḥnafija al-Māturīdija al-Samarqandija (umro 333h/944m).

Ključne riječi: utopija, *tūbāwīyyah*, *khilāfet*, *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, Imām al-Māturīdī, vjernička pokornost (*tā'ah*), objašnjenje (*bajān*), *Nakl* - *'Akl* (sukob ili sinteza)

Abstract

There is a consensus today among Muslim scholars: the Muslim global nation (*Ummah*) is in a big crisis. This crisis is similar to the two greatest crises in Muslim history: the crisis of the fall of the Abbasid *caliphate* in the 13th century and the crisis of the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in the 20th century. The current crisis has different external and internal causes. The challenge for nations as well as individuals in crisis, is to discover which parts of their identities are working well and should not be changed, and which parts are no longer working and should be changed. Today, the Muslim *Ummah*, individually and collectively, needs the wisdom and courage to recognize what must be changed in order to cope with the new situation. But, at the same time, we must draw a line and emphasize the elements, which are fundamental to our religious, cultural and civilizational identities, which cannot be changed. The Muslim *Ummah* should not be directed towards the utopian idea of *ṭubāwīyyah*, i.e., a place that does not exist (no-where), but should be directed towards the idea of true faith and common sense, the way it was directed by Imām al-Māturīdī in the 10th century in Samarkand. Namely, Imām al-Māturīdī established a synthesis between *Naql* (Tradition) and *Aql* (Reason) in the real world of faith and reason, where they do not collide, but meet on the basis of success in this world (*al-dunyā*) and salvation in the Other World (*al-ākhirah*). In this paper, the author sheds light on the idea of synthetic Islamic theology of Imām al-Māturīdī in the spirit of Sunni-Hanafi teaching, the idea he elaborated in his doctoral dissertation in 1986 at the University of Chicago under the mentorship of Pakistani professor Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988). This idea may reflect the meaning of the word crisis: "to separate", "to decide", "to draw a distinction", and it could also mean a "turning point" from utopia to the reality of the contemporary history of the Muslim *Ummah*. So, let us begin again this historical journey from Samarkand with the spirit and mind of the Great Imām Abū Mansūr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd al-Ḥnafi al-Māturīdī al-Samarqandī (d. 333h/944m).

Key words: *utopia, ṭubāwīyyah, khilāfet, al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ, Imām al-Māturīdī, faithful obedience (ṭā'ah), explanation (bajān), Nakl - 'Aql (conflict or synthesis)*

U SJENI KVAZI-SALAFI IDEOLOGIJE: POVRATAK PROSVJETITELJSKO – SUNNITSKO-SINTETIČKOJ TEOLOGIJI IMAMĀ AL-MĀTURĪDJE

I U sjeni utopije (tūbawīyah)

muslimanski moralista Ibn Taymiyya^{▼1} iz 13. stoljeća i engleski utopista Thomas More^{▼2} iz 15. stoljeća nemaju ništa slično osim što je, svaki od njih, na svoj način, bio protiv postojećeg položaja življenja, tragajući za mjestom življenja, koje ne postoji u stvarnom svijetu. Ovo stanje duha i uma zove se *utopija* od grčke riječi οὐ(ou)+τόπος, koja znači „nigdje“ ili „ne-mjesto“. Riječ *utopija* se često uzimala da znači „dobro mjesto“, jer se njen slog miješao sa grčkim *eu*, kao u *eufemizmu*, *hvalospjevu*. Kao rezultat ovog miješanja, dodana je riječ *distopija*, koja znači "loše mjesto". No, imaginarna "dobra" ili "loša" mjesta su utopije, tj., „nigdjestani“.^{▼3}

Thomas More nije bio prvi koji je sanjao o *utopiji*, „dobrom mjestu“ za življenje. Prethodio mu je Platon,^{▼4} sa svojim kapitalnim djelom *Republika*, kao i Tomaso Campanella (Tommaso Campanella)^{▼5}

▼1 Taqī al-Dīn Abū al-’Abbās Aḥmad ibn ’Abd al-Salām ibn ’Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) jedan je od najuticajnijih muslimanskih učenjaka, koji se, kao član ḥanbalijske škole, zalagao za povratak islama svojim izvorima: Kur’anu i Sunnetu. Ibn Taymiyya je bio inspiracija tradicionalističkog pokreta islama iz sredine 18. stoljeća. Ostavio je značajan djela – često iznova objavljivanih u Siriji, Egiptu, Arabiji i Indiji – koji su proširili i opravdavali njegove vjerske i političke angažmane. Pored bezbrojnih *fetvi* (pravnih mišljenja zasnovanih na vjerskom pravu) i nekoliko dogmatskih spisa, od kojih je najljepša *Wāsiṭīyah*, dva djela zaslužuju posebnu pažnju. Jedno je: *Al-Siyāsāt al-šar’iyyah* („Traktat o šerijatsko-pravednoj politici“) i drugo: *Minḥādž al-sunnah* (“Pravi Put tradicije”). To je najbogatije djelo komparativne teologije, koje je preživjelo iz srednjovjekovnog islama.

▼2 Thomas More (1478-1535) je engleski humanista i državnik. Bio je jedan od najbližih savjetnika Henrika VIII. Nije odobravao kraljev raskid s papom i protivio se zakonu kojim kralj dobiva vrhovnu vlast nad Crkvom u Engleskoj. Zbog načelnog protivljenja razvodu braka Henrika VIII. i Katarine Aragonske sukobio se s kraljem. Zbog odbijanja da položi zakletvu vjernosti Henriku VIII., kao vrhovnom poglavaru engleske Crkve, kralj ga je optužio za izdaju i dao ga pogubiti. Godine 1935. proglašen je svecem. Thomas More je bio jedan od najvećih intelektualaca svojega doba. Čuveno je njegovo glavno djelo *O najboljem uređenju države i o novom ostrvu Utopiji* (*De optimo reipublicae statu deque nova insula Utopia libellus*), poznato pod skraćenim nazivom *Utopija*, koje je štampano u Leuvenu 1516. uz pomoć prijatelja Erazma Roterdamskoga.

▼3 John Carey (ed.): *The Faber Book of Utopias*. Gardners Books, 2000., p. xi.

▼4 Platon (427- 347 p.n.e.) je poznati grčki filozof. Osnovao je vlastitu filozofsku školu u gaju blizu Atene posvećenu junaku Akademiju, čuvenu *Akademiju*. U svom najopsežnijem dijalogu *Država* Platon mitsko-simboličkim sredstvima pokušava prikazati kako bi trebalo živjeti na ovome svijetu. Platon misli da država ne treba da brine o dobru koliko treba da brine za dušu jer je duša sama odsluk besmrtnosti u njenoj trodijelnosti – žudne, voljne i razumske duše, pa se odgoj duše mora ogledati i u svim očitovanjima uspostave države. Platon je zagovarao da vladari i čuvari ne mogu imati ni privatno vlasništvo ni vlastitu porodicu, pa su im i djeca zajednička, a strogost i posluš u tom poretku osiguravaju eugenika i eutanazija. Time se postiže skladnost etike i politike: proizvođači utjelovljuju umjerenost, čuvari hrabrost, a vladari mudrost, a njihov međusoban sklad ostvaruje se kao pravednost – najviša vrlina države koja teži *Dobru*, jer “Dobro je dalje od bitke, te po uzvišenosti i moći više”.

▼5 *Usporedi*, Tommaso Campanella: *The City of the Sun*. Merchant Books. 2010.

IN THE SHADOW OF QUASĪ-SALAFI IDEOLOGY: A RETURN TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT OF IMĀM AL-MĀTURĪDĪ'S SUNNI SYNTHETIC THEOLOGY

I

In the Shadow of Utopia (tūbawīyyah)

The Muslim moralist Ibn Taymiyya^{▼1} of 13th century and the English utopian Thomas More^{▼2} (1477-1535) of 15th century have nothing similar except that, each one of them in their own terms, had been against the existing place of living, searching for or dreaming of a place of no-where, i.e., a place that does not exist in a real world. This is called *utopia* from Greek οὐ(ου)+τόπος, which means “nowhere” or “no-place”. The word *utopia* has often been taken to mean “good place”, through confusion of its syllable with the Greek *eu* as in *euphemism* or *eulogy*. As a result of this mix-up, another word *dystopia* was invented, to mean “bad place”. But, strictly speaking, imaginary “good places” and imaginary “bad places” are all **utopias**, or nowhere.^{▼3}

Thomas More was not first who dreamt of utopia, a “good place” for living. He was preceded by Plato (42-347 before Mīlād]B.M.[)^{▼4} with his *Republic* as well as by Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639) with his *The City of the Sun*.^{▼5}

▼1 Taqī al-Dīn Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd al-Salām ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) is one of the most influential Muslim scholars, who, as a member of the ḥanbali school, advocated the return of Islam to its sources: the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Ibn Taymiyya was the inspiration of the traditionalist movement of Islam in the mid-18th century. He left significant works - often republished in Syria, Egypt, Arabia, and India - that extended and justified his religious and political engagements. In addition to countless *fatwas* (legal opinions based on religious law) and several dogmatic writings, the most interesting of which is the *Wāsiṭīyyah*, two works deserve special attention. One is: *Al-Siyāsat al-ṣar’īyyah* ("Treatise on Shariah-Just Politics") and the other: *Minhāj al-sunnah* ("The True Path of Tradition"). This is one of the best works of comparative theology that has survived from medieval Islam.

▼2 Thomas More (1478-1535) was an English humanist and statesman. He was one of Henry VIII's closest advisers. He did not approve of the king's break with the pope and opposed the law that gave the king supreme authority over the Church of England. Due to principled opposition to the divorce of Henry VIII and Catherine of Aragon he clashed with the king. For refusing to take the oath of allegiance to Henry VIII as the supreme head of the Church of England, the king accused him of treason and had him executed. In 1935, he was declared a saint. Thomas More was one of the greatest intellectuals of his time. His main work *On the Best Arrangement of the State and On the New Island of Utopia* („De optimo reipublicae statu deque nova insula Utopia libellus“), is famously known under the abbreviated name *Utopia*, which was printed in Leuven in 1516 with the help of his friend Erasmus of Rotterdam.

▼3 See, John Carey (ed.): *The Faber Book of Utopias*. Gardners Books, 2000, p. xi.

▼4 Plato (427-347 BC) is a famous Greek philosopher. He founded his own philosophical school in a grove near Athens dedicated to the hero Akademos, the famous Academy. In his most extensive dialogue, *The State*, Plato uses mythic and symbolic means to show how one should live in this world. Plato thinks that the state should not take care of the goodness as much as it should take care of the soul, because the soul itself is a reflection of immortality in its tripartite nature - the eager, willing and rational soul, so the education of the soul must be reflected in all manifestations of the establishment of the state. Plato advocated that rulers and guardians can have neither private property nor their own family. Thus, they have common children. The strictness and obedience in that order are ensured by eugenics and euthanasia. By this way the harmony of ethics and politics is achieved: producers embody moderation, guardians courage and rulers wisdom, while their mutual harmony is realized in justice - the highest virtue of the state that strives for the *Good*, because "the Good is bigger than being (sein) and higher in nobility and power."

▼5 Tommaso Campanella, *The City of the Sun*. Merchant Books, 2010. Campanella Tommaso, talijanski filozof (Stilo, Kalabrija, 5. IX. 1568 – Pariz, 21. V. 1639)

sa svojim djelom *Grad sunca*. Međutim, Thomas More je bio prvi koji je smislio riječ *Utopija*.^{▼6} U toj knjizi, Tomas More svojim čitaocima predstavlja idealistički prikaz nacije koja ima egalitarnu vladu. Preko svog glasnogovornika, pronicljivog Rafaela Hitlodeja (Raphael Hythlodaj),^{▼7} Thomas More opisuje i procjenjuje utopijsku politiku i društvene vrijednosti, uključujući stavove prema novcu, radu, vlasništvu nad zemljom, kažnjavanju zločina i siromaštvu. *Utopija* nema advokate. Političari su poštovani, ali ne i slavljani, a pošto nema novca ni imovine, mito je nepoznato. Utopisti gledaju na brak kao na svetu instituciju. Predbračni odnos je zabranjen i strogo se kažnjava. „Glava svakog domaćinstva traži [iz centralnih skladišta] ono što njemu ili njegovom domaćinstvu treba i osigurava njihove potrebe bez ikakve naknade ili nadoknade. Uostalom, zašto bi bilo kome uskraćivano bilo što? Svega ima više nego dovoljno i nema straha da će neko uzeti više nego što mu je zaista potrebno”.^{▼8}

Arapci su Moreovu utopiju preveli kao *tūbiyā* (želja, nada, čežnja) od riječi „*ṭayyibah*“, što znači dobrota i sreća. Množina: „*tūbā*“, riječ koja se spominje u Kur'anu Časnom:

*Onima koji su vjerovali i radili dobra djela pripada tūbā, lijepo mjesto
(konačnog) povratka.*^{▼9}

U *Rječniku pojmova islamskog prava*,^{▼10} arapska riječ „*tūbā*“ znači „sreća“. To je ime drveta u Džennetu. „Ko god bude imao priliku da dođe do tog drveta, hodat će u njegovoj sjeni stotinu godina”.^{▼11} Nisu ni muslimanski filozofi bili bez utopijskih ideja. Najistaknutiji među njima bio je Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī^{▼12}

Tommaso Campanella je talijanski filozof (1568 –1639). Zalagao se za opće duhovnu, društvenopolitičku i vjersku obnovu, moralnu obnovu katoličanstva, za ostvarenje ideala jedinstvene vjere sveukupnoga ljudskog roda i političke slobode, te autentične i univerzalne, urođene naravne religije, koja svoj naravni i racionalni temelj ima u filozofiji. Te svoje ideje izlagao je u djelima *Realna filozofija u izrekama* (*Realis philosophia epistologica*, 1613), *Grad Sunca, Ideja filozofske države* (*Civitas Solis. Idea reipublicae philosophicae*, 1623) i u svojim političkim djelima.

^{▼6} Thomas More: *Utopia* (Transl. Ralph Robinson). Barnes & Noble Classics, New York, 2005.

^{▼7} U Tomas Moreovoj *Utopiji* Rafael Hitlodej je ime aluzija na arkandela Rafaela, pronositelja istine, dok mu prezime na grčkom znači "širitelj besmisli", gdje More opisuje društveno i političko uređenje imaginarne ostrvske zemlje *Utopije*, čije samo ime sadržava igru riječi: grč. οὐ+τόπος znači ne-mjesto, a εὖ+τόπος dobro mjesto. *Utopija* se može čitati kao idealizirana oprečnost, ali i kao ljutita satira Europe Moreovog doba.

^{▼8} More, Thomas: *Utopia* (Transl. Dominic Baker-Smith). Penguin Books, London, 2020.
Kur'an, 13:29.

^{▼9} *Kur'an*, 13:29.

^{▼10} *Mu'jam al-muṣṭalahāt wa al-'alfāz al-fiqhiyyah*, Maḥmūd Abd al-Raḥmān Abd al-Mun'im, Kairo, Dār al-faḍīlah, 2002, predmet „*tūbā*“.

^{▼11} *Ibid*, *Kalimah tūbā ya 'nī „al-sa' ādah“ wa hiya ismu šadžaratīn fī al-džannah yasīru al-rākibu fī žillihā mi'ata 'āmin*. (Riječ „*tūbā*“ znači „sreća“. Tako se zove drvo u raju pod kojim će putnik, koji uđe u raj, hodati sto godina).

^{▼12} Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Tarḥān al-Fārābī (870 -950) je arapski filozof i mistik turskoga porijekla. Nazvan je „Drugim učiteljem“, koji je utemeljio filozofski pravac po uzoru na Aristotela, „Prvog učitelja“ u filozofiji. Bio je ugledni matematičar, liječnik i muzičar. Napisao je oko 70 djela. Tri su glavne teze al-Fārābijeve filozofske misli: 1) metafizička razlika biti i bitka kod stvorenih bića, gdje bitak nije konstitutivna značajka biti, već njegov predikat,

However, Thomas More was the first to make the word *utopia* up for his book *Utopia*.^{▼6} In *Utopia*, Thomas More presents to his readers an idealistic portrayal of a nation employing an egalitarian government. Through his spokesperson, the sagacious and well-traveled Raphael Hythloday, Thomas More describes and evaluates utopian politics and social values, including attitudes toward money, work, land ownership, punishment of crime, and poverty. *Utopia* has no lawyers. Politicians are respected but not venerated, and since there is no money or property, bribery is unknown. Utopians view marriage as a sacred institution. Premarital intercourse is prohibited and severely punished. “The head of each household searches out [from central warehouses] whatever he or his household needs and carries away their requirements without any payment or recompense. After all, why should anything be denied him? There is more than enough of everything, and there is no fear that anyone will take more than they really need”.^{▼7}

The Arabs have translated the More’s *Utopia* as *ṭūbiyā* (wish, hope, yearning) from the word “*ṭayyibah*“, which means a goodness and good luck. The plural of it is “*ṭūbā*“, which is mentioned in the Holy Qur’an:

“Those who believed, and work righteousness *ṭūbā* (good luck)
is for them and a beautiful place of (final) return”.

In the *Dictionary of jurisprudential terms*, the Arabic word “*ṭūbā*“ means “happiness“, which is the name of a tree in the *Jannah* (Heaven). “Whoever gets the chance to reach such a tree will walk in the shadow of it for a hundred years”.^{▼8} Then, neither the Muslim philosophers were without utopian ideas. The most conspicuous among them was Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (870-950) by his epochal work: *Mabādī’ āra’ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍilah* (*Principles of the Views of the Citizens of the Perfect State*).^{▼9}

Al-Fārābī is interesting to us not only because he developed a *utopia-ṭūbawiyah* idea of *al-Madīna al-fāḍilah* (*The Perfect State*), but also because his major philosophical works permeate the *utopia-ṭūbā* idea, the works such as *Kitāb al-siyāsah al-madaniyyah* (*The civil Politics*); *Al-tanbīh ‘alā sabīl al-sa’ādah* (*A Reminder Toward the Road of Happiness*); and *Fī taḥṣīl al-sa’ādah* (*A Triumph of Happiness*).^{▼10}

Al-Fārābī’s utopian (*ṭūbawiyah*) ideas are not a mere imitation of Plato’s Republic, as some tend to think, but his “Virtuous City” is a structure of his theological opinions as well as his intention to make a “Perfect State”, whereby a noble society may live, the society that is compatible with the demands of time in which Al-Fārābī himself had lived.

▼6 More, Sir Thomas: *Utopia* (Transl. Ralph Robinson). Barnes & Noble Classics, New York, 2005.

▼7 More, Thomas: *Utopia* (Transl. Dominic Baker-Smith). Penguin Books, London, 2020.

▼8 *Mu’jam al-muṣṭalaḥāt al-fiqhiyyah: Kalimah ṭūbā ya’nī „al-sa’ādah“ wa hiya ismu shjaratin fī al-jannah yasīru al-rākibu fī ḏllihā mi’ata ‘āmin.* (The word “*ṭūbā*“ means „happiness“. It is the name of a tree in Paradise, under which a passenger walks for a hundred years).

▼9 Richard Walzer, *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State: Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī’s Mabādī’ Āra’ Ahl Al-madīna Al-fāḍila: a Revised Text with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary*, Clarendon Press, 1985 - 571 pages.

▼10 Ja’far Āl Yāsīn, *Al-Fārābī: al-a’māl al-falsafiyah*, al-juzā al-awwal, Dār al- manāhil, Beirut 1992. 454 pages.

sa svojim epohalnim djelom: *Mabādi' āra' ahl al-madīna al-fāḍilah* (Principi poimanja građana savršene države).^{▼13}

Al-Fārābī nam je zanimljiv ne samo zato što je razvio ideju utopije-*tūbawīyyah* o *al-Madīna al-fāḍilah* (Savršenoj državi), već i zato što njegova glavna filozofska djela prožimaju ideju utopije-*tūbā*, djela kao što su: *Kitāb al-siyāsah al-madaniyyah* (Građanska politika); *Al-tanbih 'alā sabīl al-sa' ādah* (Podsjetnik na putu do sreće); i *Fī taḥsīl al-sa' ādah* (Trijumf sreće).^{▼14}



ILUSTRACIJA – Portret Farabija (*Alfarabius*) u Liber Chronicarum iz 1493. Stranice iz rukopisa al-Farabijevog komentara o Aristotelovoj metafizici iz 17. stoljeća.

ILLUSTRATION – Portrait of Farabi (*Alfarabius*) in Liber Chronicarum from 1493. Pages from a 17th-century manuscript of al-Farabi's commentary on Aristotle's metaphysics.

Al-Fārābijevе utopijske (*tūbāwīyya*) ideje nisu puka imitacija Platonove Republike, kao što neki misle, već je njegovo djelo “Savršena država” struktura njegovih teoloških mišljenja u namjeri da ponudi ideju o najboljoj država za savršeno društvo, društvo koje je kompatibilno sa zahtjevima vremena u

akcident; 2) teoriju emanacije, koja opisuje porijeklo materijalnog kozmosa. Deset intelekta ili inteligencija emanira, tj., proizlazi uzastopno iz Prvog Bića te iz svakog od njih nastaje sfera univerzuma. Prvi intelekt je stvorio najudaljeniju sferu i drugi intelekt. Iz drugog intelekta nastala je sfera fiksnih zvijezda i treći intelekt. Proces se nastavlja, kroz sfere planeta, naniže do sfere Mjeseca. Sa Mjeseca, čisti intelekt al-Fārābī definirana kao aktivnu inteligenciju, koja pruža most između neba i zemlje; 3) teorija vjerovjesništva, gdje al-Fārābī identifikira Meleka Spoznaje i Melaka Objave. To je za al-Fārābija bitan preduvjet vjerovjesničke vjerodostojnosti. Njegova glavna djela su: *Mabādi' āra' ahl al-madīna al-fāḍilah* (Principi poimanja građana savršene države); *Iḥṣāl al-'ulūm* (Klasifikacija znanosti); *Al-Džam' bayn ra'yayn al-ḥakīmayn* (Slaganja u učenju dvojice mudraca, Platona i Aristotela).

▼13 Richard Walzer: *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State: Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī's Mabādi' Ārā' Ahl Al-madīna Al-fāḍila* (revidirani tekst sa uvodom, prijevodom i komentarom). Clarendon Press, 1985.

▼14 Ja'far Āl Yāsīn: *Al-Fārābī: al-a'māl al-falsafīyyah*. Dār al-manāhil, Beirut 1992.

Indeed, Al-Fārābī's plan for an imaginary city-state and society is at the same time a sharp critique of or opposition to the existing Muslim state and society of his time. And that is the basic idea of any utopian concept - a critique or destruction of the existing state of affairs in order to construct or reconstruct nonexistent state. In fact, by negating the existing place one wants to find or reconstruct non-existent place, if not in reality then at least in the head of protagonists of an ideal society, in the case of the contemporary Muslim affairs to reconstruct a society in accordance to the ideals of *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, the reverend and glorious forerunners of the first generation of the Prophet - the *'aṣḥāb*, then of the second generation of the Prophet and the first generation of the followers of the Prophet's *'aṣḥāb* - the *ṭābī'ūn* and then the third generation of the Prophet, the second generation of the followers of *'aṣḥāb* and the first generation of followers of the followers - *the ṭābī'ū al-ṭābī'in*.




ILLUSTRATION – Some book covers in German, in Arabic and English, within which the work of Al-Farabi is analyzed.

ILUSTRACIJA – Neke naslovnice knjiga na njemačkom, arapskom i engleskom jeziku unutar kojih se analizira djelo Al-Farabija.

In Europe or in the West generally the basic idea of Enlightenment (*tanwīr*) is founded on a deconstruction of existing methods in science and technology and, consequently, on the deconstruction of the existing norms in the state and society in order to construct new social norms and establish new scientific and technical methods. Here we have a movement or stride from unwanted past and present into a wanted future, while in the Muslim contemporary or modern history this movement was going the opposite way - from one unwanted preset toward a wanted past as a *ṭūbā-tree* in Heaven or utopian-*ṭūbāwian* no-where. Indeed, this utopian idea, which could not originate and prevail without some theological premises, has always appeared at critical historical situations, especially when the Muslims were losing their place which they thought has belonged to them forever.

kojem je živio i sâm Al-Fārābī. Zaista, Al-Fārābījev plan za imaginarni savršeni grad-državu i društvo je u isto vrijeme oštra kritika ili suprotstavljanje postojećoj muslimanskoj državi i društvu njegovog vremena. A to je osnovna ideja svakog utopijskog koncepta – kritika ili destrukcija postojećeg stanja kako bi se konstruiralo ili rekonstruiralo poželjno nepostojeće stanje. Zapravo, negiranjem postojećeg mjesta želi se pronaći ili rekonstruirati *utopija*, poželjno nepostojeće mjesto, ako ne u stvarnosti onda barem u glavi protagonista idealnog društva. U slučaju suvremenih muslimanskih zbivanja riječ je rekonstruiranju društva u skladu sa idealima *al-salaf al-šāliḥ*, „časnih i slavni“ predaka prve generacije *'aṣḥāba* Božjeg Poslanika, zatim druge generacije te treće generacije *ṭābi' ū-l-ṭābi'in*, sljedbenika sljedbenika Poslanikovih neposrednih *'aṣḥāba*.



ILUSTRACIJA - *Bayt al-Hikmah*, (Kuća mudrosti) kraljevska knjižnica ili glavna abasidska javna akademija i intelektualno središte u Bagdadu.
 ILLUSTRATION - *Bayt al-Hikmah*, (House of Wisdom) royal library or major Abbasid public academy and intellectual center in Baghdad.

Svakako, pad Abbasidskog *khilāfeta*^{▼15} u Bagdadu krajem 13. stoljeća, a potom i konačno ukidanje

▼15 Abbasidski *khilāfet* (*al-Khilāfah al-'Abbāsiyyah*) je bio treći *khilāfet*, koji je naslijedio Poslanika Muhammeda a.s.. Osnovala ga je dinastija koja potiče od Poslanikovog amidže, 'Abbāsa ibn 'Abd al-Muṭṭaliba (566–653), po kojem je dinastija dobila ime. Oni su vladali kao *halife* većinu vremena trajanja *khilāfeta* iz glavnog grada Bagdada u današnjem Iraku, nakon što su zbacili Umejevički *khilāfet* u Abbasidskoj revoluciji 750. god. Abbasidski period je obilježen ovisnošću o perzijskim birokratima, kao što je bila porodica Barmakida, kao i sve većim uključivanjem ne-Arapa u muslimansko društvo. Abbasidsko doba kulturnog preporoda i plodnosti završilo se 1258. god. sa upadom Mongola u Bagdadu pod komandom mongolskog osvajača Hulagu Khana, koji je dao pogubiti posljednjeg 37. abasidskog *halifu* al-Musta'šima billah, koji je vladao od 1242. do 1258. godine.

Usporedi, Robert Canfield: *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, str. 5; Peter Holt, *Some Observations on the 'Abbāsid Caliphate of Cairo*. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. University of London, 47 (3), 1984, str 501–507.

Certainly, the fall of the Abbaside Caliphate in Baghdad by the end of 13th century, and, then, the final abolition of the institution of the Caliphate in Istanbul by the beginning of the 20th century, marked the two most crises in the history of Islam and Muslims.▼¹¹ In the case of the former crisis it can be said that Ibn Taymiyya▼¹² and his pupil Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya▼¹³ were main protagonists of a utopian idea in the sense of a reconstruction of the deconstructed idea of *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, while in the case of latter, i.e., the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, the main protagonists of the return to the path (*minhāj*) to a pure spring of pure and eternal water (*shir'ah*) was Muḥammad bin Abd al-Wahhab.▼¹⁴

In the case of the previous crisis, it can be said that Ibn Taymiyyah and his disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah were the main protagonists of utopian-*ṭūbāwiyya* thought in terms of reconstructing the deconstructed idea of *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, while in the case of the latter crisis, i.e., the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, the main protagonist of the return to the Path (*minhāj*) of pure and eternal Norma (*shir'ah*) was Imam Muḥammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb (1703-1792). Shaykh-ul-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah was a combination of *'ilmu-l-tawḥīd* and *'ilmu-l-fiqh* with a certain appetite for politics, in which he was faithfully followed by his disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah. They both tasted prison at the same time because of it. After the death of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn al-Jawziyyah was released from prison. Imam Muḥammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb is remembered more for his Puritan *'ilm-l-tawḥīd* than for his practical *'ilm-l-fiqh* with a special emphasis on the fight against *bid'at* (innovation) in the *ahl al-ṣūfiyyah*. From today's distance, different assessments can be made of the role of Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah and Imam Muḥammad

▼¹¹ The Abbasid *Caliphate* (*al-Khilāfah al-'Abbāsiyyah*) was the third *caliphate* to succeed the Prophet Muhammad a.s.. It was founded by a dynasty descended from the Prophet's uncle, 'Abbās ibn 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib (566–653), from whom the dynasty takes its name. They ruled as *caliphs* for most of the *caliphate* from their capital Baghdad in modern-day Iraq, after having overthrown the Umayyad *Caliphate* in the Abbasid Revolution of 750. The Abbasid period was marked by dependence on Persian bureaucrats (such as the Barmakid family) for governing the territories as well as an increasing inclusion of non-Arab into Muslims the society. The Abbasids age of cultural revival and fruition ended in 1258 with the sack of Baghdad by the Mongols under Hulagu Khan and the execution of the last 37th Abbasid *caliph* al-Musta'ṣim billāh who had ruled from 1242 until 1258.

Compare, Canfield, Robert L.: *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002., p. 5.; Holt, Peter M.: *Some Observations on the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate of Cairo*. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. University of London, 47 (3), 1984., pp. 501–507.

▼¹² Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328) left a considerable body of work - often republished in Syria, Egypt, Arabia, and India - that extended and justified his religious and political involvements and was characterized by its rich documentation, sober style, and brilliant polemic. In addition to innumerable fatwas (legal opinions based on religious law) and several professions of faith, the most beautiful of which is the *Wāsiṭiyyah*, two works merit particular attention. One is his *Al-Siyāsāt al-shar'iyyah* ("Treatise on Juridical Politics"). The other, *Minhāj al-sunnah* ("The Way of Tradition"), is the richest work of comparative theology surviving from medieval Islam.

▼¹³ Ibn al Qayyim al Jawziyya (1292-1350), his contributions to the Islamic philosophy are extensive, and they particularly deal with the Qur'anic commentaries, and understanding and analysis of the prophetic traditions (*fiqh-u Sunnah*). On this occasion we will single out the following studies: *Al-Kalam al-Tayyib wa-al-'Amal al-Salih* ("The Essence of Good Words and Deeds") and Commentaries on the book of Shaikh 'Abdullah al-Ansari: *Manazil-u Sa'ireen* ("Stations of the Seekers"), which is considered the epitome of knowledge of sufi books.

▼¹⁴ Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb ibn Sulaymān al-Tamīmī (1703–1792) was an Arabian Islamic scholar, theologian, preacher, activist, religious leader, reformer, and theologian from Najd in central Arabia. Sought to revive and purify Islam from what he perceived as non-Islamic popular religious beliefs and practices by returning to what, he believed, were the fundamental principles of the Islamic religion. His works were generally short, full of quotations from the Qur'an and Hadith, such as his main and foremost theological treatise, *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd* ("The Book of Oneness").

institucije *khilāfeta*^{▼16} u Istanbulu početkom 20. stoljeća, označili su dvije najveće krize u historiji islama i muslimana.

U slučaju prethodne krize može se reći da su Ibn Taymiyya i njegov učenik Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya^{▼17} bili glavni protagonisti utopijske-*tūbāwiyya* ideje u smislu rekonstrukcije ideje *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, dok je u slučaju potonjeg ukidanja Osmanskog *khilāfeta*,^{▼18} glavni protagonist povratka na „Pravi Put“ (*minhā*) prema čistom duhovnom, moralnom i pravnom izvoru (*širi'ah*) bio Imām Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab.^{▼19}

Šeykhu-l-islam Ibn Taymiyya je bio spoj '*ilm al-tawḥīda* (islamske doktrine) i '*ilmu al-fiqha* (islamskog prava) sa određenim apetitom za politiku ('*ilm-i siyāset*), u čemu ga je vjerno slijedio njegov učenik Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah. Zbog toga su obojica istovremeno okusili zatvor. Nakon smrti Ibn Taymiyye, Ibn al-Jawziyyah je pušten iz zatvora. Imam Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb je zapamćen više po svom puritanskom '*ilm al-tawḥīdu* nego po praktičnom '*ilm al-fiqhu* sa posebnim naglaskom na borbu protiv *bid'ah* (izmišljanja u vjeri), posebno kod protivno *ahl al-ṣūfiyyah*, mistika ili derviša. Sa današnje distance mogu se iznijeti različite ocjene o ulozi Šeykhu-l-islama Ibn Taymiyya i Imāma Muḥammada bin 'Abd al-Wahhaba u oblikovanju salafijske svijesti među muslimanima, ali jedno je sigurno, a to je da su se u krizi s kojom su se obojica suočili, tražili izlaz u utopijskom-*tūbāwiyya* povratku nazad umjesto naprijed.

Stoga se ovdje suočavamo s još jednom suštinskom razlikom između utopijske misli u Evropi i utopijske-*tūbāwiyya* misli kod muslimanima.^{▼20} Naime, Evropi nije preostalo ništa drugo nego da prođe

▼16 *Khilāfet* je političko-civilno i duhovno uređenje države nakon smrti posljednjeg Božjeg Poslanika Muhammeda, a.s. (632.n.e) u Medini, Arabiji, gdje su muslimani većinsko stanovništvo različitih rasa i nacija. Pod vladavinom halife (arapski *khalīfah*, „nasljednik“), koji je imao svjetovnu, a ponekad i određeni stepen duhovne vlasti, carstvo *khilāfeta* je brzo raslo osvajanjem tokom prva dva stoljeća. Tako je carstvo *khilāfeta* uključivalo veći dio jugozapadne Azije, sjeverne Afrike i Španije. Dinastičke borbe su kasnije dovele do propadanja *khilāfeta* tako da je ta globalna muslimanska institucija prestala da postoji kao funkcionalna političko-civilna i duhovna institucija muslimana mongolskim upadom u Bagdad 1258.

▼17 Šams al-Dīn Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350) je poznat po svom doprinosu u očuvanju autohtone islamske tradiciji kroz svoje tumačenje Kur'ana te striktno analize *sunnetskih*-vjerovjesničkih predaja (*fiqh al-sunnah*). Značajna su njegova djela: *Al-Kalām al-ṭayyib wa al-'amal al-ṣāliḥ* („Lijepa riječ i dobar posao“); *Madārid al-sālikīn*, što je tumačenje i komentar na knjigu: *Manāzil al-sā'irīn* od Šeykha 'Abdullaha al-Anṣārija al-Harawija.

▼18 Osmanski *khilāfet* je bio posljednji globalno priznati *khilāfet*. Ukinut je 3. marta 1924. (27. redžeb 1342. po Hidžri) dekretom Velike narodne skupštine Turske. To je bila jedna od Atatürkovih radikalnih reformi nakon ukidanja Osmanskog carstva i uspostave Republike Turske 1923. god. Ankara je te godine proglašena glavnim gradom, a 29. 10. 1923. proglašena je Republika Turska s prvim predsjednikom Kemal-pašom, koji je ukinuo šerijatske sudove i medrese te proglasio *Novi ustav*, čime je započela preobrazba Turske u sekularnu državu.

▼19 Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb ibn Sulaymān al-Tamīmī (1703–1792) je bio islamski učenjak, teolog, propovjednik, aktivista, vjerski vođa, reformator i teolog u Nedždu, u centralnoj Arabiji. Nastojao je oživjeti i pročistiti islam od onoga što je smatrao neislamskim narodnim vjerskim novotarijama i običajima vraćajući se na ono što je na temeljnim načelima islamske religije. Njegova djela su općenito bila kratka, puna citata iz Kur'ana i *Ḥaditha*, kao što je njegova glavna i najistaknutija teološka rasprava, *Kitāb al-tawḥīd* („Knjiga o monoteizmu“).

▼20 Rasprave o idealnim državama dobivaju oblik ovisno o vremenu nastanka. Platonova Država potječe iz razdoblja društvenog



ILLUSTRATION ~ Unknown Anonymous Greek artist, *Portrait of Sultan Mahmud II enthroned*. Istanbul, beginning of the 19th century.
 ILUSTRACIJA ~ Nepoznati anonimni grčki umjetnik, *Portret sultana Mahmuda II na prijestolju*. Istanbul, početak 19 stoljeća.

Therefore, we are confronted here with another essential difference between utopian thought in Europe and utopian-*tūbāwiyya* thought among Muslims. ▼¹⁵ Namely, Europe had no choice but to go through the essential catharsis of its dark medieval past, which is rightly called the "dark age", followed by the "bright age" or the Enlightenment, while for Muslims that time was and remains the "bright age" of Muslim history, which has become "dark" due to the colonization of the area, where Muslims felt safe and prosperous. For both of these great crises in Muslim history, one had to blame someone other than the colonizers themselves, for the Baghdad the Mongols and for Istanbul the Europeans, but also to find a savior who knew the way back to the lost place, where victory and glory awaited the Muslims. In this process of looking for the "culprit" and "savior" to get out of the crisis, a process that takes a long time, it is easier for some to find the culprit than the savior.

One of these culprits is Imam Abū Maṣṣūr al-Maturīdī, who was known to the great *ulamā*' of Samarkand in the tenth century as: '*Imām al-hudā*', '*Alam al-hudā*', '*Imām al-mutakallimīn*', '*Musaḥḥiḥ 'aqā'id al-muslimīn*', '*Ra'īs ahl al-sunnah*'.

▼¹⁵ Discussions about ideal states take shape depending on the time of their creation. Plato's State originates from the period of social disintegration after the Peloponnesian War. Therefore, its sharpness is probably partly caused by the hopeless circumstances that Plato witnessed. From Aristotle we learn about utopia, which was described by Hippodamus of Miletus, a great architect, urban planner and sociologist. He realized that a city can be more than just a group of houses, squares and temples, so he began to deal with the issue of social order. The period of disorder and violence of Thomas More, who laid the foundations for his imagined state, is similar to Plato's testimony. Utopia was a bridge by which he tried to connect the order of the Middle Ages with the new customs of the Renaissance. The utopia of the Renaissance authors arose from the great contrast of new possibilities on the other side ocean and the conditions that accompanied the collapse of the economy of medieval cities. As Plato's State, they tried to deal with the problem of transition.

Compare, Mumford, Lewis: *History of Utopia*. Publishing house Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb, 2008, p.10; Fourier, Charles: *Civilization and the new social world*. School book, Zagreb, 1980, p.159.

kroz suštinsku katarzu svoje mračne srednjovjekovne prošlosti, koja se s pravom naziva "mračnim dobom", nakon čega slijedi "svijetlo doba" ili „prosvjetiteljstvo“, dok je za muslimane to vrijeme bilo i ostalo "svijetlo doba" muslimanske historije, doba koje je postalo "mračno" zbog kolonizacije područja, gdje su se muslimani osjećali sigurno i prosperitetno. Za obje ove velike krize u muslimanskoj historiji trebalo je okriviti nekog drugog osim sâmih kolonizatora, za Bagdad Mongole a za Istanbul Evropljane, ali i pronaći spasitelja, koji je znao put nazad na izgubljeno mjesto, gdje muslimane čeka izgubljena slava. U ovom procesu traženja "krivca" i "spasitelja" za izlazak iz krize, procesu koji dugo traje, nekima je lakše pronaći krivca nego spasitelja.



ILUSTRACIJA – Bagdad: psihološki danak najnapadanijeg grada na svijetu. Ilustracija iz Jami al-Tawarikh Rashida al-Dina prikazuje Hulagu Khanove snage kako jurišaju na Bagdad 1258.

rasula nakon Peloponeskog rata. Stoga je njena britkost vjerojatno dijelom uzrokovana beznadnim prilikama kojima je Platon svjedočio. Od Aristotela saznajemo o utopiji, koju je opisao Hipodam iz Mileta, veliki arhitekt, urbanist i sociolog. Shvatio je da grad može biti više od puke skupine kuća, trgova i hramova, pa se počeo baviti i pitanjem društvenog poretka. U sličnom s Platonovim svjedočenjem je i razdoblje nereda i nasilja Thomasa Morea, koji je napravio temelje za svoju zamišljenu državu. *Utopija* je bila most kojim je pokušao spojiti poredak srednjeg vijeka s novim običajima renesanse. *Utopija* renesansnih autora nastala je iz velikog kontrasta novih mogućnosti s druge strane okeana i uvjeta, koji su pratili slom gospodarstva srednjovjekovnih gradova. Kao i Platonova *Država*, pokušavali su izaći na kraj s problemom tranzicije.

Uspoređi, Lewis Mumford: *Povijest Utopija*. Naklada Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb, 2008., str.10.; Charles Fourier. *Civilizacija i novi socijetarni svijet*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1980., str.159.

But after more than a millennium (1108 H, 1075 M) this honorary title of Imam al-Māturīdī was annulled by Abū Abdullah Shamsuddin bin Muḥammad Ashraf (1420), known as al-Shams al-Salafī al-Afghānī of Pashtun. Namely, al-Shams al-Salafī decided to study ‘*aqīda*’ of Imam al-Māturīdī, which seemed to him corrupt and inappropriate to ‘*aqīdat al-salaf*’. I am not omitting the attribute of *al-ṣālih* here, but it is al-Shams al-Salafī, who obviously believes that the term “*al-salafī*” means everything, especially that you are the only saved group (*al-firqah al-nājiyah*) under that name and that, therefore, you should be against (*al-* who are not *Salafis* in the al-Shams al-Salafī al-Afghani way. It does not matter whether you are *al-ṣālih* or not. What matters is that you are *Salafi* in accordance to the al-Shams al-Salafī al-Afghani’s mind. He wrote his master’s thesis at the Islamic University of



ILLUSTRATION ~ Baghdad: the psychological toll of being the world’s most attacked city. An illustration from the Jami al-Tawarikh by Rashid al-Din shows Hulagu Khan’s forces storming Baghdad in 1258.

Medina in 1989 under the working title: “The attitude of the Al-Māturīdiyya on the *tawḥīd* of God’s names and attributes”).^{▼ 16} One would have hoped to learnt about the great representatives of the *Ahl-i Sunni-Jama’ah*, the Imam al-Māturīdī, who for some reason was neglected in the ‘*aqā’id*’ dispute, where the Ash’arite ‘*aqā’id*’ school predominated, but al-Shams al-Salafī experiences a kind of Copernican turn, so that correct becomes incorrect in his mind, and what was considered good becomes bad. Then, al-Shams al-Salafī changed the working title of

^{▼16} See, Shams al-Salafī al-Afghānī: ‘*Adā’ al-Māturīdiyya li al-‘aqīda al-salafīyya*, 3 vols. (al-Ṭā’if : al-Ṣa’īq, 1419/1998), I: 39.

Jedan od tih „krivaca“ je Imām Abū Maṣṣūr al-Maturīdī iz Samarkanda, koji je zaslužen dobio počasne titule: *‘Imām al-hudā’*, (Vođa pravoga puta); *‘Alam al-hudā’* (Znak za pravi put); *Imām al-mutakallimīn* (Čelnik muslimanskih teologa); *‘Musahḥiḥ ‘aqā’id al-muslimīn’* (Obnovitelj muslimanskih doktrina); *‘Ra’īs ahl al-sunnah’* (Glava sunnitskog islama).



ILLUSTRACIJA – Imām Abū Maṣṣūr al-Maturīdī (853-944.) se smatra jednim od pionira islamske jurisprudencije i kuranske egezeze.
ILLUSTRATION – Imām Abū Maṣṣūr al-Maturīdī (853-944) is considered one of the pioneers of Islamic jurisprudence and Qur'anic exegesis.

Naime, nakon više od jednog milenija, tačnije hiljadu sto osam godina po *Hidžri* i hiljadu sedamdeset pet godina po *Milādu*, ove počasne titule Imāma al-Māturīdīja pokušao je, iz čiste pakosti, poništiti Abū Abdullah Šamsuddīn bin Muḥammad Ašraf, poznat kao al-Šams al-Salafī al-Afghānī od Paštuna. On je odlučio proučiti *‘aqīdu* Imāma al-Māturīdīja, koju je zatim ocijenio krivom i neprikladnom za *‘aqīdat al-salaf*. Ovdje izostavljam atribut *al-ṣāliḥ* jer al-Šams al-Salafī vjeruje da je izraz "*al-salafī*" dovoljan da znači da je neko u „spašenoj grupi“ (*al-firqaḥ al-nādžiyah*) te da, prema tome, treba da bude protiv onih koji nisu *al-salafī* na al-Shams al-Salafī al-Afghānījin način. Stoga, nije važno da li je neko *al-ṣāliḥ* ili nije *al-ṣāliḥ*. Ono što je važno je da ima oznaku „*al-salafī*“, kako misli al-Šams al-Salafī al-Afghānī, koji je napisao svoj magistarski rad na Islamskom univerzitetu u Medini 1989. god. pod radnim naslovom: *Stav al-Māturīdiyya o tawḥīdu Božijih imena i atributa*.^{▼21} Neko bi se mogao ponadati

▼21 Vidi, Šams al-Salafī al-Afghānī: *‘Adā’ al-Māturīdiyya li al-‘aqīda al-salafīyya*. 3 toma, al-Ṭā’if, al-Ša’iq, 1419/1998), I: 39.

his master's thesis to the official title: *Enmity of the Al-Māturīdiyya towards the Salafī aqīda - their history and madhhab on Divine attributes*.

The logic is clear: if you don't have an enemy, invent it. That is how al-Shams al-Salafī does it. In three large volumes, each of 600 or more pages, al-Shams al-Salafī exposes the mockery of Imam al-Māturīdī, his disciples and followers, of whom Muhammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī (1879–1952) is his favorite target because, as al-Shams al-Salafī says, al-Kawtharī^{▼17} was the restorer (*mujaddid*) of the Imam al-Māturīdī school.^{▼18}




ILLUSTRATION ~ Some of the critical views on the work of Imām Abū Maṣṣūr al-Maturīdī - Cover of al-Maturīdī's *Tafsiḥ*.
 ILUSTRACIJA ~ Neki od kritičkih pogleda na djelo Imāma Abū Maṣṣūra al-Maturīdīja - Naslovnica knjige al-Maturīdījinog *Tafsiḥa*.

Al-Shams al-Salafī is not only biasedly incorrect against Imam al-Māturīdī, but he is much more aggressively biased in praising himself because all failed in defending the *Salafī aqīda* except him, who was chosen and called to defend the *Ummah* from the dangers of those who are called to defend Muḥammad's (a.s.) *Shir'ah* Norm and *Minhāj* the Way of life, but they are not doing so. They are, Al-Shams al-Salafī claims, more dangerous than all, even more than Jews and Christians, who are not concerned with *al-'aqīda* among Muslims. The fight against the *al-bid'at fī al-'aqīdah*, as seen by al-Shams al-Salafī, is more important and valuable than *jihād* itself and that is why he left the *jihād* in Afghanistan and came to Medina to write his master's thesis against the al-Māturīdī *aqīda*,

▼17 Muḥammad Zāhid b. Ḥasan al-Kawtharī (1879–1952) was an aide to the last Sheikh-l-Islam of the Ottoman Empire, He was a polymath.

▼18 *Ibid*, p. 20.

da bi to mogla biti ozbiljna studija o *ehl-i sunnitskoj* ortodoksnoj teologiji u misli i djelu velikog vođe Pravoga Puta za muslimane, Imāma Abū Manšūr al-Maturīdije iz Samarkanda, koji je, iz nekog razloga, bio zanemaren u *'aqā'idskim* raspravama, gdje je prevladavala *aš'aritska 'aqā'idiska* škola.^{▼22} No, al-Šams al-Salafī doživljava neku vrstu kopernikanskog obrta, tako da u njegovoj glavi to što je oduvijek u mātūrīdiskoj školi bilo i ostalo ispravno postaje neispravno, a ono što je oduvijek bilo i ostalo dobro i korisno postaje loše i štetno. Zbog toga, al-Šams al-Salafī mijenja radni naslov svog magistarskog rada u službeni naslov: *'Adā' al-mātūrīdiyya li al-'aqīdah al-salafīyyah - al-mātūrīdiyya wa mawqifuhum min tawhīd al-'asmā' wa al-ṣifāt* („Neprijateljstvo al-mātūrīdita prema selefijskoj *'aqīdi* (teološkoj doktrini) - njihov stav o jadroci Božjih imena i atributa“).

Logika je jasna: ako nemaš neprijatelja, izmisli ga. Tako to radi al-Šams al-Salafī. U tri velika toma, svaki od 600 ili više stranica, al-Šams al-Salafī izlaže ruglu Imām al-Mātūrīdija, kao i njegove učenike i sljedbenike, od kojih mu je Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī^{▼23} omiljena meta jer je, kako kaže al-Šams al-Salafī, bio obnovitelj (*mudžaddid*) škole Imām al-Mātūrīdija.

Al-Šams al-Salafī ne samo da je pristrasno netačan protiv Imām al-Mātūrīdija, već je mnogo agresivnije pristrasan u hvaljenju samog sebe jer niko nije uspio obraniti *selefijsku 'aqīdu* (dogmu) osim njega. On smatra da je pozvan da brani muslimanski *ummet* od opasnosti onih, koji su dužni da brane Muḥammedov (a.s.) *Šir'ah* (Normu) i *Minhādž* (Način života), ali oni to ne čine. Oni su, tvrdi al-Šams al-Salafī, opasniji i od Jevreja i od kršćana jer se ne brinu o stanju *'aqīde* među muslimanima. Borba protiv *'aqīdat bid'ata* (izmišljene dogme u vjeri) je važnija i vrjednija od samog *džihāda*. Zato je al-Šams al-Salafī al-Afghānī napustio *džihād* u Afganistanu i došao u Medinu da napiše svoj magistarski rad protiv *'aqīde* Imāma al-Mātūrīdije, kao najviši čin *īmān*/vjere u borbi protiv sablasti mātūrīdijske *'aqīde*, koja kruži nad muslimanima.

Dakle, ova najnovija kriza među muslimanima liči na krizu Ibn Taymiyya i Muḥammada bin 'Abd al-Wahhaba, ali je posebna po tome što je samo-iznuđena ili samo-promovirana kao unutrašnja kriza uma i motiv individualnih ili grupnih interesa u distribuciji naslijeđenog duhovnog blaga ili puteva do izvora ili vrela čiste i vječne riječi Božje, puteva koje interesne grupe međusobno blokiraju tako da svi ostaju i bez otvorenog puta i bez jasnog cilja ka obećanom spasenju. Zaista, bila je plemenita ideja 1960-ih godina časnih muslimanskih kraljeva, vladara i učenih umova da se osnuju tri referentna islamska univerziteta za obuku mladih ljudi, zasnovanih na autentičnoj islamskoj sunnitskoj nauci

▼22 Abū al-Ḥasan al-Aš'arī (873-936) se smatra jednim od tri muslimanska teologa, koji su integrirali i sistematizirali racionalističku metodologiju u teološku misao islama. Druga dvojica su Imām Abū Manšūr al-Maturīdī i Imām Abū Ja'far al-Ṭahāwī (843- 933). Iako među njima samima nije bilo nikakvog rivalstva, njihovi kasniji učenici i sljedbenici su često vodili polemiku između samih sebe o njihovom navodnom rivalstvu, naročito između *aš'aritske* i mātūrīdijske škole unutar *ehl-i sunnitske*-ortodokne teologije, poput polemike, koju vodi Šams al-Salafī al-Afghānī.

▼23 Muḥammad Zāhid b. Ḥasan al-Kawtharī al-Hanefī al-Ash'arī al-Naqshbandī (1879-1952), bio je pomoćnik *šeykhu-l-islam* Mustafi Sabriju, posljednjeg *šeykhu-l-islam* Osmanske carevine i glavni hanefijski pravnik, kojeg je hvalio Imām Muḥammad Abū Zahrah u Egiptu, kao obnovitelja (*mudžaddida*) četrnaestog stoljeća islama.

as the highest act of *īmān/faith* for the specter of a guilty '*aqīda*' haunting over Muslim heads. This latest crisis among Muslims bears a resemblance to the crises of Ibn Taymiyyah and Abdul-l-Wahhābi, but it is special in that it is self-extorted or self-promoted as an internal crisis of mind and motive of individual or group interests in the distribution of inherited spiritual treasures or paths to springs or springs of the pure and eternal word of God, paths that interest groups block from each other so that all remain both without an open path and without a clear goal to the promised salvation. It was, indeed, a noble idea in the 1960s from noble royal and *ulamā'* minds to raise three reference Islamic universities to train young people based on authentic Islamic Sunni science from the Qur'an and Sunnah in Saudi Arabia, Medina; Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur; and Nigeria, Abuja. ▼¹⁹

Two projects have become successful: in Kuala Lumpur and in Medina. ▼²⁰ Many of our Bosnian students also studied at the Islamic University in Malaysia and Medina. Many of them today occupy important positions in our state and society. The Islamic theological school could not, and never will be reduced to only one Path to the source or fountain of the pure and eternal word of God, but the idea of *Tawhīd*, defined for each of you the Norma (*Shir'ah*) and the The way of life (*Minhāj*), to remain forever the same alive, as Medina will remain forever *hudā* and *nūr* for all Muslims and for all followers of Imam al-Māturīdī:

May Allah's mercy be upon him, his disciples,
his followers and all who read his noble ideas of *Tawhīd*.



▼¹⁹ In the wake of realizing the impacts left by colonialization, modernity and globalization, Islamic scholars have been continuously putting on their efforts to address the issues of contextualizing Islam in the waves of emerging novel ways of thinking and perspectives. Muslim scholars since Muhammad 'Abduh had been looking for the ample approach to accommodate the modern thoughts within the boundaries of Islamic teachings resulting idea in the 1960s three reference Islamic universities to train young people. Although the real measurement for success of such approaches in addressing the gap between the Islamic world and the West has not been duly agreed upon, the echoes of the calls from scholars to continue marching have been resonating well within the Islamic scholarly circles. More about Muhammad 'Abduh see, Adams, Charles Clarence: *Muhammad Abduh : Biography, in: Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, Volume 10, Taylor & Francis, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, 1933.

▼²⁰ The *Islamic Science University of Malaysia* or better known as USIM is a unique public university, offering double major academic programmes from a variety of fields that integrate the *Naqli* and *Aqli* knowledge. USIM is also the only public university where Islamization of knowledge is addressed in all its academic programmes, reviving the Islamic Renaissance. The *Islamic University of Madinah*, established in 1961, is a medium-sized men only Saudi Arabian higher education institution formally affiliated with the Islamic religion. University students may study *Sharia*, *Qur'an*, *Usul al-din* and *Hadith*, while non-native speakers may also study Arabic language. The university offers Bachelor of Arts, Master's and Doctorate degrees.

na temelju Kur'ana i Sunneta u Medini, Kraljevina Saudijska Arabija, u Kuala Lumpuru, Malezija i u Abudži, Nigerija. ▼²⁴

Dva projekta su postala uspješna: u Kuala Lumpuru i u Medini. ▼²⁵ Mnogi naši bosanski studenti su također studirali na Islamskom univerzitetu u Maleziji i Medini. Mnogi od njih danas zauzimaju važne pozicije u našoj državi i društvu. Islamska teološka škola se nije mogla, niti će se ikada moći svesti na samo jedan *Put ka izvoru ili izvoru čiste i vječne riječi Božije*, već je ideja *tawhīda*, definirana za svakog od nas/vas kao „Norma“ (*Šir'ah*) i „Način života“ (*Minhādž*), kako bi ostala živa i djelotvorna kao što će i Medina zauvijek ostati *hudā*, uputa, i *nūr*, svjetlo, za sve muslimane i za sve sljedbenike Imāma al-Māturīdija:

Neka je Allahova milost na njega, njegove učenike,
njegove sljedbenike i sve koji čitaju njegove plemenite ideje o *Tawhīdu*.



ILUSTRACIJA - Međunarodni univerzitet Al Madina u Maleziji.

ILLUSTRATION - Al Madinah International University in Malezija.

▼²⁴ U svjetlu shvaćanja utjecaja kolonizacije, modernosti i globalizacije, islamski učenjaci kontinuirano ulažu napore da se pozabave pitanjima kontekstualizacije islama u talasima novih načina razmišljanja i perspektiva koji se pojavljuju. Muslimanski učenjaci od Muhameda Abduha tražili su širok pristup kako bi moderne misli smjestili unutar granica islamskih učenja, što je rezultiralo idejom 1960-ih o tri referentna islamska univerziteta za obuku mladih. Iako stvarna mjera uspjeha ovakvih pristupa u rješavanju jaza između islamskog svijeta i Zapada nije propisno usaglašena, odjeci poziva učenjaka da se nastavi marš dobro odjekuju u islamskim naučnim krugovima.

Vidi, Charles Adams: „*Muhammad Abduh Biografija*“, *Islam i modernizam u Egiptu*. Tom 10, Taylor & Francis, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, 1933.

▼²⁵ Islamski naučni univerzitet Malezije ili poznatiji kao USIM je jedinstveni javni univerzitet, koji nudi dvostruke glavne akademske programe iz različitih oblasti koje integriraju *Naqli* i *'Aqli* znanje. USIM je također jedini javni univerzitet na kojem se islamizacija znanja bavi u svim svojim akademskim programima, oživljavajući islamsku renesansu. Islamski univerzitet u Medini, osnovan 1961. godine, je visokoškolska ustanova srednje veličine za muškarce u Saudijskoj Arabiji.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Madinah al Munawarah- Islamic University of Madinah.
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Madinah al Munawarah - Islamski univerzitet u Medini.



ILUSTRACIJA – Ši'izam i sunizam se u temeljnim stvarima vjere ne razilaze, tako da nikakve razlike ne postoje oko obavljanja hadža (mjesto i vrijeme mira i tolerancije), odnosno hodočašća muslimana u Mekku.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Shi'ism and Sunnism do not differ in fundamental matters of faith, so there are no differences regarding the performance of the *Hajj* (a place and time of peace and tolerance), or the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca.

II

U potrazi za **al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ** umjesto kvazi-selefijske ideologije

●
I deja *salafa* je plemenita. Jer, bez *salafa*, tj. autohtonih predaka, *khalaf*, tj., autohtonih potomci ne bi znali svoj pravi identitet zato što je identitet „kontinuitet pamćenja“, a pamćenje, posebno vjersko i duhovno, čuvaju *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, dobri i brižni preci. Dakle, *salaf*, odnosno preci kao paradigma *khalafah*, tj., potomaka, su nezaobilazni u definiranju i očuvanju unutrašnjeg i vanjskog identiteta *khalafah*, potomaka.

Dakle, niko nema monopol na *salaf* jer je to muslimansko zajedničko vlasništvo individualnog i kolektivnog identiteta kao „kontinuiteta pamćenja“ načela vjere, historije, sudbine, svrhe života i kao pamćenja prava na uspjeh ovdje i sada te na spas tamo i onda. Dakle, niko ne bi trebao biti otuđen od prava da se izjasni da pripada *salafu*, kao njegovim/njezinim duhovnim zakonitim precima.

Na osnovu ove premise, svi muslimani imaju pravo tvrditi da pripadaju dobrom naslijeđu dobrog *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, ali niko nema pravo da monopolizira ovu časnu titulu izopćenjem onih koji nisu u skladu s njihovim mišljenjem o određenim pitanjima, uključujući i ona mišljenja koja se odnose na razumijevanje samog značenja *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*. Ne postoji nijedan pravi muslimanski '*ālum*, učenjak, koji bi se svjesno odrekao svojih *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, „dobrih predaka“. Naprotiv, svaki savjesni i odgovorni muslimanski '*ālum*, učenjak, je bio a i sada je ponosan što pripada i slijedi put svojih časnih predaka, *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, vjerujući da se tako ubraja u grupu pravovjernih koju su spašeni (*al-firqah a-nādžiyah*).

Međutim, muslimanski učenjaci su danas suočeni sa kvazi-slafijskom ideologijom, koja teži da zatruje duh i tijelo originalnosti ideje *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, dobrog i pozitivnog sjećanja na *salaf*, kao srž muslimanskog identiteta. Zato nam je danas, potreban duh i um Imāma Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdīja, kao i duh al-Māturīdījevih učenika i sljedbenika iz prošlosti za rješenje sadašnjih duhovnih, intelektualnih i politička kriza muslimanskog *ummeta*.

Upravo je to što pokušavam u ovom radu – pokazati al-Māturīdījevu istinsku metodološku razradu sintetičke sunnitske teologije, kao i originalni epistemološki okvir za sintezu *Naql* (Tradicije) i '*Aql* (Razuma). Stoga, ovdje donosim u italiku izvode iz moje doktorske disertacije, koju sam obranio na Čikaškom univerzitetu pred uglednim profesorom Fazlur Rahmanom 1986. god. pod naslovom

II

In the Search of **al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ** Instead of the Quasi-Salafi Ideology

The idea of *salaf* is a noble one. For, without a *salaf*, i.e. the autochthon ancestors, the *khalaf*, i.e. the autochthon descendants would not know their proper identity because the identity is “a continuity of memory”, and the memory, especially religious and spiritual one is preserved by *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, the good and caring ancestors. Thus, the *salaf*, i.e. the ancestors as a paradigm of the *khalaf*, i.e. the descendants are indispensable in defining and keeping the *khalaf*'s internal and external identity.

Hence, no one has monopoly on the *salaf* as it is a Muslim shared property of individual as well as of collective identity as “the continuity of memory” of the tenets of faith, of the knowledge of history, of the sense of destiny, of the purpose of life and of the right to a success here in this world and to a salvation in the hereafter. Therefore, no one should be alienated from the right to identify himself/herself from belonging to the *salaf* as his/her rightful predecessors.

Based on this premise, we all as Muslims have the right to claim that we belong to the good heritage of the good *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, but no one has the right to monopolize this noble title by excommunicating those who are not in the line of his/her point of view about certain issues, including those opinions pertaining to the understanding of the very meaning of *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*. There is no genuine Muslim *‘ālum*, scholar, who alienated himself from *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*. On the contrary, every *‘ālum*, scholar was proud to claim that he followed the path of *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* and believed that he was part of *al-firqah a-nājiyah*, the saved group.

However, the Muslim scholars are confronted today with a *quasi-salafi* ideology, which tends to poison the spirit and body of the originality of the idea of *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, the good and positive memory of the *salaf* as the core of the Muslim identity. This is why we need today, as our remote ancestor, Imām Abū Maṣū‘ al-Māturīdī’s spirit and mind as well as the spirit of the al-Māturīdī’s of teachings, i.e. the Māturīdiyyah of the past for the solution of the present spiritual, intellectual and political crisis of the *Ummah*.

This is exactly what we are trying to do in this paper - to show the al-Māturīdī’s genuine methodological working out of a synthetic Sunni theology as well as an original epistemological framework for a synthesis of the *Naql* (Tradition) and *‘Aql* (Reason). Here I bring some extracts from my doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago

„Studija teologije Abū Mansūr al-Māturīdija”.^{▼26} Rezultat ove disertacije nije samo otkriće ortodoksne sunnitske teološke doktrine, koja dolazi zajedno sa al-'Aša'ri-jevom, kao i al-Ṭahawijevom sunnitskom teologijom, već je i smjernica za istinsku *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* teologiju protiv kvazi-*selefijske* ideologije. Ako je ova smjernica bila primjenjiva u prošlosti, to znači da može biti izvodljiva i u sadašnjosti. Razumijem da proučavanje naslijeđa duha i uma Imāma Abū Mansūra al-Māturīdija u Taškentu ima za cilj upravo to - promovirati sunnitsku teologiju *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* protiv kvazi-selefijske ideologije.



ILUSTRACIJA - Memorijalni kompleks Imama al-Maturidija na groblju Chokardiza ("Chokar" znači "vojska", "Disa" znači tvrđava) u Samarkandu. Veliki imam i poznati filozof i teolog borio se za čistoću islama.

ILLUSTRATION - The memorial complex of Imam al-Maturidi in the cemetery Chokardiza ("Chokar" means "army", "Disa" means a fortress) in Samarkand. The grand Imam and famous philosopher and theologian fought for the purity of Islam.

^{▼26} Mustafa Ceric: *Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam: A Study of the Theology of Abū Mansūr al-Māturīdī (d.333/944)*. ISTAC, Kuala Lumpur, 1995. Bosanski prijevod: *Korijeni sintetičke teologije u islamu: Abu Mensur el-Maturidi (853-944)*, El-kalem, Sarajevo, 1433/2012.

1986 titled “A Study of the Theology of Abū Maṣṣūr al-Māturīdī”.^{▼21} The result of this dissertation was not only a discovery of an orthodox Sunni theological doctrine, which comes along with al-Ashā’rī’s as well as al-Ṭahāwī’s Sunni theology, but also it is a guideline for a genuine *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* theology against the quasi-*slafī* ideology. If this guideline was workable in the past, it means that it can be workable at the present. I understand that the study of the legacy of Imām Abū Maṣṣūr al-Māturīdī’s spirit and mind in Tashkent is aimed at promoting exactly the Sunni theology of *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* against quasi-*slafī* ideology.



ILLUSTRATION – Stone inscriptions of Imam al-Maturidi's original ideas are located inside the Imam al-Maturidi Memorial Complex at Chokardiza Cemetery in Samarkand.

ILUSTRACIJA – Zapisi na kamenu originalnih ideja Imama al-Maturidija nalaze se unutar Memorijalnog kompleksa Imama al-Maturidija na groblju Chokardiza u Samarkandu.

^{▼21} Mustafa Cerić, *Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam: A Study of the Theology of Abū Maṣṣūr al-Māturīdī (d.333/944)*. ISTAC, Kuala Lumpur, 1995.

III

U svjetlu sinteze Imāma al-Māturīdija između **Naqla** i **'Aql**

1. Vjernička pokornost (**ṭā'ah**)

Premda ideja o vjerničkoj pokornosti (**ṭā'ah**) pretpostavlja tradicionalni pristup teološkim pitanjima, ona nije lišena razuma. Jer, čovjek mora imati razloge i za odanos tradiciji. U ranom je razdoblju islama misao o bezupitnoj pokornosti (**ṭā'ah**) bila prihvaćena, prvo, zato što se usmjerila na negaciju postojeće tradicije u Arabiji, i, drugo, što muslimanska zajednica još nije bila izložena ni unutarnjim nesuglasjima, niti spoljnim utjecajima. To se može objasniti činjenicom da su prve generacije u islamu vidjele hem obnavljanje zaboravljenog monoteizma hem dokidanje postojećih društvenih nepravdi. Živjeli su opravdano u nadi da će islam donijeti bolji život na ovom i osigurati sreću na budućem svijetu. Da bi se postigla ova dva cilja, trebalo je s vjerom i pokornošću prihvatiti viziju o boljem svijetu. Prema tome, već sama misao da islam dolazi iz autentičnog Božanskog izvora i da nudi drugačije i bolje pretrpostavke za jedan moralni i društveni sistem, bila je dovoljno snažna da je rana muslimanska zajednica bezupitno prihvati. Kada govorimo o ranom razdoblju islamske teologije kao pokornosti (**ṭā'ah**), mislimo na potpunu predanost muslimana teorijskim premisama islama, bez svjesnog propitivanja o mogućim logičkim proturječnostima. Ovo, međutim, ne znači potpunu iracionalnost, već radije prihvatanje stava da je razum nedostatan da objasni sva pitanja. Na temelju ove tvrdnje možemo objasniti i doktrinu imama Malika o suzdržanom i nepitajućem **bilā kajfa** načelu kojemu su sunnitski teolozi često pribjegavali kad god bi uvidjeli da nema racionalnog objašnjenja za određeno teološko pitanje. ▼²⁷

▼²⁷ Imām Mālik ibn Anas (711–795) je muslimanski *faqīh-mudžtahid*, samostalni pravnik i tradicionalni teolog. Rođen u Medini, Imām Mālik se uzdigao i postao glavni poznavatelj i prenositelj Poslanikovih *ḥadītha*, koje je nastojao primijeniti na "cijeli pravni život" kako bi napravio sistematsku metodu muslimanske jurisprudencije, koja se dalje širila. Njegovi suvremenici nazivaju ga "Imāmom Medine." Imām Mālikovi stavovi u oblasti jurisprudencije su bili veoma cijenjeni kako u njegovom životu, tako i kasnije, te je postao osnivač jedne od četiri škole sunnitskog prava.

Vidi, „*Malikije*“ J. Schacht, Enciklopedija islama. Drugo izdanje, (ur.) P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online. Dostupno na: <https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2>. Pristupljeno 21.5.2021.; Haddad, Gibril F.: *Četiri imama i njihove škole*. Muslim Academic Trust, London, 2007., str. 121.

III

In the Light of Imām al-Māturīdī's Synthesis of Naql - 'Aql Tensions

1. Faithful Obedience (ṭā'ah)

Although the idea of ṭā'ah (obedience) assumes the traditional or irrational approach to problems, in this case to religious or theological problems, it is not completely devoid of Reason. For one must also have a justification for adopting this traditional approach of ṭā'ah. In the case of the early stage of Islam, this ṭā'ah was adopted, first, second, because the community was not yet exposed either to internal conflict or external influences.

This first aspect may be further elaborated by the fact that the early Muslim generations saw in Islam both the resumption of primordial monotheism and, more importantly, the removal of old social injustice. They thus lived in the hope that Islam would provide a better life both here and in the hereafter. To attain either of these two goals, one had obediently to accept the new perspective because it comes not from immediate experience but was supposed to create one. Thus, on the one hand, the very idea that Islam came from authentic divine source, and, on the other, that it was different from the existing ethical, social and political system, had enough force to gain the total acceptance of the early Muslim community.

When we speak of the early stage of Islamic theology as ṭā'ah, we mean the total commitment of Muslims to the theoretical premises of Islam, without consciously questioning their implications or their possible logical conflicts. This, however, does not mean complete irrationality, but rather an acceptance of the idea that Reason is short of explaining everything. On the basis of this assertion we may explain Imam Malik's doctrine of *bilā kayf* (a non-committal or non-questioning) attitude to which the Sunni theologians often had recourse when they saw that there was no rational explanation for a certain theological proposition. ^{▼22}

^{▼22} Malik ibn Anas, reverently known as *al-Imām Mālik* (711–795) by Sunni Muslims, was an Arab Muslim jurist, theologian, and *ḥadīth* traditionist. Born in the city of Medina, Malik rose to become the premier scholar of prophetic traditions in his day, which he sought to apply to "the whole legal life" in order to create a systematic method of Muslim jurisprudence which would only further expand with the passage of time. Referred to as the "Imam of Medina" by his contemporaries, Malik's views in matters of jurisprudence were highly cherished both in his own life and afterwards, and he became the founder of one of the four schools of Sunni law, the Maliki.

Schacht, J.: *Mālik b. Anas*; in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Second Edition, (ed.) P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online. Available at:

2. Objašnjenje (*bajān*)

Sve dok nije postojao vidljiv sukob unutar muslimanske zajednice načelo vjerničke pokornosti (*ṭā'ah*) bio je i razumljiv i snažan. Međutim, kada je izbio niz konflikata unutar zajednice, to načelo je izgubio svoju prvobitnu snagu. Teško je bilo bespogovorno prihvatiti umorstvo halife Osmana, ▼²⁸ ravnodušno biti svjedokom bitaka kod Deve i na Siffinu, ▼²⁹ te pokorno prihvatiti tragične događaje na Kerbeli. ▼³⁰ Zajednica je nastavila svoj život, ali je morala naći *bejān* (interpretaciju) ovih događaja. To znači da je sada muslimanska zajednica stvarala svoju vlastitu tradiciju, svoju vlastitu povijest u kojoj su neki događaji bili nespojivi s temeljnim islamskim načelima. Nadalje, brzina ovih događaja nije ostavljala mnogo vremena za mirno prosuđivanje nego se tražio brz odgovor na teško pitanje: tko je kriv, a tko ispravan u ovim krvavim borbama, odnosno kakav je odnos između teorije i prakse u islamu. Prva reakcija na ovu dilemu došla je od haridžija koji su, revoltirani nepravdomšću Mu'avije i uznemireni neodlučnošću Alije b. Ebi Taliba, ▼³¹ proglasili obje strane krivima te prema tome izrazili isključivu teološku presudu da musliman koji počinu teški grijeh ne može više biti legitimnim članom muslimanske zajednice. To je, dalje, otvorilo put nizu drugih isključivih teoloških stajališta. Pojavljuje se glas murdžija koji je dodatno opteretio teologiju s političkim konformizmom naspram umejevićskog režima. Gore od toga bijaše pojava Abdullaha ibn Sebe' ▼³² koji proglasi 'Alī ibn Ebī Tālība kao inkarnacijom Boga.

Kao što je poznato, ekstremne su teološke grupe nestale tokom islamske povijesti posluživši ortodoksnj teologiji samo kao loš primjer. Dvije su različite grupe, međutim, preživjele kroz cijelu islamsku povijest i još se čvrsto drže svojih ranijih razlika: riječ je o **sunnitima** i **ši'itima**. **Sunniti** su uvijek predstavljale glavnu maticu muslimanske zajednice, dok su **ši'iti** uvijek tražili odgovarajuće mjestu u islamskom svijetu. I kao što su razvili svoju vlastitu političku misao, **ši'iti** su na isti način ustanovili i svoje vlastitu pravnu školu i svoje teološko učenje. Ovdje je, međutim, naša pažnja usmjerena na razvitak teološke misli kod **sunnita** više negoli kod **ši'ita**.

▼²⁸ Vidi, Wilferd Madelung: *Nasljedstvo Muhameda: studija o ranom kalifatu*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997., str. 135-138.; Humphreys, R. Stephen (ur.): *The History of al-Ṭabarī*. Tom XV, *Kriza ranog kalifata: Vladavina 'Uthmana, 644-656/H. 24-35*. SUNY serija u bliskoistočnim studijama. State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1990., str. 218.

▼²⁹ Bitka kod Šiffina vođena je 657. između 'Alija ibn Abī Ṭālība, četvrtog halifa i prvog šiitskog imama, i Mu'awija ibn Abū Sufjana, pobunjenog guvernera Sirije. Bitka je dobila ime po svojoj lokaciji *Šiffina* na obalama Eufrata.

▼³⁰ Događaji u Kerbeli odražava sukob dobrih i zlih, čestitih i pokvarenih ljudi, gdje su hazreti Husejn, unuk Božjeg Poslanika, i njegova obitelj ubijeni na pravdi Boga. To je, zasigurno, najveća tragedija, koja se dogodila među muslimanima poslije smrti posljednjeg Allahova Poslanika.

▼³¹ 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālīb (600-661) je bio rođak, zet i pratilac Poslanika Muhammeda, a.s.. Vladao je kao četvrti rašidunski halifa od 656. do njegovog ubistva 661. godine. U kasnijoj islamskoj filozofiji, posebno u učenja Mullā Šadre (1571-1640) i njegovih sljedbenika, 'Alijeve izreke i propovijedi sve su se više smatrali središnjim izvorima metafizičkog znanja ili "božanske filozofije".

▼³² 'Abd Allāh ibn Sabā' al-Ḥimyarī, bio je lik iz 7. stoljeća u islamskoj historiji povezan s grupom sljedbenika zvanim Saba'iyya. Prema sunnitskoj i šiitskoj tradiciji, 'Abd Allāh ibn Sabā' je bio jemenski Jevrej iz arapskog plemena Himyar koji je prešao na islam za vrijeme Osmanove vladavine.

2. Elucidation (*Bayān*)

As long as there was no noticeable internal conflict within the Muslim community, this *ṭā'ah* attitude was both justifiable and strong. But, when a series of conflicts erupted within the community, this collective *ṭā'ah* lost its previous rationale and strength. It was, for example, hard for all Muslims to accept unquestioningly the assassination of the caliph 'Uthman,^{▼23} to witness indifferently the battles of the Camel and *Ṣiffīn*,^{▼24} and to acquiesce obediently to the unfortunate events at Karbalā'.^{▼25} Nevertheless, the community had to continue its life, and, therefore, there had to be a *Bayān* (elucidation or justification) of these unpleasant events. That is to say, the Muslim community had by now created its own tradition, and some events were not compatible with the fundamental principles of Islam on which this tradition was based. Furthermore, the rapidity of these events left no time for calm reasoning or reflection, but required an immediate response to the difficult question as to who was wrong and who right in these bloody struggles or, what was the relationship between Islamic theory and practice. The first reaction to this dilemma came from the Kharijites, who, revolted by the injustice of Mu'āwiya and upset by the indecisiveness of 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib,^{▼26} proclaimed both parties wrong and, consequently, came up with the extreme theological judgement that a Muslim who committed mortal sin can no longer be regarded as a legitimate member of the Muslim community. This, in turn, opened a series of other extreme theological views. In counter-reaction to this Kharijite view came the stance of the Murijites, who, seeing the moral utopianism of the Kharijites, connected their theology with political conformism to the Umayyad regime. Worse than this Abdullah b. Saba'^{▼27} went so far as to proclaim 'Alī b. Ṭālib as incarnation of God.

<https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2>. Accessed 21.5.2021.; Haddad, Gibril F.: *The Four Imams and Their Schools*. Muslim Academic Trust, London, 2007., p. 121.

^{▼23} The situation worsened on Thursday, 16 June. As Uthman stood in his balcony, Niyar ibn Iyad Aslami, a companion of Muhammad, lectured him from outside and demanded his abdication. In response, one of Marwan's servants threw a stone killing Niyar. Outraged by Uthman's refusal to hand over the attacker, the rebels started preparations to attack. The next day, Friday 17 June, they attacked his house setting the doors on fire. Around the time of mid-day prayers, Uthman was alone inside the house. Some Egyptian rebels climbed the houses of the neighbors and then jumped into Uthman's. According to the account of al-Waqidi (d. 823), Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr held the beard of Uthman threatening to kill him. Uthman rebuked him and asked him to leave. Muhammad pierced his forehead with an arrow. However, in another report Muhammad desisted from killing Uthman after the latter reminded him of his father Abu Bakr. Muhammad then vainly tried defending him from the attackers.

Madelung, Wilferd: *The Succession to Muhammad : A Study of the Early Caliphate*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997., pp. 135-138.; Humphreys, R. Stephen (ed.): *The History of al-Ṭabarī*; in: *Volume XV : The Crisis of the Early Caliphate : The Reign of 'Uthmān, A.D. 644–656/A.H. 24–35*. SUNY Series in Near Eastern Studies. State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1990., p. 218.

^{▼24} The Battle of Siffin was fought in 657 between Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the fourth of the Rashidun Caliphs and the first Shia Imam, and Mu'awiya ibn Abī Sufyan, the rebellious governor of Syria. The battle is named after its location Siffin on the banks of the Euphrates.

^{▼25} The events of Karbala reflect the collision of the good versus the evil, the virtuous versus the wicked, and the collision of Imam Husayn (the head of virtue) versus Yazid (the head of impiety). Al-Husayn was a revolutionary person, a righteous man, the religious authority, the Imam of Muslim Ummah.

^{▼26} 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (600-661) was a cousin, son-in-law and companion of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, a.s.. He ruled as the fourth Rashidun caliph from 656 until his assassination in 661. In later Islamic philosophy, especially in the teachings of Mullā Ṣadrā (1571-1640) and his followers, 'Alī's sayings and sermons were increasingly regarded as central sources of metaphysical knowledge, or "divine philosophy."

^{▼27} 'Abd Allāh ibn Sabā' al-Ḥimyarī, was a 7th-century figure in Islamic history associated with a group of followers called the Saba'iyya. According to Sunni and Shia tradition, Abd Allah ibn Saba' was a Yemenite Jew from the Arab Himyar tribe who converted

U početku sunnizam je pretpostavljao politički pozitivizam prije negoli teološki sinkretizam ili islamsku ortodoksiju. U stvari, ovaj rani politički sunnizam razvio se da bi suzbio politički teokratizam ši'itizma. Na taj način svi oni koji su se protivili ši'itskom političkom teokratizmu smatrani su **sunnitima**. Tek kasnije, kada je pojam sunnizma podrazumijevao teološki sinkretizam u islamu, može se govoriti o pojmu islamske ortodoksije kojom se želilo razlikovati pravo od krivog vjerovanja unutar kruga političkog sunnizma.

U stadiju **bejāna** najviđenija ličnost koja se zalaže za umjerenost u teologiji bio je Ebu Hanifa,^{▼33} osnivač jedne od četiriju pravnih škola u islamu. On nije samo važan za nas zbog učitelj-učenik odnosa između njega i Maturidija, već i zato što je vjerovatno bio jedini u tom razdoblju koji se ozbiljno bavio teološkim pitanjima. U stvari, Ebu Hanifa je iza sebe ostavio više teoloških knjiga i traktata nego itko od njegovih suvremenika. Pet je njegovih teoloških traktata sačuvano:

- ◆ *el-Fiqh el-Ekber*
- ◆ *el-Fiqh el-Ebsaṭ*
- ◆ *Kitāb el-‘Ālim we el-Mute‘allim*
- ◆ *Risālah ilā ‘Uthman el-Battī*
- ◆ *el-Waṣiyyah*

O porijeklu ovih traktata koji se pripisuju Ebu Hanifi ima određenih neslaganja. Primjerice, Wensinck misli "... da djelo *el-Fiqh el-Ekber* zastupa poglede ortodoksije iz sredine osmog stoljeća naše ere o tadašnjim istaknutim dogmatskim pitanjima te da sadrži rasprave o **hardžitima**, **ši'itima** i **kaderitima**, ali ne i o **murdžitima** niti o **mu'tezilitima**".^{▼34} Ebu Hanifina teologija imala je, takorekavši, cilj naći umjereniji i sadržajniji teološki put, te suzbiti djelovanje isključivosti haridžita, ši'ita, kaderita, džebrita i njima sličnih. Njegova teologija nije još racionalna jer nema razrađena pravila o teološkom razmišljanju. Ali ona nije više ni **tā'ah** teologija jer sadrži izvjesne teološke prosudbe koje se temelje na ljudskom iskustvu prije nego li su inspiracija Božjom Objavom.

Zato u islamskoj teologiji etapu **bejāna** mi nazivamo ono povijesno razdoblje kada su muslimanski teolozi odgovarali na neposredne izazove svoga vremena s namjerom da onda odbace ili opravdaju određena djela i aktivnosti iz prošlosti. Ova "teologija interpretacije" je u svom postupku imala racionalnih elemenata, ali je još daleko od toga da bismo je mogli nazvati racionalnom u punom smislu te riječi.

^{▼33} Nu'mān ibn Thābit ibn Zūṭā ibn Marzubān, poznatiji po svojoj **kunji**, nadimku, Abu Ḥanifa (699–767), bio je perzijski sunnitski teolog i pravnik, koji je postao istoimeni osnivač hanefijske škole sunnitskog prava, koju su Veliki Seldžuci, naročito, štivali i širili. Kao pripadnici osmanlijskog kulturno-civilizacijskog kruga, muslimani, Bošnjaci, u Bosni, slijede Imāma Abū Ḥanīfu u pravu i Imām al-Māturīdiju u teologiji. Motiv za to je pravno učenje Imāma Abu Ḥanife, koje se temelji na Kur'an, autentičnoj predaji Poslanikovog **Ḥadītha**, konsenzusu muslimanske zajednice (**idžmā'**), analogiji ili logičkom rasuđivanju (**qiyās**) te na pravnom diskreciji (**istiḥsān**) i običajnom pravu lokalnih zajednica (**'urf**).

^{▼34} A. J. Wensinck, *Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historic Development*. Franck Cass and Co. Ltd., 1932, str. 124. Više o prvom pitanju vidi, Ayyub 'Ali: *'Aqīdāt al-Islām wa al-Imām al-Māturīdī*, Bangladesh: al-Muassasa al-Islamiyya, 1983., str. 86-135.

A is well known; all these extremist groups disappeared in the course of Islamic history and have only served orthodox theology as bad examples. Two different groups within the realm of Islamic, however, have survived throughout the whole history of Islam and still hold fast to their early difference, namely, the **Sunnites** and the **Shi'ites**. The former has always represented the main stream of the Muslim community while the latter has always tried to be duly recognized and sometimes even to dominate. Just as the **Shi'ites** developed their own political philosophy, they evolved their own theological one as well. Here, however, our focus is on the theological development of the **Sunnites**, the majority part of the Muslim world, rather than the **Shi'ites**.

At first, the idea of the Sunnism implied political positivism rather than theological synthesis or Islamic orthodoxy. In fact, this early political Sunnism was developed to repel the opposition of the political theocrats of the Shi'ites. Thus, in this political sense of Sunnis, all groups that objected to the idea of the Shi'ite theocracy, such as the Muri'ites, Qadarites, Jabrites, and so on, were considered to be the Sunnites. It was only later, when Sunnism came to represent ideological or theological synthetism, that the term was reserved for Islamic orthodoxy as opposed to all extremist theological groups regardless of their political attitudes. At this point of the stage of **Bayān** in Islamic theology, the most visible figure of Islamic theological moderation of orthodoxy was Abu Ḥanīfah,^{▼28} the founder of one of the four main Islamic legal schools. He is not only important for us here because he probably was the only person at this stage who dealt seriously with theological problems. In fact, Abu Ḥanīfah left behind more books or tracts on Islamic theology than any of his contemporaries. Five of these tracts have been preserved, namely:

- ◆ *al-Fiqh al-Akbar*
- ◆ *al-Fiqh al-Absaṭ*
- ◆ *Kitab al-‘Ālim wa al-Muta’allim*
- ◆ *Risālah ilā ‘Uthmān al-Battī*
- ◆ *al-Waṣīyyah*^{▼29}

There are some questions as to the origin of these tracts which are ascribed to Abu Ḥanīfah. Wensinck thinks “...that it (*al-Fiqh al-Akbar*)^{▼30} represents the view of orthodoxy in the middle of the eighth century A.D. on the

to Islam during Uthman's reign.

^{▼28} Nu'mān ibn Thābit ibn Zūṭā ibn Marzubān, commonly known by his *kunya* Abū Ḥanīfa (699–767), was a Persian Sunni Muslim theologian and jurist who became the eponymous founder of the **Hanafi** school of Sunni jurisprudence, which has remained the most widely practiced law school in the Sunni tradition. The sources from which Abu Hanifa derived Islamic law, in order of importance and preference, are: the Qur'an, the authentic narrations of the Muslim prophet Muhammad (known as **ḥadīth**), consensus of the Muslim community (**ijmā'**), analogical reasoning (**qiyās**), juristic discretion (**istiḥsan**) and the customs of the local population enacting said law (**urf**).

^{▼29} Wensinck, A.J.: **The Muslim Creed**, Cambridge University Press, 1932.

^{▼30} See, al-Maghni'sāwī, Abu 'l-Muntahā: **Imām Abuḥ Ḥanīfa's Al-Fiqh al-Akbar Explained** (transl. Abdur-Rahman ibn Yusuf Mangera). With Selections from 'Ali al-Qari's Commentary Including Abu Hanifa's Kitab al-Wasiyya. White Thread Press, London, 2007. This translation of *Al-Fiqh al-Akbar* is an unprecedented contribution to the subject of **'aqida** in English. A lucid rendering, unhampered by sterile literalism,

3. *Nakl* - *'Akl* (sukob ili sinteza)

Puni razvoj islamske teologije dolazi s uvođenjem rafiniranije i sistematičnije elaborirane teološke metode. Opće uvjerenje je vladalo među islamolozima da racionalni put u islamskoj teologiji, kao i u drugim oblastima islamskih studija, upravo je rezultat uvođenja, iako indirektno grčke filozofije među intelektualni svijet islama krajem prvog islamskog stoljeća.^{▼35} Općenito, ova tvrdnja je tačna.

Međutim, mislim da bi muslimani, da čak nisu ni poznavali sve pojedinosti grčke filozofije, ipak imali određenu vrstu racionalnog poticaja u svom naukovnom pristupu-postupku. Jer islam, dakle, Kur'an i Poslanikov primjer, obiluju racionalnim premisama i racionalnim objašnjenjima. Naravno, islam je prvenstveno i iznad svega vjera, pa zato u svojoj strukturi sadrži određene bezuvjetne dogme. Međutim, za razliku od mnogih vjera, islam nije iracionalan u smislu da bi gušio Razum, pa makar i ne bio prevladavajuće racionalan u pitanjima čiste filozofije. Od svog početka islam je pretpostavljao određen stupanj racionalnosti što u fazi *tā'ah* nije ni bilo stvarno potrebno, pa se u razdoblju *bejāna* na tome nije dovoljno ni radilo.

Kao što je čest slučaj s bilo kojom religijom, tako je bilo i s islamom - došlo do sukoba između Razuma i Tradicije. Konflikt je zapravo izazvan od strane Razuma, a prvi njegovi eksponenti bile su *mu'teziliti*.³⁶ Oslanjajući se na racionalnu stranu islama i bivši pod utjecajem grčkih filozofa, oni su bili i prvi muslimanski mislioci koji su u Razumu tražili sve moguće odgovore na teološka i druga religiozna pitanja. Ovakav čisti racionaolizam *mu'tezilita* nije mogao proći a da ne izazove drugu stranu islama, čistu Tradiciju. Međutim, da nije u ovoj fazi bilo miješanja države u teološka pitanja koja se blagonaklono odnosila prema Razumu, ovaj prvi sukob između *naqla* i *'aqla* u islamu, vjerovatno, ne bi ni imao tako velik utjecaj na dalji razvoj islamske teologije. Pa ipak, i u ovom ogledanju između *naqla* i *'aqla* uvijek se našlo muslimana koji su mogli jasno prepoznati izvornu islamsku nakanu i ostvariti ravnotežu između Razumom i Tradicije, pokušavajući napraviti adekvatan sistem za postizanje ovog cilja.

Maturidi je u tom pogledu jedan od najboljih primjera, a kako će i pokazati naša studija, on je bio, svakako, jedan od najoriginalnijih ortodoksnih muslimanskih mislilaca tog ranog doba. Doista, Maturidi se, bez ikakvoga pretjerivanja, može smatrati najistaknutijim pravim osnivačem rane islamske ortodoksije. On je ne samo mogao uvijek održavati ravnotežu između Tradicije i Razuma, već je mogao pokazivati i vrijednost Tradicije i punu

▼³⁵ *Greek Sources in Arabic and Islamic Philosophy*. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, First published Mon Feb 23, 2009. Available at: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arabic-islamic-greek/>. Pristupljeno 24.3.2021.

▼³⁶ *Mu'tazilah*, ("Oni koji se povlače ili izdvajaju"). *Mu'taziliti* su poznati po svom principijelnom teološkom učenju: *Ahl al-'adl wa al-tawhīd* („Pristalice pravde (teodicije) i monoteizma“). Međutim, *mu'tazilijski* ultra-racionalizam u *kalāmu*, koji cvjeta u Basri i Bagdadu u 8-10. stoljeću nije prihvaćen kod ortodoksne muslimanske uleme, pa je taj teološki pravac vremenom izbljedio i postao primjer neprihvatljivog teološkog mišljenja u islamu.

then prominent dogmatic questions; and that it reflects the discussions of the Kharijites, Shi'ites and Kadarites, not those of the Muriji'ites, nor those of the Mu'tazilites."^{▼31} Our aim here is not to discuss Abu Ḥanīfah's theology per se, and the origin of his tracts, but rather to contend that they definitely represent his theological assertions and reflect, as Wensinck has rightly put it; "...the discussion of the Kharijites, Shi'ites, Kadarites, not those of the Mu'tazilites."^{▼32} That is to say, Abu Ḥanīfah's theology is aimed at finding a moderate or inclusive theological way and at repelling those extreme elements of the Kharijites, the Shi'ites, the Qadarites, the Jabrites and the like. It is not yet rational in the sense that it still lacks a definite system of reasoning, and it is no longer **Tā'ah** theology because it has in itself certain theological judgements which are based on human experience rather than merely inspired by the Scripture.

Therefore, by the stage of **Bayān** in Islamic theology we mean that period when the Muslim theologians were responding to the immediate challenges of their times with an intent either to condemn or to justify certain actions of the past. This "theology of elucidation" has rational elements in its procedure but is still far from the point to be called rational in the full sense of that term.

3. **Naql-'Aql** (Conflict and Synthesis)

Full development of Islamic theology came with the introduction of the more refined and more systematically worked out theological method. There is a general feeling among the students of Islam that the rational way in Islamic theology, and in other fields of Islamic studies as well, came as the result of the introduction, however indirect, of Greek philosophy into the intellectual world of Islam at the end of the first century of Islam.^{▼33} On the whole, this assertion, of course, is true. However, I think that even if the Muslims had not known all the details of Greek philosophy, there would still have been some sort of rational impulse in their system of learning. For, Islam, i.e., the Qur'an and the example of the Prophet, is full of rational premises and rational explanations. Of course, Islam is first and foremost a religion, it is not unconditional dogma. But unlike many religions, it is not irrational in the sense of suppressing Reason, although it is not overly rational in the sense of espousing pure philosophy. Therefore, from the very beginning, Islam had assumed a certain amount of rationality which in the stage of **Tā'ah** was not really needed and in the stage of **Bāyan** was not well worked out.

it draws on a number of commentaries to unlock a subject that has been largely inaccessible to in English. Combining Maghnisawi's basic commentary with copious notes carefully selected from 'Ali al-Qari's super-commentary and the entire *Kitab al-Wasiyya of Abu Hanifa*, this edition promises to be an essential guide on the intellectual and rewarding journey through Islam.


^{▼31} *Imām Abū Ḥanīfah's Al-Fikh al Akbar – Explained*, by Abū Muntahā al-Maghnisāwī, with Selections from 'Alī al-Qārī's Commentary, Including Abū Ḥanīfah's *Kitāb al-Waṣīyyah*, Compiled and Translated with an Introduction by Abdu-Rahman ibn Yusuf, White Thread Press, 2014.

^{▼32} *Ibid.*

^{▼33} *Greek Sources in Arabic and Islamic Philosophy*. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, First published Mon Feb 23, 2009. Available at: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arabic-islamic-greek/>. Accessed 24.3.2021.

snagu Razuma u kontekstu takve islamske Tradicije. Kao što je moguće vidjeti, mnoga pitanja koja se tiču ranog i kasnijeg razvoja islamske teologije do njegova vremena, pitanja za koja se misli da su otkriće suvremene učenosti, Maturidi je već formulirao u četvrtom (desetom) stoljeću.

Nesumnjivo, Maturidijev najvažniji doprinos islamskoj teološkoj misli jest njegova razrada ortodoksne teorije znanja. Značaj njegove teološke teorije znanja, mada je nisu uvijek u potpunosti priznali ni muslimanski kao ni nemuslimanski učenjaci, nije manji od značaja Šafijine teorijske okosnice islamskog prava. Štaviše, Maturidijeve znanstvene metode istraživanja, njegov smisao za temeljitu analizu, kao i njegov objektivni kritički um osigurali su mu mjesto među najozbiljnijim misliocima svih vremena. Kako je moguće vidjeti Maturidi se nije ustručavao bilo kojeg teološkog pitanja, nije se sustezao prihvatiti se bilo koje teške teme, nikad neseklon bilo kakvoj racionalnoj mogućnosti. ▼³⁷



ILUSTRACIJA - Sukob između Razuma i Tradicije, odnosno između *naqla* i *'aqla* u islamu - suniti i ši'iti još se čvrsto drže svojih ranijih različitih stavova.

ILLUSTRATION - The conflict between Reason and Tradition, that is, between *naql* and *'aql* in Islam - Sunni and Shi'iti still hold fast to their earlier divergent views.

▼³⁷ Tekstualni sadržaj koji je dat u ovom posljednjem (trećem) poglavlju preuzet je iz: Mustafa Cerić: *Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam: A Study of the Theology of Abū Mansūr al-Māturīdī (d.333/944)*. ISTAC, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, pp. 9-15. Bosanski prijevod: *Korijeni sintetičke teologije u islamu: Abu Mensur el-Maturidi (853-944)*, El-kalem, Sarajevo, 1433/2012, str 23-29.

** The textual content given in this last (third) chapter is taken from: Mustafa Cerić, *Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam: A Study of the Theology of Abū Mansūr al-Māturīdī (d.333/944)*. ISTAC, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, pp. 9-15.

As is often the case with any religion, so it was with Islam, too, that a conflict between Reason and Dogma has inevitably arisen. The first initiative of this conflict came on the part of Reason, and the first exponents of it were called the Mu'tazilites.^{▼34} Supported by the rational side of Islam and influenced by Greek philosophers, they were the first Muslim thinkers who saw in Reason all possible solutions for theological and other religious problems. This pure rationalism of the Mu'tazilites could not but provoke the other side of Islam, pure dogma. But probably, had it not been for interference by the state into the theological issues at this stage, which tipped the balance to favour Reason, this first conflict between *Naql* and *'Aql* in Islam would not have had such a great impact on the subsequent development of Islamic theology. Nevertheless, in this conflict of *Naql* and *'Aql* there were always those Muslims who were able to recognise the original Islamic intent and to maintain a balance between Reason and Dogma and who tried to work out proper system for realising that goal.

Al-Māturīdī is one of the best examples in this regard. In fact, as our study shows, he was one of the most original orthodox Muslim thinkers of the early period.^{▼35} Indeed, without any exaggeration, al-Māturīdī may be regarded as the most genuine founder of Islamic synthetic theology.^{▼36} He was not only able always to keep the balance between Tradition and Reason, but was also he was able to sow the validity of Tradition and the full strength of Reason within the context of that Islamic Tradition. As we shall see, many points concerning the early and later development of Islamic theology up to his time, points which are thought to be the discovery of modern scholarship, had already been made by al-Māturīdī in the fourth/tenth century.

Undoubtedly, al-Māturīdī's most important contribution to Islamic theological thought was his development of the Islamic theological theory of knowledge. The significance of his theological theory of knowledge, although not always fully recognized by either Muslim or non-Muslim scholars, is no less than that of al-Shāfi'i's theoretical framework of Islamic Law.^{▼37} Furthermore, al-Māturīdī's scientific way of research, his sense of thorough analysis, and his objective critical mind reserve for him a place among the most serious thinkers of all times. We will see that al-Māturīdī was not afraid of any theological question, was not reluctant to take up any difficult issue and was not disinclined to any rational possibility.**

▼34 *Mu'tazilah*, ("Those Who Withdraw, or Stand Apart") Engl. *Mutazilites*, also called *Ahl al-'Adl wa al-Tawhīd*, in Islam, political or religious neutralists; by the 10th century CE the term had come to refer specifically to an Islamic school of speculative theology (*kalām*) that flourished in Basra and Baghdad (8th-10th century).

▼35 See, Cerić, Mustafa: *A Study of the Theology of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī...*, p. X

▼36 See, al-Maturidi, Abu Mansur (book ascribed): *al-'Aqa'id*. ms. Dar al-Kutub al-Masriyyah, No. 147, Aqa'id Taymur.; al-Maturidi, Abu Mansur: *Kitāb al-Tawhīd*. Eited by Fathalla Kholeif, Dar al-Mashriq, 1970.; al-Maturidi, Abu Mansur: *Kitāb Ta'wilat Ahl al-Sunnah*. Ms. Dar al-Kutub al-Masriyyah, No. 873, Tafsir.; al-Maturidi, Abu Mansur: *Ta'wilat Ahla al-Sunnah*. (ed.) Ibrahim 'Awadain and Sayyid 'Awadain, vol. I, Cairo, 1391/1971.

▼37 Abū 'Abdillāh Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi'i (767–820), was an Arab Muslim theologian, writer, and scholar, who was one of the first contributors of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (*Uṣūl al-fiqh*). Often referred to as '*Shaykh al-Islām*', al-Shāfi'i was one of the four great Sunni Imams, whose legacy on juridical matters and teaching eventually led to the formation of Shāfi'i school of *fiqh* (or. *Madh'hab*).

See, Fadel, Mohammad: *The True, the Good and the Reasonable : The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law*. *Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence*. Vol. 21, No. 1, University of Toronto, 2008.; Khadduri, Majid: *Translation of al-Shāfi'i's Risāla – Treatise on the Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence*. Islamic Texts Society, United Kingdom, Cambridge, 2011., pp. 8, 11–16.

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OBNOVA GNOSTIČKE MISLI I NJEN UTJECAJ NA RAZVOJ ČOVJEKA

THE RESTORATION OF GNOSTIC THOUGHT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAN

Sažetak

Fenomen razvoja čovjeka doima se središnjim pitanjem u filozofskoj i religijskoj misli s ciljem prevladavanja stanja moralne degradacije u kojoj se sam čovjek našao. U tom kontekstu, gnostička je misao predstavljala jedan od inovativnih načina čitanja preko kojeg su njeni promotori ponudili obrazovnu alternativu za izbavljenje čovjeka iz situacije moralnoga posrnuća i stanja sukoba civilizacija među narodima. Nameću se sljedeća pitanja: Koji su uslovi za izgradnju i razvoj čovjeka sadržani u gnostičkoj misli? I kako gnoza može predstavljati jednu vrstu intelektualne i odgojne škole koja čovjeka spašava od vrijednosne degradacije nastale usljed materijalističkog diskursa koji kontrolira ljudsku slobodu, ograničava horizont njegova mišljenja i sužava prostore suživota i saradnje?

Ključne riječi: *gnoza, misao, čovjek, odgoj, tolerancija*

Abstract

The phenomenon of human development seems to them the central question of philosophical and religious thought with the aim of overcoming the state of moral degradation in which man himself has found himself. In this context, Gnostic thought represented one of the more innovative ways of reading through which its promoters offered an educational alternative to delivering man from a situation of moral failure and a state of conflict of civilizations between nations. The following questions arise: What are the conditions for the construction and development of man contained in Gnostic thought? And how can gnosis represent a kind of intellectual and educational school that saves man from value degradation caused by the materialistic discourse that controls human freedom, limits the horizon of his thinking, and narrows the spaces of coexistence and cooperation?

Key words: *gnosis, thought, man, upbringing, tolerance*

OBNOVA GNOSTIČKE MISLI I NJEN UTJECAJ NA RAZVOJ ČOVJEKA^{▼1}

Postavljanje pitanja o gnozi označava dvojbu između dva kontradiktorna stava o ovom problemu. Prema jednom mišljenju, gnoza se smatra oblikom duhovne svijesti koja se povlači u sebe u potrazi za individualnim spasenjem. Prema drugom pak riječ je o uslovu za duhovnu stabilnost i temelju otpora i nacionalnog oslobođenja. Dakle, koji će nam vrijednosni i moralni kriterij pomoći da razjasnimo suštinu ovog problema, koji neprestano otvara brojna kulturna i ontološka pitanja? Da li je naša elita sposobna ponuditi jasnu teorijsku i praktičnu viziju gnoze koja će naciju spasiti od poniženja te je potaknuti da bude predvodnica svekolikog boljitka?

Svevišnji Allah kaže: *Da ovaj Kur'an kakvom brdu objavimo, ti bi vidio kako je strahopoštovanja puno i kako bi se od straha pred Allahom raspalo.*^{▼2} Al-Qurṭubī se pita: “Može li se porediti snaga srca i snaga planina?” Potom odgovara: “Uzvišeni je Bog opskrbio svoje sluge snagom kojom mogu podnijeti sve što im je On podario, a sve iz Njegove neizmjerne milosti.”^{▼3}

Sufijski diskurs nužno je pokrenuti prije negoli obnoviti ga. Dakle, najprije je potrebno da ga potvrdimo. Upravo se na samom početku treba tome posvetiti. I to samo zbog činjenice da “Kur'an više ističe djelovanje nego misao”,^{▼4} kako to kazuje filozof i pjesnik Muhammed Iqbal. Nauk *taṣawwufa* obiluje duhovnim i humanim vrijednostima koje vjernik želi prakticirati pokoravajući se i stremeci visinama. Vrijednosti su djelatne i ne evoluiraju. Istinitost, odgovornost, svjesnost, skrušenost i predanost bivaju istim u prošlosti, sadašnjosti i bit će takve u budućnosti. Međutim, kada ove vrijednosti postanu djelatne, one nadahnjuju ljudsko biće i potiču ga na vrijednosnu kreativnost te emocionalno i materijalno davanje u trenucima kada duh dosegne do najuzvišenijih horizonata, prevazilazeći dušu koja je sklona zlu, te onu koja sebe prekora kao i onu koja je spokojna, s nadom da će taj duh postati zadovoljan, a i Gospodar njime zadovoljan. Na ovaj se način vrijednosti iz *Ploče pomno čuvane* preobražavaju u iskonsku pokretačku snagu koja nastanjuje čovjekove krajnje dubine

^{▼1} Tekst je nastao na temelju jedne debate na online međunarodnom simpoziju u organizaciji *Central College of Islamic Sciences* na *Passion International Open University* u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama 31. 3. 2021. pod naslovom “Sufijski diskurs i pitanje obnove”.

^{▼2} *Sūrah al-Ḥaṣhr*, 21. āyat.

^{▼3} Al-Qurṭubī, Abū Abdullah Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Abī Bakr. *Al-Džāmi' liaḥkām al-Qur'ān wa al-mubayyin limā taḍammnahu min al-sunnati wa āy al-furqān*. Priredio Abdullah Ibn Abduhu al-Muḥsin al-Turkī. Fondacija "Al-Risāla", Vol. I; 2006. str. 9.

^{▼4} Iqbāl, Muḥammad. *Tadẓīd al-Fikr al-dīnī fī al-islām*. Prijevod na arapski Muḥammad Yusuf Adas, uvod napisala al-Šaymā' al-Damardāš al-'Aqālī, Dār al-Kitāb al-Maṣrī, al-Qāhirah, Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, Beirut, 2011., str. 9.

THE RESTORATION OF Gnostic THOUGHT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAN ▼¹

asking questions about gnosis marks a dilemma between two contradictory positions on this problem. In one opinion, gnosis is considered a form of spiritual consciousness that withdraws into itself in search of individual salvation. According to the second, it is a condition for spiritual stability and the foundation for resistance and national liberation. So, what value and moral criterion will help us clarify the essence of this problem, which constantly raises numerous cultural and ontological issues? Is our elite capable of offering a clear theoretical and practical vision of gnosis that will save the nation from humiliation and encourage it to be at the forefront of all prosperity?

Allah Almighty says: *Had We sent down this Quran upon a mountain, you would have certainly seen it humbled and torn apart in awe of Allah.*² Al-Qurṭubī asks: "Can the strength of the heart and the strength of the mountains be compared?" Then he replies, "The exalted God has provided His servants with the power by which they can bear all that He has bestowed upon them, all from His immense grace."³

The Sufi discourse must be initiated rather than renewed. So, first we need to confirm it. It is at the very beginning that you should devote yourself to it. And that only because of the fact that "the Qur'an emphasizes action more than thought",⁴ as the philosopher and poet Muhammed Iqbal puts it. The doctrine of *Taṣawwuf* abounds in spiritual and humane values which the believer wants to practice by obeying and striving for heights. Values are active and do not evolve. Truthfulness, responsibility, awareness, contrition, and devotion are the same in the past, present and will be in the future. However, when these values become active, they inspire the human being and encourage him to value creativity and emotional and material giving in moments when the spirit reaches the highest horizons, overcoming the soul that is prone to evil, and the one that reproaches itself as well as the one that is peaceful, with the hope that that spirit will become satisfied, and the Lord will be satisfied with him. In this way, the values from the *carefully guarded Tablet* are transformed into a primeval driving force that inhabits the deepest depths of man during the ceaseless battle in which man fights against himself and the yoke of his vanity. The driving force of

▼¹ The text was created on the basis of a debate at an online international symposium organized by the Central College of Islamic Sciences at Passion International Open University in the United States of America on March 31, 2021, under the title "Sufi discourse and the issue of renewal".

▼² *Sūrah al-Ḥaṣhr*, verse 21.

▼³ Al-Qurṭubī, Abū Abdullah Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Abī Bakr. *Al-Jāmi' li-aḥkām al-Qur'ān wa al-mubayyin limā taḍammahu min al-sunnati wa āy al-furqān*. Edited by Abdullah Ibn Abduh Al-Muhsin Al-Turki. Foundation "Al-Risāla", Vol. I; 2006. p. 9.

▼⁴ Iqbal, Muḥammad. *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-dīnī fī al-islām*. Arabic translation by Muḥammad Yusuf Adas; Introduction by al-Shaymā' al-Damardāsh al-'Aqālī, Dār al-Kitāb al-Maṣrī, al-Qāhirah, Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, Beirut, 2011, p. 9.

za vrijeme neprestane bitke u kojoj se čovjek bori protiv samog sebe i jarma svoje sujete. Pokretačka snaga robovanja, saznanja i *khilāfeta* na zemlji čini promišljanje o beskonačnom mogućim, pa čak i zbiljskim, jer, kako nam se prenosi od poslanika Muhammeda, a.s., „da ne govorite odveć previše, čuli biste ono što ja čujem“.⁵



ILLUSTRACIJA - Derviš koji sjedi, stranica albuma. Turska, 16. stoljeće. © Izraelski muzej, Jeruzalem - pristupni broj B69.0603.

ILLUSTRATION - A seated dervish, Album page. Turkey, 16th century. © Israel Museum, Jerusalem - Accession number B69.0603.

Pogrešno je nastojanje da se gnoza ograniči na isposničke niše. Cilj ovakvog razmišljanja jeste da se gnoza priguši ili da se u potpunosti zanemari kao vrelo nadahnuća i duhovne snage koje je predstavljalo polazište oslobodilačkih pokreta. U tom smislu treba podsjetiti da su prostori okupljanja tek kasarne za vojnike, stanovi za askete, samostani za pobožnjake, skloništa za učenike, škole za studente, učionice za učače Kur'ana i domovi za učitelje posvećene podučavanju. Strah od gnoze vjerovatno se i javlja

⁵ *Hadis* prenosi Ahmed.

slavery, knowledge and the *caliphate* on earth makes thinking about the infinite possible, and even real, because, as it is transmitted to us from the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, "if you did not speak too much, you would hear what I hear."⁵



ILLUSTRATION - Kamāl ud-Dīn Behzād Herawī, *Portrait of a dervish*, 1500 (Timurid Period). © Private Collection: Bichzd. S. 176.

ILUSTRACIJA - Kamal ud-Din Behzad, *Portret derviša*, 1500. (Timuridski period). © Privatna zbirka: Bichzd. S. 176.

It is wrong to try to limit gnosis to hermitage niches. The aim of this thinking is to muffle the gnosis or to completely ignore it as a source of inspiration and spiritual strength that will be the starting point of liberation movements. In this sense, we should recall that the gathering spaces are merely barracks for soldiers, dwellings for ascetics, a monastery for pious people, shelters for students, schools for students, classrooms for Qur'an reciters and homes for teachers dedicated to teaching. The fear of gnosis probably arises due to the fact that spiritual knowledge is

▼⁵ *Hadith* is narrated by Ahmed.

zbog činjenice da je duhovna spoznaja saobražena s problemima zajednice, koju oslobađa duhovnog i materijalnog izopačenja u kojoj se našla. Stoga se prvak produhovljenosti u islamu, naš učitelj Muḥammed, osamljivao u pećini *Hīrā'*. U tome su ga slijedili stanovnici sofe, za koje Ibn Haldūn kaže da "u doba Poslanika, a.s., nisu bili specifični po načinu *'ibādeta*, već su bili uzor *aṣḥābima* u *'ibādetu* i izvršavanju šerijatskih dužnosti",^{▼6} jer su u sjenovitom, stražnjem dijelu Poslanikove kuće u Medini napravili prostor za molitvu i noćni namaz, koji još uvijek postoji. „Oni su radosni zbog onoga što im je Allah od dobrote Svoje dao i veseli zbog onih koji im se još nisu pridružili, za koje nikakva straha neće biti i koji ni za čim neće tugovati.“^{▼7}

Naša arapska i islamska povijest pamti nekoliko sufijskih pokreta koji su saobrazili obrazovanje i odbranu domovina. „Ne smijemo zaboraviti ustanak šejha Seida el-Kurdiya en-Nakšibendija u Turskoj, borbu šejha Šamila en-Nakšibendija u Turkestanu, pokret Alemgira u Indiji, koji je rezultat nastojanja šejha el-Farukija el-Mudžeddidiya, te otpora senusija u Libiji i pokreta derviša u Sudanu“,^{▼8} koji je predvodio svoj narod u duhovnosti i odbrambeno-oslobodilačkoj borbi, te porazio svoje protivnike i izvojevao pobjedu za svoj narod „što [također] objašnjava izvanredan napredak idrisijske države u područjima koja su bila nepokorna čak i lokalnim vođama, ali su se predali toj duhovnoj moći koju su uživali istaknuti pojedinci, a koja je odigrala važnu ulogu u otvaranju puta mnogim šejhovima koji će kasnije predvoditi *ṭarīqat*“^{▼9} u zemljama Magreba.



ILUSTRACIJA - Šejh Seid el-Kurdi, šejh Šamil en-Nakšibendi i šejh el-Faruki el-Mudžeddidi.
ILLUSTRATION - Sheikh Seid al-Kurdi, Sheikh Shamil al-Nakshibendi and Sheikh al-Faruqi al-Mujeddidi.

▼6 Ibn Khaldūn, Abū Zayd Abdurraḥman ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad. *Šifā' al-sā'ili wa tahdhib al-masā'ili*. Ur. Muḥammad Muṭī' al-Ḥāfiz, Dār al-fikr al-Mu'āšir, Bairut, Dār al-fikr, Damask, 1996., str. 53.

▼7 *Sūrah Āl 'Imrān*, 170. āyat.

▼8 Ḥawwā' Sa'id. *Tarbiyatunā al-rūhiyyah*. Dār al-salām liṭṭibā'ah wa al-našr wa al-tawzī' wa al-tardžamah, 1999., str. 11.

▼9 Banabdullah, Abdulaziz. *Mu'allimah al-tašawwuf al-islāmī*. Dār našr al-ma'rtifah, al-Rabāṭ, al-Maghrib, 2011., Vol. I, str 90.

reconciled with the problems of the community, which frees it from the spiritual and material perversion in which it found itself. Therefore, the champion of spirituality in Islam, our teacher Muḥammed, secluded himself in the cave of *Hīrā'*. In this he was followed by the inhabitants of the sofa, for whom Ibn Khaldūn says that "at the time of the Prophet, peace be upon him, they were not specific in the way of worship, but were a model for the Companions in worship and performing *Sharī'ah* duties.",^{▼6} because in the shadowy, rear part of the Prophet's house in Medina they made a place for prayer and night prayer, which still exists. "They are rejoicing in Allah's bounties and being delighted for those yet to join them. There will be no fear for them, nor will they grieve."^{▼7}

Our Arab and Islamic history remembers several Sufi movements that assimilated education and defense of homelands. "We must not forget the uprising of Sheikh Seid al-Kurđi al-Nakshibandi in Turkey, the struggle of Sheikh Shamil al-Nakshibandi in Turkestan, the Alemgir movement in India, which is the result of the efforts of Sheikh al-Faruqi al-Mujeddidi, and the resistance of the Senusi in Libya and the dervish movement in Sudan",^{▼8} who led his people in spirituality and defensive-liberation struggle, and defeated his opponents and won victory for his people "which [also] explains the extraordinary progress of the Idrisian state in areas that were disobedient even to local leaders, but surrendered to that spiritual power enjoyed by prominent individuals, which played an important role in paving the way for many sheikhs who would later lead the *ṭarīqat*"^{▼9} in the Maghreb countries.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Theodor Horschelt, *Captured Shamil before the commander-in-chief Prince Bariatinsky on 25 August 1859.*

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Theodor Horschelt, zarobljen Šamil pred vrhovnim zapovjednikom princom Bariatinskim 25. avgusta 1859.

^{▼6} Ibn Khaldūn, Abū Zayd Abdurraḥman ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad. *Shifā' al-sā'ili wa tahdhib al-masā'ili*. Ed. Muḥammad Muṭī' al-Ḥāfīz, Dār al-fīkr al-Mu'āšir, Bairut, Dār al-fīkr, Damasq, 1996., p. 53.

^{▼7} *Sūrah Āl 'Imrān*, verse 170.

^{▼8} Ḥawwā' Sa'īd. *Tarbiyatunā al-rūhiyyah*. Dār al-salām liṭṭibā'ah wa al-našr wa al-tawzī' wa al-tarjamah, 1999., p. 11.

^{▼9} Banabdullah, Abdulaziz. *Mu'allimah al-taṣawwuf al-islāmī*. Dār našr al-ma'rifah, al-Rabāṭ, al-Maghrib, 2011, Vol. I, p. 90.

Duhovni autoritet svoje teoretsko i praktično ostvarenje pronalazi isključivo u okviru političke vlasti. Međutim, čini se da se spoj sufizma i politike podvodi u okvire nerazumijevanja vjere i devijantnog razmišljanja, dok je samo ishodište sufizma primarno političko, ekonomsko, društveno i odgojno-obrazovno. Dakle, sufizam je metoda, utjelovljena u čovjeku i svemu što ga se dotiče u kontekstu neizbježnog saobraženja duhovnog i svjetovnog autoriteta.

Lingvistički gledano, korijen riječi politika (*siyāsah*) dolazi od glagola upravljati i voditi (*sāse*). *Taşawwuf* u tom smislu upravlja vjernika u njegovom svakodnevnom životu, u duhovnoj i materijalnoj perspektivi. Riječ je, dakle, o nauku koji odražava splet moralnih i duhovnih vrijednosti koje oblikuju ljudski um i razmišljanje, te ga potiču da slijedi vrlinu i izbjegne pošast, ne samo na individualnoj razini već, također, i na razini predvodnika i *khalīfe*. Na ovom polju, naš šejh, purpurni dragulj, ▼¹⁰ počastio nas je svojim rukopisom „Božanske smjernice za boljitak ljudskog kraljevstva“, u kojem nam je predočio jasnu viziju politike i upravljanja. Ovaj je rukopis sadržajniji i dublji od knjige *Društveni ugovor* Žan Žaka Rusoa. ▼¹¹ Ruso je nastojao propitati sistem odnosa između društva i pojedinaca, te između države i pojedinaca, djelo „Božanske smjernice“ opisuje odnose između pojedinaca, države, vlasti te, naposljetku, odnos svih njih prema Stvoritelju ili Istini. To je ustav koji regulira komunikacijski odnos između Boga kao Istine i čovjeka kao stvorenja, jer upotpunjena vizija religije nije ograničena samo na čovjeka, nego uključuje egzistenciju kao takvu te sve ono što ona sadrži poput kamena, vune, zemlje, neba, zvijezda, planeta, palmi, pčela, konja, noći, usjeva i plodova. Egzistencija nas upućuje na Stvoritelja, a Stvoritelj nas upućuje na egzistenciju: *Znakovi su i u vama samima*. ▼¹² Otuda se javljaju teškoće u razumijevanju inkarnacije (*al-ḥulūl*) i transcendentnog jedinstva bitka (*waḥdat al-wudžūd*), te jedinstva duhovnog osvjedočenja (*waḥdat al-šuhūd*). „Kada jedan sufija kaže: 'Ne vidim ništa osim Boga', on je u stanju jedinstva duhovnog osvjedočenja, a kada kaže: 'U svemu što pogledam vidim Boga', on je u stanju transcendentnog jedinstva bitka“, ▼¹³ a el-Hallādž je kazao: „Nisam vidio ništa a da u tome nisam ugledao Boga.“ ▼¹⁴

Ne poričemo da je *taşawwuf* bio pod utjecajem nekoliko platonskih koncepata do mjere velike sličnosti i ispreplitanja ideja usljed razumijevanja islama kod drugih naroda s različitim religijama i običajima. Međutim, to ne poništava povijesnu ulogu *taşawwufa* i njegovu civilizacijsku vrijednost koja se nametnula muslimanima, pa i čovjeku općenito, kao što ne treba zanemariti moć *taşawwufa* da obnovi zajednicu, i otuda izgradi čovjeka na način da služi drugom čovjeku izbjegavajući pri tom svaku vrstu sukoba, ratovanja i isključivosti.

▼¹⁰ Jedna od titula Ibn Arebija koju su mu dodijelili njegovi sljedbenici.

▼¹¹ Žan Žak Ruso rođen je 1712., umro 1778.

▼¹² *Sūrah al-Dhāriyāt*, 8. āyat.

▼¹³ Si'rān, Šuhaib. *Muqaddimah fī al-taşawwuf*. Dār al-ma'rifah, Ṭab'ah al-'adhlūl, Damask, 1989., str. 83.

▼¹⁴ 'Abbās, Qāsim Muḥammad. *al-Ḥallādž: Al-a'māl al-kāmilah*. Maktabah al-iskandariyyah, 2002., str. 252.

Spiritual authority finds its theoretical and practical realization exclusively within the framework of political authority. However, it seems that the combination of Sufism and politics is plunged into the framework of misunderstanding of faith and deviant thinking, while the very origin of Sufism is primarily political, economic, social and educational. Thus, Sufism is a method, embodied in man and in everything that touches him in the context of the inevitable conformity of spiritual and worldly authority.

Linguistically speaking, the root of the word politics (*siyāsah*) comes from the verb manage and guide (*sāse*). *Taşawwuf* in this sense is governed by the believer and in his daily life, in a spiritual and material perspective. It is, indeed, a doctrine that reflects the tangle of moral and spiritual values that shape the human mind and thinking, and encourage it to follow virtue and avoid scourge, not only on an individual level but also at the level of a leader and *calif*. In this field, our sheikh, the purple jewel,^{▼10} honored us with his manuscript "Divine Guidelines for the Betterment of the Human Kingdom", in which he presented us with a clear vision of policy and governance. This manuscript is more substantive and deeper than the book *The Social Contract* of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.^{▼11} Rousseau sought to question the system of the relationship between society and individuals, and between the state and individual. The work "Divine Guidance" describes the relations between individuals, the state, authorities and, finally, the relationship of all of them to the Creator or the Truth. It is a constitution that regulates the communication relationship between God as the Truth and man as a being, because the complete vision of religion is not limited to man but includes existence as such and all that it contains such as stone, wool, earth, sky, stars, planets, palm trees, bees, horses, night, crops, and fruits. Existence points us to the Creator, and the Creator points us to existence: *The signs are also within you.*^{▼12} Hence the difficulties in understanding the incarnation (*al-ḥulūl*) and the transcendent unity of being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*), and the unity of spiritual conviction (*waḥdat al-shuhūd*). "When a Sufi says: 'I see nothing but God', he is in a state of unity of spiritual realization, and when he says: 'In everything I look at I see God', he is in a state of transcendent unity of being,^{▼13} and Al-Hallaj said, 'I saw nothing without seeing God in it.'^{▼14}

We do not deny that *Taşawwuf* was influenced by several Platonic concepts to the extent of great similarity and intertwining of ideas due to the understanding of Islam in other nations with different religions and customs. However, this does not nullify the historical role of *Taşawwuf* and its civilizational value imposed on Muslims, and even man in general, just as one should not neglect the power of *Taşawwuf* to restore the community, and hence build man in a way that serves another man while avoiding all kinds of conflict, warfare and exclusion.

▼10 One of the titles of Ibn Arabi which was assigned to him by his followers.

▼11 Jean-Jacques Rousseau was born. Is 1712, died 1778.

▼12 *Sūrah al-Dhāriyāt*, verse 8.

▼13 Si'rān, Şuhaib. *Muqaddimah fī al-taşawwuf*. Dār al-ma'rifah, Ṭab'ah al-'ajlūl, Damasq, 1989., p. 83.

▼14 Abbās, Qāsim Muḥammad. *al-Ḥallāj: Al-a'māl al-kāmilah*. Maktabah al-iskandariyyah, 2002, p. 252.




ILUSTRACIJA - Dželāludīn Rūmī u osmansko-turskom prijevodu *Zvijezda legende* (*Tardžuma-i Thawāqib-i manāqib*), oko 1590.
ILLUSTRATION - Jalāl ad-Dīn Rūmī in the Ottoman-Turkish translation of *The Star of Legend* (*Tardžuma-i Thawāqib-i manāqib*), ca. 1590.

Stoga možemo samo potvrditi ono što je Corbin spomenuo u svojoj knjizi „Stvaralačka imaginacija u tesavvufu Ibn Arebija“ o velikom žalu zbog stanja zapadne filozofije, koja je odustala od kontemplacije i duha. Ona se tako preobrazila u mrtvo tijelo ili u uspravan kip, lišen svake vrste uskrsnuća. Ta je filozofija počela baštiniti mrtve sjemenke koje u svojim dubinama nose uvjete samouništenja. Prirodan razvoj filozofske misli može se ostvariti samo akumulacijom znanja u svjetlu plemenitih ljudskih vrijednosti i izvornih značenja koja povezuju niz ideja, religiju i povijest naroda. Zapadna filozofija, prema Corbinu, vapi za „fragmentima iz Mesijinog životopisa“, kako bi čvrsto stala na svoje noge te očuvala životnost, sklad i nesebičnost.



ILLUSTRATION – The impoverished Dervish of Faryab crosses the river on his prayer mat, painting by Safavid Isfahan, circa 1526.
ILUSTRACIJA – Osiromašeni derviš iz Faryaba prelazi rijeku na svojoj molitvenoj prostirci, rad isfahanskih Safavida, oko 1526.

Therefore, we can only confirm what Corbin mentioned in his book "The Creative Imagination in the Tasawwuf of ibn Arabi" about the great regret of the state of Western philosophy, which has given up contemplation and spirit. It has thus transformed into a dead body or into an upright statue, devoid of any kind of resurrection. This philosophy began to inherit dead seeds that carry in their depths the conditions of self-destruction. The natural development of philosophical thought can only be realized through the accumulation of knowledge in the light of noble human values and original meanings that connect a series of ideas, religion, and the history of peoples. Western philosophy, according to Corbin, cries out for "fragments from the biography of the Messiah" in order to stand firmly on its feet and preserve vitality, harmony and selflessness.



ILUSTRACIJA - Kroki crtež iz derviške tekije Richarda Dadda (engleski slikar viktorijanskog doba, poznat po svojim orijentalističkim scenama), Turska 1842.-1843. godine i osmanska minijatura jednog od derviša.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Croki drawing from the *dervish tekke* by Richard Dadd (English painter of the Victorian era, known for his orientalist scenes), Turkey 1842-1843, and an Ottoman miniature of one of the *dervishes*.

Odsutnost Kristove ideje u zapadnoj filozofiji dovela je do njene objektivizacije i antropomorfizma, te je izgubila smisao i životnost, za razliku od islamske filozofije, koja je ostala čvrsta, iako su je podrivali stagnacija i klouće u nekim periodima njene povijesti. Ostala je sposobna za obnovu i transcendenciju jer je “vrlina Kur'ana, kao 'znamenja' vječne riječi da uvijek može proizvoditi nove pojave”,¹⁵ odnosno ima mogućnost da ponavlja stvaranje, zbog „duhovnog, nutarnjeg tumačenja koje dopire i preobražava sve materijalne pojave”.¹⁶ Za Corbina u Kur'anu nije bitno vanjsko značenje govora, već njegova dubina, značaj i skrovitost, koja jastvu i postojanju dariva otvoreni horizont prema Apsolutu.

Duhovna kriza koja pogađa Zapad dodatno ističe odgovornost gnostičkog mišljenja i ulogu *tašawwufa* u izgradnji i razvoju čovjeka koji bi trebao teorijski i praktično utjeloviti da smo mi „najbolja zajednica ljudi”.¹⁷ *Tašawwufski* centri i škole ne trebaju biti tek svratišta u kojima se okupljaju dobri ljudi i obnovitelji, nego treba da budu aktivni širom zemlje prenoseći profinjene ljudske vrijednosti i pokazujući divnu sliku čovječanstva koju nudi islam kao „milost svim svjetovima”.¹⁸

Dakle, treba nuditi rješenja koja je teško odbraniti i provesti. Danas se od avangardne elite, te brojnih iskrenih i obrazovanih ljudi, zahtijeva mnogo djelovanja u tišini, „jer iskrenost je mač Božiji, što dotakne to i posiječe”,¹⁹ kako to kaže Zunnun el-Misri. Naša društva danas trebaju uzvišeni i stvarni duhovni odgoj kroz ispravan put ka Bogu, a to podrazumijeva oslobađanje od okova samoljublja, spas od neznanja, prevazilaženje nekih *tariqatski* običaja koji imaju za cilj da pojedince općine plesom i bace u zanos, što u konačnici *tašawwuf* lišava njegovog značenja pa se on pretvara u robu koja se nudi i prodaje, ili podešava zahtjevima vlasti, političkim kalkulacijama i društvenim spektaklima. El-Džunejd²⁰ je rekao: “Ako vidite da se neki sufiya brine o svojoj vanjštini, znajte da je u njegovoj nutrini ruševina.”²¹ Ljudi oko sufiya nisu se htjeli razlikovati po odjeći, nego su nosili vunene odore da bi im bili sličniji, a sjetimo se da je i naš prvak Omer svoju odjeću sam zašivao kožnim zakrpama.

Izvorna sufijska misao svoju misiju jedino ostvaruje slijedeći pristup dobročinstva – *ihsāna* riječju i djelom, te nudeći mapu širokog spektra, i upravo to predstavlja istinski izazov za prvake ovog nauka i sve

▼¹⁵ Corbin, Henry. *Al-khayyāl al-khallāq fī tašawwuf Ibn 'Arabī*. Prijevod Farīd al-Zāhī, Manšūrat Marsam, al-Rabāt, 2006., str. 33.

▼¹⁶ *Ibid.*, str. 33.

▼¹⁷ *Sūrah Āl 'Imrān*, 110 āyat.

▼¹⁸ *Sūrah al-Anbiyā'*, 107 āyat.

▼¹⁹ *Opširnije pogledati u: Ibn Khaldūn. Šifa' al-sā'ili wa tahdhib al-masā'ili*; s.a., str. 181.

▼²⁰ Al-Džunaid Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Al-Džunaid al-Baghdādī, (215-298, h).

▼²¹ Citat preuzet iz djela *al-Risālah lilqušairī*, 2/522.

The absence of the idea of Christ in Western philosophy led to its objectification and anthropomorphism, and lost its meaning and vitality, unlike the Islamic philosophy of, which remained firm, although it was undermined by both stagnation and languishing in some periods of its history. It remains capable of renewal and transcendence because "it is a virtue of the Qur'an, as the 'signs' of the eternal word that it can always produce new phenomena",^{▼15} that is, it has the ability to repeat creation, because of the "spiritual, an inner interpretation which reaches out and transforms all material phenomena."^{▼16} For Corbin in the Qur'an, it is not the external meaning of speech that matters, but its depth, significance and hiddenness, which gives the self and existence an open horizon towards the Absolute.

The spiritual crisis that afflicts the West further emphasizes the responsibility of the Gnostic weeping and the stake in *Taşawwuf* in the construction and development of man who should theoretically and practically embody that we are the "best community of people".^{▼17} *Taşawwuf* centres and schools should not only be places where good people and restorers gather, but should be active throughout the country, transmitting refined human values and showing the wonderful image of humanity offered by Islam as "mercy to all worlds"^{▼18}

Therefore, solutions that are difficult to defend and implement should be offered. Today, the avant-garde elite, as well as numerous honest and educated people, are required to act in silence, "because honesty is the sword of God, which touches it and cuts it",^{▼19} as Zunnun Al-Misri says. Our societies today need sublime and real spiritual upbringing through the right path to God, and this implies liberation from the shackles of self-love, salvation from ignorance, overcoming some of the *ṭarīqat* customs that aim to enchant individuals with dance and throw them into ecstasy, which ultimately deprives *Taşawwuf* of its meaning and turns it into a commodity that is offered and sold, or adjusted to the demands of the authorities, political calculations and social spectacles.^{▼20} Al-Junaid said, "If you see a Sufi taking care of his appearance, know that there is ruin within it".^{▼21} The people around the Sufis did not want to be distinguished by their clothing, but wore woollen robes to be more similar to them, and let's remember that our champion Omer also sewed his own clothes with leather patches.

Original Sufi thought realizes its mission only by following the approach of beneficence – *iḥsān* in word and deed, and offering a map of a wide spectrum, and this is precisely what represents a true challenge for the champions of this doctrine and all those who have dedicated themselves to education. In the context

▼15 Corbin, Henry. *Al-khayyāl al-khallāq fī taşawwuf Ibn 'Arabī*. Trans. Farīd al-Zāhī, Manşūrat Marsam, al-Rabāt, 2006, p. 33.

▼16 *Ibid.*, p. 33.

▼17 *Sūrah Āl 'Imrān*, verse 110

▼18 *Sūrah al-Anbiyā'*, verse 107.

▼19 Take a closer look at: Ibn Khaldūn. *Shifā' al-sā'ili wa tahdhib al-masā'ili*; s.a., p. 181.

▼20 Al-Junaid Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Al-Junaid al-Baghdādī (215-298, H).

▼21 Quote taken from: *al-Risālah lilqushairī*, 2/522.

one koji su se posvetili odgoju i obrazovanju. U kontekstu zbilje kojom dominira moralno izopačenje i kultura globalizacije, “niko nije prisiljen prijeći na islam, ali kada osoba obznani svoja načela, trebala bi prihvatiti i njegove ideje i učenja te djelovati u skladu s njima. Stvar je dakle u principu iskrenog samoodređenja”^{▼22} – kako to jasno opisuje Michel Onfray.^{▼23} Stoga je završetak projekta ostvarivanja jednog istaknutog načina odgoja odgovornost svakoga ko vjeruje u humanu ulogu gnostičke poruke i njezinu središnju važnost u izgradnji ljudskog bića preko duhovnog uzdizanja i stremljenja ka najuzvišenijem obzoru koji pojedincu dariva snagu i nadahnuće, kao i moć da predvodi i inovira.



ILUSTRACIJA – Portret sufije, prva četvrtina 17. stoljeća, Indija. © The Metropolitan Museum of Art.
Ukoliko neki sufija brine o svojoj vanjštini, onda je u njegovoj nutrini ruševina.

ILLUSTRATION – Portrait of a Sufi, first quarter of the 17th century, India.
If a Sufi takes care of his exterior, then his interior is a ruin. © The Metropolitan Museum of Art.

▼²² Onfrey, Michelle. *Nafy al-Lāhūt*, prijevod na arapski jezik: Mubāarak al-Karūsī, Dār al-džamal, Baghdad, 2012., str. 233.

▼²³ Francuski filozof.

of a reality dominated by moral perversion and the culture of globalization, "no one is forced to convert to Islam, and when a person makes his principles known, one should accept his ideas and teachings and act accordingly. It is therefore a matter of sincere self-determination"^{▼22} – as Michel Onfray clearly describes.^{▼23} Therefore, the completion of the project of realizing a prominent way of education is the responsibility of everyone who believes in the humane role of the Gnostic message and its central importance in building a human being through spiritual elevation and striving towards the highest horizon that gives the individual strength and inspiration, as well as the power to lead and innovate.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Mir Sayyid Ali, *Portrait of a Sufi*, from the Album of Prince Salim ca. 1556/60.
The original Sufi thought achieves its mission by following the approach of charity in word and deed.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Mir Sayyid Ali, *Portret sufije*, iz Albuma princa Salima ca. 1556/60.
Izvorna sufijska misao svoju misiju ostvaruje slijedeći pristup dobročinstva riječju i djelom.

▼22 Onfray, Michelle. *Nafy al-Lāhūt*, Arabic translation: Mubārak al-Karūsī, Dār al-jamal, Baghdad, 2012., p. 233.

▼23 The French philosopher.

Kada govorimo o zapadnim društvima, ne treba očekivati da se u urbanim prostorima i kulturnim ustanovama šire *taṣawwufske* institucije. Međutim, kroz gnostičku poruku možemo ponuditi temelj za otvaranje širih horizonata ljudskog mišljenja, koje će ga osloboditi od obožavanja zlatnog teleta predstavljenog pod krinkom racionalizma, znanosti i tehnologije, koje „napadaju živo ljudsko srce i iz njega iskorjenjuju skriveno bogatstvo koje leži u njegovim skrovitim dubinama“,▼²⁴ kako to možemo razumjeti iz riječi Feriduddina el-Attara▼²⁵. Dakle, ljudsko biće je dehumanizirano i pretvoreno u stvari i robu, stoga je nužan teorijski diskurs preko kojeg će se ponovo uspostaviti sufijska perspektiva, koja više neće biti fragmentirana i ograničena na religijsko, nego će predstavljati univerzalni ljudski diskurs. Preko tog diskursa obnovit će se nada u ostvarivanje vjerske tolerancije, pobratimstva među ljudima u okviru različitosti i pluralizma. Nadalje, neophodna je praktična vizija svijeta koja objedinjuje zahtjeve vremena poput tehnološkog i komunikacijskog napretka i vjerskog svjetonazora koji se utjelovljuje kroz duhovnost i vjersku praksu. Stoga, “epohe vjere jesu epohe racionalnosti“,▼²⁶ pa otuda i ideja da se čovjek mora izbaviti iz pozicije sredstva i stanja eksploatacije, te smjestiti u poziciju kreativnosti, humanizma i ljudskosti čovjeka kao časnog stvorenja, a ne kao sredstva proizvodnje. U tom smislu, gnostički diskurs ne ostvaruje se samo u teoriji koja nadilazi ljudsku moć spoznaje, već radije biva djelatni i realistički diskurs koji nastoji pružiti psihološke i duhovne odgovore na stvarna pitanja i ontološke brige koje opterećuju ljudsku egzistenciju.

Prema ljudima koji slijede Božiji put, visina *zakāta* jeste da sve pripada Bogu. Dakle, ljudska egzistencija je od Boga i za Boga, kao što je jasno navedeno u objavi, *Ljude i džinne stvorio sam samo da meni robuju*.▼²⁷ Uloga onih koji se predaju duhovnom zanosu▼²⁸ jeste nastojanje da istinski ožive djelatni smisao, oslobođen svih oblika laži, te da ostvare mir između ljudi kao braće. Obnova sufijske misli počinje obnovom našeg etičkog, obrazovnog i duhovnog jastva, što je predstavljeno u kur'anskom *ajetu* koji kazuje: *Svakog trena On je u pokretu*,▼²⁹ a to se postiže kroz duhovnu borbu kojom se polučuje „najljepši odnos prema Bogu, javnim i tajnim djelima i u skladu s Njegovim propisima“.▼³⁰ Na ovaj

▼²⁴ Opširnije pogledaj u: *Maṭīq al-ṭayr*. 5. dio, str. 243, koje je napisao filozof i sufijski pjesnik Farīduddin al-Aṭṭār; također pogledati Iqbāl, Muḥammed: *Tadẓīd al-fikr ad-dīnī fi al-islām*; s.a., str. 14

▼²⁵ Farīduddin al-Aṭṭār, (513-586 h), Nīsabūr.

▼²⁶ Opširnije pogledati u: A.N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*; vidi u: Iqbal, Muhammed: *Tadẓīd al-fikr ad-dīnī fi al-islām*; s.a., str. 15.

▼²⁷ *Sūrah al-Dhāriyāt*, 56 āyat.

▼²⁸ Duhovni zanos i slast u spoznaji Boga odnosi se na duhovno svjetlo koju istina reflektira svojim ukazanjem u srcima odabranih ljudi, pa po njemu takvi odabranici razlikuju istinu od laži a da to nisu saznali iz knjiga ili drugdje. Opširnije pogledati u: al-Džurdžānī. *al-Ta'rifāt*. str. 93.

▼²⁹ *Sūrah al-Rḥmān*, 29 āyat.

▼³⁰ Opširnije pogledati u: Ibn Khaldūn. *Šifā' al-Sā'ili wa tahdhīb al-masā'ili*; s.a., str. 54.

When we talk about Western societies, we should not expect *Taşawwuf* institutions to spread in urban areas and cultural institutions. However, through the Gnostic message we can offer a foundation for opening wider horizons of human thought, which will free him from the worship of the golden calf presented under the guise of rationalism, science and technology, which "attack the living human heart and root out of it the hidden wealth that lies in its hidden depths",^{▼24} as we can understand from the word of Farīduddin Al-Attār.^{▼25} Therefore, the human being is dehumanized and turned into a thing and a commodity, therefore a theoretical discourse is necessary through which the Sufi perspective will be re-established, which will no longer be fragmented and limited to the religious one, but will represent a universal human discourse. Through this discourse, hope will be renewed in the realization of religious tolerance, fraternity among people within the framework of diversity and pluralism. Furthermore, a practical vision of the world that unites the demands of the times such as technological and communication progress and a religious worldview that is embodied through spirituality and religious practice is necessary. Therefore, "epochs of faith are epochs of rationality",^{▼26} hence the idea that man must be delivered from the position of means and the state of exploitation, and placed in a position of creativity, humanism and the humanity of man as an honourable creature, not as a means of production. In this sense, Gnostic discourse is not only realized in a theory that transcends the human power of cognition, but rather becomes an active and realistic discourse that seeks to provide psychological and spiritual answers to real questions and ontological concerns that burden human existence.

According to people who follow God's path, the height of *zakāt* is that everything belongs to God. Therefore, human existence is from God and for God, as clearly stated in the revelation, *I created humans and jinn only to serve me.*^{▼27} The role of those who surrender to spiritual enthusiasm^{▼28} is an effort to truly revive the active meaning, freed from all forms of lies, and to achieve peace between people as brothers. The renewal of Sufi thought begins with the renewal of our ethical, educational and spiritual self, which is represented in the Qur'anic verse that says: *Every moment He is in motion,*^{▼29} and this is achieved through a spiritual struggle that results in "the most beautiful relationship to God, public and secret deeds and in accordance with His regulations".^{▼30} In this way, Gnostic thought is transformed into a universal message that aims to build a grateful and perfect

▼24 See more in: *Manṭiq al-ṭay* 5. part, p. 243, written by the philosopher and Sufi Poet Farīduddin al-Attār; Also see: Iqbāl, Muḥammed. *Tajdīd al-fikr ad-dīnī fī al-islām*; s.a., p. 14.

▼25 Farīduddin al-Attār, (513-586 H), Nīsabūr.

▼26 Take a closer look at: A.N.. Whitehead. *Religion in the Making*; Also see: Iqbāl, Muḥammed. *Tajdīd al-fikr ad-dīnī fī al-islām*; s.a., p. 15.

▼27 *Sūrah al-Dhāriyāt*, verse 56

▼28 Spiritual enthusiasm and sweetness In the knowledge of God It relates to the spiritual Light bokmāl truth reflects Your the apparition in hearts Selected people, Well by Such a chosen one. Distinguish truth from falsehood a dand that Not find out from A book or Else. Take a closer look at: al-Jurjānī. *al-Ta'rifāt*. p. 93.

▼29 *Sūrah al-Rḥmān*, verse 29.

▼30 See also: Ibn Khaldūn. *Shifā' al-sā'ili wa tahdhīb al-masā'ili*; s.a., p. 54.

način gnostička se misao preobražava u univerzalnu poruku koja za cilj ima izgraditi zahvalnu i savršenu osobu, koja će naslijediti zemlju i njome upravljati na najbolji način u skladu s Poslanikovom, a.s., krilaticom „da svakako bude zahvalni rob“; ^{▼31} kako prenosi časna Aiša, Allah njome bio zadovoljan.

Prijevod s arapskog jezika: Mirza Sarajkić

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^{▼31} *Hadis* prenosi Aiša, r.a.

person, who will inherit the earth and manage it in the best way in accordance with the Prophet's, peace be upon him, catchphrase "to be a grateful slave"^{▼31} as the honourable Aisha, may Allah be pleased with her.




ILLUSTRATION ~ *Dancing Dervishes*, Folio from a *Divan of Hafiz*, ca. 1480. © The Metropolitan Museum of Art.
ILUSTRACIJA ~ *Ples derviša*, ilustracija iz *Hafizovog divana*, oko 1480. © The Metropolitan Museum of Art.

^{▼31} The *ḥadīth* is narrated by Aisha, r.a.



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In the book "Islam and human rights", the author showed the multiplicity of Islamic thought, which cannot be understood simply, in black and white, on any topic, including the sensitive topic of human rights. It opens an insight into the existence of lively polemics within Islam itself, illuminates some differences in the interpretations of Islamic holy texts, and presents Islamic thought on the topic of human rights to the reader with an emphasis on its richness and internal tensions, rather than on controversy.

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SIMPTOM SUKOBA CIVILIZACIJA?

Rushdie afera u kontekstu rasprave o islamu i ideji univerzalnih ljudskih prava

A SYMPTOM OF THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?

The Rushdie affair in the context of the discussion about Islam and the idea of universal human rights

Sažetak

Islam i univerzalna ljudska prava predmet su suvremenih rasprava kako u akademskim, tako i u javnim krugovima. Radi se o kompleksnoj problematici koja uključuje više različitih, ali u ovom slučaju međusobno isprepletenih područja teologije, političke teorije, filozofije, lingvistike, hermeneutike i intelektualne povijesti. Osim što zahtijeva poniranje u različita područja, rasprava je iznjedrila višestruke diskurse unutar liberalne i islamske moralne tradicije koji nam daju brojne, ali nerijetko i kontradiktorne odgovore. Kroz kontekstualizaciju Salman Rushdie afere, u članku se kritički preispituje dominantan diskurs u liberalnoj moralnoj tradiciji koji autorica naziva nekompatibilističkim, a u kojem se rasprava o islamu i ljudskim pravima odvija u kontekstu *sukoba civilizacija*. U tom diskursu usvaja se narativ u kojem se islam tretira kao monolitan pojam koji je u svojoj suštini nekompatibilan sa suvremenom idejom univerzalnih ljudskih prava. Autorica ukazuje kako je takav monološki diskurs neproduktivan te argumentira da pod teretom narativa *sukoba civilizacija* diskurs ljudskih prava pada u drugi plan.

Ključne riječi: *islam, ljudska prava, sukob civilizacija, kompatibilnost, Rushdie*

Abstract

The contemporary debate about Islam and universal human rights is the subject of both academic and public circles. It is an especially complex issue that includes several different, but in this case interwoven areas of theology, political theory, philosophy, linguistics, hermeneutics and intellectual history. In addition to the fact that the discussion requires diving into different areas, it has given rise to multiple discourses within the liberal and Islamic moral tradition that give us numerous but often contradictory answers. Through the contextualization of the Salman Rushdie affair, the article critically reviews the dominant discourse in the liberal moral tradition, which the author calls incompatibility, and in which the discussion of Islam and human rights takes place in the context of the *clash of civilizations*. In that discourse, a narrative is adopted in which Islam is treated as a monolithic concept that is fundamentally incompatible with the modern idea of universal human rights. The author points out that such monologic discourse is unproductive and argues that under the burden of the narrative of the *clash of civilizations*, the discourse of human rights falls into the background.

Key words: *Islam, human rights, clash of civilizations, compatibility, Rushdie*

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Rushdie afera u kontekstu rasprave o islamu i ideji univerzalnih ljudskih prava

Uvod

U kolovozu 2022. godine, za vrijeme predavanja o slobodi umjetnosti u New Yorku, pisca Salmana Rushdija^{▼1} napao je američki državljanin libanonskog porijekla Hadi Matar te ga više puta izbo nožem. Rushdie je preživio napad, a od zadobivenih ozljeda izgubio je vid na jedno oko te osjet u jednoj ruci. Napad se dogodio 33 godine nakon objave njegovog kontroverznog četvrtog romana pod nazivom *Sotonski stihovi*,^{▼2} koji je zbog svojeg sadržaja tada izazivao burne reakcije muslimana^{▼3} diljem svijeta.

Tada, samo pet dana nakon objave knjige u Velikoj Britaniji, knjiga je zabranjena u Indiji, zatim u Pakistanu, Južnoj Africi, Sudanu, a u ožujku 1989. godine „45 islamskih nacija na Organizaciji islamske suradnje“^{▼4} glasalo je da se *Sotonski stihovi* zabrane u njihovim zemljama“ (O'Neill 1999: 220). Protesti koji su se održali u Indiji i Pakistanu odnijeli su živote mnogobrojnih žrtava, ali kao i mirni prosvjedi u Velikoj Britaniji, nisu zadobili veću pažnju svjetskih medija. Tek kada su prosvjednici u Velikoj Britaniji na jednom od prosvjeda zapalili primjerak knjige, dobili su željeni publicitet, ali im taj isti publicitet ipak nije priskrbio pažnju kakvu su priželjkivali, nego je imao suprotan učinak. Bhikhu Parekh u svom radu argumentira kako taj nagli publicitet koji su uspjeli izazvati spaljivanjem knjige nije urodio razumnom raspravom, nego je upravo suprotno doveo do „bujice osuda“, pri čemu su muslimani bili nazvani „barbarima, neciviliziranima, fanaticima, fundamentalistima“ (Parekh 1990: 699).

▼1 Sva imena u članku su zbog dosljednosti pisana prema engleskoj transliteraciji.

▼2 Već je sam naslov knjige problematičan, jer se referira na legendu prema kojoj je poslanika Muhameda prevario vrag, pa je poslanik Muhamed greškom prenio muslimanima neke dijelove Kur'ana za koje je mislio da dolaze od Boga, a nakon što je shvatio da je prevaren, povukao ih je i zamijenio ispravnim dijelovima. Riječ je o legendi koja je u islamskoj tradiciji poznata kao Priča o ždralovima (*Qissat al-gharaniq*). Nadalje, u knjizi se nalazi i scena s bordelom u Meki, u kojem radi dvanaest prostitutki koje nose imena i imaju fizički opis Poslanikovih žena. Izgled dvorišta bordela uspoređuje se s izgledom Kabe u Meki, glavnim svetištem muslimana. Shabbir Akhtar kritizira i Rushdijev izbor imena za Poslanika, kojem daje ime „Mahound“ ukazujući na to da je Mahound „pogrdno ime za poslanika Muhameda, koje se koristilo u srednjovjekovnom kršćanstvu [...] Mahound je u kršćanskoj mitologiji bio zla ličnost koja je udružila snage s vragom i kraljem Herodom“ (Akhtar 1989: 4).

▼3 Ovdje je nužno posebno istaknuti da upotreba riječi „muslimani“ nikako ne podrazumijeva da su svi muslimani jednako reagirali, niti da su jednako podržali ono što će uskoro uslijediti. U članku se riječ „muslimani“ koristi s velikim oprezom, pri čemu se neumorno ističe kako ta jedna kolektivna riječ u sebi sadrži mnogobrojne razlike među pripadnicima islamske vjeroispovijesti: jezičke, kulturološke, geografske, pa i vjerske (npr. razlike između sunita i šiita).

▼4 Međunarodna organizacija koja broji 57 zemalja članica. Glavna zadaća Organizacije je promicanje islamskih interesa i solidarnosti.

A SYMPTOM OF THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?

The Rushdie affair in the context of the discussion about Islam and the idea of universal human rights

Introduction

In August 2022, during a lecture on the freedom of art in New York delivered by the writer Salman Rushdie was attacked by Hadi Matar, an American citizen of Lebanese origin, who stabbed him several times. Rushdie survived the attack, but because of his injuries, he lost sight in one eye and feeling in one hand. The attack came 33 years after the publication of his controversial fourth novel, *The Satanic Verses*^{▼1} which, due to its content, at the time provoked violent reactions from Muslims^{▼2} around the world.

Then, just five days after the publication of the book in Great Britain, the book was banned in India, then in Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, and in March 1989, "45 Islamic nations within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation^{▼3} voted to ban *The Satanic Verses* in their countries" (O'Neill, 1999: 220). The protests that took place in India and Pakistan claimed the lives of many victims, but like the peaceful protests in Great Britain, they did not receive much attention from the world media. It was only when protesters in Great Britain burned a copy of the book at one of the protests that they got the publicity they wanted, but that same publicity did not bring them the attention they desired, but rather had the opposite effect. Bhikhu Parekh argues in his work that the sudden publicity that they managed to cause by burning the book did not result in a reasonable discussion, but led to a "flood of condemnations" where Muslims were called "barbarians, uncivilized, fanatics, fundamentalists" (Parekh, 1990: 699).

In February 1989, there is a twist that will completely polarize the already flared debate. Iran's then-leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issues a *fatwā*^{▼4} directed against Rushdie. In the *fatwā*, Khomeini calls on all


^{▼1} The title of the book itself is problematic, because it refers to the legend according to which the Prophet Muhammad was deceived by the devil, so the Prophet Muhammad mistakenly transmitted to Muslims some parts of the Qur'an that he thought came from God, and after realizing that he had been deceived, he withdrew them and replaced them with correct parts. It is a legend known in Islamic tradition as the Story of cranes (*Qissat al-Gharaniq*). Furthermore, the book also features a scene with a brothel in Mecca, in which twelve prostitutes carry names and a physical description of the Prophet's wives. He compares the appearance of the brothel courtyard to that of the Kaaba in Mecca, the main shrine of Muslims. Shabbir Akhtar also criticizes Rushdie's choice of name for the Prophet, to whom he ascribes the name "Mahound", indicating that Mahound is "a derogatory name for the Prophet Muhammad, which was used in medieval Christianity... Mahound was in Christian mythology an evil figure who joined forces with the devil and King Herod" (Akhtar, 1989: 4).

^{▼2} It is necessary to point out here that the use of the word "Muslims" does not imply that all Muslims reacted equally, nor that they equally supported what would soon follow. The article uses the word "Muslims" with extreme caution, pointing out tirelessly that this one collective word contains many differences among members of the Islamic religion: linguistic, cultural, geographical, and even religious (e.g. differences between Sunnis and Shias). The support of Islamic intellectuals to Salman Rushdie will show not only that not all Muslims think alike, but that he is changing his attitude towards Islam; he re-accepts Islam as his religion.

^{▼3} An international organization of 57 member states. The main task of the organization is to promote Islamic interests and solidarity.

^{▼4} According to Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *fatwā* is a legal "answer of a qualified scholar to a certain question" (Kamali 2016: 303) which

U veljači 1989. godine dolazi do preokreta koji će u potpunosti polarizirati već rasplamsanu raspravu. Tadašnji vjerski vođa Irana ajatolah Ruhollah Khomeini izdaje fetvu⁵ usmjerenu protiv Rushdija. Khomeini u fetvi poziva sve muslimane da ubiju Rushdija ali i sve one koji su sudjelovali u izdavanju knjige a koji su prethodno bili svjesni njezinog sadržaja.⁶ Rushdie je tada okarakteriziran ne samo kao otpadnik nego i kao neprijatelj islama, te je zbog prijetnji i napada koji su uslijedili nakon *fetve* bio prisiljen skrivati se i živjeti pod zaštitom, a incident je doveo i do prekida diplomatskih odnosa Irana i Velike Britanije.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Salman Rushdie osvaja nagradu Whitbread 1988. za Sotonske stihove, a ajatolah Ruhollah Khomeini izdao je fetvu usmjerenu protiv Rushdieja. (Fotografija, Graham Turner/Guardian)

ILLUSTRATION ~ Salman Rushdie wins the 1988 Whitbread Award for The Satanic Verses and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa directed against Rushdie. (Photograph, Graham Turner/Guardian)

▼⁵ Prema Mohammadu Hashimu Kamaliju *fetva* je pravni „odgovor kvalificiranog učenjaka na određeno pitanje“ (Kamali 2016: 303) koji se najčešće temelji na tri izvora: „interpretaciji Kur'ana, suni ili općim načelima šerijata“ (Kamali 2008: 175) pri čemu objašnjava: „U slučaju nedostatka dokaza u ovim trima izvorima islamski učenjak (*mufti*) formulira svoju vlastitu presudu, prosvijetljenu njegovim općim znanjem šerijata, morala i običaja društva. Presuda se obično sastoji od mišljenja koje ne obavezuje osobu ili osobe kojima je namijenjeno, niti obavezuje bilo koga drugog“ (Ibid.). Pravno neobavezujući karakter fetve Kamali dodatno naglašava argumentom da je „primatelj *fetve* slobodan da potraži mišljenje drugog *muftije* i da dobije drugu ili čak i treću *fetvu* za ono što njega zanima“ (Ibid.).

▼⁶ Cijeli tekst *fetve* dostupan na: <https://irandatportal.syr.edu/fatwa-against-salman-rushdie>.

Muslims to kill Rushdie and all those who participated in the publication of the book, who were previously aware of its contents.^{▼5} Rushdie was then characterized not only as an apostate but also an enemy of Islam, and due to the threats and attacks that followed *the fatwā*, he was forced to hide and live under protection. The incident also led to the severing of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United Kingdom.




ILLUSTRATION – Khomeini's successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, he publicly replied that Khomeini's fatwa was irreversible. (Photo, David Levenson/Getty)
ILUSTRACIJA – Homeinijev nasljednik, ajatolah Ali Khamenei, javno je odgovorio da je Homeinijeva fetva neponištiva. (Foto, David Levenson/Getty)

is usually based on three sources: "the interpretation of the Qur'an, the Sunnah or the general principles of the Shari'ah" (Kamali 2008: 175), where he explains: "In the event of lack of evidence in these three sources, the Islamic scholar (*mufti*) formulates his own judgment, enlightened by his general knowledge of Shari'ah, morality and customs of society. A judgment usually consists of an opinion that does not bind the person or persons to whom it is intended, nor does it bind anyone else" (Ibid.). Kamali further emphasizes the legally non-binding character of the fatwā by arguing that "the recipient of the *fatwā* is free to seek the opinion of another *mufti* and to get a second or even a third *fatwā* for what interests him." (ibid.)

^{▼5} Full text of the *fatwā* is available at: <https://irandataportal.syr.edu/fatwa-against-salman-rushdie>.

U lipnju 1989. Khomeini umire, ali njegova fetva ostaje na snazi, što ugrožava Rushdijev život, te on i dalje živi pod zaštitom i skriven od javnosti. U prosincu 1990. godine Rushdie pokušava smiriti situaciju tako što se javno pokajao, ponovno prihvatio islam kao svoju vjeru te objavio kako neće dati svoje odobrenje za novo izdanje knjige niti za nove prijevode. Khomeinijev nasljednik, ajatolah Ali Khamenei javno odgovara kako je Khomeinijeva *fetva* neponištiva,^{▼7} a 1991. godine ubojstvo japanskog prevoditelja Rushdijevog romana Hitoshija Igarashija bilo je dokaz kako za Rushdija i njegove suradnike nema oprosta za vrijeđanje Poslanika. Očekivano, *fetvu* su ozbiljno osudili zapadni, liberalni intelektualci, ali su se osudama pridružili i brojni istaknuti islamski intelektualci. Osim što su javno osudili Khomeinijevo izdavanje *fetve*, potpisane su i raznovrsne peticije u znak potpore Rushdiju. Jedna od njih je i peticija koju je u ožujku 1989. godine objavio The New York Review of Books, u kojoj potpisnici zajedno izjavljaju kako je „bigotističko nasilje oprečno islamskoj tradiciji učenja i tolerancije“.^{▼8}

Činjenica da su i sami islamski intelektualci u velikom broju osudili *fetvu* i napade na Rushdija, uz čvrste argumente kako je pravo na slobodu govora vrijednost njegovana i u islamskoj moralnoj tradiciji,^{▼9} nedvojben je pokazatelj kako islam nije jednoglasna, homogena cjelina, u kojoj jedan čovjek govori u ime svih, pogotovo kada taj jedan čovjek nekoga osudi na smrt. Osim osude koju su izrekli islamski intelektualci, *fetvu* nije podržao ni tadašnji veliki imam sveučilišta Al-Azhar^{▼10} u Egiptu Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi. Tantawi se u svojoj izjavi složio da je objava Rushdijevog romana „blasfemija i otpadništvo“ (Slaughter 1993: 175), dodavši kako „niti jedan musliman ne može biti osuđen bez zakonskog procesa cjelovitog i pravednog suđenja, čija bi svrha bila ustanoviti Rushdijeve namjere pisanja knjige“ (Ibid., 176).

▼7 Khameneijeva izjava, kao i cijeli članak „No Iranian Forgiveness For Salman Rushdie“ dostupni na: <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/27/books/no-iranian-forgiveness-for-salman-rushdie.html>. Nakon ponovnog napada na Rushdija u 2022, Khamenei je opravdavajući napadača javno izjavio kako je „*fetva* poput metka koji neće stati dok ne pogodi svoju metu“. Izjava dostupna na: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11107259/Irans-Ayatollah-Khamenei-says-fatwa-against-Salman-Rushdie-fired-like-bullet.html>.

▼8 Peticiju su potpisali Edward W. Said, Aga Shahid Ali, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Akeel Bilgrami i Eqbal Ahmad. Dostupno na: <https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1989/03/16/the-satanic-verses/>.

▼9 Mnogi autori skreću pažnju na dugačku tradiciju teoloških i filozofskih podjela u islamu o kojima se javno raspravljalo. Saadi A. Simawe bilježi kako su srednjovjekovni povjesničari dokumentirali spekulacije koje se tiču nekih pitanja poput „valjanosti prikaza Boga i vraga u Kur'anu“ i „kredibiliteta Muhamedovog poslanništva“. Pritom, Simawe otkriva da se „tijekom renesanse islama (9/10 st.) o tim pitanjima javno raspravljalo“ (Simawe 1990: 186). Također, Simawe promišljajući o Rushdie aferi zaključuje kako „većina metafizičkih pitanja koja se postavljaju u Sotonskim stihovima niti su originalna, niti su nezamisliva, o njima su javno raspravljali srednjovjekovni islamski i neislamski mislioci i pisci“ (Ibid.).

▼10 U sunitском islamu, veliki imam sveučilišta al-Azhar najveći je autoritet u jurisprudenciji, a samo sveučilište predstavlja najprestižnije i najcjenjenije tradicionalno sveučilište u islamskim znanostima.

In June 1989, Khomeini dies, but his *fatwā* remains in effect, endangering Rushdie's life, who continues to live under protection and hidden from the public. In December 1990, Rushdie tried to calm the situation by publicly repenting, re-embracing Islam as his religion, and announcing that he would not give his approval for a new edition of the book or for new translations. Khomeini's successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, publicly responds that *Khomeini's fatwā* is irreversible.^{▼6} In fact, the murder of Japanese translator Rushdie's novel Hitoshi Igarashi in 1991 was proof that Rushdie and his associates were given no forgiveness for insulting the Prophet. As expected, *the fatwā* resulted in serious condemnations of Western, liberal intellectuals, as well as many prominent Islamic intellectuals. In addition to publicly condemning Khomeini's issuing of the *fatwā*, various petitions had also been signed in support of Rushdie. One of them is a petition published in March 1989 by The New York Review of Books, in which the signatories jointly declare that "bigoted violence is in fact antithetical to Islamic traditions of learning and tolerance".^{▼7}

The fact that Islamic intellectuals themselves *condemned the fatwā* and attacks on Rushdie in large numbers, with solid arguments that the right to free speech is a value cherished in the Islamic moral tradition,^{▼8} is an undeniable indicator that Islam is not a unanimous, homogeneous whole in which one man speaks for all, especially when that one man sentences someone to death. Apart from condemnation by Islamic intellectuals, *the fatwā* was not supported by the then Grand Imam of Al Azhar University^{▼9} Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi in Egypt. While Tantawi agreed in his statement that the publication of Rushdie's novel was "blasphemy and apostasy" (Slaughter, 1993: 175), he added that "no Muslim can be sentenced to death without a legal process of a full and just trial, the purpose of which would be to establish Rushdie's intentions in writing the book" (ibid.: 176).


Despite condemnations of *the fatwā* by Islamic pens, the liberal moral tradition was loudly dominated by a current in which Islam was understood as a uniform mass of angry Muslims who want to deny freedom to those who fight for it. Anshuman A. Modal notes that "the liberals' comments on *the fatwā* easily slipped out of anger at Khomeini's savagery into disgust with the alleged savagery of Islam in general" (Mondal, 2013: 59).

▼6 Khamenei's statement, as well as the entire article „No Iranian Forgiveness For Salman Rushdie“ available on: <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/27/books/no-iranian-forgiveness-for-salman-rushdie.html>. After attacking Rushdie again in 2022, Khamenei, justifying the attacker, publicly stated that "a *fatwā* is fired like a bullet that won't rest until it hits its target." Statement available at: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11107259/Irans-Ayatollah-Khamenei-says-fatwa-against-Salman-Rushdie-fired-like-bullet.html>.

▼7 The petition was signed by Edward W. Said, Aga Shahid Ali, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Akeel Bilgrami and Eqbal Ahmad. Available at: <https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1989/03/16/the-satanic-verses/>.

▼8 Many authors draw attention to the long tradition of theological and philosophical divisions in Islam that have been publicly debated. Saadi A. Simawe notes how medieval historians have documented speculation concerning some issues such as "the validity of the depiction of God and the devil in the Qur'an" and "the credibility of Muhammad's prophethood." In doing so, Simawe reveals that "during the Renaissance of Islam (9/10th century) these issues were publicly discussed" (Simawe, 1990: 186). Also, Simawe reflecting on the Rushdie affair concludes that "some of the metaphysical questions rushdie raises in the novel are neither original nor unthinkable, they have been publicly discussed by medieval Islamic and non-Islamic thinkers and writers" (ibid.).

▼9 In Sunni Islam, the Grand Imam of Al Azhar University is the greatest authority in jurisprudence, and the university itself represents the most prestigious and respected university in Islamic sciences.



Islam after Salman

The Satanic Verses would not be written or published today. What's changed since Salman Rushdie's notorious novel?

ILUSTRACIJA - Muslimani spaljuju primjerke Salmana Rushdieja *Sotonski stihovi* ispred gradske vijećnice Bradforda, Bradford, UK. (Fotografija, Derek Hudson/Getty)

ILLUSTRATION - Muslims burning copies of Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* in front of Bradford City Hall, Bradford, UK. (Photograph, Derek Hudson/Getty)

Unatoč osudama *fetve* iz islamskih pera, u liberalnoj moralnoj tradiciji glasno je dominirala struja u kojoj se islam shvaćao kao jednolična masa gnjevnih muslimana koji žele uskratiti slobodu onima koji se za nju bore. Anshuman A. Modal bilježi kako su „komentari liberala na *fetvu* lako skliznuli iz bijesa zbog Khomeinijevog divljaštva u gađenje prema navodnom divljaštvu islama općenito“ (Mondal 2013: 59). Tada se inzistira da je sveprisutna generalizirana slika islama kao religije netrpeljivosti i ograničavanja sloboda prava slika islama, što odigrava značajnu ulogu u suparničkom antagonizmu Rushdie afere. Afera se isprva odvijala oko različitog poimanja prava na slobodu izražavanja, da bi u konačnici mutirala u neprijateljsko pitanje sruza čitavih civilizacija, toliko različitih da je sukob jednostavno neizbježan. Sukob civilizacija je 'mantra' koja se uzastopno ponavljala kroz Rushdie aferu dok nije postala normativna perspektiva kroz koju se danas promatra skoro svaki predmet koji uključuje islam i Zapad.^{▼11} Narativ sukoba civilizacija ili civilizacijskih identiteta isprva se suptilno provlačio

^{▼11} Kada god se tematizira ovo pitanje, neophodno je podsjetiti kako islam i Zapad nisu monolitni, homogeni pojmovi, nego unutar sebe sadrže različita stajališta, ideje i diskurse. Kada govorim o zapadnom, liberalnom svijetu, činim to svjesna kako Zapad osim geografskih, povijesnih, političkih razlika, nosi i različite misaone ideje, među kojima je



ILLUSTRATION ~ When Salman Rushdie was given the *fatwa* or death sentence 25 years ago, Ian McEwan, Martin Amis, E. L. Doctorow and many others stood by him. (Photography by Annie Leibovitz)

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Kada je prije 25 godina izrečena *fatva* ili smrtna kazna Salmanu Rushdiju, uz njega su stajali Ian McEwan, Martin Amis, E. L. Doctorow i mnogi drugi. (Fotografija, Annie Leibovitz)

It is then insisted that the ubiquitous generalized image of Islam as a religion of bigotry restricting freedoms is the image of Islam, which plays a significant role in the rival antagonism of the Rushdie affair. At first, the affair took place around a different notion of the right to freedom of expression, only to ultimately mutate into a hostile question of the clash of entire civilizations, so different that conflict is simply inevitable. ▼¹⁰ The clash of civilizations is a mantra repeated consistently through the Rushdie affair until it became the normative perspective through which almost every subject involving Islam and the West is viewed today. The clash of civilizations or civilizational identities is a narrative that at first subtly ran through dominant liberal, but also Islamic attitudes through statements such as "this is how we do it here", but there is one author

▼¹⁰ Whenever this issue is discussed, it is necessary to recall that Islam and the West are not monolithic, homogeneous concepts, but contain different points of view, ideas, and discourses. When I talk about the Western, liberal world, I am aware that the West, in addition to geographical, historical, political differences, carries various thought ideas among which it is liberal, although dominant, only one of them. Likewise, the liberal moral tradition is not unanimous, but like Islamic moral tradition branches in different directions into numerous, and often conflicting discourses.

kroz dominantne liberalne, ali i islamske stavove kroz izjave poput „mi to ovdje tako radimo“, ali se danas s tim postulatima rivalstva civilizacija povezuje ime jednog autora. Njegova hipoteza rezonirala je s mnogima u dominantnom liberalnom diskursu, jer je za njih Rushdie afeta bila simptom crne budućnosti iznesene u hipotezi, dokaz sukoba civilizacija.



ILUSTRACIJA - *Satanski stihovi* su autora Salmana Rushdija pretvorili u progonjenog čovjeka, podijelili kulturnu elitu i navijestila novu eru na razini čitavih civilizacija. (Fotografija, Annie Leibovitz)

ILLUSTRATION - *The Satanic Verses* turned the author Salman Rushdie into a persecuted man, divided the cultural elite and heralded a new era at the level of entire civilizations. (Photograph, Annie Leibovitz)

Ovaj članak ima dva cilja. Prvi cilj je kritičko sagledavanje usvajanja narativa sukoba civilizacija u raspravama o ljudskim pravima na primjeru Salman Rushdie afere pri čemu se želi ukazati na neproduktivnost takvog pristupa. Drugi cilj je da se kroz odbacivanje narativa *sukoba civilizacija*, u raspravi o univerzalnim ljudskim pravima ukaže na narativ koji inzistira na očuvanju razlika i kulturalnom razumijevanju u istinski ravnopravnim društvima. Kroz ova dva cilja, članak želi prikazati kako ukoliko nešto definiramo kao univerzalno, to podrazumijeva da se time obuhvate i oni koji njeguju drugačije vrijednosti, bez da su primorani neke od tih vrijednosti žrtvovati kako bi bili prihvaćeni.

Nakon uvodne kontekstualizacije Salaman Rushdie afere, članak će postupno ići prema navedenim ciljevima kroz dva glavna poglavlja. U prvom poglavlju sagledava se Huntingtonova hipoteza *sukoba civilizacija* kao narativ kojeg usvaja dominantan nekompatibilistički diskurs u liberalnoj moralnoj tradiciji. U drugom poglavlju narativ *sukoba civilizacija* se kritički preispituje i odbacuje u raspravi o ljudskim pravima kao neproduktivan i destruktivan, u isto vrijeme usvaja se pristup progresivnog islamskog diskursa s naglaskom na prihvaćanje razlika čime bi se potvrdila univerzalnost ljudskih prava.

liberalna, iako dominantna, samo jedna od njih. Jednako tako, liberalna moralna tradicija nije jednoglasna, nego se poput islamske moralne tradicije grana u različitim smjerovima u mnogobrojne, a nerijetko i oprečne diskurse.

whose name today is associated with this postulate of the rivalry of civilizations. His hypothesis resonated with many in the dominant liberal discourse, because for them the Rushdie affair was a symptom of the dark future put forward in the hypothesis, evidence of a clash of civilizations.



ILLUSTRATION ~ The *fatwā* and the burning of a copy of *The Satanic Verses* in Pakistan were severely condemned by Western, liberal intellectuals, but many prominent Islamic intellectuals also joined in the condemnations.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ *Fetvu* i spaljivanje primjeraka *Satanskih stihova* u Pakistanu su ozbiljno osudili zapadni, liberalni intelektualci, ali su se osudama pridružili i brojni istaknuti islamski intelektualci.

This article has two goals. The first goal is a critical review of the adoption of the narrative of the *clash of civilizations* in discussions about human rights, using the example of the Salman Rushdie affair, in order to point out the unproductiveness of such an approach. The second goal is to reject the narrative of the *clash of civilizations* in the discussion of universal human rights, to point to a narrative that insists on the preservation of differences and cultural understanding in truly equal societies. Through these two goals, the article wants to show how if we define something as universal, it implies that it includes those who cherish different values, without being forced to sacrifice some of those values in order to be accepted.

After the introductory contextualization of the Salman Rushdie affair, the article will gradually move towards the stated goals through two main chapters. The first chapter examines Huntington's hypothesis of the clash of civilizations as a narrative adopted by the dominant non-compatible discourse in the liberal moral tradition. In the second chapter, the narrative of the clash of civilizations is critically re-examined and rejected in the debate on human rights as unproductive and destructive. At the same time, the approach of progressive Islamic discourse is adopted with an emphasis on accepting differences, which would confirm the universality of human rights.

Sukob civilizacija

Sukob civilizacija naziv je članka koji je 1993. godine u časopisu *Foreign Affairs* objavljuje Samuel P. Huntington. On u članku izlaže gotovo kataklizmičku hipotezu prema kojoj sukob u budućnosti neće primarno imati ideološke niti ekonomske temelje, nego će se svijet primarno sukobiti i podijeliti na temelju kulturoloških razlika te tvrdi kako će sukob „između civilizacija biti posljednja faza u evoluciji sukoba u modernom svijetu“ (Huntington 1993: 22). U budućnosti će se zemlje udruživati jedne s drugima prema sličnostima svojih kultura, za što Huntington razloge pronalazi u ljudskoj prirodi, koja od nas traži da naglašavamo razlike među nama te da se prema njima grupiramo jedni s drugima, jedni protiv drugih. No, za takvu prirodu čovjeka karakteristično je da nas razlike, nakon što ih uočimo i istaknemo, neizbježno vode ka međusobnom natjecanju (za Huntingtona se to odvija i na razini pojedinaca ali i na razini čitavih civilizacija).

Jedno od načela po kojem će se ljudi u budućnosti samoodređivati i sukladno tome grupirati jeste pripadnost civilizaciji, a Huntington pritom upozorava da će „civilizacijski identitet biti sve važniji u budućnosti, a svijet će se u velikoj mjeri oblikovati interakcijama između sedam ili osam velikih civilizacija“ (Ibid., 25). U svojoj redukcionističkoj podjeli svijeta, Huntington najveći potencijal za sukob vidi između dviju civilizacija: islamske i zapadne, te ističe kako je u tom slučaju riječ o slojevitim razlikama koje su jezičke, tradicijske, povijesne, kulturne, ali prije svega vjerske. Kao što će sugerirati narativ za vrijeme Rushdie afere, Huntington argumentira da se radi o neprijateljstvu koje seže daleko u povijest i da pripadnici tih dviju civilizacija imaju različite poglede na „odnos između Boga i čovjeka, pojedinca i skupine, građana i države, roditelja i djece, muža i žene, kao i različite poglede na relativnu važnost prava i odgovornosti, slobode i autoriteta, jednakosti i hijerarhije“ (Ibid.).


U Huntingtonovoj hipotezi možemo primijetiti još nešto što je isplivalo na površinu kroz Rushdie aferu, a što ćemo detaljnije razmotriti u sljedećem poglavlju. Huntington u članku objašnjava da ljudi vlastiti identitet određuju kroz etničku i vjersku pripadnost, te će stoga one koji imaju drugačije samoodređenje promatrati kroz okvire pojmova „Mi“ i „Oni“ (Drugi), što je bio slučaj i sa Rushdie aferom. Osim mračne predikcije o neizbježnom sukobu islama i Zapada, Huntington drži kako će u budućnosti Zapad ostati dominantan kao najnaprednija civilizacija, što će ga učiniti metom drugih civilizacija, pri čemu on upozorava na najopasnijeg neprijatelja zapadne civilizacije – oživljeni islam. Islam, prema Huntingtonu, nema mogućnost reforme, ali čak i da doživi neke promjene to je samo kako bi se vratio (unazadio) u vrijeme poslanika Muhammeda. Ako i uzmemo u obzir da Huntingtonova hipoteza nastaje u vrijeme ružne epizode Rushdie afere, nevjerojatan je opseg neznanja i nepoznavanja islama, o kojem piše sa toliko samopouzdanja. On smatra da islamska društva postaju sve više islamska, a oživljeni islam predstavlja kao primarni izvor svjetskog konflikta u budućnosti

The Clash of Civilizations

the Clash of Civilizations is the title of an article published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993 by Samuel P. Huntington. In the article, he presents an almost cataclysmic hypothesis, according to which conflict in the future will not primarily have ideological or economic foundations but predicts that the world will primarily clash, and divide based on cultural differences. He further argues that the conflict "between civilizations will be the last stage in the evolution of conflict in the modern world" (Huntington, 1993: 22). In the future, countries will team up with each other according to the similarities of their cultures, for which Huntington finds reasons in human nature, which requires us to emphasize the differences between us and group them with each other, against each other. But what is characteristic of such the nature of man, is that after we notice and highlight the differences, they inevitably lead us to compete with each other (for Huntington, this takes place both at the level of individuals and at the level of entire civilizations).

One of the principles how people in the future will self-determine and accordingly group is by belonging to a civilization, whereby Huntington warns that "civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations " (ibid.: 25). In his reductionist division of the world, Huntington sees the greatest potential for conflict between two civilizations: Islamic and Western and points out that in this case these are layered differences that are: linguistic, traditional, historical, cultural, but above all religious. As the narrative during the Rushdie affair will suggest, Huntington argues that it is an enmity that goes far back in history and that members of the two civilizations have different views on "the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy " (ibid.).

In Huntington's hypothesis, we can notice something else that has surfaced through the Rushdie affair, and which we will go over in more detail in the next chapter. Huntington explains in the article how people self-identify through ethnic and religious affiliation, therefore those who have different self-identification will be viewed through the framework of the terms "We" and "They" (Others), which was also the case with the Rushdie affair. In addition to the grim prediction of the inevitable clash between Islam and the West, Huntington believes that in the future the West will remain dominant as the most advanced civilization that will make it a target of other civilizations, warning of the most dangerous enemy of Western civilization – a revived Islam. Islam according to Huntington has no possibility of reform, but even if it undergoes some changes, it is only to return (set back) in the time of the Prophet Muḥammed. Even if we consider that Huntington's hypothesis arises at the time of the ugly episode of the Rushdie affair, the extent of the ignorance and lack of familiarity on the subject of Islam about which he writes with so much confidence is unbelievable. For him, Islamic societies are becoming increasingly Islamic, and he presents revived Islam as the primary source of world conflict in the future.



ILUSTRACIJA - Nevjerojatan je opseg neznanja i nepoznavanja islama o kojem piše Huntington. On smatra da oživljeni islam predstavlja primarni izvor svjetskog konflikta u budućnosti. (Fotografija, Christian Thiel)

ILLUSTRATION - The extent of ignorance and ignorance of Islam that Huntington writes about is incredible. He believes that revived Islam represents the primary source of world conflict in the future. (Photograph, Christian Thiel)

Nadalje, Huntington naglašava kako „nezapadnjaci“ svijet vide na način da njime upravlja Zapad te kako se taj isti Zapad koristi mnogim alatima, sredstvima ali i institucijama kako bi promovirao i nametnuo svoje vrijednosti drugima. Promoviranjem vlastitih vrijednosti kao univerzalnih, Zapad će doći u sukob s ostalim, nezapadnim civilizacijama jer će izazvati „reakciju protiv imperijalizma ljudskih prava i reafirmaciju autohtonih vrijednosti, kao što se može vidjeti u potpori vjerskom fundamentalizmu kod mlađih generacija nezapadnih kultura“ (Ibid., 41). Dok drži kako će islamske zemlje nastaviti konzumirati zapadnu globalnu kulturu (npr. kroz glazbu i filmove) i koristiti se blagodatima modernizacije, u želji da zadrže vrijednosti i karakteristike svojstvene vlastitoj kulturi, nastavit će odbijati zapadne institucije (i ideje). Usto, Huntington vjeruje da će neka zemlja, čak i ako bude pozapadnjena, ispod „zapadnjačke“ površine sačuvati svoj kulturni identitet. Nameće se pitanje na koje Huntington ovdje ne odgovara: Je li to slučaj i s muslimanima koji žive u zapadnjačkim zemljama, prihvate ono što Huntington naziva zapadnjačkim životom sa zapadnjačkim vrijednostima ili muslimani bez obzira na pozapadnjivanje zauvijek ostaju fundamentalisti pod utjecajem oživljenog islama? Nadalje, jesu li prema takvoj pretpostavci svi muslimani u zapadnom svijetu skrivena prijetnja koja čeka aktivaciju u kontroverzama poput Rushdie afere? Ovim pitanjima vratit ćemo se poslije u raspravi o Rushdie aferi u kontekstu Huntingtonove hipoteze.



ILLUSTRATION - Thousands of Muslims praying at Skenderbej square in Tirana. (Photograph, Gent Shkullaku, AFP via Getty Images)

ILUSTRACIJA - Tisuće muslimana na molitvi na trgu Skenderbej u Tirani. (Gent Shkullaku, AFP via Getty Images)

Furthermore, Huntington emphasizes that "non-Westerners" see the world as governed by the West and that the same West uses many tools, means and institutions to promote and impose their values upon others. By promoting its own values as universal, the West will bring conflict to other, non-Western civilizations because it will provoke " a reaction against "human rights imperialism" and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures" (ibid.: 41). While he believes that Islamic countries will continue to consume Western global culture (e.g., through music and movies) and use the benefits of modernization, in their desire to retain the values and characteristics inherent in their own culture, they will continue to reject Western institutions (and ideas). In addition, Huntington believes that even if a country is westernized, it will preserve its cultural identity beneath the "Western" surface. A question arises that Huntington does not answer here: is this also the case with Muslims who live in Western countries, accept what Huntington calls Western life with Western values, or do Muslims regardless of westernization forever remain fundamentalists influenced by revived Islam? Furthermore, according to such an assumption, are all Muslims in the Western world a hidden threat waiting to be activated in controversies like the Rushdie affair? We will return to these questions later in discussing the Rushdie affair in the context of the Huntington hypothesis.

U svijetu u kojem su civilizacije gotovo pa programirane da se sukobe naglasak nije na zajedničkim vrijednostima, nego na nepomirljivim razlikama, a u takvom svijetu diskurs o ljudskim pravima, čak i ako teži univerzalnoj primjenjivosti, nije ništa više od još jednog aspekta natjecanja među civilizacijama. Ako zapadna i islamska civilizacija imaju drugačije poimanje svega, kao što inzistira Huntington, to podrazumijeva i da njeguju drugačije poimanje ideje univerzalnih ljudskih prava predodređenih na sukob. No, ako to prihvatimo kao pretpostavku, ima li dijalog uopće smisla? Također, ovdje treba razmisliti o još nečemu: liberali koji ne vjeruju da se islam može reformirati odbacuju mogućnost reforme samo ako ta reforma nije onakva kakvom su je zamislili, tj. u pojmovima njihovog, liberalnog iskustva reforme. Ali ako vam netko kaže da je promjena moguća, ali samo ako se mijenjate na način na koji su se oni promijenili i sada zahtijevaju od ostalih istu promjenu, je li to uistinu promjena i još bitnije pitanje za liberale: Zar je to uistinu sloboda i pluralizam koji brane? Sukob civilizacija glavna je nekompatibilistička premisa i sugerira kako postoji nerješiv problem između islama (kao monolitne, nepromjenjive cjeline sklone ekstremizmu i nasilju) i Zapada (kao monolitne cjeline ali koju karakteriziraju pluralizam, demokracija i ljudska prava). Izazov za dijalog između islama i Zapada za Huntingtona jeste u činjenici da u islamu nema središnjeg vjerskog autoriteta kojeg će prihvatiti svi muslimani. Nemogućnost da se muslimani dogovore međusobno, prema njemu, implicira i to da se ne mogu dogovoriti ni s ostatkom svijeta.^{▼12}

Huntington se u stavovima iznesenim u „Sukobu civilizacija“ poziva na članak Bernarda Lewisa iz 1990. pod nazivom „The Roots of Muslim Rage“, na što ovdje treba obratiti pažnju jer ćemo kasnije uočiti kako se narativ Lewisovog članka pojavljuje u Rushde aferi u dominantnom liberalnom diskursu. Lewis u većini svojih radova o islamu prepoznaje različite stupnjeve razvoja pojedinih civilizacija, što uzima kao glavni problem za dijalog između dviju moralnih tradicija. Za njega je riječ o primjetnim razlikama između islama i ostatka svijeta pa piše kako su te razlike nezanemarive „u području politike – unutarnje, regionalne, pa tako i međunarodne“ (Lewis 2004: 11). Ne samo što tvrdi kako te upečatljive razlike islam odvajaju od ostatka svijeta nego muslimane promatra kroz prizmu gubitnika koji su sada „slabi i siromašni nakon što su stoljećima bili bogati i snažni“ (Lewis 2002: 169), te smatra kako su danas muslimani nakon što su „izgubili svoje vodstvo koje su smatrali svojim pravom spali na ulogu sljedbenika Zapada“ (Ibid.) te su primorani biti imitatori naprednije i razvijenije civilizacije.

^{▼12} Postoji jedan zanimljiv argument u islamskoj moralnoj tradiciji koji nerijetko promiče liberalnim autorima a tiče se upravo nedostatka centralnog vjerskog autoriteta u islamu. Reza Aslan potvrđuje kako „za razliku od judaizma i kršćanstva, islam nikada nije imao jedinstveni vjerski autoritet. Nikada nije postojao islamski hram ili islamski papa – tj. centralizirani vjerski autoritet koji ima pravo govoriti u ime cijele islamske zajednice“ (Aslan 2011: 283), što može značiti da je svaka interpretacija jednako autoritativna. Aslan nadalje objašnjava kako vjerski autoritet u islamu „nije smješten unutar jedne osobe ili institucije. Umjesto toga raspršen je među mnoštvom natjecateljskih vjerskih institucija i škola prava“ (Ibid., 284). No, za progresivnu islamsku misao nedostatak centralnog vjerskog autoriteta ukazuje i na pluralističku prirodu islama. Primjerice, Abdulaziz Sachedina piše: „Vjeran svojem unutarnjem pluralizmu, islam se bavi očuvanjem slobode protiv autoritativne teologije, pogotovo u tom pogledu da odbija priuštiti bilo kakvoj ljudskoj instituciji poput crkve pravo da predstavlja božanski interes na zemlji među ljudima različitih vjera i kultura“ (Sachedina 2009: 63).

In a world where civilizations are almost programmed to clash, the emphasis is not on common values but on irreconcilable differences, and in such a world, the discourse of human rights even if it strives for universal applicability is nothing more than another aspect of competition between civilizations. If Western and Islamic civilization have a different understanding of everything as Huntington insists, it also implies that they also cultivate a different understanding of the idea of universal human rights destined for conflict. But if we take this as an assumption, does dialogue even make sense? Also, something else needs to be thought about here: liberals who do not believe that Islam can be reformed, reject the possibility of reform only if this reform is not as they envisioned it, i.e., in terms of their liberal experience of reform. But if someone tells you that change is possible but only if you change in the way that they have changed and now demand the same change from others, is it really a change and an even more important question for liberals: is this really the freedom and pluralism they defend? The clash of civilizations is the main non-compatibilist premise and suggests that there is an insoluble problem between Islam (as a monolithic, immutable entity prone to extremism and violence) and the West (as a monolithic entity but characterized by pluralism, democracy, and human rights). The challenge for dialogue between Islam and the West for Huntington is that there is no central religious authority in Islam that will be accepted by all Muslims, the inability for Muslims to agree with each other, according to him, implies that they cannot even agree with the rest of the world.^{▼11}

Huntington refers in the views expressed in *The Clash of Civilizations* to Bernard Lewis' 1990 article entitled *The Roots of Muslim Rage*, which should be addressed here because we will later notice how the narrative of Lewis' article appears in the Rushdie affair in dominant liberal discourse. Lewis, in most of his works on Islam, recognizes different stages of development between civilizations which he takes as a major problem for dialogue between two moral traditions. For him, there are noticeable differences between Islam and the rest of the world, so he writes that these differences are not negligible "in the field of politics – internal, regional, and so international" (Lewis, 2004: 11). Not only does he argue that these differences set Islam apart from the rest of the world, but he sees Muslims through the prism of losers who are now "weak and poor after centuries of being rich and strong" (Lewis, 2002: 169), and Muslims today who were subjected "to lose the leadership that they had come to regard as their right, and to be reduced to the role of followers of the West" (ibid.) and are forced to be imitators of a more advanced and developed civilization.

^{▼11} There is an interesting argument in the Islamic moral tradition that often eludes liberal authors and concerns precisely the lack of central religious authority in Islam. Reza Aslan affirms that "unlike Judaism and Christianity, Islam has never had a single religious authority. There has never been an Islamic temple or Islamic pope – i.e. A centralized religious authority that has the right to speak on behalf of the entire Islamic community" (Aslan, 2011: 283), which may mean that any interpretation is equally authoritative. Aslan further explains that religious authority in Islam "is not placed within the discretion one person or institution. Instead, it is scattered among a multitude of competitive religious institutions and schools of law" (ibid.). But for progressive Islamic thought, the lack of central religious authority also points to the pluralistic nature of Islam. For example, Abdulaziz Sachedina writes: "True to its internal juridical plurality, the Islamic tradition was concerned with the preservation of freedom against any kind of legal or political authoritarianism, especially in view of its refusal to afford any human institution like the "church" the right to represent divine interests on earth." (Sachedina, 2009: 63).



ILUSTRACIJA – Islam u obliku u kojem jeste, prema Huntingtonu i Lewisu, nije kompatibilan s idejom univerzalnih ljudskih prava, a zbog oprečno drugačijih vrijednosti nema ni mogućnost da to postane.

U ovom gubitku Lewis vidi razlog i korijen onoga što naziva islamskim bijesom. Ova formulacija izrazito je opasna jer nas u kontroverzama poput Rushdie afere želi potaknuti na vjerovanje kako je reakcija muslimana nešto što je stoljećima ključalo ispod površine samo da bi se prelilo u sukob koji je ionako neizbježan zbog nepremostivih razlika dvaju povijesnih natjecatelja.

Lewis nabraja tri faze kroz koje su se muslimani morali nositi s gubitkom: „Prva (faza) bila je gubitak svjetske dominacije i uznapredovala moć Rusije i Amerike. Druga je bila potkopavanje njegova autoriteta u vlastitoj zemlji, invazijom stranih ideja, zakona i načina života, a ponekad s pomoću stranih vladara i naseljenika [...]. Treća je izazov njegovoj vladavini u vlastitoj kući, od emancipacije žena do buntovničke djece“ (Lewis 1990: 49). Upravo zbog vidne premoći Zapada, slično kao i Huntington, Lewis drži kako već neko vrijeme među muslimanima postoji pobuna protiv te premoći te „želja da se ponovno afirmiraju islamske vrijednosti i vrati islamska veličina“ (Ibid.) ili, kako to Huntington naziva, „oživljeni islam“. U oba slučaja, ponovno afirmirane islamske vrijednosti i oživljeni islam u svojem izvoru imaju mržnju koja je „usmjerena prema nama“ (usp. Ibid.). Pažnju treba obratiti na Lewisovu diferencijaciju između „Njih“ (Oni/Drugi/muslimani) i „Nas“ („Mi“) što je prema Huntingtonovoj hipotezi upravo ono što se događa pri samoodređivanju i natjecanju civilizacija. „Mi“ vs. „Oni“ narativ je koji će uvelike pratiti Rushdie aferu. Ovdje bi nas trebalo zanimati pitanje: Da li Lewis i Huntington pod „Mi“ podrazumijevaju i muslimane koji žive u liberalnom, zapadnom svijetu i koji su se „pozapadnjačili“ u smislu da su prihvatili njihovo sekularno iskustvo ili za njih ti muslimani ispod površine ostaju „islamski“ jer se islam nikad ne može reformirati?

Također, ne smije nam promaknuti ni to da prihvaćanjem narativa sukoba civilizacija (uključujući i premisu korijena islamskog bijesa, da su muslimani bijesna skupina fanatika opsjednutih Zapadom), kroz diferencijaciju „Mi“ i „Oni“, „Oni“ se isključuju iz „Naše“ civilizacije, a pošto „Našu“ civilizaciju smatramo naprednijom, „Njih“ automatski smatramo nazadnima. U takvom odnosu, pretpostavljamo da „Oni“ trebaju i moraju nešto naučiti od nas, ali kako je njihova istinska promjena nemoguća jer se samoodređuju prema drugačijim vrijednostima, onda je zapravo i to što nauče samo površinsko i njihova prava priroda ostaje ona neprijateljska za „Naše“ vrijednosti. U ovakav kontekstualni okvir većina liberalnih komentatora smjestit će Rushdie aferu, sagledavajući je kao okršaj nazadne i napredne civilizacije na još jednom međusobnom nerazumijevanju: ljudskim pravima. Kakav je odnos moguć ako se definira u pojmovima „nemoćnog, siromašnog i nazadnog“ islamskog svijeta (usp. Ibid., 56–57) naspram naprednog Zapada, pri čemu islamski svijet nema izbora osim da imitira zapadne uspjehe? Za Lewisa nema dvojbe da se radi o „sukobu civilizacija – možda iracionalna, ali svakako povijesna reakcija drevnoga neprijatelja protiv našega judeokršćanskoga naslijeđa, naše sekularne sadašnjosti“ (Ibid., 60). Kao što je slučaj u dominantnom liberalnom diskursu za vrijeme Rushdie afere, Lewis i Huntington ne preispituju apsolutističke težnje vlastite sekularne sadašnjosti, nego je smatraju normativnim standardom koji ostali moraju doseći ukoliko žele biti civilizirani kao oni.

In this loss, Lewis sees the reason and root of what he calls Muslim rage. This formulation is extremely dangerous because in controversies like the Rushdie affair it wants to encourage us to believe that the reaction of Muslims is something that has boiled beneath the surface for centuries, just to spill over in a conflict that is already inevitable due to the insurmountable differences of the two historical competitors.

The Muslim had to deal with the loss through three stages that Lewis enumerates: "The first was his loss of domination in the world, to the advancing power of Russia and the West. The second was the undermining of his authority in his own country, through an invasion of foreign ideas and laws and ways of life and sometimes even foreign rulers or settlers... The third—the last straw—was the challenge to his mastery in his own house, from emancipated women and rebellious children" (Lewis, 1990: 49). Precisely because of the visible supremacy of the West, much like Huntington, Lewis believes that for some time there has been a revolt among Muslims against this supremacy and "a desire to reassert Muslim values and restore Muslim greatness" (ibid.) or as Huntington calls it "revived Islam". In both cases, reaffirmed Islamic values and revived Islam have at their source a hatred that is "directed towards us" (cf. ibid.). Attention should be paid to Lewis' differentiation between "Them" (They/Others/Muslims) and "Us" ("We") which according to Huntington's hypothesis is exactly what happens in self-identification and competition of civilizations. "We" vs. "They" is a narrative that will largely follow Rushdie's affair. Here we should be interested in the question: Do Lewis and Huntington by "We" also mean Muslims living in the liberal, Western world and who have "westernized" in the sense that they have accepted their secular experience or do these Muslims, for them, remain "Islamic" below the surface because Islam can never be reformed?

Also, we must not neglect the position that by accepting the narrative of the clash of civilizations (including the premise of the root of Muslim rage that Muslims are an angry group of western-obsessed fanatics), through the differentiation of "We" and "They", "them" is excluded from "our" civilization, and since we consider "our" civilization more advanced, we automatically consider "them" backwards. In such a relationship, we assume that "They" need and must learn something from "us", but since their true change is impossible because they self-identify themselves according to different values, then in fact what "they" learn is only superficial and "their" true nature remains that hostile to "our" values. In this contextual framework, most liberal commentators will place the Rushdie affair, seeing it as a clash of backward and advanced civilization on another mutual misunderstanding: human rights. What kind of relationship is possible if it is defined in terms of the "weak, poor and backward" Islamic world (cf., ibid.: 56-7) against the advanced West, whereby the Islamic world has no choice but to imitate Western successes? For Lewis, there is no doubt that this is a "clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present" (ibid.: 60). As is the case in the dominant liberal discourse during the Rushdie affair, Lewis and Huntington do not question the absolutist aspirations of their own secular present but consider it a normative standard that others must reach if they are to be civilized like them.

Ideja univerzalnih ljudskih prava za nekompatibiliste^{▼13} poput Lewisa sastavni je dio te „zapadne sekularne sadašnjosti“, koja ne rezonira s islamskom sadašnjosti. Islam u obliku u kojem jeste, prema njima, nije kompatibilan s idejom univerzalnih ljudskih prava, a zbog oprečno drugačijih vrijednosti nema ni mogućnost da to postane. Jer, prema takvom stajalištu, ako se islam i reformira, to čini samo kako bi postao više „islamski“, dakle još nekompatibilniji s onim što liberalna strana drži univerzalnim. No, jesu li ta prava uistinu univerzalna? Kao što ćemo vidjeti u sljedećem poglavlju, diskurs o ljudskim pravima nije ostao imun na narativ sukobljenih civilizacija, što je intenziviralo nepovjerljivost muslimana prema liberalnoj promociji univerzalnih ljudskih prava.



ILUSTRACIJA - Ostaju otvorena pitanja, jesu li ta univerzalna ljudska prava uistinu univerzalna, kao i zašto je intenzivirana nepovjerljivost muslimana prema liberalnoj promociji univerzalnih ljudskih prava?

▼13 U ovom članku, pojam *nekompatibilisti* koristi se za one mislioce, pisce, teoretičare i učenjake koji vjeruju kako je islam nekompatibilan s modernom idejom univerzalnih ljudskih prava.

The idea of universal human rights for non-compatriots like Lewis is an integral part of this "Western secular present" that does not resonate with the Islamic present. Islam in the form in which it is, according to them, is not compatible with the idea of universal human rights, and because of conflictingly different values, it has no possibility of becoming one. Because, according to this view, Islam and if reformed, it is only to become more "Islamic", therefore even more incompatible with what the liberal side considers universal. But are these rights really universal? As we will see in the next chapter, the discourse of human rights has not remained immune to the narrative of conflicting civilizations, which has intensified the distrust of Muslims towards the liberal promotion of universal human rights.




ILLUSTRATION ~ Questions remain open, are these universal human rights truly universal, as well as why the distrust of Muslims towards the liberal promotion of universal human rights has intensified?

Univerzalna ljudska prava i Rushdie afera

Preispitivanje univerzalnosti ljudskih prava u kontekstu islamskog i liberalnog razumijevanja istih, počelo je uvelike i prije Rushdie afere. Hronološki gledajući, teško je precizirati tačan trenutak kada se to pitanje razvilo u problematiku koja je iznjedrila mnoštvo diskursa na akademskoj ali i javnoj razini. U većini radova koji tematiziraju ovu problematiku kao početna tačka uzima se trenutak odbijanja Saudijske Arabije da glasa za Opću deklaraciju OUN-a o ljudskim pravima (1948), tvrdeći kako se članak 18^{▼14} protivi islamskim propisima. Iako je Saudijska Arabija jedina islamska zemlja koja je službeno odbila glasati za Opću deklaraciju, nužno je istaknuti kako je nekoliko islamskih zemalja, unatoč potpisivanju, „kritiziralo Opću deklaraciju zbog nemogućnosti da u obzir uzmu kulturni i vjerski kontekst nezapadnih zemalja. Iran je tvrdio kako je Opća deklaracija sekularno razumijevanje judeokršćanske tradicije, koju muslimani ne mogu implementirati a da ne krše šerijat“ (Mubarak 2013: 21–22).

Također, svakako ne treba izostaviti ni činjenicu da pojedine islamske zemlje, iako su formalno potpisale Opću deklaraciju i danas nastavljaju kršiti temeljna ljudska prava zagarantirana njome. Jedan od primjera je Afganistan, koji je potpisao Opću deklaraciju bez prigovora na članak 18, ali kaznenim zakonom i dalje kriminalizira blasfemiju, a za otpadništvo od vjere propisuje smrtnu kaznu.^{▼15} Drugi primjer je Pakistan, koji „ne samo da je potpisao Deklaraciju, nego je njihov UN predstavnik kritizirao tvrdnju Saudijske Arabije da sporazum krši islamski zakon i načela“ (Price 1999: 163), a prema pakistanskom kaznenom zakonu blasfemija se kažnjava smrću.^{▼16} Osim Opće deklaracije, Pakistan je 2010. godine pristupio i Međunarodnom paktu o građanskim i političkim

▼14 „Svatko ima pravo na slobodu mišljenja, savjesti i vjeroispovijesti; to pravo uključuje slobodu promjene vjeroispovijesti ili uvjerenja i slobodu da pojedinačno ili u zajednici s drugima, javno ili privatno, iskazuje svoju vjeroispovijest ili uvjerenje bogoslužjem, poučavanjem, praktičnim vršenjem i obredima.“

▼15 Iako se radi o rijetkim slučajevima, smrtne kazne za blasfemiju i otpadništvo prisutne su i u bližoj prošlosti. Primjerice, 2006. godine Abdul Rahmana vlastima prijavljuje vlastita obitelj jer posjeduje Bibliju. Rahman je otpao od islama i prešao na kršćanstvo, zbog čega je osuđen na smrtnu kaznu za otpadništvo. Zbog međunarodnog pritiska i uz borbu nevladinih organizacija, pušten je na slobodu, nakon čega mu Italija daje politički azil. Drugi primjer je smrtna kazna za blasfemiju novinara Sayeda Perveza Kambaksuja 2007. godine, jer je distribuirao blasfemične tekstove. Kazna mu je nakon međunarodnog pritiska promijenjena u dvadeset godina zatvora. U konačnici, godinu dana poslije, Kambaksu je pomilovan i uz pomoć norveških diplomata bježi iz Afganistana.

▼16 U pakistanskom kaznenom zakonu pod 295 C stoji: „Korištenje pogrđnih primjedbi itd., za časnog Poslanika. – Tko god riječima, bilo izgovorenim ili napisanim, ili vidljivim predstavljanjem, ili bilo kojim pripisivanjem, insinucijom, izravno ili neizravno, skrnavi sveto ime časnog poslanika Muhameda bit će kažnjen smrću, ili doživotnim zatvorom, a također će biti podložan novčanoj kazni“, (dostupno na: <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/64050/88951/F1412088581/PAK64050%202017.pdf>).

Universal Human Rights and the Rushdie Affair

Questioning the universality of human rights in the context of the Islamic and liberal understanding of them began to be greatly debated even before the Rushdie affair. Chronologically speaking, it is difficult to specify the exact moment when this issue developed into a problem that has spawned a multitude of discourses at the academic as well as the public level. In most of the papers that deal with this issue, the starting point is taken the moment of Saudi Arabia's refusal to vote for the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), arguing that Article 18^{▼12} is opposed to Islamic law. Although Saudi Arabia is the only Islamic country that has officially refused to vote for the Universal Declaration, it is necessary to point out that several Islamic countries, despite the signing, "criticized the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for its perceived failure to take into account the cultural and religious context of non-Western countries. Iran claimed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was "a secular understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition", which could not be implemented by Muslims without trespassing the Shari'ah" (Mubarak, 2013: 21-22).

Also, one should certainly not omit the fact that some Islamic countries, although having formally signed the Universal Declaration, continue to violate the fundamental human rights guaranteed by it. One example is Afghanistan, which signed the Universal Declaration without objecting to Article 18, but the criminal code continues to criminalize blasphemy and prescribes the death penalty for apostasy.^{▼13} Another example is Pakistan, which "not only signed the declaration, but its UN representative criticized Saudi Arabia's claim that the agreement violates Islamic law and principles" (Price, 1999: 163), and under Pakistan's penal code, blasphemy is punishable by death.^{▼14} In addition to the Universal Declaration, Pakistan joined the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 2010 (1966.)^{▼15} wherein Article 6(2) provides that "in countries which have not

▼12 „Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes the freedom to change religion or belief and the freedom to express, individually or in community with others, publicly or privately, his religion or belief through worship, teaching, practice and rituals.“

▼13 Although these are rare cases, the death penalty for blasphemy and apostasy are also present in the recent past. In 2006, for example, Abdul Rahman was reported to the authorities by his own family because he owned a Bible. Rahman fell away from Islam and converted to Christianity, for which he was sentenced to the death penalty for apostasy. Due to international pressure and the struggle of NGOs, he was released and Italy gave him political asylum. Another example is the death penalty for the blasphemy of journalist Sayed Pervez Kambaksu in 2007, for distributing blasphemous texts. His sentence was commuted to twenty years in prison after international pressure. Ultimately, a year later, Kambaksu was pardoned and with the help of Norwegian diplomats flees Afghanistan.

▼14 Pakistan's penal code under 295C states: The use of derogatory remarks, etc., for the Honorable Prophet. – Whoever, in words, whether spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any attribution, insinuation, directly or indirectly, desecrates the holy name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad shall be punished with death, or life imprisonment, and shall also be subject to a fine" (available on <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/64050/88951/F1412088581/PAK64050%202017.pdf>).

▼15 Available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>.

pravima (1966),^{▼17} u kojem se člankom 6 stavkom 2 propisuje kako „u zemljama koje nisu ukinule smrtnu kaznu, kazna smrću može se izreći samo za najteže zločine“.^{▼18} No, ukoliko se ne obrati pažnja na šerijat, koji je izvor pakistanskog kaznenog zakona, može nam lako promaknuti činjenica da se pod najtežim zločinima, *ḥudūd*^{▼19} zločinima, nalazi upravo otpadništvo. Smrtna kazna za otpadništvo^{▼20} te kriminalizacija blasfemije nisu u primarnom fokusu ovog članka, no svakako jesu neizostavan element cijele problematike jer se tiču prava na slobodu vjerovanja i prava na slobodu izražavanja – što uz prava žena, predstavlja glavne tačke napetosti oko kojih se najčešće postavlja pitanje (ne)kompatibilnosti islama s idejom univerzalnih ljudskih prava. Također, slučaj koji se preispituje u ovom članku u svojoj kompleksnosti uključuje raspravu o pravu na slobodu vjerovanja, kao i o pravu na slobodu izražavanja.

S obzirom na to da će se u članku većim dijelom kontekstualizirati okolnosti objave knjige 1988. godine i onoga što je uslijedilo, za ovu raspravu važno je da shvatimo kako su okolnosti u kojima živimo danas drugačije od okolnosti u kojima je Saudijska Arabija odbila dati svoj glas Općoj deklaraciji te jednako tako da je „svijet u kojem živimo danas uvelike drugačiji od onoga u kojem se kontroverza dogodila“ (Mondal 2014: 13). Pritom, misli se na kulminaciju događaja^{▼21}

^{▼17} Dostupno na: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>.

^{▼18} Unatoč tome što je broj izrečenih i izvršenih smrtnih kazni u Pakistanu opao, Međunarodna federacija za ljudska prava (2022) izvještava kako je još uvijek „širok raspon kaznenih djela za koja je predviđena smrtna kazna i uključuje zločine koji ne spadaju u 'najteže zločine', među kojima je još uvijek blasfemija. Izvještaj dostupan na: <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/pakistan/World-Day-Against-Death-Penalty-capital-punishment-Pakistan>. Također, prema izvješću Komisije Sjedinjenih Američkih Država o međunarodnim vjerskim slobodama, od 2014. do 2018. godine, više od jedne četvrtine svih 674 prijavljena slučaja u kojima je država provela kaznu za blasfemiju otpada na Pakistan (184) te 14% (96 slučajeva) na Iran. Prema istom izvješću, više od pola prijavljenih slučajeva za masovno nasilje nad onima koji su počinili blasfemiju otpada na Pakistan. Dostupno na: https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2020%20Blasphemy%20Enforcement%20Report%20_final_0.pdf.

^{▼19} *Ḥudūd* zločini su oni „zločini“ za koje se u islamskoj jurisprudenciji drži da su za njih u Kur'anu propisane fiksne kazne: krađa, blud, konzumacija alkohola, kleveta, terorizam te otpadništvo. No, iako se smatra da Kur'an propisuje fiksne kazne za ove zločine, u islamskoj jurisprudenciji postoji vrlo živa rasprava među pravnicima i teolozima oko interpretacije kur'anskih dijelova koji tematiziraju zločine i kazne. Tako primjerice dok postoji konsenzus među četirima pravnim školama u sunitskom islamu da je kazna za otpadništvo smrt, mnogi suvremeni teolozi i pravnici ukazuju na to kako se od muslimana u Kur'anu traži da kaznu za otpadnike prepuste Bogu na Sudnjem danu. Mnogi suvremeni autori, poput Kamalija, tvrde da je smrtna kazna za otpadništvo protivna glavnoj poruci Kur'ana, da „u vjeri nema prisile“, štoviše, prema Kamaliju, čitava rasprava je „kontroverzna“ jer kada je riječ o smrtnoj kazni za otpadništvo, Kamali piše kako je „Kur'an u potpunosti tih o tom pitanju“ (Kamali 2019: 142).

^{▼20} Iako se ovdje neću detaljnije baviti time, svakako želim napomenuti kako u suvremenim raspravama u islamskoj moralnoj tradiciji progresivni autori poput Abdullaha an-Na'ima i Mohammada Hashima Kamalija argumentiraju protiv smrtno kazne za otpadništvo. Na drugom mjestu detaljnije preispitujem smrtnu kaznu za otpadništvo i odbacujem je kao praksu proturječnu ideji univerzalnih ljudskih prava, vidi: Čustović, Ajla. „Smrtna kazna za otpadništvo u islamu“. *Politička misao*. 2020;57(1):127-149.

^{▼21} Teroristički napad na Svjetski trgovački centar 2001. godine svakako je jedan od događaja koji je promijenio svijet, posebice svijet u kontekstu odnosa islama i Zapada (uz svu opreznost korištenja ovih pojmova). Mnogi autori poput

abolished the death penalty, the penalty of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes."^{▼16} But unless we pay attention to the Shari'ah, which is the source of Pakistan's penal code, we can easily miss the fact that under the most serious crimes, the *ḥudūd*^{▼17} crimes, where one finds precisely apostasy. The death penalty for apostasy^{▼18} and the criminalization of blasphemy are not in the primary focus of this article, but they are certainly an indispensable element of the whole issue because they concern the right to freedom of belief and the right to freedom of speech - which, along with the rights of women, represents the main points of tension around which the most common issue is the question of the (in)compatibility of Islam with the idea of universal human rights. Also, the case that is reviewed in this article in its complexity includes a discussion of the right to freedom of belief, as well as the right to freedom of expression.

While the article will largely contextualize the circumstances surrounding the publication of the book in 1988 and what followed, it is important for this discussion to understand that the circumstances in which we live today are different from the circumstances in which Saudi Arabia refused to give its voice to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and equally that "the world in which we live today is vastly different from the one in which the controversy occurred" (Mondal, 2014: 13). Furthermore, we are referring to the culmination of events^{▼19} which had been continuously happening since the publication of the book to the present day,

^{▼16} Despite the decline in the number of sentences handed down and executed in Pakistan, the International Federation for Human Rights (2022) says there is still "a wide range of crimes punishable by the death penalty and includes crimes that do not fall into the "most serious crimes", including blasphemy. Report available at: <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/pakistan/World-Day-Against-Death-Penalty-capital-punishment-Pakistan>. Despite the decline in the number of sentences handed down and executed in Pakistan, the International Federation for Human Rights (2022) says there is still "a wide range of crimes punishable by the death penalty and includes crimes that do not fall into the "most serious crimes", including blasphemy. Report available at https://www.uscfr.gov/sites/default/files/2020%20Blasphemy%20Enforcement%20Report%20_final_0.pdf.

^{▼17} *Ḥudūd* crimes are those "crimes" for which Islamic jurisprudence holds that fixed penalties are prescribed for them in the Qur'an: theft, fornication, alcohol consumption, slander, terrorism and apostasy. But although the Qur'an is thought to prescribe fixed sentences for these crimes, in Islamic jurisprudence there is a very vivid debate among lawyers and theologians over the interpretation of the Qur'anic parts that deal with crimes and punishments. For example, while there is a consensus among the four legal schools in Sunni Islam that the punishment for apostasy is death, many modern theologians and lawyers point to how Muslims in the Qur'an are asked to leave the punishment for apostates to God on the Day of Judgment. Many contemporary authors, such as Kamali, argue that the death penalty for apostasy is contrary to the main message of the Qur'an that "there is no coercion in religion", moreover according to Kamali, the whole debate is "controversial" because when it comes to the death penalty for apostasy, Kamali writes that "the Qur'an is completely silent on this issue." (Kamali, 2019: 142).

^{▼18} Although I will not deal with it in more detail here, I certainly want to note that in contemporary discussions in the Islamic moral tradition, progressive authors such as Abdullahi an-Na'ima and Mohammad Hashim Kamali argue against the death penalty for apostasy. Elsewhere, I question the death penalty for apostasy in more detail and reject it as a practice contradictory to the idea of universal human rights, see: Čustović, Ajla. 2020 *Death penalty for apostasy in Islam. Politička misao*, 57,1:127-149.

^{▼19} The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 was certainly one of the events that changed the world, especially the world in the context of the relationship between Islam and the West (with all the caution of using these terms). Many authors such as Edward W. Said (see: Said, Edward W. 2003. *Krivotvorenje islama*. VBZ. Zagreb.) they cite as a crucial moment in which he identified with terrorism in the Western public and slam and which deepened misunderstanding, distrust and hostility. At that time, a superficial, incisive approach to Islam was often written about jihad as a holy war of all Muslims against the rest of the world. *Jihad* is understood then, but still today, in liberal discourses as an expansionist campaign by Muslims that will stop only when all people accept Islam or agree to live under Islamic rule (see: Lewis, Bernard. 2004. *The crisis of Islam – Holy War and Unholy Terror*. Phoenix. London). It is *jihad* today that many liberals cite as an indispensable element of Islam that best explains the incompatibility of

koji su se kontinuirano dešavali od objave knjige do danas, a imali su zajednički kontekst koji je u dominantnim diskursima islamske i liberalne moralne tradicije uključivao dva glavna aktera: islam i Zapad u okviru narativa sukobljenih civilizacija. Pritom je Zapad okarakteriziran kao raznolik, slobodan, napredan i otvoren, a islam kao nazadan, represivan, zatvoren i nehuman,^{▼22} onako kako je shvaćen u Huntingtonovoj i Lewisovoj viziji svijeta. Iako se članak ranije referirao na generalizirane pojmove „islam“ i „Zapad“, ovdje treba istaknuti Saidovo retoričko pitanje: Zašto se islamu često suprotstavlja Zapad, a ne kršćanstvo? Said odgovara da

postoji pretpostavka da je „Zapad“ veći i da je nadišao fazu kršćanstva, svoje vodeće religije, dok je istodobno svijet islama (njegova različita društva, povijesti i jezici) zaglibio u vjeru, primitivnost i nazadnost. Prema tome, Zapad je suvremen [...] Islamski svijet, s druge strane, nije ništa više nego „islam“, sveden na mali broj osobina koje se ne mijenjaju usprkos pojavljivanju proturječja i iskustvima raznolikosti kojih, čini se, ima u istom tolikom izobilju kao i na Zapadu. (Said 2003: 7)

Zabrinjavajuće je što takav narativ obiluje površnim pojmovima kojima se drugi etiketiraju nizom nepreciznih oznaka, s kojima se onda olako barata. Osim što su takve oznake opasne, iznimno su manjkave jer „grupiraju ljude pod pogrešnim rubrikama poput 'Amerika', 'Zapad' ili 'islam“ te izmišljaju kolektivne identitete za veliki broj pojedinaca koji su zapravo vrlo različiti“ (Said 2004: 878).

Nakon Khomeinijeve objave *fetve*, medijska pozornost koju su protesti priskrbili spaljivanjem knjige bila je svojevrsna procjena kompatibilnosti islama s uzvišenom vrijednosti britanskog društva – pravom na slobodu izražavanja. Unatoč tome što mnogi nisu podržali Khomeinija te što protesti

Edwarda W. Saida (vidi: Said, Edward W. *Krivotvorenje islama*. Zagreb: VBZ; 2003) navode kao presudan trenutak u kojem se u zapadnoj javnosti islam poistovjetio s terorizmom, što je produbilo nerazumijevanje, nepovjerenje i neprijateljstvo. Tada se često na jedan površan, huškački pristup islamu pisalo o *džihadu* kao svetom ratu svih muslimana protiv ostatka svijeta. *Džihad* se tada, ali i danas, u liberalnim diskursima shvaća kao ekspanzionistički pohod muslimana koji će prestati tek kada svi ljudi prihvate islam ili pristanu živjeti pod islamskom vladavinom (vidi: Lewis, Bernard. *The crisis of Islam – Holy War and Unholy Terror*. London: Phoenix, 2004). Upravo *džihad* danas mnogi liberali navode kao neizostavan element islama koji najbolje objašnjava nekompatibilnost islama i muslimana sa zapadnim, liberalnim društvima. Nadalje, svijet u kojem živimo svjedočio je i ubojstvu nizozemskog redatelja Theodoora van Gogha nakon što je režirao kratki film *Submission*, u kojem se prikazuje golo tijelo žene ispisano dijelovima Kur'ana koji se naziru ispod prozirnog vela, terorističkim napadima 2005. godine u Londonu, kontroverzama koje su izazvali crteži Poslanikove glave na tijelu psa švedskog umjetnika Larsa Vilksa 2007. godine, koji je godinama poslije bio žrtva mnogobrojnih napada, objave karikature Poslanika s bombom u turbanu u Danskoj 2009. godine i terorističkom napadu na uredništvo novina Charlie Hebdo u Francuskoj nakon što su objavile karikaturu Poslanika te evropske zabrane nošenja *hidžaba*.

^{▼22} Akhtar u svojoj kritici za vrijeme Rushdie afere izlaže kako u suvremenoj zapadnoj misli prevladavaju određeni pojmovi kojima se opisuje islam i to: „barbarski, fanatičan, zastario, egzotičan, opresivan, senzualan“ (Akhtar 1989: 9). Usmjerava čitatelje da obrate pažnju na naslove knjiga objavljenih o islamu, a koje u svojim naslovima najčešće imaju riječi poput: teror, bijes, bodež, mač, nasilje i slično. Takvi naslovi postoje i danas, ali svakako treba napomenuti da ne treba generalizirati te istaknuti kako su napisane i knjige koje su se ozbiljno, akademski bavile islamom bez senzacionalističkih naslova. Ipak, zapadni autori koji pišu o islamu sa željom da ga istinski razumiju, a koji nisu pod utjecajem dominantne struje, nerijetko su okarakterizirani kao apologetičari islama.

and had a common context whereby in the dominant discourses of Islamic and liberal moral tradition there are two main actors: Islam and the West within the narrative of conflicting civilizations. In fact, the West has been characterized as diverse, free, progressive and open, and Islam as backward, repressive, closed and inhumane^{▼20}, such as it was implied in Huntington and Lewis' vision of the world. Although the article previously referred to the generalized terms "Islam" and "The West", Said's rhetorical question should be highlighted here: why is Islam often opposed by the West and not by Christianity? Said answers this question saying

“the assumption is that whereas “the West” is greater than and has surpassed the stage of Christianity, its principal religion, the world of Islam — its varied societies, histories, and languages notwithstanding — is still mired in religion, primitivity, and backwardness. Therefore, the West is modern... the world of Islam, on the other hand, is no more than “Islam,” reducible to a small number of unchanging characteristics despite the appearance of contradictions and experiences of variety that seem on the surface to be as plentiful as those of the West” (Said, 2003: 7).

What is troubling in such a narrative is that it abounds in superficial concepts that label others with a series of imprecise labels, which are then easily handled. In addition to such labels being dangerous, they are extremely flawed because they "herd people under falsely unifying rubrics like "America," "the West" or "Islam" and invent collective identities for large numbers of individuals who are actually quite diverse, (Said, 2004: 878).

After Khomeini's publication *of the fatwā*, the media attention that the protests gained by burning the book, was a kind of assessment of the compatibility of Islam with the lofty value of British society – the right to freedom of expression. Despite many failing to support Khomeini, and the protests not including all Muslims, the nature of Islam has been identified with the reaction of several of his followers. Nicole Falkenhayer realizes that it was the Western media that "passed the verdict" according to which Muslims were left out of the debate about the right to freedom of speech because of Khomeini's reaction, and in her

Islam and Muslims with Western, liberal societies. Furthermore, the world we live in has also witnessed the murder of Dutch director Theodor van Gogh after directing the short film *Submission* in which the naked body of a woman is written in parts of the Qur'an that can be seen under a transparent veil, the 2005 terrorist attacks in London, controversy caused by drawings of the Prophet's head on the body of the dog of Swedish artist Lars Vilks in 2007, who years later was the victim of numerous attacks, The publication of caricatures of the Prophet with a bomb in a turban in Denmark in 2009, the terrorist attack on the editorial board of Charlie Hebdo newspapers in France after publishing a caricature of the Prophet and the European ban on wearing *hijābs*.

^{▼20} Akhtar, in his critique during the Rushdie affair, exposes how certain concepts that describe Islam predominate in contemporary Western thought: "barbaric, fanatical, outdated, exotic, oppressive, sensual" (Akhtar, 1989: 9). It directs readers to pay attention to the titles of books published about Islam, which in their titles most often have words such as: terror, rage, dagger, sword, violence and the like. Such titles still exist today, but it should certainly be noted that it should not be generalized and pointed out that books were written that seriously, academically dealt with Islam without sensationalist titles. Yet Western authors who write about Islam with the desire to truly understand it, without being influenced by the dominant current, are often characterized as apologetics in the name of Islam.

nisu uključivali sve, pa ni većinu muslimana, priroda islama poistovjećena je s reakcijom nekolicine njegovih sljedbenika. Nicole Falkenhayer uviđa da su zapadni mediji bili ti koji su „donijeli presudu“ po kojoj su muslimani zbog Khomeinijeve reakcije bili izostavljeni iz rasprave o pravu na slobodu govora te u svom radu ukazuje na prisutnost medijske „antagonističke retorike, koja je *kulturalizirala*▼²³[...] obračun između *Zapada* i islama“ (Falkenhayer 2010: 129). Različiti pogledi na pravo na slobodu govora (i da li pravo na slobodu govora uključuje i pravo da se nekoga uvrijedite) medijske težnje svele su na kulturološke i civilizacijske razlike, a Rushdie afera tako postaje „centar velikih bitki između kršćanstva i islama, sekularizma i fundamentalizma, Evrope i njezinih bivših kolonija, zemlje primateljice i njezinih imigranata, post i predmodernista, umjetnosti i religije i između skepticizma i vjere“ (Parekh 1990: 696). Primjerice, jedan od velikih kritičara islama Daniel Pipes u više je navrata pisao o Rushdie aferi, u kojoj vidi sukob islamske i kršćanske civilizacije. Čini se kako Pipes prepoznaje da u islamskoj moralnoj tradiciji postoje različiti smjerovi te iskazuje suosjećanje s „nefundamentalnim muslimanima“. Za Pipesa je ta vrsta muslimana u nezavidnoj poziciji, jer su „prepušteni da se bore sa svojom radikalnom braćom, ali i predrasudama zapadnjaka, koji ih nepravedno sjedinjuju s njihovim suparnicima“ (Pipes 1990). No, u istom članku Pipes Rushdie aferu opisuje kao događaj zbog kojeg „kršćanska i islamska civilizacija ušle su u konfrontaciju kakva nije viđena stoljećima“ (Ibid.). Pipes time potez pojedinca, koji ne govori u ime svih muslimana (jer niti jedan musliman to ne može), te unatoč tome što su muslimani u većini osudili *fetvu* i nasilje, izjednačava s islamskom civilizacijom i pozicionira je nasuprot kršćanskoj. Takav narativ skriva opasnu sugestiju da je na jednoj strani kršćanstvo s vrijednostima poput prava na slobodu govora, koje se smatraju njemu svojstvenima, dok je na drugoj strani islam, koji ne samo da ne posjeduje te vrijednosti, nego ih želi ograničiti.▼²⁴ Problem je u tome što s ovakvim pristupom, osim što on destruktivno simplificira pojmove, ako držimo da su vrijednosti poput prava na slobodu govora svojstvene zapadnom, judeokršćanskom identitetu,▼²⁵ a onda islam pozicioniramo s druge strane u kontekstu okršaja i sukoba – rasprave o univerzalnosti nema.

▼²³ Ovaj pojam nadalje u tekstu posuđujem od Falkenhayerove, a pod njim podrazumijevam da je sukobu dodijeljena kulturološka pozadina, tj. da je u srži ove afere razlika između nepomirljivih kultura, što u konačnici i jeste ono što Huntington pretpostavlja u svojoj hipotezi.

▼²⁴ Jedan od primjera možemo pronaći i u pismu „The words for Salman Rushdie“, koje je napisalo 28 pisaca, a objavljeno je 12. ožujka 1989. godine u The New York Times Book Review. Octavio Paz piše: „Ono što vidimo jeste nestajanje modernih vrijednosti koje su došle s prosvjetiteljstvom. Ljudi koji su tebe osudili žive prije prosvjetiteljstva. Suočeni smo s povijesnom kontradikcijom u našoj zemlji.“ Dostupno na: <https://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/12/books/words-for-salman-rushdie.html>.

▼²⁵ Primjerice, Charles Taylor nakon što bilježi kako „liberalizam ne može i ne treba tvrditi potpunu kulturnu neutralnost“, argumentira kako se „razdvajanje Crkve i države prati sve do najranijih dana kršćanske civilizacije. Prvobitni oblici odvajanja drugačiji su od naših, ali postavljeni su temelji za moderni razvoj. Sam pojam sekularno izvorno je dio kršćanskog vokabulara“ (Taylor 1994: 62). Usto, Taylor zaključuje kako za mainstream islam „odvajanje politike i vjere kako očekujemo mi u zapadnom liberalnom društvu ne dolazi u obzir“ (Ibid., 61).

work points to the presence of media “antagonistic rhetoric, which has *culturized*▼²¹... the conflict between *the West* and Islam” (Falkenhayner, 2010: 129). Differing views on the right to freedom of speech (and whether the right to free speech also includes the right to offend someone) media aspirations have been reduced to cultural and civilizational differences, and the Rushdie affair thus becomes “the center of the great battles between Christianity and Islam, secularism and fundamentalism, Europe and its former colonies, the receiving country and its immigrants, post and pre – modernists, art and religion and between skepticism and faith” (Parekh, 1990: 696). For example, one of the great critics of Islam Daniel Pipes has repeatedly written about the Rushdie affair. While according to Said most liberal actors will write about Islam and the West, Pipes sees in the Rushdie affair a clash between the Islamic and Christian civilization. Pipes seems to recognize that there are different directions in the Islamic moral tradition and expresses sympathy for “non-fundamental Muslims”. For Pipes, these kind of Muslims are in an unenviable position, because “they are left to fight with their radical brothers, but also with the prejudices of Westerners, who unjustly unite them with their rivals.” (Pipes 1990). But in the same Pipes article, Rushdie describes the affair as an event that “Christian and Islamic civilizations have entered into a confrontation unlike anything seen in centuries” (ibid.). Pipes thus equates the action of an individual, who does not speak for all Muslims (because no Muslim can) and despite the fact that Muslims in the majority condemned the *fatwā* and the violence, with Islamic and positions it against the Christian civilization. This kind of narrative masks a dangerous suggestion, that on the one hand Christianity has values such as the right to freedom of speech that are considered inherent in it, while on the other side is Islam, which not only does not possess these values, wants to limit them.▼²² The problem with this approach, in addition to destructively simplifying concepts, is that if we hold that values such as the right to freedom of speech, are values that are inherent in Western, Judeo-Christian identity,▼²³ and then we position Islam on the other hand in the context of skirmishes and conflicts, there is no discourse about universality.

▼²¹ I borrow this term from Falkenhayer, by which I imply that the conflict is assigned a cultural background, i.e. that at the core of this affair is the difference between irreconcilable cultures which ultimately is what Huntington assumes in his hypothesis.

▼²² One example can be found in the letter “Words for Salman Rushdie” written by 28 writers and published on March 12, 1989 in The New York Times Book Review. Octavio Paz writes: “We are seeing the disappearance of the modern values that came with the Enlightenment. The people who condemned you live before the Enlightenment. We face a historic contradiction in our country.” Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/12/books/words-for-salman-rushdie.html>.

▼²³ For example, Charles Taylor, after noting that “liberalism cannot and should not claim complete cultural neutrality,” argues that “the separation of Church and State is traced back to the earliest days of Christian civilization. The original forms of separation are different from ours, but the foundations for modern development have been laid. The very term secular is originally part of the Christian vocabulary” (Taylor, 1994: 62). In addition, Taylor concludes that for mainstream Islam, “the separation of politics and religion as we expect in western liberal society is out of the question” (ibid.). In addition to adopting the Us and Oni divide himself, Taylor does not define what it considers under mainstream Islam. Also, Falkenhayner in her work cites the example of the writer Faye Weldon who argued that “the Bible can serve as the foundation of a decent society, while on the other hand this is not the case with the Qur’an” (Falkenhayner, 2010: 116).



ILUSTRACIJA - Zapad se koristi mnogim alatima, sredstvima ali i institucijama kako bi promovirao i nametnuo vlastite vrijednosti kao univerzalne. Rasprave o univerzalnosti nema, čemu doprinose i tvrdnje da su vrijednosti poput prava na slobodu govora svojstvene zapadnom, judeokršćanskom identitetu, s druge strane islam pozicioniraju u kontekstu okršaja i sukoba, kao i odbijanju zapadnih institucija (i ideje).



ILLUSTRATION ~ The West uses many tools, means and institutions to promote and impose its own values as universal. There is no debate about universality, which is contributed to by claims that values such as the right to freedom of speech are inherent in the Western, Judeo-Christian identity, on the other hand Islam is positioned in the context of skirmishes and conflicts, as well as the rejection of Western institutions (and ideas).

U Rushdie aferi je u prvi plan isplivao destruktivan ali vrlo dominantan diskurs kojim se imigranti (u ovom slučaju muslimani) i Britanci razdvajaju u dvije skupine: Mi i Oni (Drugi), a u toj podjeli ono što se identificiralo pod „Našim vrijednostima“ Oni moraju prihvatiti ako žele živjeti u „Našem“ društvu, na „Našem“ teritoriju, pod „Našim“ uvjetima. Imigrantima je rečeno, kako objašnjava Parekh, „da su dolaskom u Veliku Britaniju bili suglasni s njezinim načinom života i obavezali se pridržavati njezinih zakona, normi i vrijednosti“ (Parekh 1990: 701). Mondal slično argumentira kada primjećuje kako su u liberalnom diskursu koji je komentirao Rushdie aferu „muslimani bili isključeni iz 'naših' kulturalnih 'normi i vrijednosti', koje 'oni' moraju 'naučiti' kako bi demonstrirali svoju integraciju u društvo“ (Mondal 2013: 61). Tako je prihvaćanje ismijavanja vlastitih vrijednosti jedna vrsta inicijacije u liberalno društvo. Riječ je o postupku u kojem se musliman mora odreći vlastitog identiteta da bi bio prihvaćen u liberalnoj stvarnosti društva koje ga prisiljava na tu promjenu pod maskom „univerzalnosti“. No, ako se prihvati narativ sukoba civilizacija, to implicira da se musliman samo površinski može promijeniti, ali ispod površine musliman ostaje musliman – fundamentalan i nazadan, skrivena prijetanja društvu koje ga je navodno objeručke prihvatilo.



ILUSTRACIJA – Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo mrzi imigrante iz Indije ili Pakistana zbog niza razloga, a nedavno se politika useljavanja mijenja imajući u vidu ovaj aspekt. Prema novom useljeničkom pravilu, imigranti moraju položiti ispit kako bi dokazali svoje znanje engleskog jezika.. (Canada Updates, 8.01.2017)

ILLUSTRATION – UK hates Immigrants from India or Pakistan due to a number of reasons and recently the immigration policies are being changed keeping this aspect in mind. AS per the new immigration rule, immigrants need to give an examination to prove their hold over the English Language (Canada Updates, January 8, 2017)

In the Rushdie affair, a destructive but very dominant discourse emerged in the foreground by which migrants (in this case Muslims) and the British were separated into two groups: Us and They (Others), and in this division what was identified under "our values" They must accept if they want to live in "our" society, in "our" territory, under "our" conditions. Migrants were told, as Parekh explains, "that by coming to the United Kingdom they were in agreement with its way of life and committed to abiding by its laws, norms and values" (Parekh, 1990: 701). Mondal argues similarly when he observes that in the liberal discourse that commented on the Rushdie affair, "Muslims were excluded from 'our' cultural 'norms and values', which 'they' must 'learn' in order to demonstrate their integration into society" (Mondal, 2013: 61). Accepting the ridicule of one's own values is thus a kind of initiation into a liberal society, it is a procedure in which a Muslim must renounce his own identity in order to be accepted in the liberal reality of society that forces him to make this change under the guise of "universality". But if one accepts the narrative of the clash of civilizations, it implies that a Muslim can only change superficially but beneath the surface a Muslim remains a Muslim – fundamental and backward, a hidden threat to the society that allegedly embraced him with open arms.



ILLUSTRATION – A protester holds a sign during a march about the exploitation of and discrimination against immigrant workers, in Trafalgar Square, London, in 2007. Photograph: Matt Cardy/Getty Images)

ILUSTRACIJA – Prosvjednica drži natpis tokom marša o izrabljivanju i diskriminaciji radnika imigranata, na Trafalgar Squareu u Londonu, 2007. (Fotografija: Matt Cardy/Getty Images)

Također, ako Huntingtonovu tezu o kulturološkoj različitosti kao temelju međunarodnih konflikata uzmemo kao ispravnu i istinitu, univerzalnost ljudskih prava onako kako je promovira Opća deklaracija niti je moguća niti je prihvatljiva. Polazimo li od toga da je ona, pa čak i samo geografski, nastala na Zapadu, Huntingtonova podjela svijeta podrazumijeva da civilizacije na koje je taj svijet podijeljen imaju nepremostive kulturološke razlike, koje će rezultirati njihovim sukobima. Ako su ljudska prava geografski nastala u zapadnoj civilizaciji, koja je toliko kulturološki različita od islamske civilizacije, to implicira da ljudska prava nastala na vrijednostima jedne civilizacije nisu primjenjiva na drugu civilizaciju. Stoga, kada se priča o univerzalnim ljudskim pravima i ukoliko se nastoji dokazati njihova univerzalnost, ta rasprava ne može uključivati kontekst sukoba civilizacija.

Nemogućnost da se međusobno shvate najviše je došla do izražaja kod prava na slobodu izražavanja. Rushdie afera nije nam pokazala samo kako su snažni diskursi koji apsolutiziraju svoje pozicije i to kroz paradigmu „Mi protiv svih, s tim da smo mi ti koji smo u pravu“, nego nam je pokazala i to kako u ovakvim slučajevima kada se raspravlja o univerzalnim ljudskim pravima upravo diskurs ljudskih prava pada u drugi plan. Modal argumentira kako je u Rushdie aferi došlo do „fetišizacije prava na slobodu izražavanja kao totema zapadne kulture i kao oznake kulturne superiornosti liberalizma“ (Modal 2013: 61), a kako se pravo na slobodu izražavanja branilo u kontekstu „Naše“ civilizacije i „Naših“ vrijednosti, time su se „muslimani isključivali iz okvira 'slobode' i stoga 'civilizacije'“ (Ibid., 62). Parekh slično bilježi da je liberalno javno mišljenje muslimanima željelo dati do znanja da „britansko društvo izrazito cijeni slobodu govora te da o tome nema pregovora; muslimani to moraju ili poštovati ili migrirati negdje gdje se osjećaju ugodnije“ (Parekh 1990: 700).

Usvajanje ovakvog narativa poništava bilo kakav pokušaj ravnopravnog dijaloga, pri čemu nije riječ samo o civilizacijskom natjecanju, nego o uvjerenju kako im druge civilizacije zavide, kako ih kroz lažnu integraciju pojedinaca žele uništiti iznutra jer se oni nikada ne mogu istinski promijeniti. Rasprava oko prava na slobodu govora tako je u slučaju Rushdie afere prerasla u pitanje civilizacijskog sukoba u kojem je jedna od strana žrtva koja je dobronamjerno prihvatila Drugog, a Drugi je „skriveni neprijatelj“. Prema dominantnom liberalnom diskursu u Rushdie aferi se nije radilo o dvama različitim shvaćanjima prava na slobodu govora, nego je, kao što argumentira Peter Hervik u slučaju danske kontroverze, riječ o sukobu u kojem je sloboda govora shvaćena kao „univerzalno ljudsko pravo kojem prijete islamizam“ (Hervik 2012: 48). Slično zaključuje i Talal Asad kada navodi da je prema liberalnoj poziciji (ljevice i desnice podjednako), Rushdie afera bila „islamski napad na načelo slobode govora“ (Asad 2003: loc. 2524), zbog čega su mnogi liberali postavljali pitanje da li „islamska tradicija uopće može pronaći svoje legitimno mjesto u modernom zapadnom društvu“ (Ibid.).

Narativ sukoba civilizacija u kontekstu ljudskih prava sugerira kako se na jednoj strani nalazi civilizacija kojoj su ljudska prava inherentna i neodvojiva od njezinog identiteta, dok se na drugoj strani nalazi civilizacija koja nema prirodne predispozicije da se promijeni i postane kompatibilna

Also, if we take Huntington's thesis on cultural diversity as the basis of international conflicts as correct and true, the universality of human rights as promoted by the Universal Declaration is neither possible nor acceptable. If we start from the fact that it, even only geographically, originated in the West, Huntington's division of the world implies that the civilizations into which that world is divided have insurmountable cultural differences that will result in their conflicts. If human rights originated geographically in Western civilization, which is so culturally different from Islamic civilization, it implies that human rights derived from the values of one civilization are not applicable to another civilization. Therefore, when we talk about universal human rights and if one seeks to prove their universality, this debate cannot include the context of a clash of civilizations.

The inability to understand each other, came to the fore most in the right to freedom of expression. The Rushdie affair not only showed us the power of discourse that absolutizes their positions through the paradigm "Us against all, with us being the ones who are right", but also showed us that in such cases when discussing universal human rights, it is precisely the discourse of human rights that falls into the background. Modal argues that in the Rushdie affair there was a "fetishization of the right to freedom of expression as a totem of Western culture and as a mark of the cultural superiority of liberalism" (Modal, 2013: 61), and that the right to freedom of expression was defended in the context of "our" civilization and "our" values thus "excluding Muslims from the framework of 'freedom' and therefore 'civilization'" (ibid.: 62). Parekh similarly notes that liberal public opinion wanted to let Muslims know that "British society highly valued freedom of speech and that it was non-negotiable; Muslims must either respect this or migrate somewhere they feel more comfortable" (ibid.: 700). At the same time, the narrative of conflicting values in the struggle between Us and Them served as a catalyst because soon it was no longer just a debate about the right to freedom of speech but began to argue about the very right to life. Charles Taylor first writes that the statement "that is how we do it here" should not be used lightly in multicultural societies, but in the very next moment he adds that this is the answer "that must be given in cases such as the Rushdie controversy, in which "that is how we do it here" covers issues such as the right to life and freedom of speech" (Taylor, 1994: 62).

The adoption of such a narrative nullifies any attempt at equal dialogue, thereat it is not just a civilizational competition, but a belief that other civilizations envy them, that through the false integration of individuals they want to destroy them from within because they can never truly change. The debate over the right to free speech as in the case of the Rushdie affair grew into a question of civilizational conflict in which one side is the victim who benevolently accepted the Other and the other side is the "hidden enemy". According to the dominant liberal discourse, the Rushdie affair was not about two different understandings of the right to free speech, but as Peter Hervik argues in the case of the Danish controversy, it is a conflict in which freedom of speech is understood as "a universal human right threatened by Islamism" (Hervik, 2012: 48). Talal Assad concludes similarly when he states that according to the liberal position (left and right alike), the Rushdie affair was "an Islamic attack on the principle of freedom of speech" (Assad, 2003: loc. 2524) which is why many liberals have questioned whether "Islamic tradition can even find its legitimate place in modern Western society" (ibid.).

The narrative of the clash of civilizations in the context of human rights suggests that on the one hand there is

s onim što prva civilizacija smatra univerzalnim jer je proizašlo iz njezinog iskustva. No, ukoliko je nešto univerzalno, primjena toga ne bi trebala zahtijevati suštinsku promjenu od drugih, zar ne? Ovo se pitanje podjednako odnosi i na liberalne i na islamske apsolutiste. Uostalom, ako vjerujemo da se radi o sukobu na razini civilizacijskih identiteta, zahtjev da drugi mijenjaju svoj identitet kako bi postao kompatibilan s njihovim jeste uistinu hegemonijski pokušaj dominacije nad drugima u ime univerzalnih vrijednosti. Univerzalne vrijednosti ne podrazumijevaju to da se druge uvrijedi kako bi ih se uvelo u napredniju civilizaciju i „naučilo“ kako se to radi kod „Nas“. Takvi pokušaji jedino govore da se radi o kulturnim imperijalistima koji nemaju osjećaj za druge, njihove vrijednosti i njihova iskustva.



ILUSTRACIJA – *Mogući zapadni i islamski model modnih trendova u oblačenju žena* - ako vjerujemo da se radi o sukobu na razini civilizacijskih identiteta, zahtjev da drugi mijenjaju dio svog identiteta kako bi postao kompatibilan s njihovim jeste uistinu hegemonijski pokušaj dominacije nad drugima u ime univerzalnih vrijednosti.

Liberalni pristup želi nas uvjeriti kako ništa nije tabu tema, sve mora biti otvoreno za kritičko preispitivanje čak i najdubljih uvjerenja. Ipak, ne možemo zanemariti činjenicu da postoji nemali broj slučajeva da pravo na slobodu govora nije apsolutno niti neograničeno,^{▼26} ali zašto se onda očekuje od muslimana da ga tako shvate? Kao što ukazuje Hervik u svojem preispitivanju karikaturnog prikaza Poslanika u Danskoj, sloboda govora „univerzalno je ljudsko pravo, ali ima pravne restrikcije i ne bi se trebalo koristiti u svrhu nepotrebnih provokacija“ (Hervik 2012: 48).

▼26 Primjera je puno, no ovdje ću navesti samo dva: blogerica Alison Chabloz osuđena je 2018. godine na dvadeset tjedana zatvora uz zabranu objavljivanja na internetu u periodu od godinu dana. Osuđena je nakon što je na svojoj stranici objavila pjesme u kojima je zaničevala holokaust. U Španjolskoj je 2021. godine glazbenik Pablo Hasel uhićen i osuđen na godinu dana zatvora jer je u svojim pjesmama veličao terorizam i klevetao monarhiju. Naglašavam kako ove primjere ne navodim kako bih uperila prst u druge i tako opravdala Khomeinijev potez, nego da bih dodatno ukazala na to da pravo na slobodu govora nije neograničeno pravo.

a civilization to which human rights are inherent and inseparable from its identity, while on the other side there is a civilization that has no natural predisposition to change and become compatible with what the first civilization considers universal because it stemmed from its own experience. But if something is universal, applying it should not require substantial change from others, right? This question concerns the liberal and Islamic absolutist alike. After all, if we believe that it is a conflict at the level of civilizational identities, asking others to change their identity to become compatible with theirs, is nothing less than a hegemonic attempt to dominate others in the name of universal values. Universal values do not imply that others are offended in order to introduce them to a more advanced civilization and “teach” them how “we” do it. The only thing that speaks about such attempts is that they are cultural imperialists who have no sense about others, their values and their experiences.



ILLUSTRATION - A possible Western and Islamic model of fashion trends in women's clothing - if we believe that it is a conflict at the level of civilizational identities, the demand that others change part of their identity in order to become compatible with theirs is truly a hegemonic attempt to dominate others in the name of universal values.

The liberal approach wants to convince us that nothing is *taboo*, everything must be open to critical questioning, even the deepest beliefs. However, we cannot ignore the fact that there are many examples whereby the right to free speech is neither absolute nor unlimited.^{▼24} Why is it, then, that Muslims are expected to understand it that way? As Hervik points out in his review of the Prophet's caricature depiction in Denmark, freedom of speech is "a universal human right, but it has legal restrictions and should not be used for unnecessary provocation." (Hervik, 2012: 48).

^{▼24} There are many examples, but Here I will list only two: Blogger Alison Chabloz, in 2018 was sentenced to twenty weeks in prison with a ban on publishing on the Internet for a period of one year. She was convicted after posting poems on her site denying the Holocaust. In Spain, in 2021, musician Pablo Hasel, was arrested and sentenced to a year in prison for glorifying terrorism and slandering the monarchy in his songs. I emphasize that I do not cite these examples to point the finger at others and thus justify Khomeini's move, but to further indicate that the right to free speech is not an unlimited right.

Također, iako se članak ovdje neće tome detaljnije posvetiti, želi se otvoriti jedno pitanje koje će se možda obraditi na drugom mjestu. Liberalni diskurs od muslimana očekuje da preispituju i ono što im je „sveto“, ali u istom trenutku liberali sami pravo na slobodu govora tretiraju kao nešto što je njima „sveto“, ali u njihovom slučaju o tome nema rasprave. Pravo na slobodu govora izdiže se iznad rasprava, preispitivanja i propitivanja. Zašto bi vrijednosti jedne kulture, civilizacije ili društva bile u povlaštenom položaju kada govorimo o univerzalnom? Arogantno je inzistirati na pravu na slobodu govora nauštrb prava drugih da ne budu uvrijeđeni i ismijavani, posebice kada postoje pravna ograničenja tog prava, koje je u Rushdie aferi (i drugim spomenutim slučajevima koji uključuju „islam“ i „Zapad“) tretirano kao apsolutno. Prema članku 10 Europske konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda (1950) svatko ima pravo na slobodu izražavanja^{▼27} i za dominantan liberalni diskurs to pravo uključuje i pravo da se nekoga uvrijedi. No, stavak 2 istog članka govori nam kako ta sloboda nije apsolutna, nego obuhvaća „određene dužnosti i odgovornosti“ te kako bi se održao javni red i sigurnost može biti podvrgnuta „formalnostima, uvjetima, ograničenjima ili kaznama propisanim zakonom“ kao što i jeste. Ako je pravo na slobodu govora apsolutno, onda nitko ne može biti u povlaštenom položaju, niti jedna skupina, niti jedna manjina, ali niti jedan događaj ili uvjerenje. Od predrasuda smo zaštićeni svi ili nije nitko, ideja jednakosti svih podrazumijeva i jednako poštovanje dostojanstva drugih, dostojanstva kojeg su muslimani bili lišeni u Rushdie aferi.^{▼28}

Iako nisu svi muslimani reagirali isto, Slaughter ispravno zaključuje kako je „nemuslimanima teško shvatiti koliko su duboko muslimani osobno reagirali na objavu *Sotonskih stihova*“ (Slaughter 1993: 169). U istraživanju za ovaj članak, među islamskim autorima nije pronađen niti jedan autor kojem su *Sotonski stihovi* prihvatljivi (što nikako ne znači da su opravdavali Khomeinijevu *fetvu*), nego, kako odgovara Ziauddin Sardar, „Sotonski stihovi su napisani na pogrdan i uvredljiv način kako bi prikazali Poslanika kao mit; a ako je mit, onda ga je (kao i sve druge mitove) moguće odbaciti. Ne vjerujem kako jedan vjernik musliman tome ne bi prigovorio.“ (Sardar 2008).

Parekh u svojem radu ukazuje kako sloboda govora nije jedina vrijednost koju moramo njegovati, nego mora biti u ravnoteži s drugim vrijednostima. On pojašnjava da se uz slobodu govora, koja je važna vrijednost, moraju uvažiti i druge vrijednosti poput „ljudskog dostojanstva, jednakosti, slobode da se živi bez uznemiravanja i zastrašivanja, društvene harmonije, uzajamnog poštovanja i

▼27 Dostupno na: <https://www.zakon.hr/z/364/%28Europska%29-Konvencija-za-za%C5%A1titu-ljudskih-prava-i-temeljnih-sloboda>.

▼28 Neki od autora istakli su i dvoličnost britanskog zakona protiv blasfemije, koji „štiti samo anglikansko kršćanstvo [...] kršćanstvo je stoga uživalo poseban politički status i nije se isto tretiralo kao ostale religije“ (Parekh 1990: 702-703). Pinaki Chakravorty slično objašnjava kako je sud u Velikoj Britaniji odbacio optužbe za blasfemiju „na temelju toga što prekršaj običajnog prava za blasfemiju vrijedi samo za napade na kršćanstvo“ (Chakravorty 1995: 2217).

Also, although the article will not devote itself to this in more detail here, it wants to address one issue that may be expanded elsewhere. Liberal discourse expects Muslims to question what is "sacred" to them, but at the same time, liberals themselves treat the right to free speech as something that is "sacred" to them. Only, in their case there is no discussion about it. The right to free speech rises above debate, scrutiny, and questioning. Why should the values of a culture, civilization or society be in a privileged position when we talk about the universal? It is arrogant to insist on the right to free speech at the expense of the right of others not to be offended and ridiculed, especially when there are legal restrictions on that right that is treated as absolute in the Rushdie affair (and other cases that include "Islam" and "the West" as absolute). According to Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) everyone has the right to freedom of expression ^{▼25} and for dominant liberal discourse that right also includes the right to offend someone. However, paragraph 2 of the same article tells us that this freedom is not absolute but includes "certain duties and responsibilities" and in order to maintain public order and security can be subjected to "formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties prescribed by law" as it is. If the right to free speech is absolute, then no one can be in a privileged position; no group, no minority, no event or belief. From prejudice we are protected by everyone or no one, the idea of the equality of all implies equal respect for the dignity of others, the dignity that Muslims were deprived of in the Rushdie affair. ^{▼26}

Although not all Muslims reacted the same, Slaughter correctly concludes that "it is difficult for non-Muslims to understand how the deeply personal reaction Muslims had to the revelation of the Satanic Verses" (Slaughter, 1993: 169). In the research for this article, not a single author was found among the Islamic authors to whom the *Satanic Verses* are acceptable (which by no means that they justified Khomeini's *fatwa*), but as Ziauddin Sardar responds „The Satanic verses were written in a derogatory and insulting way to portray the Prophet as a myth; And if it is a myth, then (like all other myths) it can be discarded. I do not think there is a single Muslim believer that would not object to that." (Sardar 2008.).

Parekh points out in his work that freedom of speech is not the only value we must cherish but must be in balance with other values. He explains that while freedom of speech is an important value, other values such as "human dignity, equality, freedom to live without harassment and intimidation, social harmony, mutual respect and protection of reputation and honor must be respected" (Parekh, 2017:2). According to Parekh, while it is understandable that sometimes these values will come into conflict in certain contexts, it is up to the human community to balance them and not allow any of these values to be "so absolutized that it always nullifies the others" (ibid.). In addition to achieving a balance between the different values that society needs

^{▼25} Available at <https://www.zakon.hr/z/364/%28Europska%29-Konvencija-za-za%C5%A1titu-ljudskih-prava-i-temeljnih-sloboda>.

^{▼26} Home of the authors pointed out the duplicity of the British anti-blasphemy law, which "protects only Anglican Christianity ... Christianity therefore enjoyed a special political status and was not treated the same as other religions" (Parekh, 1990: 702-703). Pinaki Chakravorty similarly explains that a UK court has dismissed the blasphemy charges "on the grounds that a blasphemy violation of common law applies only to attacks on Christianity." (Chakravorty, 1995: 2217).

zaštite ugleda i časti“ (Parekh 2017: 2). Prema Parekhu, razumljivo je da će nekada te vrijednosti u određenim kontekstima doći u sukob, no na ljudskoj je zajednici da ih izbalansira i da ne dopusti da ijedna od tih vrijednosti bude „toliko apsolutizirana da uvijek poništi druge“ (Ibid.). Uz postizanje ravnoteže između različitih vrijednosti koje društvo treba jednako njegovati, za Parekha je nužno da se prakticira uzajamno kulturalno poštovanje između članova zajednice. Uzajamno kulturalno poštovanje ima nekoliko prednosti, ali Parekh ističe dvije:

Uvjerava muslimane da šire društvo cijeni njihovu kulturu i da ne trebaju paničariti, zatvarati se ili postajati beskompromisni. Šire društvo uvjerava kako je i dalje zaduženo za svoj kulturni život, da muslimani ne traže da ih potkopaju neodgovornim zahtjevima i da se razlike između njih mogu riješiti racionalnim dijalogom u duhu zajedničke posvećenosti zajedničkom životu. (Parekh, 2008: 26)

Huntingtonova verzija svijeta jeste jednodimenzionalna, ona na karti svijeta povlači oštre granice koje je u stvarnom svijetu i među stvarnim ljudima nemoguće povući. Naše civilizacije, naši svjetovi, naša društva dodiruju se, prožimaju i nadopunjavaju na višestruke načine. Said kad raspravlja o „zapadnoj“ nepovjerljivosti prema islamu preispituje „što je toliko prijeteće u sve većoj prisutnosti muslimana na Zapadu?“ (usp. Said 2001). U odgovoru, Said argumentira da se u „stvaranju odbrane Zapad oslanjao na humanizam, znanost, filozofiju, sociologiju i historiografiju islama. [...] Islam je unutra od samog početka“ (Ibid.), ukazujući na to da granice koje Huntington povlači, kao i narativ sukoba civilizacijskih identiteta – nema smisla. Said s razlogom Huntingtonovu hipotezu naziva „receptom za rat“, jer je, za Saida, riječ o dinamičkoj međuovisnosti, o uzajamnom i neprekidnom prožimanju, ali pojašnjava kako ne predlaže jednu „ujedinjenu, pojednostavljenu, sažetu kulturu koja uključuje svakoga bez razlike“ (Ibid.). Umjesto toga, svjestan naše neraskidive povezanosti, Said govori „o očuvanju razlika i suživotu“ (Ibid.).

Oslanjajući se na Saidovo „očuvanje razlika“ i Parekhovo „uzajamno kulturalno razumijevanje“, ovdje odbacujemo Huntingtonov redukcionistički pogled na svijet. Slučajevi poput Rushdie afere sukob su dvaju ljudskih prava ili, kako kaže Parekh, dviju različitih vrijednosti: prava da izrazimo vlastito mišljenje i prava da ne budemo žrtve predrasuda. Zadržavanje balansa tih vrijednosti u ravnopravnom društvu možda bi trebalo shvatiti na način da oni poput Rushdija prihvate da to što imaju pravo nešto reći svakako ne znači da bi i trebali.

to cultivate equally, it is imperative for Parekha to practice mutual cultural respect between members of the community. Mutual cultural respect has several advantages but Parekh points out two:

"He assures Muslims that their culture is valued by wider society and that they need not panic and turn inside or become uncompromising. The wider society assures them that it remains in charge of its cultural life, that Muslims do not seek to undermine them with irresponsible demands and that differences between them can be resolved through rational dialogue in a spirit of shared commitment to living together" (Parekh, 2008: 26).

Huntington's connection to the world is one-dimensional, it draws clear boundaries on the world map that cannot be drawn in the real world and among real people. Our civilizations, our worlds, our societies touch, permeate and complement each other in multiple ways. When discussing "Western" distrust of Islam, Said questions "what is so threatening about the growing presence of Muslims in the West?" (cf., Said 2001). In response, Said argues that in "creating a defense, the West relied on the humanism, science, philosophy, sociology and historiography of Islam... Islam has been inside since the very beginning" (ibid.), indicating that the boundaries that Huntington draws, as well as the narrative of conflicts of civilizational identities - make no sense. Said calls Huntington's hypothesis a "recipe for war", because Said's word is a dynamic interdependence, a mutual and continuous interpenetration, but he explains that he does not propose a "united, simplified, concise culture that includes everyone without distinction" (ibid.). Instead, aware of our unbreakable connection, Said speaks of "the preservation of differences and coexistence" (ibid.).

Relying on Said's "preservation of differences" and Parekh's "mutual cultural understanding", Huntington's reductionist view of the world is rejected here. Cases like the Rushdie affair are a clash of two human rights or as Parekh says two different values: the right to express our own opinions and the right not to be victims of prejudice. Keeping the balance of these values in an equal society, perhaps, should be understood in a way that those like Rushdie accept that just because they have the right to say something, certainly does not mean that they should.

Zaključak

Slučajevi poput Rushdie afere podjednako u islamskoj i liberalnoj moralnoj tradiciji rezultiraju dominantnim diskursima koji pojednostavljaju svoje sugovornike te ih svode na pojmove koje promatraju kao oprečne vlastitim vrijednostima. Time se istinska rasprava o ljudskim pravima, koja bi trebala rezultirati dubljim međusobnim shvaćanjem dvaju različitih poimanja ljudskih prava – reducira na međusobno natjecanje i na sukob civilizacijskih identiteta. Zanimljivo je, međutim, primijetiti kako ovakvi slučajevi u objema moralnim tradicijama potiču i na jačanje tih negativnih, monoloških diskursa u kojima se onaj Drugi predstavlja kao nazadan, nerazvijen i nekompatibilan s vlastitim univerzalističkim težnjama. Dok su u liberalnoj moralnoj tradiciji ovakvi slučajevi shvaćeni kao jasan indikator nazadnosti islama, kojem nije mjesto u liberalnom svijetu (čak ukoliko se islam i reformira, a reformacija naravno uključuje da muslimani prihvate ismijavanje vlastitih vrijednosti), u islamskoj moralnoj tradiciji isti su slučajevi percipirani kao jednako jasan indikator nazadnosti moralno degradirajućih zapadnih društava, njihovih ništavnih vrijednosti i nepoželjnog načina života, koji bi bio razoran za islamska društva u slučaju da ga muslimani prihvate.

U oba dominantna diskursa akteri smatraju kako druge trebaju podučiti jer su civiliziraniji i napredniji, a vlastito neznanje prikrivaju simplificiranim pojmovima koji nastaju upravo iz nepoznavanja sugovornika. Rushdie afera nije simptom sukoba civilizacijskih identiteta, nego je još jedan slučaj obostrane nemogućnosti razumijevanja naše bogate, višedimenzionalne stvarnosti u kojoj smo povezani nerazmrsivim sponama.

Za raspravu o ljudskim pravima nužno je prihvatiti premisu po kojoj monološki diskursi sami sebe isključuju iz dijaloga. Bilo da je riječ o dominantnom liberalnom ili dominantnom islamskom diskursu u njihovim tradicijama, radi se o diskursima koji upotrebljavaju monolitne pojmove, što dovodi do neizbježnog sukoba nepomirljivih vrijednosti i interesa. Time se bogatstvo naše stvarnosti svodi na jednodimenzionalne oznake, na ratobornu diferencijaciju oznaka „Mi“ i „Oni“, tj. „Mi“ protiv „Njih“. Rushdie afera nije simptom sukoba civilizacija, nego je simptom zajedničkog neznanja, ali i hronične nezainteresiranosti da shvatimo one koji žive, vjeruju i razmišljaju drugačije od nas. Simptom je kulturalne arogancije u kojoj jedna tradicija svoje iskustvo nameće drugima kao univerzalno, a usvajanje narativa sukoba civilizacija nije ništa osim promocija superiornosti jedne tradicije nad drugim tradicijama. Monološke diskurse oslabljujemo inzistiranjem na ravnopravnom dijalogu u kojem su svi sugovornici jednaki i u kojem se niti jedna kultura niti tradicija ne nameće kao superiorna, niti se od drugih zahtijeva promjena i prilagodba onome što jedna tradicija postavlja kao normativni

Conclusion

Cases such as the Rushdie affair equally in the Islamic and liberal moral tradition thrust dominant discourses to the forefront, which simplify their interlocutors and reduce them to concepts that they view as contrary to their own values. Thus, a genuine debate on human rights, which should result in a deeper, mutual understanding of two different concepts of human rights, is reduced to competing with each other and to a clash of civilizational identities. It is interesting to note, however, that such cases in both moral traditions encourage the strengthening of these negative, monologue discourses in which the Other is presented as backward, underdeveloped and incompatible with their universalist aspirations. While in the liberal moral tradition, such cases are understood as a clear indicator of the backwardness of Islam that has no place in the liberal world (even if Islam is reformed, and the reformation of course involves Muslims accepting the mockery of their own values), in the Islamic moral tradition the same cases are perceived as an equally clear indicator of the backwardness of morally degrading Western societies, their null and void values and an undesirable way of life that would be devastating for Islamic societies in the event that the Muslims accept it.

In both dominant discourses, the stakeholders believe that they should teach the other because they are more civilized and advanced, and they conceal their own ignorance with simplified concepts that arise precisely from the ignorance of the interlocutor. The Rushdie affair is not a symptom of a clash of civilizational identities but is another case of a mutual inability to understand our rich, multidimensional reality in which we are bound by inseparable bonds.

For a discussion on human rights, it is necessary to accept the premise by which monologue discourses exclude themselves from dialogue. Whether it is the dominant liberal or dominant Islamic discourse in their traditions, it is a discourse that handles monolithic concepts doomed to an inevitable conflict of irreconcilable values and interests. Thus, the richness of our reality is reduced to one-dimensional labels, to the belligerent differentiation of the labels "We" and "They", i.e. "Us" against "Them." The Rushdie affair is not a symptom of a clash of civilizations, but is a symptom of common ignorance, and also a chronic disinterest in understanding those who live, believe and think differently from us. It is a symptom of cultural arrogance in which one tradition imposes its experience on others as universal, and the adoption of the narrative of a clash of civilizations is nothing but a promotion of the superiority of one tradition over another tradition. Monologue discourses are weakened by insisting on an equal dialogue in which all interlocutors are equal and in which no culture or tradition is imposed as superior, nor are others required to change and adapt to what one tradition set as a normative standard. Only through dialogue can we achieve a common foundation of truly universal human rights in which the values of one tradition will not be sacrificed in the name of another

standard. Samo kroz dijalog možemo postići zajedničke temelje uistinu univerzalnih ljudskih prava u kojima vrijednosti jedne tradicije neće biti žrtvovane u ime druge tradicije. Riječima nekadašnjeg predsjednika Irana Mohammada Khatamija, „humanost, kultura i civilizacija mogu prevladati samo ako prevlada duh dijaloga“ (Khatami 2001: 30).

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tradition. In the words of the former President of Iran Mohammad Khatami: "humanity, culture and civilization will prevail only if the spirit of dialogue prevails" (Khatami, 2001: 30).

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Review article - Pregledni članak

Enes KARIĆ

ČOVJEČANSTVO U SJENI SUDNJEGA DANA
HUMANITY IN THE SHADOW OF JUDGMENT DAY

Sažetak

Esej ukazuje na jednu od temeljnih opasnosti za planetu Zemlju, koja proistječe iz suštinske razlike između potencijala kojima je čovječanstvo nekada raspolagalo i onoga čime sada raspolaze. Autor ističe da od stvaranja prvog čovjeka pa do nedavne prošlosti čovječanstvo, svim onim čime je raspolagalo, nije moglo uništiti samo sebe, ono nije moglo prerasti u neposrednu prijetnju samome sebi i nije imalo kapaciteta da svoj opstanak dovede u pitanje. Jedna razlika dijeli ovo naše današnje čovječanstvo od svih drugih minulih i davnih izdanja čovječanstva – današnje čovječanstvo u stanju je sebe uništiti, u stanju je sebi označiti kraj, pa i – sportski rečeno – 'odsvirati kraj' samoj planeti Zemlji i svim oblicima života na njoj.

Upravo stoga mi možemo ovih osam milijardi ljudi, koji sačinjavaju današnje čovječanstvo, označiti 'čovječanstvom u sjeni Sudnjega dana'. Već nekoliko desetljeća upravo je ovo čovječanstvo najopasniji omotač Zemlje. Jedva da je danas i moguće opisati sve strane čovječanstva destruktivne po samu planetu Zemlju, po njezine ekosisteme, po samo čovječanstvo kao takvo, po floru i faunu Zemlje. Autor ističe nekoliko karakteristika koje danas, kao užasna morbidna stanja, obilježavaju čovječanstvo: *nema povratka na manje, nema povratka na sporije, nema povratka na bezopasnije*. U ovakvim okolnostima teško da će planeta Zemlja preživjeti, zato što čovječanstvo danas gubi Prirodu baš kao što je nekada izgubilo Raj.

Ključne riječi: čovječanstvo, čovjek, Priroda, Raj, Sudnji dan, planeta Zemlja, Kur'an, Biblija

Abstract

This essay points to one of the fundamental dangers to planet Earth, which stems from the essential difference between the potential once available to humanity and what it disposes of now. The author points out that from the creation of the first man to the recent past, humanity, with everything it had at its disposal, could not destroy itself, it could not grow into an immediate threat to itself and did not have the capacity to question its survival. A single difference separates our present humanity from all other past and ancient editions of humanity – today's humanity is able to destroy itself, it is able to mark the end for itself, and even – in sporting terms – “the final whistle” of the planet Earth itself and all the forms of life on it.

This is precisely why we can designate to these eight billion people, who make up today's humanity, as "Humanity in the Shadow of the Judgment Day." For several decades, this very humanity has been the most dangerous mantle around the Earth. Today it is hardly possible to describe all the destructive aspects of humanity towards planet Earth itself, towards its eco-systems, towards humanity itself as such, towards the flora and fauna of the Earth. And the author highlights several characteristics that today, as terrible morbid states, mark humanity: *no going back to less, no going back to slower, no going back to the more harmless*. In these circumstances, it is unlikely that planet Earth will survive, because today humanity is losing Nature just as it once lost Paradise.

Key words: *humanity, man, Nature, Paradise, Judgment Day, planet Earth, Qur'an, Bible*

ČOVJEČANSTVO U SJENI SUDNJEGA DANA

1.

Davno čovječanstvo, Božije i Rajsko

na početku ovog skromnoga eseja treba reći: Oni koji se sada rađaju, usred ili tokom ove 2022. godine, na planeti Zemlji zatiču osam milijardi ljudi. Kao da se može reći da današnju novorođenčad dočekuje čovječanstvo koje nikad prije nije bilo brojnije. Da li je tako brojno čovječanstvo jedna opasnost za planetu Zemlju, za novorođenčad koja se tek rađaju i dolaze, za biljke, životinje, zrak, tlo, vodu, svemir u susjedstvu?! Ukratko, da li je čovječanski omotač danas najopasniji omotač po planetu Zemlju?! Teško je na ova pitanja dati jasne odgovore. U agoniji mnogih opasnosti po čovječanstvo danas, teško je ponuditi ikakve smislene odgovore.

Religije posredno naučavaju da je ovih osam milijardi ljudi odnekuda krenulo. Naime, negdje, to jest tamo na Početku, Božanskim proglasom 'budi!' začeo se prvi ljudski par, od kojeg se danas namnožilo osam milijardi ljudi. Ima bodrih nagovora i optimističkih mišljenja da je taj Početak čovječanstva bio sretan.

Godinama, pa i desetljećima, mogu se čitati i studirati knjige o Postanju, kako biblijskom, tako i kur'anskom, pa i o Postanju, o kojem izmaglično govore grčki mitovi, afričke i azijske kosmogonije, potom religije azijskih istoka, bliskoistočnih, srednjoistočnih i dalekoistočnih.

I prema Bibliji i prema Kur'ānu Postanje obuhvata i postanje čovjeka. K tome, uglavnom vjerska utemeljiteljska štiva onu zametnu klicu čovječanstva povezuju s nekom lijepom i optimističnom Božanskom intervencijom: *Ja [Bog] ću na Zemlji stvoriti namjesnika [čovjeka]*!^{▼1} I blagoslovi ih (Adama i Evu) Bog i reče im: *“Plodite se i množite i napunite zemlju, i sebi je podložite!”*^{▼2}

▼1 Usp. Kur'ān, Krava/al-Baqara, 2:30, i dalje.

▼2 Usp. *Biblija*, Stari i Novi Zavjet, Kršćanska sadašnjost, Zagreb, 1974., str. 1.

HUMANITY IN THE SHADOW OF JUDGMENT DAY

1. Long ago humanity, of God and Paradise

At the beginning of this modest essay, it should be said: Those who are now born, in the middle of or during this year of 2022, are born and find eight billion people on planet Earth. It can almost be said that today's newborns are greeted by a humanity that has never been more numerous before. Is this numerous humanity a danger to planet Earth, to newborns who are just being born and coming, to plants, animals, air, soil, water, outer space in our neighbourhood?! In short, is the human mantle the most dangerous mantle on planet Earth today?! It is difficult to give clear answers to these questions. In the agony of many dangers to humanity today, it is difficult to offer any kind of meaningful answer.

Religions indirectly teach that these eight billion people started somewhere. In fact, somewhere, that is, there at the Beginning, the Divine Proclamation of "Be!" conceived the first human couple, who have been multiplied into eight billion people today. There are cheerful persuasions and optimistic opinions that this Beginning of humanity was a happy one.

For years, even decades, one can read and study books on Genesis, both in the Bible and the Qur'ān, and even about Genesis which is hazily spoken of by Greek myths, African and Asian cosmogonies, then religions of the Asian East, Middle East and Far East.

According to both the Bible and the Qur'ān, Genesis also includes the genesis of man. In addition, most religious foundational readings associate that misplaced germ of humanity with some beautiful and optimistic Divine intervention: *I [God] am going to place a successive [human] authority on Earth!*^{▼1} And God blessed them (Adam and Eve) and said to them, *"Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it."*^{▼2}

^{▼1} Cf. The Qur'an, Cow/al-Baqara, 2:30, and further.

^{▼2} Cf. *Bible, Old and New Testaments*, Christian Present, Zagreb, 1974, p. 1.



ILUSTRACIJA - Kršćanski pogled: Hendrik Goltzius, Raspetljavanje haosa ili stvaranje četiriju elemenata, 1589., iz zbirke Muzeja umjetnosti okruga Los Angeles®.



ILLUSTRATION – Christian view: Hendrik Goltzius, *The Untangling of Chaos, or the Creation of the Four Elements*, 1589, From the collection of Los Angeles County Museum of Art®.

Dakle, stvaranje čovjeka, i muškarca i žene, biva po svemu jedan svečani čin posred Raja, a rajsko porijeklo čovjeka i čovječanstva nije samo motiv Biblije i Kur'āna, već i mnogih drugih vjerskih štiva, iako često datih u metaforičkim slikama do čije plavolike jasnoće dolazimo tumačenjem. I grčki mitovi naglašavaju božanske intervencije u stvaranju čovječanstva, kao i čovjekovu prisnu vezu sa Zemljom. Praktički, uloga Zemlje u formiranju čovječanstva uvijek se snažno isticala.



ILUSTRACIJA – Islamski pogled: *Ādam* i *Ḥawwāʾ*, rukopis *Hadiqat al-Suʿada* (Bašta blaženih) u Fuzuliju, Bagdad, Irak, 1602-3.

ILLUSTRATION – Islamic view: *Ādam* i *Ḥawwāʾ*, Manuscript of the *Hadiqat al-Suʿada* (Garden of the Blessed) of Fuzuli, Baghdad, Iraq, 1602-3.

Vratimo li se Bibliji i Kur'ānu, Rajem su ljudi, i Adem i Hava (*Ādam* i *Ḥawwāʾ*, Adam i Eva), i muško i žensko, počašćeni, stvoreni su u najljepšem obliku i/li najljepšem rasporedu stvari.^{▼3}

Ali, na temelju samih Božanskih svjedočanstava odveć se dobro zna da se čovjek u Raju nije ni dobro, niti disciplinirano ponašao. Kod *Drveta Spoznaje i Znanja*,^{▼4} ili *Drveta Vječnosti* (*šadžarah*

▼3 Usp. Kur'ān, Smokva/at-Tīn, 95:4.

▼4 Usp. Biblija, Stari i Novi zavjet. Postanak, odjeljak 3.

Thus, the creation of man, both man and woman, is a solemn act in the midst of Paradise, and Paradise is the origin of man and humanity, being not only the motif of the Bible and the Qur'ān, but also of many other religious readings, although often given in metaphorical images whose blue-like clarity we come to by interpretation. And Greek myths emphasize divine interventions in the creation of humanity, as well as man's intimate connection to the Earth. Practically, the role of the Earth in the formation of humanity has always stood out strongly.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Christian view: Lucas Cranach the Elder, *Adam and Eve*, 1532. © Kulturhistorisches Museum Magdeburg.
 ILUSTRACIJA ~ Kršćanski pogled: Lucas Cranach Stariji, *Adam i Eva*, 1532. © Kulturhistorisches Museum Magdeburg.

If we return to the Bible and the Qur'ān, Paradise was for Man, for both *Adam* and *Ḥawwā'* (Adam and Hava, Adam and Eve), both male and female, an honour, created *in the most beautiful form and/or the most beautiful arrangement of things*.^{▼3}

But on the basis of the Divine testimonies themselves, it is well known that Man in Paradise did not behave well or demonstrate discipline. In the Tree of Knowledge^{▼4} or the Tree of Immortality, or the Tree of Eternity (*shajarah al-*

▼3 Cf. The Qur'an, Fig tree/at-Tīn, 95:4.

▼4 Cf. Bible, Old and New Testaments, Genesis, psection 3.

al-khuldi),^{▼5} prvo čovječanstvo, Adem i Hava u međusobnim relacijama raskrivaju sebe i svoju spolnost iako do toga još nije bilo došlo vrijeme.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Islamski pogled: Drvo Vječnosti (ar. *šadžarah al-khuldi*) je motiv stabla života kako se pojavljuje u Kur'anu, © Palača Shaki Khans, Azerbajdžan.

ILLUSTRATION ~ Islamic view: The Tree of Immortality (Ar. *shajarah al-khuldi*) is the tree of life motif as it appears in the Qur'an, © Palace of Shaki Khans, Azerbaijan.

Pa iako prvo čovječanstvo trpi zbud zvani Izgubljeni raj, vjerske knjige govore o Zemlji, na koju su prognani praroditelji čovječanstva, uvijek kao o jednom vrtu ili bašči, u svakom slučaju kao o izdašnom zavičaju prirodne ljepote. Tu još nije bilo nikakve ekološke katastrofe. Čovjek je izgubio Raj, ali je zauzvrat dobio Prirodu. K tome, Bog i dalje Svojom Milošću i Objavom ostaje s praroditeljima čovječanstva i njihovim potomstvom.

Bilo kako bilo, i Biblija i Kur'an mnogo više govore o tome "kako čovjek", negoli o tome "zašto uopće čovjek", "zašto i čemu čovječanstvo". Ali, uzaludno je baviti se tim važnim pitanjima. Na njih ionako neće biti odgovora, barem ne onih koji bi mogli zadovoljiti sve znatiželje. Tako je, sve od vremena "Izgubljenog raja", čovječanstvo krenulo napuštivati Zemlju. Praroditeljima je Bog oprostio, njihovo potomstvo postupno se množilo, ljudski naraštaji, pokoljenje za pokoljenjem, rasli su i širili se.

^{▼5} Usp. Kur'an, TāHā, 20:120.

khuldi)^{▼5}, the first humanity, Adam and Hava, in relation to each other, reveal themselves and their sexuality when the time has not yet come of it (or: for it) everything has not yet come to be.




ILLUSTRATION ~ Christian view: *Tree of life*, an 1847 depiction of the Norse Yggdrasil as described in the Icelandic Prose Edda by Oluf Olufsen Bagge.
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Kršćanski pogled: *Drvo života*, prikaz nordijskog Yggdrasila iz 1847. opisan u islandskoj prozi Edda Olufa Olufsena Baggea.

And although humanity suffers from the first awakening called Paradise Lost, religious books speak of the Earth, to which the first parents of mankind were exiled, as a garden and as a generous homeland of natural beauty. There has not been an environmental disaster yet. Man lost Paradise, but in return he gained Nature. In addition, God by His Grace and Revelation remains with the first parents of mankind and their offspring.

Be that as it may, both the Bible and the Qur'ān speak much more about "how man", than about "why man at all", "why and for whom humanity"? But it is futile to address these important issues. There will be no answers to them in any case, at least not those that could satisfy all curiosities. Thus, ever since the time of paradise lost, humanity has set out to populate the Earth. God forgave the first parents, their offspring gradually multiplied, human generations, generation after generation, grew and spread.

^{▼5} Cf. The Qur'an, TāHān, 20:120.

Po religijskom postavu stvari, tom ljudskom mnoštvu od Boga su dolazili Božiji poslanici, Stvoritelj Bog je, prema narativima Biblije i Kur'āna, Svojim porukama pomagao čovjeku i ljudima da tradiraju onu važnu svijest o pripadnosti čovječanstvu i o Božijoj stvoriteljskoj intervenciji na Početku. O tome da Bog jeste 'tu', 'tik do čovječanstva', nalazimo svjedočanstva i u Bibliji i u Kur'ānu.

Ali, iako čovječanstvo potječe od istog Izvora, ono se razgranalo u zajednice i narode. Manje-više, 'svaka zajednica imala je poslanika'▼⁶ odaslanog od Boga, 'svaki narod imao je napatitelja'.▼⁷ Poslanici i uputitelji donosili su Božanska objašnjenja tog 'čovječanskog jeste' i njegove sudbine.

Sve vjerske knjige semitskog kruga religija potvrđuju da se čovječanstvo nakon Nuha (*Nūh*, Noa) i Sveopćeg potopa obnovilo i namnožilo, a u tom silnom množenju bio je posebno odabran znak Božiji. Štaviše, Biblija sa svojih stranica oglašava jedno proročanstvo dato Ibrahimu (Abraham) o velikom čovječanskom mnoštvu koje će nastati od njega:

“[...] svoj ću blagoslov na te izliti
i učiniti tvoje potomstvo brojnim
poput zvijezda na nebu
i pijeska na obali morskoj!”▼⁸



ILUSTRACIJA - Islamski pogled: Nuhova arka, iz *Džāmi' al-tawārikh* od Rašiduddina, Tabriz, Perzija, 1314/15.

ILLUSTRATION - Islamic view: Nūh's Ark, from *Jāmi' al-tawārikh* of Rashid al-Dīn, Tabriz, Persia, 1314/15.

▼⁶ Usp. Kur'ān, Jūnus/Yūnus, 10:47.

▼⁷ Usp. Kur'ān, Grmljavina/ar-Ra'd, 13:7.

▼⁸ Usp. Biblija, Stari i Novi Zavjet, isto, 15.

According to the religious settings, to this human multitude came God's messengers, and the Creator God had, according to the narratives of the Bible and the Qur'ān, with His messages helped man and people to traditionalize that important awareness of belonging to humanity and of God's creative intervention at the Beginning. About the fact that God is in fact "there", "right next to humanity", we may find testimonies in both the Bible and the Qur'an. But even though humanity was of the same origin, it branched out into communities and nations. More or less, "every congregation had a messenger" sent from God, "every nation had a guide". The prophets and instructors brought divine explanations of this "human being" and his fate. ▼^{6,7}

All religious books of the Semitic circle of religions confirm that humanity after *Nūḥ* (Noah) and the Universal Flood renewed and multiplied, in this mighty multiplication was the specially chosen sign of God. Moreover, the Bible proclaims from its pages a prophecy given to Abraham about the great multitude of men that will come from him:

"[...] I will pour out my blessing on you
and make your offspring numerous
Like a star in the sky
and sand on the shore!" ▼⁸



ILLUSTRATION – Christian view: *Painting of Noah's Ark* by Aurelius Luini, around 1556.

ILUSTRACIJA – Kršćanski pogled: *Slika Noine arke*, Aurelija Luinija, oko 1556.


▼⁶ Cf. The Qur'an, *Jūnus/Yūnu*, 10:47.

▼⁷ Cf. The Qur'an, *Thunder/ar-Ra'*, 13:7.

▼⁸ Cf. *Bible*, Old and New Testaments, *Genesis*, *ibid.*, 15.

Ipak, Adem i Hava, Nuh, Ibrahim, te poslije Musa i druga pokoljenja i naraštaji, svi oni zaredom dolaze i stupaju na pozornicu čovječanstva bilo u doba kad je ono tek postalo (Adem i Hava, ili u vremenima kad je ono brojem bilo još neznatno, kad se ono, zapravo, kvantitativno tek dokazuje i pokazuje. Pa ipak, kvantitativni rast čovječanstva potvrđuju mnoga istraživanja i uvidi. U vremenima dolaska Isaa, Isusa Krista (*Īsā al-Masīh*) čovječanstvo je svojim brojem vjerovatno dostizalo do nekih tri stotine miliona ljudi. Erupcija vulkana na Islandu sredinom šestog stoljeća, nakon čega je prašina dugo vremena prekrivala Evropu i dobar dio Levanta, učinila je da se broj stanovništva uveliko smanji. Neke procjene govore da je za vrijeme Muhammeda, a.s., na Zemlji ukupno bilo nekih dvije stotine i trinaest miliona ljudi.^{▼9}

Bilo kako bilo, od Adema do Muhammeda, a.s., čovječanstvo, svim onim čime je raspolagalo, nije moglo uništiti samo sebe, ono nije moglo prerasti u neposrednu prijetnju samome sebi, ono nije imalo kapaciteta da svoj opstanak dovede u pitanje.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Islamski pogled: Div 'Uj i poslanici *Mūsā*, *Īsā al-Masīh* i *Muḥammad*, 15. stoljeće. © Zbirka Khalili Islamic.
ILLUSTRATION ~ Islamic view: The Giant 'Uj and the Prophets *Mūsā*, *Īsā al-Masīh* and *Muḥammad*, 15th century. © Khalili Collection Islamic.

^{▼9} Naime, srednja procjena za svjetsku populaciju oko 600. godine je 213 miliona. Ovdje konsultirati sljedeći izvor: Kees Klein Goldewijk, „Estimating global land use change over the past 300 years: The HYDE Database“, *Global Biochemical Cycles* 15:2 (June 2001), str. 417-433.

Nevertheless, Adam and *Hawwā'*, *Nūḥ* (Noah), *Ibrāhīm* (Abraham), and after *Mūsā* (Moses) and other generations and generations, all of them come and enter the stage of humanity in succession either at a time when it was first created (Adam and *Hawwā'*), or in times when the number was still insignificant, when, in fact, it is only quantitatively proving and showing itself. And yet, humanity's quantitative growth is confirmed by much research and insights. At the time of the coming of Jesus Christ (*Īsāa al-Masīḥa*), humanity probably reached some three hundred million people in its number. The eruption of a volcano in Iceland in the middle of the sixth century, after which dust covered Europe and much of the Levant for a long time, caused the population to greatly decrease. Some estimates suggest that the total population in the time of Muhammad s.a.w. on earth was some two hundred and thirteen million people.^{▼9}

Be that as it may, from Adam to Muhammad s.a.w., humanity, with all that it had at its disposal, could not destroy itself alone, it could not grow into an immediate threat to itself, it did not have the capacity to question its survival.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Christian view: Philippe de Champaigne, *Moses with the Ten Commandments*, 17th century.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Kršćanski pogled: Philippe de Champaigne, *Mojsije s deset zapovijedi*, 17. stoljeće.

▼9 The median estimate for the world's population around 600 A.D. is 213 million. Consult the following source here: Kees Klein Goldewijk, „Estimating global land use change these past 300 years: The HYDE Database”, *Global Biochemical Cycles* 15:2 (June 2001), pp. 417-433.

2. Čovječanstvo i postanak svijesti o njemu

Već smo spomenuli: Glavne Božanske knjige, kao i glavne kosmogonije svijeta, drevno i davno uspravljanje i razvijanje čovječanstva povezuju s Božanskim stvoriteljskim činom. Ali, da li je čovjek od/uvijek znao da je član čovječanstva?

Da li su ljudi od/uvijek znali da su pripadnici jednog sveopćeg ljudstva i zajedništva takve vrste?

Mnoge vjerske knjige, naravno, sadrže proklamacije o jednome Bogu i o jednome čovječanstvu. Ali, sama ljudska stvarnost i njezina uvijek prisutna fragmentiranost, opstojanje u plemenima i narodima, prebivanje u različitim jezicima, i u različitim rasama, itd., sve to je itekako snažno, s jedne strane osujećivalo, a s druge strane ohrabrivalo, sve mogućnosti da se čovječanstvo osjeti jednim i jedinstvenim. Sve do najnovijih vremena mi ne znamo da li je čovječanstvo ikada prije imalo jedan svoj zajednički forum, na jednom mjestu i u jednom vremenu. Naravno, posve je drugo pitanje samo postojanje onog dragocjenog vjerovanja da svekoliko čovječanstvo svoje jedinstvo temelji na Božanskoj odluci da stvori čovječanstvo.

Pitanje: Da li je čovjek od/uvijek znao da je član čovječanstva? jeste jedno teško pitanje koje bi trebalo, baš stoga što je teško, možda proglasiti nepotrebnim. Ali, s druge strane motreno, sva teška pitanja nisu i nepotrebna pitanja. Imamo li u vidu da davne epohe čovjeka i čovječanstva sve više i brže proždire prošlost, kao i to da nestaju u nepojamno dalekim davninama, nama današnjima teško je pouzdano znati i potvrditi, ili pak zanijekati, da su ljudi baš uvijek bili ne/svjesni svoga pripadništva, ili svojih pripadništava, jednom i jedinom čovječanstvu.

Uostalom, šta je u minulim epohama uopće značila, ili mogla značiti, svijest o čovječanstvu?! Baš kao i danas, i tada je – vjerovatno – skladno čovječanstvo bilo jedan ideal, jedna zadaća koju valja izvršiti.^{▼10} Skladno i harmonično čovječanstvo uvijek se moralo njegovati kao jedna poželjna

^{▼10} Pogotovo je teško, ako ne i posve nemoguće, imati nesporna jamstva i dokaze da su davni naraštaji imali znanje i svijest o ne/pripadanju čovječanstvu ili ne/prihvatanju nekih predstava o jednom čovječanstvu.

2. Humanity and the origin of awareness of it

We have already mentioned: The main Divine books, as well as the main cosmogonies of the world, associate the ancient and long-ago uprighting and development of humanity with the Divine act of creation. But did man/always know that he was a member of humanity?

Have people always known that they are members of a universal humanity and communion of this kind?

Many religious books, of course, contain proclamations about the one God and about one humanity. But human reality itself and its ever-present fragmentation, existence in tribes and nations, dwelling in different languages, and in different races, etc., all this has very strongly, on the one hand thwarted, and on the other, encouraged, all possibilities for humanity to feel one and unique. Until recent times, we do not know if humanity has ever had one common forum of its own before, in one place and in one time. Of course, another question is the very existence of that precious belief that all mankind bases its unity on the Divine decision to create humanity.

The question "did man/always know that he was a member of humanity?" is a difficult question that should, precisely because it is difficult, perhaps be declared unnecessary. But, on the other hand, all difficult questions are not unnecessary questions. If we bear in mind that the ancient epochs of man and humanity are devouring the past more and more quickly, as well as that they are disappearing in incomprehensibly distant ancient times, it is difficult for us today to reliably know and confirm, or deny, that people have always been unaware of their belonging, or of their belongings, to the one and only humanity.

After all, what did consciousness of humanity mean, or could have meant in the past epochs? Just as today, back then – probably – harmonious humanity was an ideal, a task to be accomplished. An agreeable and harmonious humanity has always had to be cultivated as a desirable idea, it had to be achieved and reached, despite many "obstacles": linguistic, religious, racial, geographical, communicative. But on the other hand, all this linguistic, religious, racial... diversity was, in itself, also an effective means of stepping out of them towards achieving awareness of a single humanity. ▼¹⁰

▼¹⁰ It is especially difficult, if not entirely impossible, to have indisputable guarantees and evidence that ancient generations had

zamisao, moralo se postizati i dostizati, unatoč mnogim “preprekama”: jezičkim, religijskim, rasnim, geografskim, komunikacijskim. Ali, s druge strane, sve te jezičke, religijske, rasne... raznolikosti bile su, same po sebi, i efikasna sredstva da se iz njih zakorači ka postizanju svijesti o jednom čovječanstvu.

Ali, nepostojanje dokaza da se potvrdi bilo koja od tih dviju mogućnosti (postojanje svijesti o pripadanju ili nepripadanju čovječanstvu) ne znači da ti davni „arhaiski ljudi“ – kako ih naziva Mircea Eliade (1907–1986) – nisu imali mnoga znanja i osjećanja pripadanja čovječanstvu, makar onom segmentu čovječanstva koji ih je geografski, komunikacijski, jezički, vremenski... blisko obuhvatao i saodređivao. Zapravo, svijest o Bogu kao Stvoritelju u 'arhaiskom čovjeku' bila je glavno jamstvo postojanja čovjekove svijesti o čovječanstvu, ma koliko ta svijest mogla biti fluidna i nepostojana.

Ali i to kad mi 'arhaiskim' nazovemo sve davne naraštaje ljudi i sva ta od nas sada itekako daleka pokoljenja čovječanstva – i to je, vjerovatno, jedno naše ni na čemu utemeljeno nagađanje o minulim vremenima, to je jedno naše puko proricanje, da ne kažemo gatanje, o tome što je sada zavijeno u mnogostruke tmine prošlosti i zastore mnogih davnina. K tome, sve to od nas se sve više udaljava i netragom nestaje.

Čak se i pretpostavke o 'davnim pokoljenjima' i 'arhaiskim ljudima' kao o 'zaostalim', a što su pretpostavke nastale iz našeg 'progresivnog' i 'prosvjetiteljskog' čitanja povijesti, ne mogu dokazati pukim arheološkim prekopavanjem po ljudskim ostacima doprlim do nas iz nepojamnih davnina za koje nam se planeta Zemlja smilovala i isporučila nam ih kao polutruhle.

Kakve se i koliko velike pogibelji nalaze u potragama za istinom i cjelinom iz truhlih i fosiliziranih ostataka davnašnjeg čovjeka i čovječanstva – o tome najbolje mogu govoriti arheolozi, antropolozi, jezikoslovci, ovi potonji naročito onda kad izlažu teme o izumrlim jezicima čovjeka i čovječanstva. Doista, kakva li su ta 'groblja izumrlih jezika' i može li se (i ako može: čime i kako?) prekopavati po njima – to nama ostaje i dalje kao pitanje, još više kao čuđenje.

Ma kako bilo, nama današnjima teško je zaputiti se u nepojamne slojeve prošlosti, sve i kad bi ti slojevi negdje postojali u sređenoj formi. Teško nam je ikoliko restaurirati vjerne slike kako su prošle i davnašnje forme čovječanstva kao zajednice mogle izgledati.

Unatoč tome, čovjeku, sve otkada jeste čovjek, ne treba odricati sposobnost da uobražava i zamišlja neku svoju 'svjetsku čovječansku zajednicu'. Drugo je pitanje da li je ta čovjekova davnašnja 'svjetska zajednica', u svojim različitim oblicima, učinila ljude sretnim. Ali, ipak, jedno je sigurno: Nije ih dovela na rub samouništenja, nije ih spriječila da prežive, nije ih uništila niti destruirala.▼¹¹

▼¹¹ Ovdje je dobro podsjetiti i na sljedeće: Sama planeta Zemlja, na kojoj čovječanstvo živi, na ljude djeluje i integrativno i dezintegrativno. “Čovjek je satvoren od Zemlje i u Zemlju se vraća”, čovjekova krajnja sudbina je neizmjenjiva, tu se Zemlja pomalja kao ona koja svim stvorenjima na sebi daje jednaku mjeru. Ali, Zemlja je i puna bogatstava, ona se pred čovjekovom pohlepom pomalja kao dezintegrativni faktor, kao izlika za rat, ubijanje, zlostavljanje i pustošenje.

But the absence of evidence to confirm either of these two possibilities (the existence of an awareness of belonging to or not belonging to humanity) does not mean that these ancient 'archaic people' – as Mircea Eliade (1907-1986) calls them – did not have much knowledge and feelings of belonging to humanity, even if it is that segment of humanity that geographically, communicatively, linguistically, temporally... closely embraced and coordinated them. In fact, the awareness of God as the Creator in 'archaic man' was the main guarantee of the existence of man's consciousness of humanity, however fluid and volatile that consciousness may be.

But also, when we call all the ancient generations of people and all those generations of humanity now very distant from us "archaic" – and this is probably our unfounded speculation about past times, it is our mere prophesizing, not to say divination, about what is now wrapped in the manifold darkness of the past and the curtains of many centuries. In addition, all this is increasingly moving away from us and disappearing without a trace.

Even the assumptions of 'ancient generations' and 'archaic people' as 'backwards', which are assumptions arising from our 'progressive' and 'enlightening' reading of history, cannot be proved by mere archaeological digging through human remains reaching us from incomprehensible ancient times for which planet Earth had mercy on us and delivered to us semi-rotten.

What and how great the casualties are found in the search for truth and totality from the rotten and fossilized remains of ancient man and humanity – archaeologists, anthropologists, linguists, the latter can best speak of when they expose topics about the extinct languages of man and humanity. Indeed, what are these "graveyards of extinct languages" and whether (and if so: what and how?) one can dig through them – this remains to us a question, even more as amazement.

Be that as it may, it is difficult for us today to venture into the incomprehensible layers of the past, even if these layers existed somewhere in a settled form. It is difficult for us to restore the faithful images of what the ancient forms of humanity as a community might have looked like.

Nevertheless, ever since man has been a man, he should not be denied the ability to imagine his own "worldly human community". Another question is whether this ancient "world community", in its various forms, made people happy. But, still, one thing is certain: It did not bring them to the brink of self-destruction, did not prevent them from surviving, did not devastate or destroy them.▼¹¹

knowledge and awareness of not/belonging to humanity or not/accepting some notions about one humanity.

▼¹¹ Here it is good to recall the following: The very planet Earth on which humanity lives, it acts on humans both integratively and disintegratively. "Man is made of the earth and returns to the earth," man's ultimate destiny is unchangeable, where the earth emerges as one that gives equal measure to all creatures on it. But the Earth is also full of riches, it appears before man's greed as a disintegrative factor, as an excuse for war, killing, abuse, devastation.



ILUSTRACIJA - Zašto je današnje čovječanstvo 'Čovječanstvom u sjeni Sudnjega Dana'?



ILLUSTRATION ~ Why is today's humanity 'Humanity in the Shadow of Judgment Day'?

3. Čovječanstvo u svome posljednjem izdanju?

Pažljivo plijevljenje poruka, uputa, savjeta, proglasa, obznana... sa listova drevnih vjerskih knjiga, npr. Veda, Upanišada, Aveste, Biblije, Kur'āna..., na mnogo načina pokazuje da iz Velike vijesti o tom 'Božijem Jeste' i o 'Božijoj Jedinosti' slijedi i poimanje jedinosti čovjekovog stabla i čovjekovog pripadanja čovječanstvu. To da je Bog stvoritelj tog čovječanstva, i da ga On kontinuirano stvara, polazište je koje poslušni i krotki vjernici svih religija ne dovode u pitanje.

Ali, kad sve ovo rečeno iznova kažemo, pa i prihvatimo, ne treba zalupiti vrata pred pitanjima: Zašto ovo ovoliko čovječanstvo Bog nije stvorio jednostavnijim? Zašto čovječanstvo govori ovoliko jezika, koji se nekad pokazuju kao prepreka sporazumijevanju? Zašto čovječanstvo slijedi mnoštvo svjetonazora, religija, običaja, zakona, normativnih sistema? Zašto zbog svega toga često izbijaju ratovi, sukobi, pogibeljna trvenja?

Sve otkad je čovječanstva kao čovječanstva, bez obzira na njegove kvantitativne razmjere, sva ova maločas postavljena pitanja bila su prisutna i na njih se nisu mogli dati odgovori koji bi zadovoljili sve znatiželje. Ipak, samo jedna razlika dijeli ovo naše današnje čovječanstvo od svih drugih minulih i davnih izdanja čovječanstva – današnje čovječanstvo u stanju je sebe uništiti, u stanju je sebi označiti kraj, pa i – sportski rečeno – 'odsvirati kraj' samoj planeti Zemlji i svim oblicima života na njoj.

Upravo stoga mi ovih osam milijardi ljudi, koji sačinjavaju i satvoruju današnje čovječanstvo, možemo označiti 'čovječanstvom u sjeni Sudnjega Dana'.

Sve i kad bismo se mogli oduprijeti pesimizmu mnogih današnjih 'teorija ugroze', ostaje neosporna tvrdnja da je već nekoliko desetljeća baš ovo čovječanstvo najopasniji Zemljin omotač. Jedva da je danas i moguće opisati sve strane čovječanstva destruktivne po samu planetu Zemlju, po njezine ekosisteme, po samo čovječanstvo kao takvo, po floru i faunu Zemlje.

Nekoliko je karakteristika koje danas, kao užasna morbidna stanja, obilježavaju čovječanstvo. Ovdje ćemo ih ukratko pobrojati.

3. Humanity in its last edition?

Careful weeding of messages, instructions, advice, proclamations, made known... from the sheets of ancient religious books, e.g., Vedas, Upanishads, Avesta, Bible, Qur'ān..., in many ways shows that from the Great News of this 'God Is' and of 'God's Oneness' follows the notion of the oneness of man's tree and man's belonging to humanity. The fact that God is the creator of this humanity, and that He continuously creates it, is a starting point that obedient and meek believers of all religions do not question.

But when we say all this ahead anew, and even accept it, we should not slam the door on the question: Why did not God make this much humanity simpler? Why does humanity speak so many languages that sometimes prove to be an obstacle to communication? Why does humanity follow a multitude of worldviews, religions, customs, laws, normative systems? Why do wars, conflicts, dangerous frictions often break out about all this?

Ever since mankind as mankind, regardless of its quantitative scale, all these questions have just been asked and they could not be answered in order to satisfy all curiosities. However, only one difference separates our present-day humanity from all other past and ancient editions of humanity – today's humanity is able to destroy itself, it is able to mark the end for itself, and even – in sporting terms – “the final whistle” of the planet Earth itself and all the forms of life on it.

That is why we can designate these eight billion people, who make up and create today's humanity, as "Humanity in the Shadow of the Judgment Day".

Even if we could resist the pessimism of many of today's "threat theories," there remains an indisputable claim that for several decades this very humanity has been the most dangerous mantle around the Earth. Today it is hardly possible to describe all the destructive aspects of humanity towards planet Earth itself, towards its eco-systems, towards humanity itself as such, towards the flora and fauna of the Earth.

There are several characteristics that today, as terrible morbid states, mark humanity. We will briefly list them here.

Prvo, *nema povratka na manje*. Sve što je čovječanstvo jučer proizvelo, već danas proizvodi uz više zahtjeva za vodom, zrakom, zemljinim tлом, florom i faunom. Naravno, čovječanstvo će sutra tražiti više (resursa, vode, zraka, zemljina tla...) negoli je tražilo danas. *Nema povratka na manje!* – to je ona morbidna konstanta koja je planetu Zemlju učinila potrošnom robom.

Drugo, *nema povratka na sporije*. Sva tehnika, od njezina izuma do danas, nutarnje djeluje pod neumitnim moranjem koje se odvija po formuli *brže, brže, brže!* Jučer mora biti brže od prekjučer, danas mora biti brže od jučer, sutra mora biti brže od danas! Sve, baš sve, npr. transmisija elektronske slike, elektronskih valova, procesa zamrzavanja u frižiderima, potom svekolika kretanja prevoznih sredstava, sve do pukih operacija u kompjuterima i na mobitelima – sve to djeluje po unutarnjem usudu da treba biti brže, *da nema povratka na sporije*. Sve otkad je tako, čovječanstvo je pokrenuto i nagnano u stampedo, štaviše, i samo čovječanstvo smatra neopozivo vrijednim to da sve u rukama savremenog čovjeka 'radi' *brže i brže*.

Treće, *nema povratka na bezopasnije*. Sva oružja koja je čovječanstvo spravljalo djelovala su po matrici ubiti više, ubiti brže! To je taj 'morbidni nerv' povećanja 'efikasnosti' ili 'učinkovitosti' oružja. Ovim se došlo do nutarnje matrice po kojoj se proizvodi ubitačno oružje, atomska bomba je 'prevaziđena', ona je 'zastarjela'. Tako se došlo do strašne pohlepe za onim oružjem koje je opasnije, efikasnije, učinkovitije. Današnje čovječanstvo širi ruke dobrodošlice upravo takvim vrstama oružja. Ali i ta oružja treba prevazići ubitačnijim oružjima! I u tome se vidi 'uspjeh' i 'napredak' čovječanstva. Zato se današnje čovječanstvo može nazvati 'Čovječanstvom u sjeni Sudnjega Dana'.

Ovaj esej završit ćemo podsjećanjem na jedan naš esej od prije više od dvadeset godina. Naime, "S čime to unuci homo sapiensa izlaze 2000. godine pred dragoga Boga?" – esej je koji smo objavili 1999. godine^{▼12} i u kojem smo podsjetili na *dvije izreke o maču*, jednu od Isaa, Isusa Krista (*‘Īsā al-Masīh*), a drugu od poslanika Muhammeda.

Naime, *‘Īsā al-Masīh* je rekao:

“Nisam došao da donesem mir, nego mač!“,
dok je Poslanik Muhammed rekao:

“Poslan sam pred Smak Svijeta sa mačem!“^{▼13}

Kao i sve u vjerama i religijama, i ove dvije izreke treba protumačiti. A najbolje ih je protumačiti tako što će se kazati da *‘Īsā al-Masīh* i poslanik Muhammed postavljaju mač kao granicu koja se ne smije povrijediti niti prekršiti. Naime, mač je ovdje oružje koje je samo po sebi kriterij ne samo 'napadačkog

▼12 *Usporedi: Enes Karić, Eseji od Bosne (tro bosanske enklave)*, izd. Sejtarija, Sarajevo, 1999., str. 164-167.

▼13 Radi objektivnosti, važno je napomenuti da mnogi autoriteti ovaj hadis smatraju sumnjive vjerodostojnosti zbog slabosti u lancu njegovih prenosilaca, pa čak i apokrifnim, jer je njegov sadržaj u suprotnosti sa temeljnom misijom Muhammeda, a. s., kako je ona prikazana u kur'anskom tekstu.

First, *there is no going back to less*. Everything that humanity produced yesterday, it already produces today with more demands on water, air, earth's soil, flora and fauna. Of course, humanity will ask for more tomorrow (resources, water, air, earth's soil...) than it did today. *There's no going back to less!* – it is that morbid constant that has made planet Earth a consumable commodity.

Second, *there's no going back to slower*. All technology, from its invention to the present, operates internally under an inexorable moration that takes place according to the formula *faster, faster, faster!* Yesterday must be faster than the day before yesterday, today must be faster than yesterday, tomorrow must be faster than today! Everything, everything, e.g., transmission of electronic images, electronic waves, freezing processes in refrigerators, then all movements of means of transport, all the way to mere operations in computers and mobile phones – all this acts by internal fate that it should be faster, *that there is no going back to slower*. Ever since that time, humanity has been moved and pushed to stampede, moreover, humanity itself considers it irrevocably worthwhile doing everything in the hands of modern man to “do” *faster and faster*.

Third, *there is no going back to the more harmless*. All the weapons that humanity made worked on the matrix to *kill more, to kill faster!* It is this 'morbid nerve' of increasing the 'efficiency' of weapons. This has led to an inner matrix by which murder weapons are produced, the atomic bomb is "overcome", it is "outdated". This led to a terrible greed for those weapons that are more dangerous, more efficient, more effective. Today's humanity extends its welcome arms to these kinds of weapons. But these weapons should also be overcome with those weapons that are more deadly! And in this we see the "success" and "progress" of humanity. This is why today's humanity can be called "Humanity in the Shadow of Judgment Day".

We will end this essay with a reminder of one of our essays from more than twenty years ago. Namely, "With what do the grandchildren of Homo sapiens go before the dear God in 2000?" – is an essay that we published in 1999 and in which we recalled^{▼12} *two sayings about the sword*, one is from Jesus Christ (*ʿĪsā al-Masīḥ*) and the other from the Prophet Muhammad s.a.w.

Namely *ʿĪsā al-Masīḥ* said:

"I have not come to bring peace, but a sword!"

The Prophet Muhammad s.a.w.said:

"I was sent before the End of the World with a sword!"^{▼13}

Like everything in faiths and religions, these two sayings need to be interpreted. And it is best to interpret them by saying that *ʿĪsā al-Masīḥ* and the Prophet Muhammad s.a.w. set the sword as a boundary that must not be violated or broken. Namely, the sword here is a weapon that is in itself a criterion not only of an

▼12 Compare: Enes Karić, *Essays of Bosnia (three Bosnian enclaves)*, ed. Seitaria, Sarajevo, 1999, p. 164-167.

▼13 For the sake of objectivity, it is important to note that many authorities consider this hadith of dubious credibility due to the weakness in the chain of its narrators, and even apocryphal, because its content contradicts the fundamental mission of Muhammad, peace be upon him, as it is presented in the Qur'anic text.

oružja' već i 'oružja koje je odbrambeno'. Preko mača ne smije se dalje ići, kod mača treba ostati. K tome, do mača, ako mu je do mača, svaki čovjek može lahko doći. I njime se braniti. I tako dalje.

Ali, mač je odavno izbačen iz arsenala oružja. Došli su katapultovi, topovi, tenkovi i borna kola. Potom transkontinentalne rakete. Mislili smo da transkontinentalne rakete neće nikada zastarjeti. Ali, u epohi 'čovječanstva u sjeni Sudnjega dana' uskoro će i same transkontinentalne rakete biti zastarjelo oružje. Naravno, to će one moći biti samo ako preživi planeta Zemlja i sve što je na njoj. A teško da će planeta Zemlja preživjeti, zato što danas čovječanstvo gubi Prirodu baš kao što je nekada izgubilo Raj.

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Kur'an.

GOLDEWIJK, KEES KLEIN, „Estimating global land use change over the past 300 years: The HYDE Database“, *Global Biochemical Cycles* 15:2 (June 2001), pp. 417-433.



"attacking weapon", but also of a "weapon that is defensive". Through the sword one must not go any further, at the sword one must remain. In addition, by the sword, if it is up to the sword, every man can easily reach. And defend oneself with it. And so on.

But the sword was long since thrown out of the arsenal of weapons. Catapults, cannons, tanks and combat vehicles came. Transcontinental missiles. We thought transcontinental missiles would never become obsolete. But in the epoch of "Humanity in the Shadow of Judgement Day", transcontinental missiles themselves will soon be outdated weapons. Of course, they will only be able to do this if they survive planet Earth and everything on it. And it is unlikely that planet Earth will survive, because today humanity is losing Nature just as it once lost Paradise.





PREZIDIJUM
NARODNE SKUPŠTINE FNRJ
P.Br. 2337
8-IV-1952 god.
BEOGRAD

8-IV-1952 godine, d
ODLUKU

Kr 322 / 50
70

Da se ponovna molba za pomilovanje DŽOZO HUSEINA, izrečenom presudom Vojnog suda Komande grada Sarajeva br. 41/45 od 5 VI 1945- UVAŽI.

Da se osuđeni DŽOZO HUSEIN od daljeg izvođenja ograničenja građanskih prava - OSLOBODI.

S.P.-S.N.

SEKRETAR,
M.Peruničić v.r. M.P.

VIŠI VOJNI SUD JUG.ARMIIJE
II Sud br.1178/45
23 juna 1945 god.

VOJNOM SUDU KOMANDE GRADA SARAJEVA

Viši vojni sud, vijeće kod Generalštaba Jug.Armije POTVRDIO je presudu toga suda od 5 juna 1945 god. Sud br.41/45 u krivičnom predmetu protiv DŽOZO HUSEINA, suplent medrese u Sarajevu, koji je zbog krivičnog djela čl.14 Uredbe o vojnim sudovima osuđen na kaznu od pet godina i gubitak časnih prava u trajanju od pet godina. Presuda je pravilno donešena i dobro obrazložena.

Vraća se spis.

Smrt fašizmu - Sloboda narodu

Sekretar - poručnik:
Uroš Biedić, s.r. M.P.

Da je prepis vjeran svom originalu tvrdi

Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina
OPŠTINA CENTAR SARAJEVO
Opštinski sekretarijat za unutrašnje poslove SARAJEVO

Broj:
Dana:

Husein
iz Sarajeva, ulica M...
poziva se da dođe lično, ili preko
moćnika na dan 15. juna 1952.
u SUP. Centar. ul. M...
ulica, br...
in forma

ŠEF KANCELARIJE
VOJNI SUD
SARAJEVO

ASD

Šaćir Filandra (1961) doktor filozofskih znanosti, redovni profesor Fakulteta političkih nauka Univerziteta u Sarajevu na kolegijima iz Političke filozofije, Nacije i nacionalizma te Politika identiteta. Autor je četiri knjige iz područja etničkih studija i savremenih političkih ideja i pokreta te preko stotinu znanstvenih studija. Bio je gostujući profesor na univerzitetima u SAD i Mađarskoj. Aktivan je sudionik u nevladinom sektoru.
E-mail: sacir.filandra@fpn.unsa.ba i filandra@hotmail.com

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E-Mail: sacir.filandra@fpn.unsa.ba and filandra@hotmail.com

onelo je sledeću

SUD BR. 41/45.

PRESUDA

ime naroda Jugoslavije

83/33/24
3065/24

MINISTARSTVO UNUTRAŠNJIH POSLOVA
OPŠTINO ODRŽANJE
3046
9-7-10 1946



Vojni sud Komande grada Sarajeva u vijeću sastavljenom od dru-
ga Pekića majora, kap predsjednika vijeća, majora Šahinpašića
Andžić Tome kapetana, kao članova vijeća, drugo poručnika Hadži-
ćkije kao zapisničara u prisutnosti druge Vese Jovanovića kao
ni optužbe, te okrivljenog Dozo Huseina zbog krivičnih djela
iz člana 14 UOVŠ-a. Nekom održane glavne rasprave dne 5-VI-1945 g. u
Sarajevu donio slijedeću

PRESUDA :

Okrivljeni Dozo Husein, sin Sulejmanov, rođen 1.12 g. u
selu Vraniću, srez Gorski, suplent medrese u Sarajevu, oženjen sa
djetetom, pišmen, sa stanom u Zrinjskoga čika br.3

KRIV JE :

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SMR



USEINA, osuđenog
Sarajeva Sud. broj

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PRETSEDNIK,
I. Ribar v. r.

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POZIV ZA STRANKU

Dozo
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uputi svog zakonskog zastupnika odnosno puno-
02. 1981 god. u 10⁰⁰ časova
MANKA ŠOREL 5 soba broj 35 radi
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otvornog razgovora



TRUDO



Dostavljeno Sl. ligu
za objavljivanje 9. IX.

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UDK: 929 Dozo H.
Original scientific paper - Izvorni naučni rad

Šaćir FILANDRA

ĐOZO I SOCIJALIZAM
ĐOZO AND SOCIALISM

Sažetak

Kao najizrasliji islamski intelektualac socijalističkog perioda Bosne i Hercegovine, Husein Đozo dao je nemjerljiv doprinos razvoju i afirmaciji nacionalne samobitnosti Bošnjaka. Autorskim ostvarenjima i društvenim angažmanom značajno je sudjelovao u popisu stanovništva sedamdesetih godina prošlog stoljeća doprinoseći na taj način ideji ravnopravnosti građana i naroda svoje države. Njegovo afirmativno obraćanje pripadnicima Islamske vjerske zajednice tokom tog procesa pospješilo je njihovo nacionalno samorazumijevanje i političko stasavanje.

Ključne riječi: *Husein Đozo, islam, socijalizam, nacionalnost, popis stanovništva*

Abstract

As the most outstanding Islamic intellectual of the socialist period of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Husein Đozo made an immeasurable contribution to the development and affirmation of the national identity of Bosniaks. With his authorial achievements and social engagement, he significantly participated in the census of the 1970s, thus contributing to the idea of equality between the citizens and peoples of his country. His affirmative address to members of the Islamic religious community during this process enhanced their national self-understanding and political growth.

Key words: *Husein Đozo, Islam, socialism, nationality, census*

ĐOZO I SOCIJALIZAM

I

Rasvjetljavanje mjesta i uloge Huseina Đoze u socijalističkom razdoblju bosanskohercegovačke i bošnjačke povijesti postavljamo kroz šire, kontekstualno pitanje: Kako se socijalizam odnosio prema Bošnjacima? Mada je ovo pitanje još otvoreno za historiografska i politološka istraživanja, i mada nije u fokusu ovog rada, na osnovu dosadašnjih saznanja te povijesnih iskustava življenja u tom političkom sistemu, moglo bi se reći da je socijalizam Bošnjacima istovremeno bio i majka i maćeha. Kada se sagledava odnos Đoze i socijalizma, ishodišno polazište je činjenica da je Đozo bio velikodostojnik jedne vjerske institucije, kao i to da je socijalizam doktrinarno bio sekularistički i ateistički ideološki sistem, te je shodno takvoj njegovoj naravi potrebno pristupati razumijevanju tretmana, mjesta i uloge organizacija i institucija vjerskih zajednica u njemu. Za svaki politički sistem kao organiziranu državnu vlast najvažnije je da njegova vladajuća politička elita održava taj sistem i tu vlast. Tako su se ponašali i komunisti. Odbrana države, njenog društvenog sistema i ideologije bila je tačka s koje su procjenjivane i vrednovane njemu opozicijske društvene i političke snage. U tom rangiranju tzv. neprijatelja sistema vjerske zajednice nisu imale visok status, kako se moglo očekivati. Naime, one nisu imale instrumente za preuzimanje vlasti, a očuvanje vlasti za politku je uvijek najvažniji cilj i krajnje postignuće. U krajnjem slučaju, vjerske zajednice tretirane su kao pomoćna i moguća izvorišta opozicijskih strujanja, ali nikada nisu imale status ozbiljnih suparnika, što je u konačnici i određivalo odnos sistema prema tim institucijama. Islamska zajednica je od svih vjerskih zajednica u bivšoj Jugoslaviji u tom smislu imala najkoooperativniji odnos prema društvenom sistemu

ĐOZO AND SOCIALISM

I

Shedding light on the place and role of Husein Đozo in the socialist period of Bosnian and Bosniak history, we ask through a broader, contextual question: How did socialism treat Bosniaks? Although this question is still open to historiographical and political research, and although it is not in the focus of this paper, based on the current knowledge and historical experiences of living in this political system, it could be said that socialism was both a mother and a stepmother for Bosniaks at the same time. When we look at the relationship between Jose and socialism, the starting point is the fact that Đozo was a dignitary of a religious institution, as well as that socialism was doctrinally secular and atheistic ideological system, and according to its nature it is necessary to approach the understanding of the treatment, place and role of organizations and institutions of religious communities in it. For any political system as an organized state power, it is most important that this system and the power of its ruling political elite is maintained. This is also how the Communists behaved. The defense of the state, its social system and ideology was the point from which the opposition social and political forces were evaluated and valued. In this ranking of the so-called enemies of the system, the religious communities did not have a high status, as might be expected. Namely, they did not have the instruments to take power, and the preserving of power for politics is always the most important goal and the ultimate achievement. As a last resort, religious communities were treated as auxiliary and possible sources of opposition currents, though they never had the status of serious rivals, which ultimately determined the attitude of the system towards these institutions. Of all religious communities in the former Yugoslavia, the Islamic Community had the most cooperative attitude towards the social system and the

i državi. Budući je dugo tokom tog perioda bila jedina institucija nacionalno nepriznatog naroda, ona nije imala ni prostora, a po mome uvjerenju ni ozbiljnih razloga da se radikalno opozicijski postavlja spram države. Ona se, danas bi se reklo, krajnje pragmatično odnosila prema prostorima slobode koje joj je društveni sistem s vremenom otvarao, te se uspjela, sa svojim narodom, nakon njegovih velikih fizičkih gubitaka u Drugom svjetskom ratu, reorganizirati, revitalizirati i postepeno razvijati kroz u osnovi neku vrstu partnerskog odnosa sa državom. Uspijevala je ograničeni ideološki prostor i vrijeme koristiti za svoje potrebe, ali ne nauštrb svog poslanja. Husein Đozo, kao njen istaknuti član, bio je paradigma takvog odnosa.

Kako je socijalistička država rangirala svoje osporavatelje sedamdesetih godina prošlog stoljeća, kada se odvija i značajna Đozina društvena i intelektualna aktivnost? Uvidom u jedan razgovor saveznih, republičkih i pokrajinskih sekretara unutarnjih poslova bivše jugoslavenske države s maršalom Titom 1975. godine, a Tito je stvarno i simbolički u tom sistemu bio najbitniji, vidimo da su u hijerarhiji sigurnosnih prijetnji režimu vjerske zajednice i njihove aktivnosti vrlo nisko rangirane, a što je bio i osnov da se prema njima dobrohotno i korektno postupi. Najizraženiju neprijateljsku djelatnost, tih godina nakon Hrvatskog proljeća i „srpskih liberala“, isijavale su birokratsko-etatističke snage (informbiroovci, novoeksponirani staljinisti i rankovićevci), na drugom mjestu su bili liberali, koji su negirali rukovodeću ulogu Partije u društvu, zatim se navode anarholiberalne snage koje koriste naučne časopise i znanstvene konferencije za kritiku režima, tek na četvrtom mjestu spominju se aktivnosti vjerskih zajednica i to Rimokatoličke crkve i Srpske pravoslavne crkve, bez spominjanja Islamske zajednice i na petom mjestu navodi se politička emigracija.^{▼1} Zanimljivo je da u ovom razgovoru Tita s najodgovornijim bezbjednjacima ni nacionalizam zemlje nije spominjan kao posebna prijetnja režimu, mada se tokom cijelog njegova trajanja bilo svjesno da je pravilno rješavanje nacionalnog pitanja i održavanje skladnih međunacionalnih odnosa u zemlji, a komunisti su bili uvjereni da su to postigli, bilo pitanje od prvorazrednog političkog značaja. S tog aspekta ispravnim se smatralo i konačno rješavanje muslimanskog nacionalnog pitanja, koje je dugo bilo „kamenčić u cipeli“ jugoslavenskih, a posebno bosanskih komunista, te se njegovu otvaranju prilazilo s posebnom pažnjom.

Peti kongres historičara Jugoslavije, održan u Ohridu 1963. godine, ušao je u našu historiju kao prvi znanstveni skup na kome se nacionalno pitanje Bošnjaka nastojalo znanstveno postaviti. Kongresna tema „Etnički i nacionalni procesi u našoj zemlji“ okupila je preko hiljadu učesnika. Mustafa Imamović svjedoči da je „[...] u centru interesovanja učesnika Kongresa bilo nacionalno pitanje bosansko-hercegovačkih Muslimana, pa skoro i nije bilo govornika koji je zaobišao ovu temu“.^{▼2} Bošnjačko-

▼1 *Razgovori saveznog, republičkih i pokrajinskih sekretara za unutrašnje poslove sa predsjednikom Republike.* Arhiv Kabineta predsjednika CKSKBiH; 31. august 197

▼2 Imamović, Mustafa. „Na marginama petog kongresa istoričara Jugoslavije: Pažnja prema istoriji naroda i narodnosti“, *Oslobođenje*. Sarajevo; 20. septembar 1969. godine.

state. Since for a long time it was the only institution of a nationally unrecognized people, it had no space, and in my belief, no serious reasons to radically oppose the state. Today, it would seem, it treated the spaces of freedom that the social system eventually opened to it, and managed, with its people, after their great physical losses in the Second World War, to reorganize, revitalize and gradually develop through, basically, a kind of partnership with the state. It managed to use limited ideological space and time for its own needs, but not at the expense of its mission. Husein Đozo, as its distinguished member, was the paradigm of such a relationship.

How did the socialist state rank its disputants in the 1970s, when Đozo's significant social and intellectual activity also took place? By examining a conversation between the federal, republican and provincial secretaries of the interior of the former Yugoslav state with Marshal Tito in 1975, and Tito was in actuality and symbolically the most important person in this system, we see that in the hierarchy of security threats to the regime, the religious communities and their activities are ranked very low, which was the basis for being treated benevolently and correctly. The most pronounced hostile activity, in those years after the Croatian Spring and the "Serbian liberals", was radiated by bureaucratic-etatist forces (information bureau officers, newly exposed Stalinists and followers of Ranković), while in second place were the liberals, who denied the leadership of the Party in society, then followed the anarcho-liberal forces that used scientific journals and scientific conferences to criticize the regime, only in fourth place were the aforementioned activities of religious communities, namely the Roman Catholic Church and The Serbian Orthodox Church, without mentioning the Islamic Community and in fifth place, cited political emigration.^{▼1} It is interesting that in this conversation of Tito with the most responsible security guards, the nationalism of the country was not mentioned as a special threat to the regime, although throughout its duration it was aware that the proper resolution of the national issue and the maintenance of harmonious interethnic relations in the country, and the communists were convinced that they had achieved this, was an issue of first-class political significance. From this point of view, the final resolution of the Muslim national question, which for a long time was considered correct, and which had long been a "pebble in the shoe" of the Yugoslav, and especially Bosnian communists, and its opening was approached with special attention.

The Fifth Congress of Yugoslav Historians, held in Ohrid in 1963, entered our history as the first scientific conference at which the national question of Bosniaks sought in a scientific manner. The congress topic "The Ethnic and National Processes in our Country" gathered over a thousand participants. Mustafa Imamović testifies that "... at the center of interest of the participants of the Congress was the national issue of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Muslims, so there were almost no speakers who bypassed this topic."^{▼2} Bosniak-Muslim

▼1 *Talks between federal, republican and provincial secretaries for internal affairs with the President of the Republic.* Archives of the Cabinet of the President of CKSKBiH; August 31, 1975.

▼2 "I'm going to have to, Mustafa." *On the Margins of the Fifth Congress of Yugoslav Historians: Attention to the History of Nations and Nationalities*", *Oslobođenje*. Sarajevo; September 20, 1969.

muslimanska problematika posebno je razmatrana u šest referata i nakon tih izlaganja vođene su najznačajnije rasprave. I pored izvjesnih oprečnih mišljenja i nijansi u pojedinim stavovima, kroz diskusiju je nesumnjivo utvrđeno da bosanski muslimani predstavljaju jednu nacionalnu posebnost jer se većina njih tako predstavlja. Zadatak znanosti bio je da odgovori na pitanje zašto se bosanski muslimani tako osjećaju i koje su osnove njihove posebnosti. Spomenuti kongres historičara u osnovi je usmjerio referat Avde Sućeske o „historijskim osnovama posebnosti bosansko-hercegovačkih muslimana“. Sućeskina studija prokrčila je put bošnjačkim nacionalnim temama u jugoslavensku historiografiju kao legitimnim pitanjima i područjima istraživanja, budući da je iz ideoloških razloga znanstveno bavljenje tom tematikom tokom socijalizma u osnovi bilo izostalo. Spremnost bosanskih komunista na priznavanje nacionalnosti Muslimana na ovaj i slične načine znanstveno je legitimirana.


Za vrijeme polustoljetne vladavine komunista Bosnom, Bošnjaci su kao posebnost tretirani uglavnom, mada ne i jedino, kroz „ekcese“, slučajeve i afere. To je bio oblik njihove negativne legitimacije. Bilo ko s razine nacionalne elite i bilo kada da je tražio neka prava za Bošnjake, a izvan zamišljenog ideološkog nacarta, dolazio je u sukob s Partijom, bio je politički i profesionalno izopćavan, u pravilu proglašavan „islamskim fundamentalistom“ ili „muslimanskim nacionalistom“. „Obični svijet“, tj. većina naroda bila je pacificirana. On se i tada, kao i uvijek i svugdje, lahko mirio s nametnutom vladajućom voljom i dovodio u stanje da je kao takvu podržava, vodeći se tradicionalnim principom da je vjera naroda u osnovi vjera njegova vladara. Ali je zato svaki intelektualac bio pod izvjesnim ideološkim nadzorom, oni koji su javno pokazivali zanimanje za bosanskomuslimanske teme bili su pod prismotrom tajne policije, a oni koji su o Bošnjacima pisali ili se zalagali za njihova prava, na način koji je izlazio iz okvira vladajuće ideologije, bili su društveno kompromitirani. Takvo stanje duha 1983. godine, povodom obilježavanja 40-godišnjice Drugog zasjedanja AVNOJ-a, a na znanstvenom skupu u Sarajevu, Avdo Sućeska izrazio je riječima da, usprkos povoljnim društvenim uvjetima za znanstveno istraživanje muslimanske posebnosti, „[...] postoji još uvijek, na žalost, u određenim krugovima izvjesna odbojnost prema ovoj temi, pa su čak i oni naučni radnici Muslimani koji najiskrenije nastoje da naučnom metodom objasne fenomen Muslimana izloženi katkad riziku da od tih krugova budu etiketirani kao muslimanski nacionalisti“.^{▼3} Takve su bile ličnosti Muhameda Hadžijahića, Atifa Purivatre, Esada Ćimića, Muhameda Filipovića, Kasima Suljevića, Muzafera Hadžagića, Hamdije Pozderca, Avde Hume, Alije Izetbegovića, Alije Isakovića, Muhsina Rizvića, Rusmira Mahmutćehajića, Pašage Mandžića, Salema Ćerića i dr. Zato nije metodološki neopravdano i politički pretenciozno razumijevati i predstavljati bošnjačku komunističku polustoljetnu zbiljnost kao povijest ekscesa i montiranih afera, bar na fenomenološkoj ravni.

^{▼3} Sućeska, Avdo. „KPJ prva uočila činjenicu da Muslimani čine posebnost“. *AVNOJ i suvremenost*. Sarajevo: Institut za proučavanje nacionalnih odnosa; 1984:1022.

issues were specifically discussed in six papers and after these presentations the most important discussions were held. Despite certain conflicting opinions and nuances in certain attitudes, through discussion it was undoubtedly established that Bosnian Muslims represent a national peculiarity because most of them present themselves as such. The task of science was to answer the question of why Bosnian Muslims feel this way and what are the basics of their peculiarities. The aforementioned congress of historians basically directed Avdo Sućeska's paper on "The historical basis of the distinctiveness of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Muslims". Sućeska's study paved the way for Bosniak national topics into Yugoslav historiography as legitimate issues and areas of research, since for ideological reasons scientific dealing with this topic during socialism was basically absent. The willingness of Bosnian communists to recognize the nationalities of Muslims in this and similar ways has been scientifically legitimized.

During the half-century rule of communists in Bosnia, Bosniaks were treated mainly, though not exclusively, through "excesses", cases and affairs. It was a form of their negative identification. Anyone from the level of the national elite and at any time who sought some rights for Bosniaks, and outside the imaginary ideological blueprint, came into conflict with the Party, was politically and professionally ostracized, as a rule proclaimed an "Islamic fundamentalist" or a "Muslim nationalist". "Ordinary people", i.e., most of the people were pacified. Even then, as always and everywhere, he easily reconciled with the imposed ruling will and brought it to a state of support as such, guided by the traditional principle that the faith of the people is basically the faith of its ruler. But every intellectual was under some ideological scrutiny, those who publicly showed interest in Bosnian Muslim topics were under surveillance by the secret police, and those who wrote about Bosniaks or advocated for their rights, in a way that went beyond the framework of the ruling ideology, were socially compromised. Such a state of mind in 1983, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Second Session of the AVNOJ, and at a scientific conference in Sarajevo, Avdo Sućeska expressed that, despite the favourable social conditions for scientific research of Muslim distinctiveness, "[...] Unfortunately, there is still a certain aversion to this subject in certain circles, and even those Muslim scientists/scholars who sincerely seek to explain the phenomenon of Muslims by the scientific method are sometimes at risk of being labeled as Muslim nationalists by these circles."³ Such were the personalities of Muhamed Hadžijahić, Atif Purivatra, Esad Ćimić, Muhamed Filipović, Kasim Suljević, Muzafer Hadžagić, Hamdija Pozderac, Avdo Humo, Alija Izetbegović, Alija Isaković, Muhsin Rizvić, Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, Pašama Mandžić, Salem Ćerić and others. Therefore, it is not methodologically unjustified and politically pretentious to understand and represent Bosniak communist half-century reality as a history of excesses and concocted affairs, at least on the phenomenological level.

³ Sućeska, Avdo. "The CPY was the first to notice the fact that Muslims are a distinction." *AVNOJ and modernity*. Sarajevo: Institute for the Study of National Relations; 1984:1022.



A u čemu je pojam jugoslovenstva, šta, naime, znači biti Jugosloven? Danas to znači biti građanin socijalističke Jugoslavije. Međutim, iako je to jasno, kod nas postoje i jalove diskusije, na primjer o tome da li Muslimani treba da se opredijele za neku nacionalnost. To je besmislica. Svaki može da bude ono što osjeća da jeste i niko nema prava da mu natura neku nacionalnu pripadnost ako se on osjeća samo građaninom Jugoslavije.

Iz Titovog govora na Sedmom kongresu Saveza omladine Jugoslavije, održan u januaru 1963.

ILUSTRACIJA - Za vrijeme polustoljetne vladavine komunista Bosnom, Bošnjaci su kao posebnost tretirani uglavnom, mada ne i jedino, kroz „ekcese“, slučajeve i afere. To je bio oblik njihove negativne legitimacije. U pravilu proglašavani su „islamskim fundamentalistom“ ili „muslimanskim nacionalistom“.



ILLUSTRATION ~ During the half-century rule of the communists in Bosnia, Bosniaks were treated as a special feature mainly, though not exclusively, through "excesses", cases and affairs. It was a form of their negative identification. As a rule, they were declared "Islamic fundamentalist" or "Muslim nationalist".

II

Upolitičkom razvoju Bosne i Hercegovine tokom socijalističke ere od presudne je važnosti period između 1968. i 1974. godine. Tada su se desila tri presudna afirmativna bošnjačka i bosanska događaja: priznavanje nacionalnosti Muslimana (1968), popis stanovništva (1971) te federalni Ustav iz 1974. godine. To su istovremeno godine početka otvorenih nasrtaja na Bosnu i Hercegovinu, koji će kulminirati ratom protiv Bosne i Hercegovine devedesetih godina 20. stoljeća, budući da se već tada mogu prepoznati „[...] duh i ideje velikosrpskih i velikohrvatskih nacionalističkih nukleusa u tumačenju ove republike kao navodno historijski nezrelog, civilizacijski dubioznog i nacionalno nedefinisanog društva [...]“, ^{▼4} u kojoj caruje dogmatizam, čvrsta ruka, staljinizam, nedemokratija i rigidnost. Okidač za ovakvo razmahivanje antibosanskih percepcija bilo je priznavanje nacionalnosti Muslimana, s kojim se nisu mirile nacionalističke ali dijelom i komunističke snage u susjednim republikama.

Najmanje su dva moguća izvorišta ovakvog negativnog tretiranja bošnjačkih tema i pitanja tokom ovog perioda naše povijesti: jedno je jugoslavenska, a drugo komunistička ideologija. Jugoslavenska ideja po sebi je bila antibosanska i antibošnjačka. Ne ulazeći u dublje razmatranje ovog stava, samo naglašavamo da je ideja jugoslavenstva u svojim počecima i prvotno bila oblik rješavanja srpsko-hrvatskog pitanja, Bosni u toj ideji nije priznavan ravnopravan politički i kulturni status s ostalim zemljama sastavnicama prve Jugoslavije, a njeni muslimani tretirani su vjerskom, a ne narodnom skupinom. Recidive takvog stava dugo imamo i tokom socijalizma, mada ne sve vrijeme i na svakom mjestu. S druge strane, ideologija komunizma počivala je na tezi o nužnosti odumiranja ili prevazilaženja triju važnih društvenih kategorija: kategorije države, kategorije nacije i kategorije religije. Ovo se mora imati u vidu kada se procjenjuje odnos komunizma kao ideologije i socijalizma kao njegove društvene prakse prema nacionalnom i vjerskom fenomenu. I nacija i religija dugo su smatrane recidivima prošlosti, oblicima nazadne, nerazvijene, retrogradne svijesti, nečim što će se, tako se smatralo, tokom razvoja socijalističke svijesti prevazići. Iz takvih i sličnih razloga „tolerirano“ je prisustvo religijskog unutar manje obrazovanih i seoskih masa, budući da su, shodno prosvjetiteljskom konceptu, bile još nedovoljno klasno svjesne, dok se unutar visokoobrazovanih lica i novih socijalističkih snaga podrazumijevalo iščezavanje nacionalne i vjerske pripadnosti u korist ateizma i klasne umjesto nacionalne grupne identifikacije. Moglo bi se reći da je čin priznavanja bošnjačke nacionalnosti kao muslimanske bio u izvjesnoj nesuglasnosti s ideologijom komunizma, ali

^{▼4} Hadžihasanović, Aziz. *1968-1974 vrijeme prvih nasrtaja na Bosnu i Hercegovinu: Kako su srasli birokratizam i nacionalizam*. Sarajevo: Kult/B; 2005. str. 16-17.

The period between 1968 and 1974 was crucial in the political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the socialist era. At that time, three crucial affirmative Bosniak and Bosnian events took place: the recognition of the nationality of Muslims (1968), the census (1971) and the federal Constitution of 1974. These are at the same time the beginning years of the of open attacks on Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will culminate in the war against Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, since they can already be recognized as "[...] the spirit and ideas of greater Serbian and greater Croatian nationalist nuclei in interpreting this Republic as a supposedly historically immature, civilizationally dubious and nationally undefined society [...]",^{▼4} in which dogmatism, the firm hand, Stalinism, non-democracy and rigidity reign. The trigger for such a flare-up of anti-Bosnian perceptions was the recognition of the nationality of Muslims, with which nationalist but partly communist forces in neighbouring republics did not reconcile.

There are at least two possible sources of this negative treatment of Bosniak topics and issues during this period of our history: one is Yugoslav and the other is communist ideology. The Yugoslav idea in itself was anti-Bosnian and anti-Bosniak. Without going into a deeper consideration of this position, we only emphasize that the idea of Yugoslavism in its beginnings was in fact initially a form of solving the Serbo-Croatian issue. Bosnia in this idea was not recognized as of equal political and cultural status with other countries constituent of the first Yugoslavia, and its Muslims were treated as a religious, not a people's group. We have had this attitude for a long time during socialism, although not all the time and not in every place. On the other hand, the ideology of communism rested on the thesis of the necessity of eliminating or overcoming three important social categories: the category of state, the category of nation and the category of religion. This must be taken into account when assessing the relationship of communism as an ideology and socialism as its social practice to national and religious phenomena. Both nation and religion have long been regarded as relapses of the past, forms of backward, underdeveloped, retrograde consciousness, something that, as it was thought, during the development of socialist consciousness should be overcome. For such and similar reasons, the presence of the religious within the less educated and rural masses was "tolerated", since, according to the Enlightenment concept, they were still insufficiently class conscious, while within highly educated persons and new socialist forces it implied the disappearance of national and religious affiliation in favor of atheism and class instead of national group identification. It could be said that the act of recognizing Bosniak nationality as Muslim was in a certain disagreement with the ideology of communism, but such a

^{▼4} Hadžihasanović, Aziz. *1968-1974 The time of the first attacks on Bosnia and Herzegovina: How bureaucracy and nationalism merged*. Sarajevo: Kult/B; 2005. p. 16-17.

je takav politički pothvat ipak učinjen budući da je bio rezultat i socijalističke društvene realnosti i da je taj narod jednostavno postojao kao neoboriva činjenica, te da je nacionalno asimiliranje bosanskih muslimana izostalo, odnosno nije uspjelo, nakon što mu je Komunistička partija nakon Drugog svjetskog rata bila namijenila takvu sudbinu.

No, stvari se nisu sve vrijeme odvijale onako kako je ta ideologija željela. Već 1958. godine Tito ističe da treba prestati s nacionalnim igrama oko Muslimana i dozvoliti ljudima da se izjasne kako hoće. „Ovo sam spomenuo uzgred da bih pokazao da i one stvari sa nacionalnošću Muslimana treba postepeno likvidirati. Ljude treba pustiti pa neka ako hoće budu nacionalno opredijeljeni građani Jugoslavije. Neka čovjek bude Bosanac, Hercegovac. Vani vas i ne zovu drugačije nego imenom Bosanac, pa bio to Musliman, Srbin ili Hrvat“.^{▼5} Četiri godine poslije Tito pojam jugoslavenstva, koji je kao popisna odrednica na popisu stanovništva iz 1953. godine bio ponuđen Bošnjacima, označava građanskom, a ne nacionalnom kategorijom. Jugoslaven, prema njemu, znači „biti građanin socijalističke Jugoslavije“, besmislica je nametati nekome njegovo ime, svako ima pravo da se izjašnjava onako kako se osjeća. Time se Bošnjaci/muslimani nisu više mogli u popisnim odjeljcima izjašnjavati kao „Jugoslaveni“, nego im se morao tražiti novi etnonim.

U osnovnim načelima Ustava SRBiH iz 1963. godine etnička posebnost bosanskih muslimana izražava se tako da se oni pišu velikim početnim slovom „M“, kao „Muslimani“, a ne malim slovom „m“ kao „muslimani“, i ta preinaka može se razumijevati na način da su oni već tada tretirani kao narod, a ne kao vjerska skupina. Politički stavovi o Bošnjacima kao posebnom narodu konačno su izraženi na Dvadesetoj sjednici CKSKBiH 1968. godine riječima:

Sloboda ličnosti i ispoljavanja nacionalnog osjećanja i pripadnosti jedan je od osnovnih činilaca ravnopravnosti ljudi i naroda. Praksa je pokazala (akcent je na ovom „praksa“ – moja primjedba) štetnost raznih oblika pritisaka i insistiranja iz ranijeg perioda da se Muslimani u nacionalnom smislu opredjeljuju kao Srbi odnosno Hrvati, jer se i ranije pokazalo, a to i današnja socijalistička praksa potvrđuje da su Muslimani poseban narod.^{▼6}

Time se zvanično „priznalo“ postojanje bošnjačkog naroda pod muslimanskim imenom, koji je, uostalom, oduvijek narodom i bio. Istovremeno se s pojavom nove nacije rodio i pojam „muslimanskog nacionalizma“, budući da tog pojma nije bilo ranije jer nije bilo nacije koja bi ga nosila. Kao pojave muslimanskog nacionalizma navode se sada zahtjevi, bez preciziranja od koga, kada i gdje, „da se u školama predaje književnost Muslimana, u ideji za pokretanje muslimanskog lista 'Novi behar', ili u

^{▼5} Navedeno prema Purivatra, Atif. *Nacionalni i politički razvitak Muslimana*. Sarajevo: Svjetlost; 1970. str. 13.

^{▼6} Purivatra, op. cit., str. 30.

political undertaking was nevertheless done because it was also the result of socialist social reality. This people simply existed as an irrefutable fact and the national assimilation of Bosnian Muslims was absent, i.e. failed, after the Communist Party following World War II intended such a fate for him.

However, not everything occurred by the will of the ideology. As early as 1958, Tito pointed out that national games around Muslims should be stopped and people should be allowed to declare themselves as they wish. "I mentioned this incidentally to show that even those things with the nationality of Muslims should be gradually liquidated. People should be allowed to do as they wish, and let them be nationally determined citizens of Yugoslavia if they want. Let the man be Bosnian, Herzegovinian. Outside, they do not refer to you as anything other than a Bosnian, whether it's a Muslim, a Serb or a Croat."⁵ Four years later, Tito deemed the term Yugoslavism, which was offered to Bosniaks as a census determinant in the 1953 census, as a civil, not a national category. Yugoslav, according to him, means "to be a citizen of socialist Yugoslavia", it is nonsense to impose a name on someone, everyone has the right to declare themselves as they feel. Thus, Bosniaks/Muslims could no longer declare themselves as "Yugoslavs" in census sections, but had to ask for a new ethnonym.

In the basic principles of the 1963 Constitution of the SRBiH, the ethnic specificity of Bosnian Muslims is expressed in such a way that they are written with a capital initial letter "M", as "Muslims", and not with a lowercase letter "m" as "muslims", and this modification can be understood in such a way that they were already then treated as a people, and not as a religious group. Political views on Bosniaks as a special people were finally expressed at the Twentieth Session of CKSK BiH in 1968 with the words:

Freedom of personality and expression of national feeling and belonging is one of the basic factors of equality of people and peoples. Practice has shown (the emphasis is on this "practice" – my remark) the harmfulness of various forms of pressure and insistence from the earlier period that Muslims in the national sense choose as Serbs or Croats, because it has been shown before, and today's socialist practice confirms that Muslims are a special people.⁶

This officially "recognized" the existence of the Bosniak people under the Muslim name, which, after all, has always been a people. At the same time with the emergence of a new nationality, the concept of "Muslim nationalism" was born, as it had not existed earlier because there was no nation to carry it. With the phenomena of Muslim nationalism, demands were cited, without specifying from whom, when and where, "that the literature of Muslims be taught in schools, in the idea of launching the Muslim newspaper 'Novi behar', or in attempts to constitute a separate Muslim language".⁷ For communists, the ideological balance

⁵ Listed according to Purivatra, Atif. *National and political development of Muslims*. Sarajevo: Svjetlost; 1970. p. 13th.

⁶ Purivatra, op. cit., p. 30.

⁷ P"Information from the Thirteenth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on November 13, 1969". The information was sent to the President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Pov. Number:

pokušajima da se konstituiše poseban muslimanski jezik“.⁷ Komunistima je ideološka uravnilovka u Bosni, održiva na načelu spojenih posuda: čim se pojavi jedan nacionalizam, treba izmisliti drugi i treći, sve vrijeme služila za raspodjelu krivice na troje.

Drugo je pitanje zašto su komunisti bosanskomuslimanski narod „priznali“ pod nazivom „Muslimani“, a ne „Bošnjaci“, ili „Bosanci“, kakvih je prijedloga tih godina bilo, a što izlazi iz okvira našeg interesa ovoga puta. Jedno je sigurno, tom narodu komunisti nisu silom nadjenuli ime, on se sam već dugo tako zvao, ni u svojoj skupnoj privatnosti on drugog općeg imena nije imao, niti je sebe drugačije nazivao. Da je on drugačije ime i imao, niko mu ga u sferi privatnosti nije mogao zabraniti, a nije ga imao. Muslimanska grupno identitarna nominacija, dakle, istovremeno kao i vjerska i narodna i etnokulturna, bila je njegova sigurna luka tokom najvećeg dijela 20. stoljeća.

Svoje etničko ime „Bošnjak“ bosanskomuslimanski narod u 20. stoljeću nije preuzeo kao svoje nacionalno ime, niti je pod njime vodio borbu za svoja prava i slobodu, sve do 1993. godine. Zašto su Bošnjaci tako dugo bili prilično indiferentni prema „bošnjaštvu“ kao narodnoj nominaciji suviše je kompleksno pitanje i nije u fokusu ovog rada. Nerijetko su čak postojale i dogmatske snage za koje je i samo pitanje bošnjačke nacije tretirano kao antiislamsko. One su se u osnovi zadovoljavale vjerskim pravima, a nacionalna, pa time i državna, za svoj narod nisu ni tražile, ne znajući da se bez državnih prava ne mogu ostvariti ni vjerska ni nacionalna. A da i ne spominjemo nagovaranja „moderne“ muslimanske inteligencije da se sopstveni narod nacionalizira u srpskom, hrvatskom ili jugoslavenskom smislu, što je bila duboka povijesna zabluda, koja danas nije ni vrijedna spomena. Sam čin priznavanja Bošnjaka pod nazivom „Muslimani“ odvija se bez djelatnog sudjelovanja starije, tradicionalne bošnjačke inteligencije. U tom momentu ta tzv. građanska inteligencija, kako su je kvalificirali komunisti, ili je još u zatvoru ili je netom izašla iz njega ili je biološki sišla s povijesne pozornice. U svakom slučaju ona je razbijena, ideološki delegitimirana i povijesno nedjelotvorna. I dobro je da je bilo tako, budući da su njena nacionalno-politička usmjerenja bila povijesno pogrešna i obesnažena. Njena povijesna scena bio je Drugi svjetski rat, u kojem se ta inteligencija teško snalazila. Da su ideološki i politički nacrti snaga s kojima je kooperirala odnijeli prevagu u Drugom svjetskom ratu, pitanje je da li bi danas bilo i Bosne i Bošnjaka.

Izuzetak od ovog pravila bio je Husein Đozo, i u tome je njegova posebnost i veličina. On je bio i Bošnjak i Bosanac. Mada je iz jednog aspekta, u ranoj mladosti, pripadao toj staroj, građanskoj inteligenciji, dijeleći sve njene zablude i lutanja, on je iz drugog, jedini od njih, snažno zakoračio u novu političku i društvenu stvarnost. Na načelu prilagođavanja doktrinarnih islamskih načela duhu vremena svoga življenja, on se snažno uključuje u nove interpretativne izazove islama i snažno

▼⁷ “Informacija sa Trinaeste sjednice Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine, održane 13. 11. 1969. godine“. Informacija je upućena Predsjedniku Saveza komunista Jugoslavije. Pov. broj: 02-104/1-69. Arhiv Kabineta predsjednika CKSKBiH, str. 8.


sheet in Bosnia, sustainable on the principle of connected vessels: as soon as one nationalism appears, a second and a third should be invented, all the while serving to distribute the guilt onto the three.

Another question is why the communists "recognized" the Bosnian Muslim people under the name "Muslims" and not "Bosniaks", or "Bosnians", with the former being proposed at the time. This goes beyond the scope of our interest at this time. One thing is certain, the Communists did not name this nation by force, they had been called that for a long time, even in their collective privacy they did not have another general name, nor did they refer to themselves otherwise. If they had had a different name, no one in the sphere of privacy could forbid it, but they did not have one. The Muslim group-identitarian nomination, therefore, at the same time as religious and folk and ethnocultural, was its safe harbor for most of the 20th century.

The Bosnian Muslim people did not take their ethnic name "Bosniak" as their national name in the 20th century, nor did they fight for their rights and freedom under it, until 1993. Why Bosniaks have been quite indifferent to "Bosniakism" as a popular nomination for so long is too complex a question and is not in the focus of this paper. Not infrequently, there were even dogmatic forces for which the very question of the Bosniak nation was treated as anti-Islamic. They basically satisfied themselves with religious rights, and they did not ask for a national denomination, nor did they request for a state, for their people, not knowing that without state rights neither religious nor national could be achieved. The persuasion of the "modern" Muslim intelligentsia to nationalize its own people in the Serbian, Croatian or Yugoslav sense, which was a deep historical fallacy, is not even worth mentioning today. The very act of recognizing Bosniaks called "Muslims" takes place without the active participation of the older, traditional Bosniak intelligentsia. At that moment, this so-called civic intelligence, as qualified by the Communists, is either still in prison or has just gotten out of it or has biologically stepped off the historical stage. In any case it is shattered, ideologically delegitimized and historically ineffective. And it is good that it was so, since its national-political orientations were historically wrong and disempowered. Its historical scene was World War II, in which this intelligence had a hard time navigating. If the ideological and political blueprints of the forces with which she co-operated had taken the lead in World War II, the question is whether there would have been Bosnia and Bosniaks today.

The exception to this rule was Husein Đozo, and that is his peculiarity and greatness. He was both a Bosniak and a Bosnian. Although from one aspect, in his early youth, he belonged to this old, civic intelligentsia, sharing in all their errors and wanderings, he was the only one who stepped strongly from one into a new political and social reality. On the principle of adapting doctrinal Islamic principles to the spirit of the time of his life, he was strongly involved in the new interpretive challenges of Islam and was strongly engaged in the conquest of new socio-political opportunities for his people. In socialism, a new Bosniak intelligentsia was emerging, which Đozo joined at least actively in the most important tasks of the time, by which we mean the process of recognizing the nationalities of Muslims, and this intelligence carries another Bosniak-Muslim

angažuje u osvajanju novih socijalno-političkih mogućnosti za svoj narod. U socijalizmu stasava nova bošnjačka inteligencija, kojoj se i Đozo u najvažnijim zadacima vremena bar djelatno priključuje, pri čemu mislimo na proces priznavanja nacionalnosti Muslimana, i ta inteligencija nosi drugi bošnjačko-muslimanski preporod. Dva ključna djela, u filozofskom smislu, obilježavaju tu epohu, i svojim karakterističnim i sretno biranim naslovima odražavaju specifičan bošnjački odnos prema svijetu, jedno je *Sfinga Zapada* (1968) Abdulaha Šarčevića, a drugo *Islam u vremenu* (1976) Huseina Đoze. Da li su se njih dvojica poznavali i družili, nije nam poznato, kao ni to da li su jedan na drugoga imali intelektualni utjecaj. Danas je ipak jasno da su, bar prema mome sudu, njih dvojica iz duha svoga vremena najdominantnije, i do danas neprevaziđeno, ovim knjigama utjecali na oblikovanje bošnjačkih i bosanskih duhovnih i filozofskih obzora.



ILUSTRACIJA – Husein Đozo se sa djelom *Islam u vremenu* priključio priznavanju nacionalnosti Muslimana, te utjecao na oblikovanje bošnjačkih i bosanskih duhovnih i filozofskih obzora.

ILLUSTRATION – With his work *Islam in Time*, Husein Đozo joined the recognition of Muslim nationality, and influenced the shaping of Bosniak and Bosnian spiritual and philosophical horizons.

Nacionalno „muslimanstvo“ ili ime Muslimani, s velikim „M“, jeste oblik i stupanj razvoja bošnjačke nacionalne ideje i nacionalnosti Bošnjaka, nezaobilazan stupanj u povijesnom razvoju bošnjačkog naroda i on je oblikom i obuhvatom prava koja je sa sobom nosio bio veliki povijesni iskorak. U tom

revival. Two key works, in the philosophical sense, mark this era, and with their characteristic and happily chosen titles reflect the specific Bosniak attitude towards the world; one is *The Sphinx of the West* (1968) by Abdullah Šarčević, and the other *Islam in this Time* (1976) by Husein Đozo. Whether the two of them knew each other and socialized is unknown to us, nor do we know whether they had an intellectual influence on each other. Today, however, it is clear that, at least according to my judgment, the two of them, from the spirit of their time, in the most dominant manner, and to this day remain unsurpassed, influenced the formation of the Bosniak and Bosnian spiritual and philosophical horizons.

National "Muslimism" or the name Muslims, with a capital "M", is the form and stage of development of the Bosniak national idea and nationality of Bosniaks, an indispensable stage in the historical development of the Bosniak people and it was a great historical step forward by the form and scope of the rights it carried. At that moment, it meant the end of decades of extermination of Bosniak national subjectivity and the elevation of this national group to the same level with neighboring nations. In the complex Bosnian and Yugoslav conditions of the time, this was the ultimate political reach that the Bosniak people could historically reach.




ILLUSTRATION ~ Abdulah Šarčević marked the epoch of Bosniak-Muslim revival, and with his work *Sphinx of the West* he reflected a specific Bosniak attitude towards the world.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Abdulah Šarčević je obilježio epohu bošnjačko-muslimanskog preporoda, a djelom *Sfinga Zapada* odrazio specifičan bošnjački odnos prema svijetu.

trenutku on je značio okončanje višedecenijskog potiranja bošnjačkog narodnog subjektiviteta te izdizanje te narodnosne skupine u istu ravan sa susjednim narodima. U tadašnjim složenim bosanskohercegovačkim i jugoslavenskim uvjetima to je bio krajnji politički domet koji je bošnjački narod povijesno i mogao doseći. Istovremeno, održanje, razvijanje i oplemenjivanje te dosegnute političke razine bilo je mnogo teže, neizvjesnije i izazovnije, jer je formalizam komunističkog uma, iza koga su u prikrajku uvijek stajali srpski kadrovi u Partiji, namjeravao tu biljku ostaviti bez vode, te priznavanje u cijelosti ostaviti na formalnoj, deklarativnoj razini i suštinski ga ugasiti. Mora se priznati da se u tome, iz različitih razloga, umnogome i uspijevalo. Formalno priznanje nacionalnosti Muslimana nije automatski značilo i afirmativni odnos prema duhovnim i kulturnim sadržajima tog identiteta.



ILUSTRACIJA - Problematika nacionalnog izjašnjavanja Bošnjaka - od muslimana, Srbina, Hrvata, Muslimana sa velikim "M"... do Bošnjaka.
 ILLUSTRATION - The issue of the national declaration of Bosniaks - from muslims, Serbs, Croats, Muslim with a capital "M"... to Bosniaks.

Komunisti su sve vrijeme svog režima vodili nekonzistentnu politiku prema nacionalnim izričajima Bošnjaka. Kako su njihova očekivanja o asimiliranju i iščezavanju te skupine bila iznevjerena, a u tom smislu najviše su se zalagali Moša Pijade i Milovan Đilas, što je već općepoznato mjesto naše historiografije, oni su bili „zatečeni“ identitarnom kohezijom i žilavošću Bošnjaka te su im na svakom popisu stanovništva „odoka“ nadijevali imena, svaki put različito. Bošnjaci su bili u prilici da specifičnosti vlastitog bića čuvaju krajnjim pounutarnjenjem, zatvaranjem u privatnost doma, obitelji i avlijskih zidova. Razdvojenost privatnog i javnog života dosegala je šizofrene razmjere. Bilo je poželjno da oni odbace svoju vjeru i kulturu te da se odmaknu od svog identiteta, što je bila mjera društvene promocije i moderniteta, a biti sličan drugome i biti kao neko drugi postalo je akulturacijski obrazac željenog ponašanja. Samo su rijetki od Bošnjaka među bosanskim komunistima ukazivali na licemjernost i pogubnost takve politike, a iz tih sedamdesetih godina prošlog stoljeća ističemo Pašagu Mandžića i generala Salima Ćerića.

At the same time, the maintenance, development and refinement of this achieved political level was much more difficult, uncertain and challenging, because the formalism of the communist mind, behind which serbian personnel in the Party always stood in the sidelines, intended to leave this plant without water, and to completely leave the recognition at the formal, declarative level and essentially extinguish it. It must be admitted that, for various reasons, it has succeeded in many ways. Formal recognition of the nationality of Muslims did not automatically mean an affirmative attitude towards the spiritual and cultural contents of that identity.



ILLUSTRATION - The identity card of Banja Luka and Tuzla mufti Muhamed Šefket Kurt from 1946, where he declares himself as "undecided".
 ILUSTRACIJA - Lična karta banjalučkog i tuzlanskog muftije Muhameda Šefketa Kurta iz 1946. godine gdje se izjašnjava kao "neopredjeljen".

All the time of their regime, the Communists pursued an inconsistent policy towards the national expressions of Bosniaks. As their expectations about the assimilation and disappearance of this group were betrayed, and in this sense Moša Pijade and Milovan Đilas were the most vocal advocates, which is already a commonly known place of our historiography. They were "taken aback" by the identitarian cohesion and toughness of Bosniaks, and in each census they named them "randomly", each time differently. Bosniaks were able to preserve the specifics of their own being by extreme interiority, by confining them to the privacy of their home, family and backyard walls. The separation of private and public life reached schizophrenic proportions. It was desirable for them to reject their faith and culture and to move away from their identity, which was a measure of social promotion and modernity. To be similar to the other and to be like someone else became an acculturation pattern of desired behavior. Only a few of the Bosniaks among the Bosnian communists pointed to the hypocrisy and perniciousness of such a policy, and from those seventies of the last century we highlight Pašaga Mandžić and General Salim Ćerić.



ILUSTRACIJA - Huseih ef. Dozo prilikom jednog od susreta sa Josip Broz Titom u Beogradu.



ILLUSTRATION - Husein ef. Đozo during one of his meetings with Josip Broz Tito in Belgrade.

III

najreferentnija pozitivna tačka bošnjačkog življenja tokom socijalizma jeste popis stanovništva iz 1971. godine. Popis se izvodio sa savezne, državne razine i njegova izazovnost za bosansku političku zajednicu bila je u tome da je popisom trebalo jednu političku, partijsku, volontarističku odluku o novopriznatoj nacionalnosti Muslimana sada potvrditi i pretočiti na saveznoj, jugoslavenskoj razini u službeni, statistički državni dokument. Da bi partijska odluka bosanskih komunista bila legitimna i postala državnim aktom važećim na njenom cijelom prostoru, morala se kroz popis legitimirati, odnosno kroz izjašnjavanje slavenskih muslimana Jugoslavije za nacionalnu odrednicu „Musliman“ i potvrditi. U svrhu dostizanja tog cilja u Bosni i Hercegovini je pokrenuta široka popisna kampanja, Atif Purivatra i Kasim Suljević pišu i posebnu knjižicu, brošuru, kao orijentacijsku uputu Muslimanima kako i zašto da se izjašnjavaju kao „Muslimani“. Takvu djelatnost komunisti su mogli svojim aparatom izvesti i sami, ali im je rezultat akcije bio izvjesniji s podrškom Islamske zajednice. Njeno afirmativno sudjelovanje u tom procesu bilo bi poželjno, i bilo je, bar se tako među komunistima tada smatralo. Time bi se istovremeno ostvarila dva cilja: pozitivnim odnosom prema nacionalnosti Muslimana izrazio bi se jasan i nedvosmislen prosocijalistički, prodržavni stav te vjerske zajednice prema režimu, s jedne, a potporom popisu njegovi rezultati bili bi, i jesu bili, i izvjesniji, s druge strane. Budući je popisno izjašnjavanje svake osobe bilo slobodni individualni čin svjesnog opredjeljenja svakog pojedinca, u ovom slučaju Muslimana, postojala je, istina samo teorijski, i mogućnost da se novoizabrano muslimansko ime većinski, ili dijelom, i ne prihvati. A to komunisti sebi nisu mogli dozvoliti.

U takvom povijesnom kontekstu u djelatnost popisa stanovništva uključuje se Husein Đozo, kao član Islamske zajednice, budući da je tada predstavljao njenu intelektualno najizrasliju i u javnosti najprepoznatljiviju figuru. Njegov angažman u ovoj društvenoj aktivnosti dio je već uznapredovalog procesa pojačavanja vjerske djelatnosti Bošnjaka sedamdesetih godina prošlog stoljeća. Kao izraz demokratizacije i liberalizacije društva, nove etničke politike i priznavanja nacionalnosti Bošnjacima, razvoja islamske svijesti Bošnjaka i stasavanja nove generacije islamskih intelektualaca i teologa, pokreće se islamsko informativno glasilo *Preporod* na čelu s Huseinom Đozom. List od početka okuplja širok krug studenata i mladih intelektualaca koji u vremenu što dolazi imaju značajnu ulogu u bošnjačkom javnom životu. Sam *Preporod* sabire i misao islama kod Bošnjaka, čineći je razgovjetnom i aktualizirajući njegovu ulogu u privatnom ali i javnom životu svakog pojedinca, te snažno kontekstualizira mogućnosti i modalitete islamskog življenja i djelovanja u jednom društvu

III

The most referenced positive point of Bosniak living during socialism is the 1971 census. The census was conducted from the federal, state level and its challenge to the Bosnian political community was that the census needed to confirm and translate at the federal, Yugoslav level into an official, statistical state document. In order for the party decision of the Bosnian Communists to be legitimate and become a state act valid throughout its territory, it had to be legitimized through the census, i.e. through the declaration of the Slavic Muslims of Yugoslavia for the national determinant "Muslim" and officially confirmed. In order to achieve this goal, a wide census campaign was launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Atif Purivatra and Kasim Suljević write a special booklet, brochure, as an orientation instruction to Muslims how and why to declare themselves as "Muslims". The Communists could carry out such activity themselves with their apparatus, but the result of the action was more certain with the support of the Islamic Community. Its affirmative participation in this process would have been desirable, and it was, at least this is how it was considered among communists at the time. This would simultaneously achieve two goals: a positive attitude towards the nationality of Muslims would express a clear and unambiguous pro-socialist, pro-state attitude of this religious community towards the regime, on the one hand, and by supporting the census, its results would be, and are, even more certain, on the other. Since the census statement of each person was a personal individual act of conscious commitment of each individual, in this case a Muslim, there was, true only theoretically, the possibility that the newly elected Muslim name would not be accepted by the majority, or part, of the same. The Communists could not afford it.

In such a historical context, Husein Đozo, as a member of the Islamic Community, is included in the census activity, since he represented its most intellectually grown and publicly recognizable figure. His involvement in this social activity is part of the already advanced process of strengthening the religious activity of Bosniaks in the 1970s. As an expression of democratization and liberalization of society, new ethnic policy and recognition of nationality to Bosniaks, the development of Islamic consciousness of Bosniaks and the growth of a new generation of Islamic intellectuals and theologians, the Islamic information journal *Preporod*, led by Husein Đozo, was launched. From the beginning, the paper gathers a wide circle of students and young intellectuals who in the time that was coming had a significant role in Bosniak public life. *Preporod* itself collects the thought of Islam among Bosniaks, making it distinct and actualizing its role in the private and public life of each individual, strongly contextualizing the possibilities and modalities of Islamic living and acting in a society that, at least ideologically and nominally, was atheistic. Đozo sought to establish a bridge between the state, secular and communist, and society, the people to which it belongs, a nation that is still

koje je, bar ideološki i nominalno, bilo ateističko. Đozo nastoji uspostaviti premosnicu između države, sekularne i komunističke, i društva, naroda kojem pripada, naroda koji je još duboko religiozan i sklon tradicionalizmu. On svojom ličnošću i djelom miri ove podvojenosti, prema državi se odnosi kao prema svojoj državi, radujući se njenom prosperitetu i sam mu doprinoseći. A takav afirmativni odnos prema državi imao je i njegov narod, tako da je danas pomalo upitno kvalificirati negativnim razne oblike suradnje islamskih službenika toga doba s vlastitom državom. Može se pretpostaviti, na osnovu svega, da je on visoko cijenio doprinose te države svim njenim građanima, prije svega jednakost u ostvarivanju individualnih, socijalnih, obrazovnih i radnih prava, a kad su Bošnjaci u pitanju, ta država osigurala im je i fizičku sigurnost, čega je ranije nedostajalo. Samo je za komuniste Romanija bila mirna, a što nije ni danas. Istovremeno, na osnovu njegovog uređivanja *Preporoda* jasno se vidi da je bio svjestan negativnih posljedica službene ateizacije na duhovni i nacionalni status njegovog naroda. Ideja vodilja *Preporoda* glasi da nema naroda bez njegove vjere.



ILUSTRACIJA - Islamsko informativno glasilo *Preporod* sa osnivačem Huseinom Đozom - jubilarno hiljadito izdanje.

ILLUSTRATION - The Islamic news magazine *Preporod* with founder Husein Đoza - jubilee 1000th edition.

deeply religious and prone to traditionalism. He reconciled these divisions with his personality and actions, treated the state as his own state, rejoicing in its prosperity and contributing to it himself. His people also had this kind of affirmative attitude towards the state, so today it is somewhat questionable to qualify as negative the various forms of cooperation of Islamic officials of that era with their own state. It can be assumed, on the basis of everything, that he highly appreciated the contributions of this state to all its citizens, primarily equality in the exercise of individual, social, educational and labour rights, and when it comes to Bosniaks, that state also provided them with physical security, which was previously lacking. Only for communists Romanija was peaceful, which it is not even today. At the same time, based on his editorial engagement in *Preporod*, it is clear that he was aware of the negative consequences of official atheization on the spiritual and national status of his people. The guiding principle of *Preporod* is that there is no nation without its faith.



ILLUSTRATION ~ As a member of the Islamic Community, Husein Džozo got involved in the agitation of the population why they should declare themselves as "Muslims".

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Kao član Islamske zajednice, Husein Đozo se uključio u agitaciju stanovništva zašto da se izjašnjavaju kao „Muslimani“.

Preporod se djelatno uključuje u nove bosanske i bošnjačke prilike. Prilozima domaćih autora i prenošenjem pisanja druge štampe razvijaju se, usmjeravaju i brane islamska duhovnost i nacionalnost naroda. Posebno je značajan njegov doprinos popisu stanovništva 1971. godine, kada se cjelokupnoj muslimanskoj javnosti u vidu svojevrstne nacionalne tribine, što *Preporod* tih godina uistinu jeste i bio, budući da je predstavljao prvo i jedino bošnjačko-muslimansko glasilo, objašnjavaju moguće nedoumice između velikog „M“ i malog „m“, između vjere i nacije, čime se podupire nacionalno i političko izrastanje vlastitoga naroda.⁸ U takvim djelatnostima posebno je prednjačio Husein Đozo, koji je, objašnjavajući ulogu pripadnika islamske zajednice u novim društvenim uvjetima, istakao da „[...] priznanje bosansko-hercegovačkih Muslimana posebnim narodom predstavlja vanredno važan historijski značajan događaj“.⁹ Podupirući takvu politiku nacionalnih odnosa u Bosni, on je tekstom „Muslimani“ izrazio svojevrstnu zahvalnicu socijalističkom režimu na afirmativnom odnosu prema Muslimanima. Značajniji od stava prema režimu jeste Đozin pozitivni odnos prema etničkom identitetu kao takvome. Pitanju odnosa etničkog/nacionalnog i vjerskog identiteta kod bosanskih muslimana on ne prilazi manihejski, na način da jedan isključuje drugi, niti subordinira jedan pol identiteta drugome, nacionalni i vjerski identitet u njegovom mišljenju i društvenoj praksi nadaju se kao uzajamni i istovremeno prisutni oblici identiteta koji je uvijek polivalentan i socijalno posredovan. Sada su vjernici, muslimani, osvijestili i prihvatili svoj etnički i nacionalni identitet, pri tome ne umanjujući svoj vjernički kredo, što je bio kvalitativan iskorak u odnosu na dobar dio tradicionalnih bošnjačkih ulemanskih mišljenja o pitanju islama i nacije, ali i iskorak u odnosu na njegove i stavove njegovih drugova iz mladosti.

U čemu je značaj i veličina Đozina angažmana tokom popisa stanovništva? On je pravilno recipirao procjepe slobode i liberalizacije socijalističkog sistema u jednom specifičnom povijesnom kontekstu, pravilno je ocijenio njegovu bremenitost horizontima ravnopravnosti i identitarnog uvažavanja naroda kome je pripadao, te je u tom političkom trenutku u potpunosti bio naklonjen rješenju tog sistema. Interesi njegova naroda i njegove zemlje Bosne tada su se podudarali s interesima vladajuće političke elite. Drugi važan momenat Đozina angažmana ogleda se u činjenici da je kao islamski teolog rekao „Da“ kategorijama etniciteta i nacionaliteta u bosanskomuslimanskom identitetu, što je važno s obzirom na čitavu historiju panislamističkih maglina i lutanja njegovih brojnih prethodnika. Istovremeno, ni on nije bio do kraja konzistentan. Samo da navedemo jedan primjer. Oslobođenje ga 1968. kritikuje da je na Četvrtom kongresu uleme svijeta u Kairu poručio učesnicima kongresa da su „muslimani

⁸ O značaju popisa stanovništva *Preporod* donosi sljedeće priloge 1970. i 1971. godine: „Muslimani u popisu stanovništva“, preneseno iz lista *VUS, Preporod*. 1970. 1. nov.; I(4):10; „Za slobodno izražavanje svoje nacionalnosti“, *Preporod*. 1970. 15. nov.; I(5):3; „Muslimani su posebna nacija“. *Preporod*. 1971. 1. mar.; II(12):8; „Muslimani – ravnopravnost i afirmacija“. *Preporod*. 1971. 15. mar.; II(13):8; „Nacionalna afirmacija Muslimana“. *Preporod*, 1971. 1. apr.; II(4):8.

⁹ Đozo, H. Husein. „Muslimani“. *Glasnik Vrhovnog islamskog starješinstva Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije*, 1968. nov.-dec.; XXXI(11-12):476.

Preporod is actively involved in new Bosnian and Bosniak opportunities. The contributions of local authors and the transmission of the writings of other press evolve, direct and defend Islamic spirituality and the nationality of the people. Particularly significant is his contribution to the 1971 census, when the entire Muslim public in the form of a kind of national forum, which *Preporod* really was in those years, since it represented the first and only Bosniak-Muslim newspaper, elaborating on the possible confusion between the big "M" and the small "m", between religion and nation, which supports the national and political growth of one's own people.^{▼8} In such activities, Husein Đozo was particularly prominent in such activities, who, explaining the role of members of the Islamic community in new social conditions, pointed out that "... the recognition of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims as a distinct people is an extraordinarily important and historically significant event."^{▼9} Supporting such a policy of national relations in Bosnia, he expressed a kind of gratitude to the socialist regime for its affirmative attitude towards Muslims with his paper by the name "Muslims". More significant than the attitude towards the regime was Đozo's positive attitude towards ethnic identity as such. He does not approach the issue of ethnic/national and religious identity in Bosnian Muslims in a way that one excludes the other, nor does it subordinate one pole of identity to the other, national and religious identity in his opinion and social practice is hoped for as mutual and at the same time present forms of identity that is always polyvalent and socially mediated. Now believers, Muslims, have become aware of and accepted their ethnic and national identity, while not diminishing their religious creed, which was a qualitative step forward in relation to a good part of the traditional Bosniak ulama's opinions on the question of Islam and the nation, but also a step forward in relation to his and his comrades' views from his youth.


What is the significance and magnitude of Đozo's engagement during the census? He correctly accepted the gaps of freedom and liberalization of the socialist system in a specific historical context, correctly assessed its burden with horizons of equality and identitarian appreciation of the people to which he belonged, and at that political moment he was fully inclined to the solution of this system. The interests of his people and his country of Bosnia then coincided with the interests of the ruling political elite. Another important moment of Đozo's engagement is reflected in the fact that as an Islamic theologian he said "Yes" to the categories of ethnicity and nationality in Bosnian Muslim identity, which is important given the entire history of pan-Islamist nebulae and the wandering sway of his many predecessors. At the same time, he was not completely consistent. Just to give one example. *Oslobođenje* criticized him in 1968 for telling congress participants at the Fourth Congress of the World in Cairo that "the Muslims of Yugoslavia are ready to volunteer for a holy war"^{▼10} for the liberation of Palestine and the

^{▼8} On the significance of the census *Preporod* brings the following contributions in 1970 and 1971: "Muslims in the census", conveyed from the newspaper *VUS, Preporod*. 1970 1. nov.:(4):10; "For the free expression of one's nationality", *Preporod*. 1970. 15. nov.:(5):3; "Muslims are a special nation." *Preporod*. 1971 1 March;II(12):8; "Muslims – Equality and Affirmation". *Preporod*. 1971 Mar 15; II(13):8; "National Affirmation of Muslims". *Preporod*, 1971 1 Apr.; II(4):8.

^{▼9} Joso, H. Hussein. "Muslims". *Messenger of the Supreme Islamic Eldership of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, 1968 nov.-dec.; XXI(11-12):476.

^{▼10} Hadžihasanović, op. cit., p. 30.

Jugoslavije spremni da se dobrovoljno jave za sveti rat“¹⁰ radi oslobođenja Palestine i svetih mjesta koje su cionisti okupirali. I kao treći važan momenat vezan za Đozin društveni angažman oko popisa stanovništva navodimo činjenicu da je priznavanjem nacionalnog statusa Bošnjaka pod imenom „Muslimani“ konačno iz javnog života nestala povijesna priča o njihovom tzv. opredjeljivanju, tj. nacionaliziranju u srpskom, hrvatskom ili jugoslavenskom smislu. Time se Đozo radikalno odvojio od intelektualno-političkog kruga kome je u mladosti i sam pripadao, od nesretnih lutanja i nesnalaženja brojnih političkih i intelektualnih bošnjačkih djelatnika koji nisu bili dosegli svijest o subjektivitetu vlastitog naroda.



ILUSTRACIJA – Važan momenat vezan za Đozin društveni angažman oko popisa stanovništva je bio priznavanje nacionalnog statusa Bošnjaka pod imenom „Muslimani“. Konačno iz javnog života nestala je povijesna priča o tzv. opredjeljivanju Bošnjaka, tj. nacionaliziranju u srpskom, hrvatskom ili jugoslavenskom smislu.

ILLUSTRATION – An important moment related to Đoza's social involvement in the census was the recognition of the national status of Bosniaks under the name "Muslims". Finally, the historical story about the so-called the determination of Bosniaks, i.e. nationalization in the Serbian, Croatian or Yugoslav sense.

Nije sve oko popisa i nacionalne nominacije Bošnjaka išlo bez suprotstavljanja i protivrječnosti. Dvojilo se o slavenskim muslimanima i izvan Bosne. Bilo je nastojanja da se tim ljudima kao zajedničko s Bošnjacima prizna samo religioznost, islam, naročito u Makedoniji, a kod pojedinih sudionika

¹⁰ Hadžihasanović, op. cit., str. 30.

holy places occupied by the Zionists. And as a third important moment related to Đozo's social engagement around the population census, we mention the fact that by recognizing the national status of Bosniaks under the name "Muslims", the historical story of their so-called determination, i.e. nationalization in the Serbian, Croatian or Yugoslav sense. In doing so, Đozo radically separated himself from the intellectual and political circle to which he himself belonged in his youth, from the unfortunate wanderings and misadventures of numerous political and intellectual Bosniak workers who had not reached the awareness of the subjectivity of their own people.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Đozo's involvement was also reflected in the fact that, as an Islamic theologian, he said "Yes" to the categories of ethnicity and nationality in the Bosnian Muslim identity, which is important considering the entire history of pan-Islamist nebulae and wanderings of his numerous predecessors..

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Đozin angažman ogledao se i u činjenici da je kao islamski teolog rekao „Da“ kategorijama etniciteta i nacionaliteta u bosanskomuslimanskom identitetu, što je važno s obzirom na čitavu historiju panislamističkih maglina i lutanja njegovih brojnih prethodnika.

Not everything about the list and the national nomination of Bosniaks went without opposition and contradiction. There were doubts about Slavic Muslims outside Bosnia. There was an effort to recognize only the religiosity, Islam, as common to these people who were Bosniaks, especially in Macedonia, and in the case of certain participants in the conversation, such proposals should have also applied to Sandžak.^{▼11} We here note a debate between Enver Redžić, a historian and public worker, and Nikola Stojanović, a professor at the Faculty of Economics in Sarajevo

▼11 "Some Issues of Interethnic Character in the 1971 Census", *Daily Information*. Political Information Group SKSSRNJ, 1970 22 Jan.; (6):4.

razgovora takvi prijedlozi trebali su se odnositi i na Sandžak.^{▼11} Bilježimo jednu polemiku između Envera Redžića, historičara i javnog radnika i Nikole Stojanovića, profesora Ekonomskog fakulteta u Sarajevu i visokopozicioniranog komunističkog funkcionera na Sekciji za međunacionalne odnose SKSSRNJ. Na Redžićevu konstataciju da se u Bosni i Hercegovini javljaju naznake srpskog i hrvatskog nacionalizma Stojanović je oštro reagirao, iznoseći čitav niz pogrđnih i neprihvatljivih stavova o Muslimanima, što svjedoči da je i u vrhu bosanskih komunista bilo izrazitih nacionalističkih antimuslimanskih stavova. Stojanovićeve stavove donosimo samo zbog uvida u složenost atmosfere u kojoj je i Đozo radio i u kojoj se nacionalna afirmacija Muslimana odvijala. Stojanoviću smeta pojava Muslimana u javnom životu, u politici, a posebno na Univerzitetu. S politikom „nacionalnog ključa“, tvrdio je Stojanović, pojavilo se toliko Muslimana da se srpska i hrvatska inteligencija osjeća ugroženom, seli se u Srbiju i Hrvatsku i kao odgovor na veliko muslimansko prisustvo počinje govoriti o tome da se pojedini dijelovi Bosne pripoje tim republikama, što je, prema njegovom mišljenju, u tom slučaju i opravdano. (Nije dakle sve s rasparčavanjem Bosne počelo jučer). Raste „muslimanski klerikalizam“, nastavlja Stojanović, grade se nove džamije, a sve stare proglašavaju se spomenicima kulture. Muslimani komunisti svoju nacionalnost još uvijek vežu za islamsku religiju.

I dalje svojoj djeci daju islamska imena, a vrlo rijetko narodna, zatim se u pogledu jela strogo pridržavaju vjerskih propisa [...]. Ni do danas još muslimani-komunisti nisu spriječili jednu zastarjelu i nehigijensku manipulaciju sa mrtvacima. Zašto se vjerski obredi ne obavljaju samo na groblju, a ne u centru grada pred glavnom džamijom [...]. Zato družo Redžiću, kada govorite o srpskom i hrvatskom nacionalizmu, prvo pometite ispred svojih vrata.“^{▼12}



ILLUSTRATION ~ Stojanović na SKSSRNJ: Muslimani komunisti svoju nacionalnost još uvijek vežu za islamsku religiju.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Stojanović on SKSSRNJ: Muslim communists still tie their nationality to the Islamic religion.

▼11 “Neka pitanja međunacionalnog karaktera u popisu stanovništva 1971. godine”, *Dnevna informacija*. Grupa za političko informisanje SKSSRNJ, 1970. 22. jan.; (6):4.

▼12 “Polemika sa stavovima Envera Redžića iznetim na sednici SK SSRNJ“. Stojanović je pismo uputio Sekciji za međunacionalne odnose SKSSRNJ sa zahtjevom da se s njime upoznaju prisutni prilikom rasprave o pitanjima koja je na prethodnoj sjednici pokrenuo Enver Redžić.

and a high-ranking communist official at the Section for Interethnic Relations of the SKSSRNJ. Stojanović reacted sharply to Redžić's statement that there were signs of Serbian and Croatian nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, expressing a series of derogatory and unacceptable attitudes about Muslims, which testifies that there were also nationalist anti-Muslim attitudes in the top echelon of Bosnian communists. We bring Stojanović's views only because of the insight into the complexity of the atmosphere in which Đozo worked and in which the national affirmation of Muslims took place. Stojanović is bothered by the appearance of Muslims in public life, in politics, and especially at the University. With the policy of the "national key", Stojanović claimed, so many Muslims have appeared that the Serbian and Croatian intelligentsia feel threatened, move to Serbia and Croatia and in response to the large Muslim presence begins to talk about certain parts of Bosnia being annexed to these republics, which, in his opinion, is justified in that case. (Therefore, not everything with the division of Bosnia started yesterday.) "Muslim clericalism" is growing, Stojanović continues, new mosques are being built, and all old ones are being declared cultural monuments. Communist Muslims still tie their nationality to the Islamic religion.

They continue to give their children Islamic names, and very rarely folk ones, then in terms of eating they strictly adhere to religious regulations [...]. Even to this day, Muslim communists have not prevented an outdated and unsanitary manipulation with the dead. Why are religious ceremonies not only performed in the cemetery and not in the city center in front of the main mosque [...]. So comrade Redžić, when you talk about Serbian and Croatian nationalism, first sweep at your own door."^{▼12}



ILUSTRACIJA ~ In response to Redžić's statement, Stojanović made a series of derogatory and unacceptable statements about Muslims.
ILLUSTRATION ~ Na Redžićevu konstataciju, Stojanović je iznio čitav niz pogrdnih i neprihvatljivih stavova o Muslimanima.

^{▼12} "Controversy with the positions of Enver Redžić presented at the session of sk SSRNJ". Stojanović sent a letter to the Section for Interethnic Relations of the SKSSRNJ requesting that those present be introduced to him during the discussion on the issues raised by Enver Redžić at the previous session.

Ovim riječima nije potreban komentar.

Iznošenje stavova i polemiziranja oko nacionalne nominacije bosanskih muslimana prisutna su sedamdesetih godina prošlog stoljeća i među bošnjačkom emigracijom. „Bošnjaštvo – naša nacionalna identifikacija“, naslov je uvodnika br. 28–29 *Bosanskih pogleda* iz 1963. godine, kojim se najjasnije određuje bošnjačka nacionalna misao uz ocjenu dotadašnjih „opredjeljivanja“. Naša dosadašnja nacionalna opredjeljivanja, s malim izuzecima, „nisu izlazila iz okvira političke orijentacije i subjektivnih simpatija prema Hrvatima ili Srbima odnosno adaptacije historijsko-kulturnih koncepcija zagrebačke ili beogradske sredine“, kaže se u tekstu uvodnika. Takva ocjena jasno ističe da je svako dotadašnje opredjeljivanje bosanskih muslimana bilo političke, pragmatične, taktičke, a ne nacionalne naravi, te se srpskoj i hrvatskoj emigraciji daje do znanja da je svaka daljnja borba za nacionalno pridobijanje bosanskih muslimana uzaludna.

Na udar bošnjačke emigracije bio je došao i Husein Dozo, povodom njegova teksta „Muslimani“ objavljenog 1968. u *Glasniku IZ*. Emigracija se nije slagala s „muslimanskom“ nominacijom. Ona smatra da je bošnjaštvo staro koliko i Bosna i da nikada nije bilo vezano za vjeru. U Uvodniku prvog broja novopokrenutog lista Glas Bošnjaka iz Čikaga stoji:

Danas, poslije 26 godina neuspjelog prevaspitanja bh muslimana, koji su neopredjeljenošću manifestirali svoju opredjeljenost BOŠNJAŠTVU, režim, nađen na rubu propasti, donosi odluku kojom rješava nacionalno pitanje bh muslimana, dodjeljujući im do sada u svijetu nepostojeću naciju – MUSLIMAN. Mi, Bošnjaci u slobodnom svijetu, duboko vjerujemo da djelimo mišljenje naše braće u Domovini, kada zastupamo ideju BOŠNJAŠTVA kao nacionalno obilježje, jer je to za nas jedina i stvarna identifikacija. ▼¹³

Dozino pozitivno određenje prema priznavanju političkih i nacionalnih prava bosanskih muslimana pod imenom „Musliman“ Irfan Trebinčević iz Čikaga ne smatra doprinosom Bosni i bošnjaštvu, već je to „prije svega [...] gledano, smjernicama direktive 'odozgo', s brda s dola otpjevana zahvalnica režimu za jedan poklon koji muslimani Bosne i Hercegovine ne žele niti su ga tražili“, te se sa stajališta povijesnih interesa Bošnjaka to može nazvati cirkusom i neozbiljnošću.

Smatramo da je Dozino političko stajalište u datom povijesnom kontekstu bilo ispravno. To što su komunisti priznali nacionalni status bosanskim muslimanima, i jedini od svih ideologija 19. i 20. stoljeća ipak ih uvažili kao poseban narod, bio je krupan korak naprijed u razvoju toga naroda, u

▼¹³ Vidi „Uvodnik“. *Glas Bošnjaka: nezavisni list Bošnjaka u slobodnom svijetu*. 1970. mar.; I(1).

These words do not require a comment.

Expressions of views and the debate over the national nomination of Bosnian Muslims were also present among Bosniak emigration in the 1970s. "Bosniakism – Our National Identification" is the title of editorial no. 28–29 *Bosnian views* from 1963, which most clearly defines Bosniak national thought with the assessment of previous "commitments". Our national orientations so far, with few exceptions, "did not go beyond the framework of political orientation and subjective sympathy towards Croats or Serbs, i.e. adaptations of historical and cultural concepts of the Zagreb or Belgrade environment," reads the text of the editorial. Such an assessment clearly points out that any previous commitment of Bosnian Muslims was political, pragmatic, tactical, not national in nature, and it is made clear to Serbian and Croatian emigration that any further struggle for the national conquest of Bosnian Muslims is futile.

Husein Đozo also came under attack from the Bosniak emigrants, on the occasion of his text "Muslims" published in 1968 in *the Gazette* of the Islamic Community. The emigrants disagreed with the "Muslim" nomination. It believed that Bosniakism is as old as Bosnia and that it had never been related to faith. The editorial of the first issue of the newly launched newspaper *Glas Bošnjaka* from Chicago states:

Today, after 26 years of failed re-education of BiH Muslims, who have manifested their commitment to BOSNIAKISM, the regime, found on the verge of ruin, makes a decision that solves the national issue of BiH Muslims, assigning them a so far non-existent nation in the world – a MUSLIM. We, Bosniaks in the free world, deeply believe that we share the opinion of our brothers in the Homeland, when we represent the idea of BOSNIAKISM as a national feature, because for us it is the only true identification. ▼¹³

Đozo's positive determination towards the recognition of the political and national rights of Bosnian Muslims under the name "Muslim", was not considered by Irfan Trebinčević from Chicago to be a contribution to Bosnia and Bosniakism, but that it is "primarily [...] viewed from the guidelines of the directive 'from above', a nonsense song of thanks sung from the hills below to the regime for a gift that the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not want nor did they ask for", and from the point of view of the historical interests of Bosniaks, it can be called a circus and frivolity.

We believe that Đozo's political position in the given historical context was correct. The fact that the Communists recognized the national status of the Bosnian Muslims, and the only one of all the ideologies of the 19th and 20th centuries to recognize them as a separate people, was a major step forward in the development of this

▼¹³ See "Editorial". *Glas bošnjaka: An independent newspaper of Bosniaks in the free world*. 1970 Mar.; And(1).

osvajanju novih horizonata prava i sloboda, ali su i snage iz emigracije koje su se već tada zalagale za bošnjačku nominaciju naroda povijesno imale pravo. Glasovi bošnjačke političke emigracije u korist „bošnjaštva“, budući da je ono jedino među njima preživjelo, nisu imali, niti su mogli imati, s obzirom na totalitarnu narav komunističke ideologije, bilo kakav utjecaj na nominaciju naroda u zemlji. Dvoipoddecenijski život pod nazivom „Musliman“ kasnije će se odraziti na skupnu svijest naroda tako da mu je i devedesetih godina bošnjaštvo bilo strano. U prvi mah ono je označeno emigrantskom kategorijom i nečim što je stvar prošlosti. Tek je agresija na Bosnu i Hercegovinu, dakle jedan krajnje radikalni, traumatični i krizni socijalni momenat, prizvala bošnjaštvo u svijest i volju narodu, s tim da je i tada ostalo dosta nejasnoća oko njegova definiranja u odnosu prema religiji.

Zaključak

Ideje koje je dijelio u mladosti Đozo je u zreloj životnoj dobi radikalno odbacio kao zablude. On nije bio komunist među muslimanima, već musliman među komunistima. Jedini je od uleme svoga vremena iskoračio iz tradicionalnog formata i zakoračio u jedan novi svijet. On se pojavio u javnom životu nove države i novog političkog sistema, koji je na svjetskoj pozornici u postkolonijalnom svijetu u jednom historijskom periodu svim muslimanskim narodima nudio vidike slobode, prosperiteta i jednakosti.

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people, in conquering new horizons of rights and freedoms, but the forces from emigration that were already advocating for the Bosniak nomination of the people were historically in the right. The votes of Bosniak political emigration in favor of "Bosniakism", since it was the only one among them that survived, did not have, nor could they have, given the totalitarian nature of communist ideology, any influence on the nomination of the people in the country. A two-and-a-half-decade life called "Muslim" would later be reflected in the group consciousness of the people so that even in the 1990s Bosniakism was alien to it. At first it is marked as an emigrant category and something that is a thing of the past. Only the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. an extremely radical, traumatic and critical social moment, evoked Bosniakism into the consciousness and will of the people, but even then there was a lot of ambiguity about its definition in relation to religion.

Conclusion

the ideas he shared in his youth, Đozo radically dismissed as misconceptions at a mature age. He was not a communist among Muslims, but a Muslim among communists. He was the only one of the ulama of his time to step out of the traditional format and step into a new world. It emerged in the public life of a new state and a new political system, which on the world stage in the postcolonial world in a period of history offered all Muslim nations perspectives of freedom, prosperity and equality.


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
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Linda HYÖKKI

**PRISTRANOST U POPULARNOJ KULTURI.
Moć vizuelnih i jezičkih narativa**

Prikaz knjige: autor Anas Al-Shaikh-Ali, Istanbul: MAHYA Yayıncılık, 2023, 351 str.,
ISBN: 978-605-72206-2-2

**BIAS IN POPULAR CULTURE.
The Power of Visual and Linguistic Narratives**

Book review: Anas Al-Shaikh-Ali, Istanbul: MAHYA Yayıncılık, 2023, 351 pp., ISBN: 978-605-72206-2-2.

PRISTRANOST U POPULARNOJ KULTURI. MOĆ VIZUELNIH I JEZIČKIH NARATIVA

Prikaz knjige: autor Anas Al-Shaikh-Alić, Istanbul: MAHYA Yayıncılık, 2023, 351 str.,

ISBN: 978-605-72206-2-2..

Koliko nas kritički razmišlja o stereotipima koje svakodnevno konzumiramo na TV-u, u novinskim člancima i u reklamama? Uloga medija u širenju rasizma poslednjih decenija postaje sve očiglednija jer su manjinske grupe počele da se bore protiv nedostatka zastupljenosti. Sada su korporacije kao što je Disney preuzele zadatak da osiguraju da manjinske grupe, kao što je Sámi u svom crtanom filmu za djecu Frozen, budu zastupljene kao kulturno osjetljive i da su manjinske grupe čak uključene u stvaranje likova kroz konsultacije. Međutim, islamofobni stereotipi u našim dnevnim medijima još uvijek nisu toliko kritikovani kao drugi rasistički i diskriminatorni stereotipi.

Ponekad, stereotipi mogu biti skriveni iza lažnih pokušaja predstavljanja. Na primer, u britanskoj seriji "Tjelohranitelj," pokrivena muslimanka uhvaćena je na djelu u putničkom vozu u pokušaju samoubilačkog bombaškog napada. Međutim, bila je odvrćena da se ne raznese od strane glavnog lika serije; Bivši vojnik je postao telohranitelj. Obrazlažući se s njom koristeći arapske fraze i stvarajući "odnos," uvjerio je mladu ženu – koju je navodno suprug prisilio na taj nasilni čin – da ne izvrši svoj plan. Publika je vidjela bijelca kako spašava "potlačenu muslimanku". Ali, kako se ispostavilo, mozak i pokretna sila koja stoji iza samoubilačke misije bila je sama mlada žena, a ne njen muž.

Ono što je suštinsko, međutim, nije samo prepoznati stereotype, već i razumjeti kako su oni povezani sa širom slikom o tome kako se islam i muslimani tretiraju u zapadnim društvima kao drugoklasni. A s Anas al-Shaikh-Alijevom knjigom "Pristranost u popularnoj kulturi. Moć vizuelnih i jezičkih narativa" pokazuje da

stereotipi koji nam se svakodnevno prezentuju kroz različite medije imaju implikacije koje nisu nužno vidljive na prvi pogled. Iako ih neki od nas prepoznaju tu i tamo, njihova moć leži u njihovoj sposobnosti da utiču na uslovni odgovor i rasuđivanje. Kako se muslimanski ženski lik u "Tjelohranitelju" pretvorio iz "dame u nevolji" u zamaskiranu sigurnosnu prijetnju, ovi i mnogi drugi prikazi "neprijatelja iznutra" uvlače se u političku agendu opravdavanja nametljive politike suprotstavljanja nasilnom ekstremizmu i rasnom profiliranju. Kao što Al-Šeik Ali tvrdi, trebalo bi da prepoznamo kako se ideologija izvedena kroz pristrasnost popularne kulture prevodi u političke aktivnosti. Popularna kultura pomaže da se prihvatanje ovih aktivnosti usmjeri u široj javnosti.

Knjiga je podijeljena u tri glavna poglavlja, s uvodom i epilogom. Prvo poglavlje se fokusira na meku moć popularne fikcije. Autor analizira brojne romane iz 1970-ih kako bi pokazao kako je zastupljenost muslimana u ovim djelima povezana sa britanskom i američkom politikom u inostranstvu. Autor tvrdi da je arapski/muslimanski neprijatelj u popularnoj fikciji pomogao da se podstakne javna podrška među širom publikom za korištenje vojske za rješavanje Drugog. Jedno od osnovnih pitanja ovog poglavlja jeste "zašto?" iza prelaska sa "arapa kao neprijatelja" na "muslimana kao neprijatelja". Ipak, ostaje pomalo neodgovoreno. S tim u vezi, poglavlje bi imalo koristi od rasprave koja uključuje priznavanje islamofobije kao antimuslimanskog rasizma i uloge rasizma u stvaranju slika muslimanskih neprijatelja. Zanimljiva rasprava u poglavlju uključuje, međutim, žanr invazijske literature koja je, prema autoru, posebno efikasna u stvaranju

BIAS IN POPULAR CULTURE. THE POWER OF VISUAL AND LINGUISTIC NARRATIVES

Book review: author Anas Al-Shaikh-Ali, Istanbul: MAHYA Yayıncılık, 2023, 351 pp., ISBN: 978-605-72206-2-2.

How many of us think critically about the stereotypes we consume daily on TV, in newspaper articles, and in advertisements? The role of media in spreading racism has, in the last decades, become more and more evident as minority groups have started to fight against the lack of representation. Now, corporates such as Disney have taken up the task of ensuring that minority groups, such as the Sámi in its children's cartoon movie Frozen are represented culturally sensitively. Minority groups are even involved in the making of the characters through consultations. However, Islamophobic stereotypes in our daily media are still not as frowned upon as other racist and discriminatory stereotypes are.

Sometimes, the stereotypes might be hidden behind bogus attempts for representation. For instance, in the UK series "Bodyguard," a veiled Muslim woman was caught red-handed in a passenger train attempting a suicide bombing. However, she was convinced not to blow herself up by the main character of the series; an ex-soldier turned bodyguard. Reasoning with her using Arabic phrases and creating a "rapport," he convinced the young woman – supposedly pressured by her husband to the violent act – not to execute her plan. The audience saw a white man saving the "oppressed Muslim woman." But, as it turned out, the brains and moving force behind the suicide mission were the young woman herself, not her husband.

What is essential, though, is not only to recognize the stereotypes but also to understand how they are connected to a larger picture of how Islam and Muslims are treated in Western societies as racial Others, heavily securitized. As Anas al-Shaikh-Ali's book "Bias in Popular Culture. The Power of Visual and Linguistic Narratives" shows, stereotypes fed to

us daily through diverse media have implications that are not necessarily evident at first glance. Even though some of us recognize them here and there, their power lies in their ability to affect conditional response and judgment. As the Muslim female character in "Bodyguard" shifted from a "damsel in distress" to a security threat in disguise, these, and many other depictions of the "enemy from within" feed into the political agenda of justifying intrusive policies of countering violent extremism and racial profiling. As Al-Shaikh Ali argues, we should recognize how the ideology delivered through popular culture's bias translates into political actions. Popular culture helps to direct the acceptance of these actions amongst the larger public.

The book is divided into three main chapters, with an introduction and an epilogue. The first chapter concentrates on the soft power of popular fiction. The author analyses numerous novels from the 1970s to show how the representation of Muslims in these works has been connected to UK and US policies overseas. The author argues that the Arab/Muslim enemy in popular fiction has helped induce public support amongst wider audiences for using the military to deal with the Other. One of the chapter's central questions is the "why?" behind the shift from "the Arab as an enemy" to "the Muslim as an enemy." Yet it remains somewhat unanswered. In this regard, the chapter would have benefited from a discussion involving the acknowledgment of Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism and the role of racialization in creating the imagery of Muslim enemies. An interesting discussion in the chapter involves, however, the genre of invasion literature that, according to the author, is particularly effective

slike pretnje spolja, stvarajući kaos i nered u domovini, što zahtijeva akutni odgovor u političkom odgovoru.

Drugo poglavlje se fokusira na ulogu slika u kreiranju diskursa, jer autor tvrdi da "umjetnost bukvalno 'slika' pristrasne naracije" (str. 61). Poglavlje o slikama, crtežima i skulpturama je zanimljivo štivo i dovodi u pitanje ulogu muzeja u stvaranju i jačanju pristrasnosti. Prema autoru, umjetnost je dostupna u muzejima svima, a posebno upozorava na ranjivost djece na pristrasne narative jer su posjete muzeju dio nastavnih planova i programa. Poglavlje takođe rasvjetljava vizuelne prikaze u oglašavanju, mada samo sa primjerima iz 19. i ranog 20. stoljeća. Iako je analiza povezana sa imperijalnom politikom tog vremena, primeri su mogli biti prošireni na prikazivanje modernih rasističkih reklama ili slika brenda kako bi se naglasilo kako savremena pristrasnost bijele supremacije nije daleko od starog orijentalizma. Ostatak poglavlja je ponovo usredsređen na analizu književnih tropa. Autorica predstavlja, između ostalih, čestu temu erotičkog žanra "bijela zapadnjačka žena kao meta požudnog arapskog/muslimanskog muškarca" i uvodi tako rodne aspekte islamofobije i navodnu hipermuškost muslimanskih muškaraca. On, međutim, u svojoj analizi ne istražuje dublje ove suštinske teorijske ključne koncepte.

U trećem poglavlju razmatraju se paralele između istorijskih antisemitskih narativa i savremenih islamofobičnih narativa u popularnoj kulturi i političkoj propagandi. Autor uvodi koncept "narativa ubica," što ne znači narativ o ubistvima, već uticaj većeg diskursa narativa koji su dio narativa. Naime, upozorava na nasilne ishode poput genocida, što dovodi do dezinformacija i straha o neprijatelju. Prikladno, autor takođe analizira širenje lažnih vesti u novinama i tabloidima i dotiče se važnih pitanja terminologije i pitanja koji nasilni počinioci su definisani kao "strijelci" i "teroristi."

Jedan od najznačajnijih strukturnih nedostataka knjige je nedostatak podnaslova za podsekcije svakog poglavlja u tabeli sadržaja. To bi olakšalo navigaciju kroz knjigu onima koji traže određene informacije i pružilo bi

veću preglednost njenog sadržaja čitaocima. Iako autor koristi brojne primarne izvore kao primjere, praćene korisnim vizuelnim prikazima naslovnica knjiga, reklama i plakata, analize nisu podržane teorijskim diskusijama o centralnim konceptima vezanim za islamofobiju, kao što su rasa, rasizam i rodni stereotipi. Stručni čitalac može da otkrije doprinos autora ovim konceptima. Ipak, kako nedostaju u indeksu, knjiga je manje korisna za istraživače koji traže moguće citate paralelne studije za svoj rad.

Na kraju knjige čitaocu su obezbijedena tri dodatka. Prvi navodi propagandne tehnike sa kratkim objašnjenjima. Drugi definiše kognitivne pristrasnosti i kratke sažetke različitih srodnih koncepata. Treći dodatak govori o tome kako su različite vjerske manjine i rasne grupe prikazane kao Druge u popularnim medijima. Budući da knjiga dobro funkcioše za dodiplomske kurseve iz medijskih studija, kulturnih studija i sociologije o temama vezanim za islam na Zapadu, ovi dodaci koji rade kao glosar mogu biti koristan izvor za studente koji žele odabrati konceptualni alat analize za svoje seminarske radove.

Sva tri poglavlja knjige doprinose odgovoru na pitanje: "Koliko daleko fikcija proizvodi činjenice?" (p. xxiii) i može dati uvjerljiv pregled koliko su duboko ukorijenjene antimuslimanske i antiislamske predrasude svuda oko nas u kulturnim proizvodima koje svakodnevno konzumiramo. To je dobro komplementarno štivo za razumijevanje manifestacija islamofobije na Zapadu. Mnoge analize knjige, koje prikazuju autorovo impresivno životno djelo, podržavaju argumente drugih istraživača o kulturnim izrazima islamofobije na Zapadu.

in creating an image of a threat from outside, creating chaos and disorder in one's homeland, which demands an acute response in political response.

The second chapter concentrates on the role of images in discourse-making, as the author argues that "art literally 'paints' biased narratives" (p. 61). The section on paintings, drawings, and sculptures is an interesting read and questions the role of museums in creating and reinforcing the bias. According to the author, art is accessible in museums for everyone, and he warns especially about the vulnerability of children to biased narratives as museum visits are part of curricula. The chapter also sheds light on the visuals in advertising, though only with examples from the 19th and early 20th centuries. While the analysis is connected to the imperial politics of the times, the examples could have been extended to showcase modern racist advertisements or brand images to highlight how the contemporary bias of white supremacy is not far from the old Orientalism. The rest of the chapter is again centered around analyzing literature tropes. The author presents, among others, the erotica genre's frequent theme of a "white Western woman as a target of the lustful Arab/Muslim man" and introduces thus gendered aspects of Islamophobia and its alleged hyper-masculinity of Muslim men. He does not, however, in his analysis look deeper into these essential theoretical key concepts.

The third chapter discusses the parallels between historical antisemitic narratives and contemporary Islamophobic narratives in popular culture and political propaganda. The author introduces the concept of "killer-narratives," which does not mean a narrative of killings but rather the impact of the larger discourse of the narratives are part of. Namely, he warns against violent outcomes such as genocide, which leads to misinformation and fearmongering about an enemy. Fittingly, the author also analyzes the dissemination of fake news in newspapers and tabloids and touches upon important questions of terminology and the question of which violent perpetrators are defined as "shooters" and "terrorists".

One of the book's most significant structural shortcomings is the lack of subheadings for the subsections of each chapter in the content table. These would have made the navigation through the

book easier for those looking for specific information and provided more overview of its content for the readers. While the author uses numerous primary sources as examples, accompanied by useful visuals of book covers, advertisements, and posters, the analyses are not supported by theoretical discussions on central concepts related to Islamophobia, such as race, racialization, and gendered stereotypes. A knowledgeable reader can detect the author's contribution to these concepts. Still, as they are missing in the index, the book is less useful for researchers looking for citable parallel studies for their work.

At the end of the book, the reader is provided with three appendixes. The first lists propaganda techniques with brief explanations. The second defines cognitive bias and short summaries of various related concepts. The third appendix discusses how diverse religious minorities and racialized groups have been depicted as Others in popular media. Since the book functions well for undergraduate courses in Media Studies, Cultural Studies, and Sociology on topics related to Islam in the West, these appendixes that work like a glossary might be a helpful source for students looking to choose a conceptual tool of analysis for their seminar papers.

All three chapters of the book contribute to answering the question, "How far does fiction produce facts?" (p. xxiii), and give a convincing overview of how deeply rooted the anti-Muslim and anti-Islam biases are in all around us in cultural products we consume daily. It is a good complementary read for understanding the manifestations of Islamophobia in the West. The book's many analyses, showcasing the author's impressive life work, support other researchers' arguments on cultural expressions of Islamophobia in the West.







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- a) original scholarly papers that include previously unpublished research results;
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The papers are categorized into the following basic categories:

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- preliminary note
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Authors propose the category in which they want the paper to be published, while the final decision is made by the Editorial Board upon the completed blind peer review process.

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- title of the text,
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- an abstract of 150 – 300 words, in Bosnian language, and English translation is desirable, stating precisely the topic under consideration, the method of argument used in addressing the topic, and the conclusions reached,
- a list of up to **five keywords** suitable for indexing and abstracting purpose,
- main text
- literature / references

Addenda (drawings, tables, graphs, maps and images, if there are any) should be submitted as a separate file in one of the following formats: .tiff or .jpg, in a resolution of at least 300 dpi. Photographs attached to the text must be incorporated in the text with a caption, and submitted by email as addenda in the right size (optimal width 16.5 cm at 300 dpi). Authors must obtain proper consent from the owners of any copyrighted illustrations.



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References

Below are some guidelines for in-text citations, notes, and references, which authors may find useful when preparing manuscripts for submission.

If you are in a dilemma on how to use this citation system, please visit: svjetionik.cdiv.ba

jedini razlog zbog čega su prisutni Vancouverski i djelimično Hardvarski sistem citiranja. Od sljedećeg izdanja isključivo ćemo koristiti Vancouverski sistem jednoobraznosti. Svi radovi trebaju slijediti Vancouverski sistem paritetnih citata u tekstu.

Čini se bitnim napomenuti da se u tekstu navode brojevi referenci u superskriptu; naslovi ispisuju velikim slovima (Times New Roman Bold 12pt); podnaslovi početnim velikim ostalo malim slovom (Times New Roman Bold 12pt); podpodnaslovi početnim velikim ostalo malim slovom ali u *italicu*/kurziv (Times New Roman Italic 12pt); numerički sistem citiranja koristi se uz bibliografske napomene (bilješke) na podnožju stranice – u fusnoti ili na kraju rada ili poglavlja – u endnoti; brojevi stranica se pišu u cijelosti; kod citiranja zadržavaju se sve pravopisne osobenosti (interpukcijski i pravopisni znaci) i eventualne greške; citirani tekst se obavezno označava navodnicima na početku i na kraju („“); navodnici i polunavodnici (‘ ’), kao i **boldirani** font mogu se koristiti za isticanje riječi, pojmova ili kratkih fraza unutar teksta; naslovi članaka iz časopisa i referentnih djela se tretiraju navedenim fontom **bold** u *italicu*/kurziv; kada je citirani tekst obiman, zagostavljene dijelove treba označiti sa tri tačke u uglastim zagradama prije i poslije prekida [...]; također, sve eventualne izmjene u citiranom tekstu je potrebno označiti uglastim zagradama; citat u citatu se označava polunavodnicima („...“); izuzetno, kada primarni izvor nije dostupan, može da se navodi citat koji je već citiran od strane nekog drugog autora i u tom slučaju u popisu literature potrebno je navesti puni bibliografski zapis originalnog citatata, kao i publikacije iz koje je preuzet dati citat; kada se citira izvor informacija koji je već ranije naveden u radu koristi se kratica *op. cit.*; kratica *ibid.* se koristi kada se iz istog izvora navodi više citata na istoj stranici; veći dijelovi citiranog teksta pišu se u posebnom odjeljku, uvučenom slijeva, sa po jednim praznim redom iznad i ispod odjeljka, pisanim manjim fontom u *italicu* (kurziv 10pt). Ove veće odjeljke ne treba stavljati u navodnike.

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Ako se navodi više od jednog članka iz iste knjige, treba navesti tu knjigu kao posebnu jedinicu pod imenom urednika, pa u jedinicama za pojedine članke uputiti na cijelu knjigu. Imena autora dati u cijelosti, a ne zamjenjivati ih inicijalima, osim ako sam autor obično koristi samo inicijale. Naslove knjiga i časopisa treba pisati **bold italicom** (kurzivom). Naslove članaka iz časopisa ili zbornika treba pisati pod navodnim znacima u **boldu**.

• • •

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Prikaz knjige obično sadrži između 800 i 1.200 riječi. Podnaslove treba svesti na minimum, a fusnote treba što rjeđe koristiti. Prikaz knjige treba biti naslovljen bibliografskom informacijom u skladu sa sljedećim pravopisom: Ime i prezime autora, Naslov knjige, Mjesto izdavanja: Izdavač, godina izdanja. Broj strana, ISBN Ime autora prikaza navesti na kraju rada.

U prikazu dati kratak pregled glavnih ciljeva djela za koje se piše prikaz, glavnih teza i tema kojima se bavi te koju vrstu izvora koristi. Za uredničku knjigu, sumirati glavne teme i naznačiti, samo ukoliko je to potrebno, pojedina poglavlja. Navesti koji je originalni doprinos tog djela kako konkretnom području istraživanja, tako i nauci općenito. Ako je svrshodno, označiti širi kontekst kojemu ovo djelo daje doprinos, te procijeniti koliko je to djelo ispunilo svoju svrhu, je li ono teorijski i metodološki pouzdano? Preporučiti ciljno čitateljstvo za knjigu.

• • •

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Prevedeni članci trebaju biti, uz prevedeni tekst, popraćeni prevodiočevom napomenom o relevantnosti i značaju članka. Poželjno je da se dadne kratka analiza prevedenog teksta u vidu uvodnog teksta i prevodiočevih bilješki.

• • •

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Nakon što je prihvaćen, rad se s ispravkama u PDF formatu e-mailom dostavlja autoru da provjeri ima li činjeničnih i štamparskih grešaka. Autori su odgovorni za provjeru korigiranog rada i preporučuje im se da koriste alatnu traku Comment & Markup da unesu svoje eventualne izmjene direktno na korigirani tekst. U ovoj fazi pripreme dozvoljene su samo manje izmjene.

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It is well known that there are several accepted systems for citing literature. Our goal is to have a common citation of accurate data and uniformity, which, unfortunately, we were not able to explicitly provide at the outset. This is the only reason the Vancouver and partly the Harvard citation systems are present. From the next issue onwards, we will exclusively use the Vancouver Uniformity System. All papers should follow the Vancouver Parity Quotation System in the text.

It seems important to note that in the text: reference numbers in the superscript are listed; titles in capital letters (Times New Roman **Bold** 12pt); subtitle initial big remaining small letters (Times New Roman **Bold** 12pt); additional titles (subheading) initial large and remaining small letters, but in *italics* (Times New Roman *Italic* 12pt); the numerical citation system is used within the bibliographic notes (footnotes) at the foot of the page – in the footnote or at the end of the paper or chapter – in the endnote; page numbers are written in their entirety; citation retains all spelling peculiarities (punctuation and spelling) and possible errors; quoted text must be marked with quotation marks at the beginning and end („ ”); quotation marks and single quotation marks (‘ ’), as well as bold font, can be used to highlight words, concepts or short phrases within the text; the titles of journal articles and reference works are treated with the indicated **bold font in italics**; when the quoted text is extensive, the omitted parts should be marked with three dots in square brackets before and after the break [...]; also, any possible changes to the quoted text should be marked with square brackets; the quotation in the quotation is indicated by single quotation marks ('...'); exceptionally, when the primary source is not available, the citation already cited by another author may be cited, in which case the full bibliographic record of the original citation as well as the publications from which the citation was taken should be indicated; when quoting a source of information already cited earlier in the paper, abbreviation is used *op. cit.*; abbreviation *ibid.* is used when multiple citations on the same page are quoted from the same source; larger parts of a quoted text are rendered in a separate paragraph, left-indented, with a space above and below the paragraph, in a smaller font size in *italics* (10pt). These larger sections should not be quoted.

Bibliographic units should be alphabetized by the author's surname. Arrange the works of the same author in chronological order, from earlier to newer, and additionally mark the works of one author published in the same year in small letters (e.g. 1988a, 1988b).

If more than one article in the same book is cited, it should be cited as a separate unit under the name of the editor, and referenced throughout the book in individual article units. Give the author's names in their entirety, not replace them with initials, unless the author usually uses only the initials. Book and magazine titles should be written in **bold italics**. The titles of journal articles or proceedings should be written in quotation marks in **bold**.

• • •

Book reviews

A book review typically consists of between 800 and 1200 words. Subheadings should be reduced to a minimum while footnotes should be used as little as possible. A book review should be titled by the bibliographic information in accordance with the following rule: Author's full name, Book title, Place of publication: Publisher, Year of publication, Number of pages, ISBN. Name of the author of the review should be provided in the end of the work.

The review should provide a short overview of the main aims of the work that is being reviewed, the main theses and topics it deals with and the kind of sources it uses. For an edited collection the review should sum up the main topics, and mention individual chapters only if necessary. It should describe the original contribution of the work both to the specific area of research and to science in general. If relevant, it should describe the broader context the work contributes to and assess to what extent the work has fulfilled its purpose and whether it is theoretically or methodologically reliable. Target readership for the book should also be recommended.

• • •

Translation

Translated articles should be accompanied by the translator's comment on the relevance and significance of the article. It is desirable to provide a brief analysis of the translated text in the form of an introductory text and translator's notes.

• • •

Preparation of the paper

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VODIČ ZA TRANSLITERACIJU NA BOSANSKOM JEZIKU
TRANSLITERATION GUIDE FOR BOSNIAN

Arapski / Arabic	Simbol / Symbol	Arapski / Arabic	Simbol / Symbol
ا	A	ط	T
ب	B	ظ	Z
ت	T	ع	c
ث	Th	غ	Gh
ج	Dž	ف	F
ح	H	ق	Q
خ	Kh	ك	K
د	D	ل	L
ذ	Dh	م	M
ر	R	ن	N
ز	Z	ه	H
س	S	و	W
ش	Š	ي	Y
ص	Ş	ء	'
ض	Ḍ	ة	A/T

Kratki samoglasnici:

Short Vowels:

أ	u
ا	a
ي	i

Dugi samoglasnici:

Long Vowels:

و	Ū
ا	Ā
ي	Ī

Dvoglasnici:

Diphthongs:

وا	Aw
يا	Ay

Važna napomena: Ovo je transliteracija arapskog na bosanski alfabet koja se koristi u ovom časopisu!



TRANSLITERATION GUIDE FOR ENGLISH
VODIČ ZA TRANSLITERACIJU NA ENGLISKOM JEZIKU

Arapski / Arabic	Simbol / Symbol	Arapski / Arabic	Simbol / Symbol
ا	A	ط	Ṭ
ب	B	ظ	Ẓ
ت	T	ع	‘
ث	Th	غ	Gh
ج	J	ف	F
ح	Ḥ	ق	Q
خ	Kh	ك	K
د	D	ل	L
ذ	Dh	م	M
ر	R	ن	N
ز	Z	ه	H
س	S	و	W
ش	Sh	ي	Y
ص	Ṣ	ء	’
ض	Ḍ	ة	A/T

Kratki samoglasnici:

Short Vowels:

ó	u
ò	a
o	i

Dugi samoglasnici:

Long Vowels:

و	Ū
ا	Ā
ي	I

Dvoglasnici:

Diphthongs:

وا	Aw
يا	Ay

Important Note: This is transliteration of Arabic into English alphabet that is used in this Magazine!



**CENTAR ZA DIJALOG – VESATIJA
AL-WASATIYYA CENTER FOR DIALOGUE**

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71000 Sarajevo
Bosna i Hercegovina / Bosnia and Herzegovina



Telefon / Phone: +387 33 570 025
Email: info@cdv.ba
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Chairman of the Board: Dr. Mustafa CERIĆ
Direktor / Director: Dr. Senad ĆEMAN
Sekretar / Secretary: Mohamed-Suleyman TADEFI

Misiju i ciljeve **Centar za dijalog – Vesatijja** realizira kroz sljedeće aktivnosti:


- multidisciplinarna istraživanja i studije o dijalogu i srednjem ili miroljubivom putu u islamu;
- publiciranje zapaženih ostvarenja domaćih i stranih autora o dijalogu i srednjem ili miroljubivom putu u islamu;
- organiziranje naučnih skupova, okruglih stolova, seminara, foruma i sličnih skupova na kojima će se razmatrati problemi i pitanja iz domena dijaloga i islamskog djelovanja u savremenim uslovima globaliziranog svijeta i diskutirati o njima;
- različite vrste edukacije i obuke u cilju osposobljavanja mladih ljudi da se aktivno uključe u procese dijaloga na lokalnom, regionalnom i međunarodnom nivou;
- identifikiranje i predlaganje mjera za otklanjanje različitih oblika devijantnog, ekstremnog ponašanja i shvatanja;
- održavanje internetskog portala posvećenog misiji i aktivnostima Centra;
- prikladne medijske aktivnosti.

Na planu realizacije svoje misije i ciljeva Centar putem naučno-istraživačkih radova i projekata posebno radi na uspostavljanju obostrano korisnih i prihvatljivih oblika saradnje sa srodnim centrom u Državi Kuvajt kao i s drugim sličnim centrima i ustanovama u regiji i svijetu. Centar će u perspektivi, shodno potrebama i mogućnostima, a u dogovoru s islamskim zajednicama u regionu, posebnu pažnju posvetiti uspostavi raznovrsnih oblika institucionalne saradnje na planu realizacije osnovne ideje i cilja Centra, a to je promoviranje kulture dijaloga, tolerancije i suživota te promicanje interpretativne tradicije srednjeg ili miroljubivog puta u islamu (**vesatijja**).

Al-Wasatiyya Center for dialogue achieves its mission and vision through the following activities:

- multidisciplinary research and studies on dialogue and issues of the middle way of Islam;
- publishing prominent works by local and international authors on dialogue and issues of the middle way of Islam;
- organizing scientific meetings, round tables, seminars, forums and similar gatherings which will consider problems and issues in the domain of dialogue Islamic activity in the contemporary conditions of the globalized world and discuss them;
- various kinds of education and training aimed at enabling young people to become actively involved in the dialogue processes at the local, regional and international level;
- identifying and proposing measures for the elimination of various kinds of deviant or extreme behavior and understanding;
- maintaining the Internet portal devoted to Center's mission and activities;
- appropriate media activities.

In achieving its mission and goals, Center is particularly involved in establishing the mutually useful and acceptable forms of cooperation with the related center in the State of Kuwait, as well as with other similar centers and institutions in the region and the world through research papers and projects. In the future, depending on needs and possibilities and in the agreement with Islamic communities in the region, Center will pay a particular attention to the establishment of diverse forms of institutional cooperation in the area of achieving Center's basic idea and goal, i.e. the promotion of the culture of dialogue, tolerance and coexistence and nourishing the interpretative tradition of the middle way of Islam (**Al-Wasatiyya**).





CENTAR ZA DIJALOG - VESATIJA
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Misija Centra je širenje i promoviranje kulture dijaloga kako među muslimanima tako i među pripadnicima različitih religija i svjetonazora, a u skladu s ciljevima i misijom Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini definiranim izvorima islama i normativnim aktima.

Osnovna djelatnost Centra je usmjerena na realizaciju naučno-istraživačkih i edukativnih projekata u oblasti kulture dijaloga i promocije srednjeg puta u islamu.

The **mission of the Center** is to spread and promote a culture of dialogue among Muslims as well as members of different religions and worldviews, in accordance with the goals and mission of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina defined by the sources of Islam and its normative acts.

The main **activity of the Center** is focused on the realization of scientific-research and educational projects in the field of cultural dialogue and the promotion of the cultural dialogue.



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